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ABSTRACT 
************* 
 
This thesis examines the political marketing of the African National Congress (ANC) around 
seminal political events between 1955 and 2009, and the relationship between such marketing 
and its strategic behaviour in the political sphere. Further, the analysis examines the means by 
which these techniques located the ANC at the centre of liberation and post-independent 
political narratives and explores and posits a basis for understanding the behaviour of the 
ANC and leading actors in the political sphere. The thesis explicates the nature of the 
continuities and discontinuities in the ANC’s discursive forms of political exchange and 
interaction and problematises the theoretical underpinnings of political marketing through the 
case of the ANC in South Africa. The thesis employs a broad understanding of political 
marketing to include such activities as publicity, promotion and propaganda. It extends its 
theoretical and conceptual remit beyond purely scientific and positivist approaches to 
understanding political persuasion and endows marketing with a strongly ‘cultural’ aspect. In 
doing so, greater consideration is afforded to the complex of influences that over time have 
come to inform the discursive and representational registers of the ANC. Drawing on a range 
of archival sources obtained during fieldwork in South Africa, this thesis contributes to the 
study of South African politics by reconceptualising the politics of the ANC through the lens 
of political marketing. It contributes to the theory of political marketing by using the South 
African case to address the theoretical blind-spots and challenge its western-centric notion of 
the political market. Centred on the themes of liberation, political culture and spectacle, the 
thesis enriches the understanding of each through the case of the ANC. As such, the thesis 
provides a deeper understanding of the social and cultural bases of political change in a post-
colonial and post-apartheid setting.  
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1. 
INTRODUCTION 
********** 
“...the ANC name is a kind of magic”1 
It is a truism that the African National Congress (ANC) has featured centrally in the story of 
liberation from apartheid rule and the process of making a ‘new’ and democratic South 
Africa. This story, replete with its heroes, heroines, trials, tribulations and feats of sacrifice 
and endeavour, was highly complicit in endowing the ANC with a moral and ethical authority 
commensurate with a fantasticality in predominant narratives of struggle – ‘a kind of magic’ 
as I noted in the epigraph. Such authority and the location of the ANC at the centre of 
political life in South Africa was inculcated through the articulation of a discursive and 
representational grammar that emerged in the theatre of anti-apartheid confrontation. 
Informed and influenced by a constellation of forces and factors, this grammar was carefully 
constructed and underpinned by a desire, as in other national liberation struggles, to locate the 
ANC as the ‘sole and authentic’ representative of the majority of the oppressed. This enquiry 
problematises the development and inculcation of this grammar through the lens of political 
marketing. An apposite heuristic, political marketing offers a novel lens through which the 
strategic behaviour of the ANC may be understood and illuminates the nature of the complex 
and varied relationships that characterise the political sphere. 
The thesis employs a broad understanding of political marketing to include such activities as 
publicity, promotion and propaganda. It extends its theoretical and conceptual remit beyond 
purely scientific and positivist approaches to understanding political persuasion and endows 
marketing with a strongly ‘cultural’ aspect. In doing so, greater consideration is afforded to 
the complex of influences that over time have come to inform the discursive and 
                                                 
1
 Quoted in Marina Ottaway, ‘The ANC: From Symbol to Political Party’ in Helen Kitchen and J. Coleman 
Kitchen (eds.) South Africa: Twelve Perspectives on the Transition (Praeger: Westerport, 1994), 30 
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representational registers of the ANC. Its ability to access these registers functions not only to 
maintain consistency in its cultural and political self-construction at the centre of the 
narrative of South African political life, but also locates this narrative within wider network 
of discursive and representational connections. Berthing politics within this rich narrative 
tapestry allows for a recasting of the relationships of power and influence that circulate 
through the political market and accentuates the interactive and dialogic nature of these 
relationships and the actors that inform them. In this way, new conceptions of liberation 
history and the unfolding post-apartheid epoch may be obtained through emphasising the 
ANC’s conscious acknowledgement of marketing and propaganda in the prosecution of the 
struggle. Indeed, and as I demonstrate further in the chapters that follow, the significance 
accorded by the ANC to the discursive and representational battle for the veritable ‘hearts and 
minds’ of the South African polity highlights the operation of a distinct marketing imperative 
in its political strategy. To understand the importance and richness of the ANC’s political 
marketing requires a reflection on the long and variegated influences that informed its 
contours during the protracted struggle against apartheid. In the democratic period, the 
assumption of governmental power and the making of a ‘symbolic’ South African state re-
focused its marketing capacities into new political arenas. Indeed, policy-making became a 
key site of symbolic statecraft despite its drier, bureaucratic register. 
The focus on political marketing here allows for an assessment of the continuities in the 
oeuvres, tenors and scope of the ANC’s persuasion landscape to be accentuated and allows 
for a greater conception of the cultural construction and location of the ANC within the body 
politic. More than that, examination of the ANC’s political marketing provides an apt means 
through which organisational change and political culture may be understood. A wide and 
informative documentation of the ANC exists and it is not my aim to undertake a survey of 
the history of the ANC. However, to understand the threads that inform its political 
marketing, a brief exegesis is required. 
LOCATING THE ANC: A POLITICAL MARKETING APPROACH 
From the founding in 1912 of its earlier incarnation, the South African Native National 
Congress (SANNC), the ideological and moral orientation of the ANC pivoted on the need to 
“defend and advance African civil and political rights” against colonial discrimination and 
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subjugation.
2
 With a leadership drawn from the African petite-bourgeoisie, such ‘defence and 
advance’ would occur through the lobbying of colonial authorities by recourse to “peaceful 
propaganda” and then “passive action.”3 The lack of success of such an approach against a 
powerful and uncompromising authority was offset by the coalescence of Africanist and 
Communist influences within the ANC from the 1920s.
4
 The effect of this would be central to 
the representational and discursive practises of the ANC to the present day. 
However, the failure of this approach and the increasing oppression upon the majority 
populace, occasioned by the 1950s a more confrontational approach by the ANC. The 
sprouting of regional, ethnic and class organisations permitted, by this time, a “convergence 
of energies” that culminated in the Congress Alliance, “a multi-racial, ideologically 
heterodox and regionally representative confederation of extra-parliamentary opposition 
movements.”5 Inspired to greater protest and dissent through civic mobilisation and public 
demonstration, the decision to hold the Congress of the People in 1955 built on the 
momentum of earlier campaigns of defiance. Within the teleology of struggle, the Congress 
of the People and the resulting Freedom Charter performed a seminal moment that endowed 
the overall narrative of liberation from apartheid rule with sanctity and venerability. As such, 
its marketing function for the ANC would prove important especially in the latter phases of 
the struggle as the ANC attempted to re-assert its presence inside South Africa. Indeed, 
Dubow rightly noted that the “highly visible (though sometimes overly romanticised) 
spectacles of cultural and political resistance to the entrenchment of apartheid bulk large in 
the political memory of the 1950s.”6 Despite this, the Charter also highlighted important 
ideological strains within the ANC, and its predominance as the inclusive ethical touchstone 
for a liberated South Africa stood in counterpoint to more Africanist tendencies within the 
movement, eventually culminating in the breakaway and formation of the Pan-Africanist 
Congress.
7
 
The Congress of the People, while representing a watershed moment in liberation teleology, 
also highlighted the increasingly repressive measures of the apartheid state and the closing of 
                                                 
2
 Saul Dubow, The African National Congress(Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2000), 1. Also William 
Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC, (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005), 4 
3
 Quoted in Heidi Holland, The Struggle: A History of the African National Congress (London: Grafton Books, 
1989), 40 
4
 Dubow, 15 
5
 Dubow, 37-38 
6
 Dubow, 47 
7
 Dubow, 62-64; Holland, 100-126 
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any remaining public space for dissent. The failure of the state to prosecute Congress 
Alliance leaders on charges of treason, the trial itself a significant marketing exercise, was 
offset by the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. Amidst brutal physical and juridical repression, 
the ANC and other liberation organisations were banned and forced underground. 
Organisationally, these moves served to fracture an already dissonant ANC.
8
 Banning and 
liberation reoriented the struggle which would now be prosecuted through popular 
mobilisation; the establishment of a strong underground presence within South Africa; armed 
struggle; and international diplomatic and popular pressure. In each of these, marketing 
became imperative. While the thesis does not examine explicitly the international marketing 
efforts of the ANC through its diplomatic overtures, it nevertheless notes the importance and 
consideration accorded to the marketing of the ANC both within South Africa and abroad. 
Despite its banning, Raymond Suttner, in challenging widespread contentions that the ANC 
did not have presence inside South Africa from the early 1960s until the Soweto uprisings in 
1976, has recently demonstrated the forms of publicity, advertising and marketing that were 
undertaken within South Africa during this period.
9
 In consonance with his view, other 
commentators have also noted the highly symbolic nature of this period of struggle. Indeed, 
from the “armed propaganda” campaigns undertaken by the ANC’s armed wing, Mkhonto we 
Sizwe (MK), against the symbols of the apartheid edifice, there was also from the early 1970s 
a recognition that “[p]olitical propaganda [...] was regarded as essential to keep alive the 
ANC’s name and reputation, to attract guerrilla recruits and to sway the black civilian 
population to lend active support to guerrilla fighters.”10 Political marketing was effected 
through radio broadcasts, songs, graffiti, public expression at funerals, through visual and 
cultural artefacts, and leaflets and posters. A highly representational struggle was being 
prosecuted. 
The Soweto uprisings provided a fillip to the mobilisation and popularisation efforts of the 
struggle. Indeed, as Tom Lodge has noted, the “openness” in forms of resistance that 
‘Soweto’ permitted, 
 
                                                 
8
 Nigel Worden, The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation and Apartheid (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1994), 102-103 
9
 Raymond Suttner, The ANC Underground in South Africa: A Social and Historical Study (Auckland Park: 
Jacana Media, 2008) 
10
 Thomas G. Karis and Gail M. Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics 
in South Africa, 1882-1990 Volume 5: Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1979 (Pretoria: UNISA Press, 1997), 50 
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[...] was reflected in the increasingly frequent appearance in the black press of 
political biographies and memoires of the 1950s. A new, nationalist genre of poetic 
and dramatic writing provided a popular medium for this process of historical 
rediscovery.
11
 
Moreover, MK camps became important sites of political education in the ANC tradition and 
the Freedom Charter the centrepiece of that education. Similarly, Robben Island, despite the 
constrictions of prison life, played an important role in the marketing of the ANC to prisoners 
who were then endowed to popularise and advertise the movement upon release.
12
 Thus, an 
intricate network of political communication developed that sought to publicise the ANC 
brand and that was rendered open to the proliferation of myths and fables about the 
movement. 
The emergence of the popular protest and civic movements in the early 1980s under the 
United Democratic Front (UDF) provided a strong popular impetus and content to anti-
apartheid campaigns. Indeed, underpinning this popular content were the “beliefs and 
emotions of ‘ordinary people’” thus imbuing performances of dissent, such as political rallies, 
with greater legitimacy and authority.
13
 The political theatre of South Africa in popular 
revolution provided an apposite stage in which the ANC could assert its hegemony on 
struggle forces. Symbolically, the ANC’s manoeuvring inside South Africa was fronted by 
invocations of the Freedom Charter as well as the “deliberate decision to profile Nelson 
Mandela as the representative personality” of the “struggle for the release of political 
prisoners.”14 The personalisation of the struggle and the ‘icon-ising’ of the brand of Nelson 
Mandela endowed the ANC with an ability to exert its hegemony over the quest for political 
liberation. Indeed, through these forms of “symbolic identification”, together with its claim 
that the “‘ANC is the nation’”, the movement not only obtained political centrality but also an 
acutely cultural presence in South Africa.
15
 Indeed, in constituting ‘the nation’, the ANC was 
able to exercise legitimate claims on history, heritage, memory, personalities and tradition in 
                                                 
11
 Tom Lodge, ‘Rebellion: The Turning of the Tide’ in Tom Lodge and Bill Nasson, All, Here and Now: Black 
Politics in South Africa in the 1980s (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1991), 41 
12
 See Suttner, The ANC Underground in South Africa: A Social and Historical Study; also Fran Buntman, 
Robben Island and Prisoner Resistance to Apartheid (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) esp. 61-
193 
13
 Lodge, ‘Rebellion: The Turning of the Tide’, 25 
14
 News24, ‘Mbeki Letter to the ANC’ Available online: 
http://www.news24.com/MyNews24/YourStory/Mbeki-letter-to-the-ANC-20081031 (accessed 31 October 
2008) 
15
 Suttner, The ANC Underground in South Africa: A Social and Historical Study, 153 
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the exercise of its power. The ANC’s exiled movement was deeply complicit in directing this 
process. Despite its distance from South Africa, and the concomitant organisational strains 
with other sections of the movement, Suttner notes of the 1980s that the exiled leadership, 
[...] understood, sometimes better than the UDF [...] the language of the various 
constituencies, language that would persuade them to undertake certain tasks.
16
 
This ability of the exiled movement, as Tom Lodge has noted in his seminal analyses of this 
formation of the ANC, to utilise language to pacify different constituencies and corral support 
from conflicting interests highlights not only its diplomatic nous but also the 
acknowledgement of the deeply political environment and contending forces that the ANC 
would need to negotiate when it assumed power.
17
 As I demonstrate subsequently in this 
thesis, this ability to use language to pacify contending interests characterised the ANC’s 
approaches to economic policy-making from the 1980s and especially over the politically 
fraught contest over the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy in the mid-
1990s. 
The release of Nelson Mandela in early 1990 and the unbanning of the ANC and other allied 
organisations set in motion a process of negotiations for the transition to a multi-racial 
democracy.
18
 The euphoria of the release and unbanning belied a fractious organisational 
reality and a sense of ‘betrayal’ by more militant elements of the ANC as a negotiated route 
to power superseded an insurrectionary one. Moreover, as the negotiations between 
nationalist regime, ANC and other parties were undertaken, the need to give ideological 
content to a democratic South African state became apparent. Expediently, the use of the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), sold as the incarnation and extension of 
the Freedom Charter, provided the ANC with a product to generate electoral support. 
Developed in the union movement, the RDP not only fostered links with important 
constituencies, but also confirmed the ANC’s historical and rhetorical tendency for a people-
centred development agenda for a democratic South Africa. While the 1994 election stands as 
a monument to the political liberation of South Africa, the second and more protracted 
                                                 
16
 Suttner, The ANC Underground in South Africa: A Social and Historical Study, 163 
17
 Tom Lodge, ‘State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa, 1976-1986’ in Philip Frankel, 
Noam Pines and Mark Swilling (eds.) State, Resistance and Change in South Africa (London: Croom Helm 
Publishers, 1988) 246. See also Stephen Ellis, ‘The ANC in Exile’ African Affairs, 90 (1991), 439-447. 
18
 For a good  synopsis of the ANC in the early 1990s, see Tom Lodge, ‘The African National Congress in the 
1990s’ in Glenn Moss and Ingrid Obery (eds.) South African Review 6: From ‘Red October’ to CODESA 
(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992), 44-77 
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economic liberation would only then commence. The shift towards a neoliberal economic 
policy by the ANC, two years after assuming power, is instructive in understanding the 
symbolic bases of creation of the ‘new’ South African state. A modernising imperative, 
conjured by then vice-President, and later President, Thabo Mbeki and strongly supported by 
Nelson Mandela, GEAR became a site of intense struggle for much of the ANC’s first decade 
of governing. Aiming to market ‘brand ANC’ as a modern, rational and pragmatic 
organisation that aimed to establish sovereign financial stability and security, GEAR’s 
purport as the means to realise the RDP’s ends was lost in the highly divisive and fractious 
relations that developed between the ANC and its alliance partners, the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The 
animosities raised over the economic policy spoke broadly to fissures in the political culture 
of the movement as the ANC began to increasingly centralise its operations and dilute its 
mass orientations. 
The record of the first decade of democracy was mixed, and while the project of re-making of 
the South African state as a modern, African and advanced construction proceeded, 
underpinned by a state-led development drive from the mid-2000s, it was underpinned by 
increasing economic marginality, inequality and social malaise. The firing of Jacob Zuma 
from the deputy-presidency of the Republic unleashed these burgeoning tensions and 
“plunged the [ANC] into one if the worst crises of its history.”19 As those forces coalesced 
around the figure of Zuma, greater impetus was given to his claims to the Presidency of the 
ANC. Spearheaded by a marginalised SACP and COSATU, a brutal battle ensued. The 
campaign was remarkable, not only for the politics that underlay it, but also for its 
inculcation, even entrenchment, of spectacle at the centre of the South African political 
sphere. Ensconced in his Zulu identity, Zuma marketed himself as a traditionalist while 
commensurately invoking the history of the struggle through performances of liberation era 
songs in mass gatherings. Obtaining widespread and popular appeal within the ANC, Zuma 
successfully secured the ANC Presidency and as such, would head the party’s campaign in 
the 2009 national general election. That campaign, composed of numerous acts of spectacle, 
was a well-choreographed enactment of the power of ANC, and its claims to heritage, 
memory, tradition, personality and popular input aimed to realign the ANC with its historic 
mission as contained in the Freedom Charter after the aberrational Mbeki years. Indeed, the 
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campaign undertook a marketing offensive that not only sought to re-establish the brand at 
the centre of South African political life, but also the continued progress to the realisation of 
a ‘a better life for all’ – the governing vision of the ANC since the 1994 election. 
While such a chronology provides an appropriate interpretive lens through which to view 
South African politics, it nevertheless obscures the rich and varied operation of the discursive 
and representational grammars that flow through time and through the organisation. As will 
be rendered clear in the chapters which follow, the ANC was able to maintain a sharp 
consistency in its messaging despite the uneven topography of its organisational presence 
inside South Africa, across Africa and indeed globally. As such, this study of its political 
marketing provides important insights into the organisational operation of the ANC during 
both the apartheid and post-apartheid periods, in both its liberation movement and political 
party identities. Nevertheless, while the analysis in this thesis aims to locate the ANC within 
a complex of forces that characterised the political sphere, it is limited and only presents a 
partial and fragmented picture of the ANC’s political marketing over time. Moreover, a level 
of romanticism greets a study of this nature. Political marketing is highly complicit in 
fomenting this romanticism and this study is tasked with understanding how this romanticism 
came to be entrenched in popular consciousness and the politics that underpinned it. The 
ANC is not unique in this endeavour and displays tendencies that have characterised national 
liberation movements, particularly in Southern Africa. Indeed, the revolutionary theatres of 
anti-colonial struggle were deeply informed by the operation and circulation of a rich 
discursive and representational culture. Like these fraternal organisations, the ANC on 
assuming power has utilised memory, history and tradition to legitimate its claims to an 
authority to rule. Writing in the context of Namibia, but with particular resonance to South 
Africa, Henning Melber has argued that upon assuming power, liberation movements 
reorganised themselves as political parties where their, 
[…] legitimacy to rule stemmed from their emergence from the decolonisation 
process […] The result is a new ruling political elite operating from commanding 
heights shaped in and based upon the particular context of post-Apartheid societies by 
selective narratives and memories related to the war(s) of liberation and hence 
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constructing or inventing new traditions to establish an exclusive postcolonial 
legitimacy under the sole authority of one particular agency of social forces.
20
 
Thus, considerations of the liberation movement-political party identity interplay are 
premised on a negative reading of post-liberation politics, in which the anti-democratic 
exigencies and cultures of anti-colonial struggle cohere on the newly formed national 
political party. Moreover, scholars have noted that the assumption of power by these 
movements has come to “signal the defeat of popular movements.”21 While a conclusive and 
highly authoritative body of scholarship exists on the closing of political space and the 
ascendancy of elite formations, and to which in specific instances the South African case 
conforms, a political marketing approach provides an aperture into understanding the 
democratic impulse and diffusions of power within the political realm given the constellation 
of forces and the need to inculcate a sense of trust, responsibility and confidence in the ruling 
party’s ability to govern. Despite the ANC’s continued dominance since 1994, elections 
constitute important sites of competition especially at local and regional levels. The centrality 
ascribed to political marketing in the instance of election campaigns by the ANC highlights 
such competitiveness and the continuance of a democratic ethos through its electioneering. 
Moreover, while criticism of political marketing would hold that it is bereft of meaning and 
leads to a superficial politics, such a view downplays the highly critical faculty of the 
electorate and the power that resides within it to make electoral choices. 
FOCUS 
In light of these theoretical and empirical contexts, this thesis aims to: 
1. Analyse the techniques of political marketing employed by the ANC between 1955 
and 2009 
2. Examine the relationship between the use of the various marketing techniques 
employed and the strategic behaviour of the ANC around seminal political events 
3. Examine the means by which these techniques and behaviours located the ANC at the 
centre of liberation and post-independent political narratives 
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4. Explore and posit a basis for understanding the behaviour of the ANC and leading 
actors in the South Africa political sphere 
5. Explicate the nature of the continuities and discontinuities in the ANC’s discursive 
forms of political exchange and interaction pre- and post-1994 
6. Problematise the theoretical underpinnings of political marketing through the case of 
South Africa 
Given this focus, the thesis will: 
1. Contribute to the study of South African politics by reconceptualising the politics of 
the ANC through the lens of political marketing 
2. Contribute to the theory of political marketing by using the South African case to 
address the theoretical blindspots and challenge its western-centric notion of the 
political market 
3. Offer a richer understanding of the themes of liberation, political culture, and 
spectacle in South African politics 
4. Provide a deeper understanding of the social and cultural bases of political change in a 
post-colonial and post-apartheid setting 
ON METHODOLOGY 
In pursuance of the aims and objectives noted above, two key methods of enquiry were 
utilised in the present study. First, and given the temporal scope of this examination, recourse 
to a large range of archival and documentary sources provided the basis for a rich and 
textured understanding of the political marketing activity of the ANC over time. In addition, 
these primary and secondary sources provide an important insight into the internal and 
strategic processes that informed the discursive and representational posturing of the ANC. 
Second, while the bulk of the analysis is premised on the development of such posturing over 
time, the final chapter of the study provides an ethnographic rendering of the recent 2009 
national general election campaign. The experience of ‘living through’ this campaign 
provided the opportunity for ‘first-hand’ observations and an intimate insight into the 
marketing activities of the ANC. Locating myself within the ‘theatre of the campaign’, both 
as participant and observer, raised critical questions on my status and standpoint as a 
researcher. 
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The discussion which follows unpacks the methods utilised in this thesis and problematises 
the ethical constraints I negotiated in the course of this research. Before such discussion 
however, it is important to acknowledge the epistemological strictures that inform the present 
study, and to disclaim any overt generalities that may be inferred from the analysis below. 
The focus on particular ‘moments’ within the telos of the creation of a democratic South 
Africa renders clear how “meaning is constituted in particular situations” and not as Shurmer-
Smith has argued, to “decipher whole cultures.”22 Thus, the examination of the continuity and 
discontinuity in those meanings over time (effected in the present study through political 
marketing), and their utilisation in specific moments, is instructive in understanding the 
dynamism, variability and responsiveness of the ANC’s political marketing in differing 
political, social and economic milieus. In this way, and as the examination in the chapters 
which follow will render clear, a deeper understanding of the social and cultural bases of 
political change in a post-colonial and post-apartheid setting may be obtained. 
A terminological note is necessary. As with other studies on South Africa, I adhere to 
convention in the classification of race groups and use the same apartheid-era markers of race 
in this study. Moreover, regarding the identities of ANC, I characterise it as both a 
‘movement’ and a ‘party’ and use these terms as the context of the discussion necessitates. 
While discussion on organisational identity issues are raised at various points in the thesis, 
and despite the ANC’s abidance to its liberation movement incarnation, it also functions 
within a wider political environment in which it also performs as a political party. 
‘I breathed in their dust’: 23 The Archives 
Four archives were consulted at different sites in South Africa, namely the ANC archive at 
the University of Fort Hare (Alice)
24
; the Mayibuye archive at the University of the Western 
Cape (Cape Town); the South African History Archive (Johannesburg) and the African 
Studies Library at the University of Cape Town (Cape Town). Rich in their assortment of 
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materials, the holdings in each allow for a documentary imbrications of ANC activity in the 
anti-apartheid struggle and transition period to be obtained.
25
 
Entering the archive for the first time as a researcher, I was struck by the unassuming nature 
of each. Generally, located in the basements of university ‘main’ libraries, they were spatially 
relegated from the centre of activity and knowledge storage – dim, small spaces, quiet and 
reflective, and populated by few people.
26
 Such relegation and the atmosphere which obtains 
serves also to endow the archive with a sanctity, solemnity and seriousness –  an escape from 
the bustle of knowledge accumulation and production undertaken in the spaces ‘above’. 
Consulting each of the four archives was based on my assessment of their utility to provide 
the ‘fullest’ picture possible of the political marketing of the ANC. Such assessment was 
made during a four month pilot study to South Africa between June and October 2008.  
While overall, each of the archives contains material from the struggle against apartheid, their 
holdings nevertheless accent different organisations and aspects of that struggle. A brief 
overview of the archives is necessary here. The liberalisation of political space in South 
Africa in 1990 set in motion a process of return to South Africa of organisations, people and 
importantly, the documents of the exile period. The decision to locate the official ANC 
archives at the University of Fort Hare was both symbolic and political.
 27
 Given its history as 
a premier site for black higher education, and also that many African liberation leaders had 
trained there, it was deemed the “natural home” for the archive.28 Indeed, the importance of 
the archive was expressed clearly by Nelson Mandela who noted, 
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These archives are the single most important record of the ANC, especially in the 
period after its banning in 1960. They are instrumental in documenting the untold 
history of South Africa [...] The organisation further recognises that the archival 
material contains the seeds of our new democratic order. A study of the [ANC] 
comprises an intrinsic part of our society, the transition we have experienced and what 
the future may hold. The ANC archives provide a window into this significant period 
of our country and fill the vacuum in historical continuity.
29
 
Conceiving of the importance of the archive as such, is important for locating it within 
debates on power, history and the process of remembering. I will return to this discussion 
below. In constituting the ‘single most important record of the ANC’ as Mandela opined,  the 
archive at Fort Hare holds material from the exiled missions that were spread across the 
continents
30
, and importantly also, records from ANC President’s Office during the period of 
Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela’s leadership.31 In addition, the archive holds important 
collections from the Lusaka and London missions. As the key loci of the exiled movement, 
these missions’ records were also deposited by activists and exiles at the Mayibuye Archive 
at the University of the Western Cape. Formed through deposit of archival holdings from the 
London-based International Defence Aid Fund (IDAF), Robben Island materials, and 
individual and personal collections, the archive provides a wealth of documentation on the 
struggle against apartheid. It functions too as a repository for a large photographic, sound, 
film and oral history collection, as well as a poster and banner collection. The personal papers 
and collections of struggle veterans provided an important collection of materials of external 
missions, internally-based civil society groupings and clippings from newspapers, periodicals 
and interviews of the individual activists. 
The South African History Archive (SAHA) at the University of the Witwatersrand acts as an 
important repository for the internal movement and struggle documentation. This archive 
houses ANC material, as well as the personal collections and civil society organisations’ 
papers, most notably, those of the UDF and its affiliated community organisations. A large 
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ANC and UDF poster collection is also available. SAHA also holds an important store of 
interview transcripts and tape recordings made with leading members of the struggle 
movement. Useful for the breadth of topics covered in these interviews, these transcripts 
provided a strong account of personal recollections and experiences of the period of 
struggle.
32
 Finally, the African Studies Library at the University of Cape Town, while holding 
a significant collection of secondary material related to the struggle, does have a small and 
uncatalogued ephemera collection. Its film and video collection is an excellent resource for 
television interviews given by activists and members of the ANC leadership as well as 
containing a number of important films and documentaries on the anti-apartheid struggle. 
While there was an overlap in material, especially the London and Lusaka files at the 
University of Fort Hare, Mayibuye and SAHA, the materials consulted during a second and 
longer period of field between January and October 2009 produced an extremely rich 
collection of primary documentation that informed the present analysis. Despite the richness 
of collected materials and the vastness of the archives, the researcher is nevertheless 
confronted by only a partial rendering of the contours, recollections, textures and nuances as 
housed in the archives. 
Archives are acutely political sites where power and knowledge intersect and are “crystallised 
within [its] material and metaphorical spaces.”33 Indeed, as Foucault has posited, “[the] 
archive is first the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of 
statements as unique events.”34 In noting Foucault’s lack of clarity in “who the makers of 
those ‘laws’” are, Cheryl McEwan highlights an elision in Foucault’s conception of power 
and the archive. The present study, in focusing on the ANC, locates this power within an elite 
political formation that dominated discourses resistance politics in South Africa during the 
apartheid period. But this political formation, despite its elite underpinnings, was nevertheless 
occluded from ‘official’ political life by the laws of apartheid, much like the mass of 
disenfranchised, marginalised and subjugated people that it represented. Thus, the dominance 
it was purported to exert in one arena was undercut by its actual political strength and 
operation in another. Recognition of this shifting power differential is important in 
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understanding the claims to ownership, authenticity and validity on the past, while also 
acknowledging the strength and influence on the ANC, now as the dominant ‘official’ 
political formation, to “structure (or ‘write’) what the future will be like” through 
“assembling” the archive and “providing access” to it.35 That the archives are highly political 
sites is evidenced further by the partiality of the material which it stores. Indeed, given the 
‘sanitising’ of the documents by the ANC before their deposition in the archive permits a 
stylised rendering of the ANC’s existence and concomitantly, endows the ANC with an 
ability to shape history and memory.
36
 
These ideas are given greater resonance when consideration is given to an archive’s function 
in fomenting a national identity. In an address at the opening of the Fort Hare archive, Thabo 
Mbeki was keen to assert that the archive “speaks in another language” which, 
[...] is the language of reinforcement of the pride and identity of the formerly 
oppressed and despised, because in it will be found much which says that, after all, we 
were never conquered.
37
 
Indeed, in defying censorship and banning laws the ANC, its activists, supporters, affiliated 
and non-affiliated organisations and more were implicated in another struggle in which, pace 
Mandela above, writing and documenting various allowed for the resistance movements to 
control the production of history.
38
 As such, Mbeki noted further that, 
The archive is a school both for the philosophers and the historians as well as the 
agitators and the activists, all of whom are linked one to another by virtue of their 
common commitment to the full emancipation of all human beings [...] The ANC 
archive, like the ANC itself, will be such a living reality.
39
 
Indeed, and at times, the material being examined function to offer a direct link back to an 
unfamiliar past. Revealing the ‘everydayness’ of the struggle against apartheid the collected 
materials documented personal struggles of deprivation, frustration, anxiety, excitement, 
coordination, planning, homesickness, (in-)competence and more. In addition, and 
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importantly for the present purposes, this ‘everydayness’ also provided an insight into the 
daily operations of the organisation itself. Strategy documents, minutes of meetings, diaries 
and the like allowed for a novel conception of the strategic thinking and decision-making 
processes of the ANC. In lifting the mask of the experience of the struggle, the archive 
functioned, as Blouin and Rosenberg have noted, as “a point of intersection between the 
actual and the imagined, lived experience and its remembered (or forgotten) image.”40 
Acknowledging this, it is further incumbent upon the archival researcher to negotiate any 
incipient bias that may emerge given the ‘venerability’ of the documents that the archive 
holds. As acutely political sites, the researcher is nevertheless confronted with twin “aims: 
[a]t one extreme to learn and understand what actually happened; at the other, partisan zeal to 
fabricate a past that suits present needs.”41 In my experience, engaging in archive research 
functioned to colour any objectivity in two clear senses. Firstly, in accessing an archive, one 
is exposed to a range of documentation that detail, first-hand, the lived, ordinary and 
everyday experiences of those who struggled against apartheid. While my analytical eye was 
focused on the political marketing of the ANC, I was distracted occasionally by various 
documents – testimonies, diagrams, poems, photographs, and even redundant lists of house-
arrested persons some of whom I was familiar with – that located the ANC, for me,  in the 
‘personal’. I will discuss this in more detail below. The second related to the “veneration” of 
the documentation with which I dealt.
42
 Seeing the handwritten notations on a document by 
Nelson Mandela, a memorandum by Thabo Mbeki or even the scribbled notebook of an 
unnamed Robben Island prisoner imbued the document with a sanctity that had not 
previously been experienced. In ‘touching history, and perhaps ‘breathing in its dust’,  I had a 
sense of being transported back to a frenetic ANC President’s office in a transitioning South 
Africa; a more languid and sparse room in the exiled headquarters on the outskirts of Lusaka; 
or ‘feverish’ note-taking in a prison cell. This ability to be ‘transported’ back left me with 
needing to negotiate my position in relation to these documents – between my personal 
connection to the stories that they told and the information that they held while 
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simultaneously attempting to maintain a critical distance from them so that I may, myself, tell 
an objective story. I will return to these themes below. 
My approach to collecting materials was to cast my net as widely as possible and in so doing 
I obtained a sizeable collection of materials – a personal archive of sorts – that would inform 
the content of the thesis. While the archives consulted are well-organised, catalogued and 
amenable for research, their extent and vastness does place considerable pressures on the 
researcher’s time. The nature of the struggle against apartheid, wherein there was an overlap 
in the roles undertaken by individuals and organisations, is reflected in the structure of the 
archive. Thus, to obtain a richer understanding of the marketing activities of the ANC, it was 
necessary not only to focus on the named ANC collections, but also on personal activist 
collections wherein much useful information was contained. The many roles that these 
activists played, and their inter- and intra-organisational membership and duties, provided a 
more holistic understanding of the political marketing activities of the ANC. Moreover, it 
was necessary to examine the representational activities of organisations affiliated to the 
ANC to obtain a more nuanced picture of the proliferation its marketing activities in the 
public sphere. At Fort Hare, SAHA and UCT, I was able to photocopy documents which 
were then appropriately referenced. Staff members at the Mayibuye archive undertook the 
photocopying of material, and at times did not reference the material copied. Despite 
cataloguing the material according to theme and chronologically, I noticed the omission of 
sufficient referencing of this archived material immediately prior to returning to the UK. 
Obtaining the missing references at that stage proved too difficult given the constraints on my 
time. Moreover, the lack of dating of documents at times proved difficult. Where possible, 
certain clues in the text (such as events, meetings, references to other dates) allowed for a 
rough dating to occur. Compact disc copies of sound and video recordings were also 
obtained, as were relevant copies of posters and banners. While copies of speeches of ANC 
leaders and key documents were obtained in the archive, the ANC’s website has also 
archived these materials. In encouraging greater access to these materials, I have preferred to 
use the website reference in the text below. 
Archives, as I have noted, play an important role in process of nation-building and the 
development of a national culture. It is important, however, to note the archived ANC 
materials are not part of the national state archives, but are rather located ‘off-centre’ at 
universities around the country. Most cogently, the locus of the struggle documentation is 
placed at two former ‘black’ universities both deeply implicated in the struggle against 
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apartheid.
43
 In giving a home to the archives at these locations, and at Fort Hare specifically, 
the ANC attempted to “memorialise the liberation struggle and create a monument to those 
who participated in the conflict.”44 As such, while it is acknowledged that the archive 
contributes to the making of a South African nation, it is from this decentred position that 
such ‘making’ occurs. The benefit of this decentring lies in its ‘insulating-effect’ wherein the 
ANC-as-government is separated from the ANC-as-movement and the latter is absolved from 
any of the failings, shortcomings or criticism of the former. Moreover, insulating the ANC-
as-movement permits the dominant relations of power that inform memory, history and 
remembering to be preserved and sanctified. In this way, a ‘clean’, even unimpeachable, 
history and historiography may be effected. 
More on Documents 
The documentary evidence informing this study is, as I have noted, partial and fragmented 
given the contested nature of archival collections. More than that, it should be remembered 
that the actual document itself becomes an important site of erasure, hyperbole, ‘mis-
truthfulness’ and more. As such, a “questioning of the document” is necessary for as Foucault 
has posited, one needs to enquire whether it is “telling the truth, and by what right they could 
claim to be doing so, whether they were sincere or deliberately misleading, well-informed or 
ignorant, authentic or tampered with.”45 The importance of this critical enquiry, he notes, 
relates to the means by which the “past” was “reconstituted,” for the “document was always 
treated as the language of a voice since reduced to silence, its fragile, but possibly 
decipherable trace.”46 However, the predominance of a hegemonic narrative of the struggle 
against apartheid, and the ANC’s role in that struggle, produces a reflexive turn in which that 
narrative or history was “trying to define within the documentary material itself unities, 
totalities, series, relations.” 47 In engaging with the documents of struggle and post-struggle, 
such a critical awareness was imperative given my aim of interrogating the politics that 
underscored predominant discursive and representational narratives that informed the ANC’s 
political marketing. 
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While I have attempted to berth documents in their wider social and political context, I also 
attempted to use them to “construct” that context.48 Again, however, given the “clandestine 
nature of some of the ANC’s activities as a revolutionary organisation” such construction can 
only be partial.
49
 Moreover, context again plays an important role in more contemporary 
documentary capture. Considering the clandestine nature of the negotiations around South 
Africa’s shift to neoliberal economic policy, a clear and open record of those negotiations is 
not obtainable. Similarly, given the highly competitive nature of election campaigns, I was 
unable to obtain information on the ANC’s strategic orientations to the campaign given the 
sensitivity of their content. 
The emphasis on the ‘textual’ in this study permits an important, though admittedly 
inconclusive, understanding of the “social context” in which documents are produced. 
Indeed, and as evidenced in the discussion below, the reliance on a documentary rendering of 
the ANC’s political marketing, and particularly the continuities and discontinuities in its 
strategies of representation, provide a rich account of the means, motivations, ideas and 
strategies by which the ANC undertook to create meaning and “encode” these within a 
particular discursive and representational apparatus.
50
 Through such encoding (and the 
concomitant process of decoding), an understanding of the “wider ideologies in society” is 
rendered clear and provides insight into “the means by which power and ideology are made 
to signify in particular discourses.”51 As the analysis in the chapters that follow demonstrates, 
the process of encoding both internal and external documents permits an opening through 
which to understand the social, political, ideological and cultural milieu in which these 
documents were produced. Further, such understandings are consolidated through an 
intertextual appreciation of the documents that are analysed here.
52
 As will be demonstrated 
below, the strength of the ANC’s marketing lay in its ability to ‘stay on message’ across 
organisations, times and contexts. The power of its discourses traversed time and geography 
and contributed to the hegemonic narratives that the movement espoused. 
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In the chapters which follow, I make use of a stock of images – banners, posters and 
photographs – that accentuates and offers a “visual knowledge” to the analysis and discussion 
here.
53
 I have noted above the various types of documents that were collected and analysed, 
but more than ‘official’ movement or party documents, a notable collection of ‘ephemera’ 
supported traditional documentation including, flags, bookmarks, letters, pamphlets, blankets, 
car bumper stickers, comic books, T-shirts and the like. Classifying these as ‘ephemera’ is 
somewhat pejorative, especially given the focus of the study. Rather, they constitute an 
important aspect of the material culture of the struggle against apartheid and provide an 
insight into the representational canvas utilised by the ANC.  Indeed, given the emphasis on 
the representational in this thesis, the images utilised here supplement the interpretive thrust 
of the analysis and put on clear “display” a visual culture of the ANC. Posters and banners 
were obtained from the holdings at the Mayibuye archive as were certain historical 
photographs. These images conform notionally to “documentary photographs” which, Gillian 
Rose has argued, “tended to picture the poor, oppressed and marginalised individuals, often 
as part of reformist projects to show the horror of their lives and thus inspire change.”54 The 
conception of photography as such is akin to the resistance photography which shared the 
same aims.
55
 The images utilised in the final chapter were taken by me over the period of a 
few weeks just prior to the elections. Photographs were also obtained from the social network 
site, Facebook, where the ANC utilised the site as a repository for election campaign 
photographs in addition to other functions. As with all images utilised here, due consideration 
needs to be given the social and political context in which they are produced. The images 
utilised here span themes of resistance and contestation, mobilisation, unity and 
reconciliation and power and presence. As such, and by their very nature as a marketing 
apparatus, I am acutely aware of their lack of neutrality and one-sidedness. But it is 
specifically this lack which renders the image valuable for the present study. As such, in 
accepting the non-neutrality of the images here, I concur the position forwarded by Gillian 
Rose that “all discourse is organised to make itself persuasive.”56 As a study of persuasion, 
this thesis seeks out those very points of persuasion. 
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In addition to this form of documentary evidence, the use of internet websites also provided 
an important platform through which documents were obtained and utilised. The shift of 
newspapers and periodicals online, to supplement their print versions, made the internet an 
increasingly important source of obtaining news and information at a national level, utilised 
especially during the election campaign. Regional and local news that would previously have 
been unavailable was now easily accessible. The ANC, as explicated in greater detail below, 
developed a campaign-specific website that sought to give it a prominent internet presence. 
Documenting the campaign, it became a ‘real-time’ resource for understanding the ANC’s 
discursive and representational strategies. Popular input and participation was also obtained 
through social network sites such as Facebook and Twitter, which operated as a central online 
forum in which ANC supporters and non-supports alike could render opinions, undertake 
discussions, re-circulate news articles, and engage with leaders of the ANC.
57
 The internet 
video site Youtube, also became an important visual repository of the ANC’s election 
campaign as videos and television campaign advertisements were stored on the site. Access 
to these resources was open and has continued to be housed on the site since 2009. 
One important omission in the ANC’s marketing compendium is the lack of analysis of 
election radio broadcasts. My attempts to access these through the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation proved unsuccessful both in 2008 and again 2009. A full 
understanding of these broadcasts would enhance the overall assessment of the ANC’s 
representational and discursive overtures given the centrality of radio in the South African 
communications landscape. Scope thus exists in future researches for further exploration of 
this form of marketing. 
Observing and Participating 
While the primary method of data collection rested on archived documentary sources, a 
secondary and more ethnographic method was also employed. In spending nine months in 
South Africa from the beginning of 2009, I sought to ‘live through’ election campaign, that 
spanned approximately three months from January to April 2009. This process of ‘living 
through’ the campaign in the field site of South Africa placed me within my own 
‘community’ – as I am South African and Capetonian – and rendered me both participant and 
observer within the parameters of this field. While the campaign operated on a national scale, 
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the present study is focused primarily on observations made at specific urban locations, 
namely Johannesburg, Durban, Port Elizabeth but predominantly in Cape Town. 
Acknowledging the differential impact and tenors an election campaign would have 
depending on the location, the target audience, language, racial and class variables and a host 
of other factors, this study highlights aspects of those differences where possible, while 
demonstrating the standardised and regularised discursive and representational practices that 
characterised the campaign at a national level. 
My aim of ‘living through’ an election campaign was motivated by a desire to experience the 
contours, shifts and textures which characterised it. Indeed, a fuller and richer understanding 
of the ANC’s campaign discourses and representations would be obtained by being in the 
field and observing first-hand the operation of its electioneering. Indeed, given the dynamism 
of the political sphere, especially during election campaigns, it became necessary to become 
“part of the life” of that sphere “in order to understand how it changes”; “we must participate 
in it and record our experiences of those transformations, their effects on people, as well as 
their interpretations.”58 My observations of the ANC, however, were limited given my 
inability to gain access to the organisation at the time of its campaigning. Moreover, parts of 
my observations of the ANC were refracted through the mass media which altered the overall 
effect of the ANC’s campaign communication. However, despite these limitations and 
occlusions, the observations of the election behaviours and representations of the ANC are 
rich and detailed. Given the discursive depth and representational breadth of the campaign, 
the observer is nevertheless in a sound position to examine the political marketing of the 
ANC. Indeed, by its very operation and function, political marketing is geared towards 
political consumers and links them intimately to both the candidate and the party. It is 
precisely at this point of linkage that the final empirical chapter examines. 
Being based in South Africa during a national election campaign, I was also firmly located 
within a larger community that engaged with the discourse formations of the ANC. Given the 
context in which the election was occurring, the period generated considerable comment, 
analysis, conjecture and supposition from all parts of the political market. Indeed, engaging in 
casual and often unplanned conversation with petrol attendants, shop assistants, academics, 
car guards, policy-makers, entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, ANC supporters and opponents added 
vitality to my observations. It is important to recognise moreover that these constituents of 
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the public sphere are the focus of the ANC’s marketing activities. It is they that obtain, 
digest, consider and acknowledges the discursive and representational ‘products’ that are 
created in the process of deciding for whom to vote. In acknowledging this, I also 
acknowledge my position within this group, being a citizen, a voter, and a consumer of 
political communication. This positionality needed to be offset by my position as a researcher 
wanting to establish and better understand the forms of persuasion that the ANC engaged in 
to obtain (my) support. 
While I discuss the more ethical considerations of my positionality in the field in the 
subsequent section, it is important for the present purpose to note my shifting subjectivity 
between being the participant and observer. Conventional understandings of participant 
observation acknowledge the tenuousness between these roles and implorations are made to 
“balance” these subject positions.59 Such balancing is premised on the more difficult task of 
simultaneous emotional involvement and objective detachment.” 60 In embodying both these 
roles, the difficulty I had was captured in an entry in my research ‘scrapbook’ on the day of 
the election. I noted, 
I’ve been up since before dawn, scanning the papers online, watching the news, 
browsing Facebook, Twitter, blogs to see if anything happened during the course of 
the night. The coverage of this election is unbelievable! The TV is on, pictures of the 
IEC centre and voters arriving at voting stations have been on a constant loop. The 
excitement is tangible! Everyone has an opinion and it willing to share it. Everything 
is geared toward today’s events – the country has come alive, and I am living through 
it! This is, I’m told, almost what ’94 felt like.61 
‘Living through’ the campaign and interacting with both the ANC and the voting public as 
participants, I was able to capture the dynamism and change in the political market and assess 
the actions, motivations and behaviours of the ANC in campaign mode. At the same time, 
however, I needed to constantly gauge my reflexivity and curb any ‘over-enthusiasm’ that 
would impinge upon my ability to undertake further research from an objective position as 
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possible. The findings and commentary based on these ethnographic practices, I 
acknowledge, are incomplete, ‘partial’ and exclude as much as they include. As such, it may, 
may be characterised, as Clifford has noted, as “fictions” of larger and more complex social 
whole.
62
 As such, I enjoin my reader to accept the ‘fictitiousness’ of the account below noting 
my endeavours to provide an accurate account of my experience in the field. 
Reflexivities 
I noted in the discussion above the various constraints I needed to take cognisance of and 
negotiate during the period of field research. More pointedly, my concern related to my 
positioning at the centre of an election campaign where the very goal of the campaign was to 
shift attitudes and opinions and encourage acquiescence to the ANC’s persuasive 
performance. More than that, given my relation to working with a ‘venerable’ collection of 
archival documents at the very time of the campaign, there was a greater need to stand back 
from the project and reflect deeply on the objective and critical stance that I needed to 
maintain through the process. Indeed, engaging with accounts of resistance against 
domination and subjugation ‘by people like me’ both during and before my life time, 
provided a strong emotional connection to the ANC which had the potential to introduce bias 
into the research and compromise its overall attempts at objectivity. Balancing these 
emotional claims with the constant pursuance of (and admittedly elusive claims to) 
objectivity required a constant negotiation of identities between researcher and the material 
being researched. Encountering the experiences of ‘people like me’ through the course of 
research, holds important implications for questions of reflexivity, for wrapped up in 
acknowledging one’s subject position is a further acknowledgement of the “values and 
interests” as well as the “socio-historical locations” of the researcher.63 To obviate this, I 
strategically sought to “pivot the centre” – thus being constantly aware of accentuating 
different aspects of my identity as required by the prevailing situation. This may occur in 
casual conversation, in sourcing documents and in analysing texts.
64
 
While this ‘pivoting’ became an important means to research, it also became central to 
guiding the process of analysis and writing. Based in Durham and being away from ‘home’ 
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and experiencing the usual effects of dislocation, longing, homesickness and more, I found 
myself adopting a ‘defensive’ position on matters South African – a patriotic joust to what I 
would like to consider my otherwise cosmopolitan sensibilities. Sitting away from the site 
and re-reading the documents that were collected served to highlight even more the 
seriousness of the sacrifice that ANC leaders and members undertook in the name of ‘my’ 
freedom.  But with this freedom, I should note, comes a position of power and privilege 
which is deeply inscribed in my intellectual constitution. Indeed, being university educated, 
English speaking, male, in addition to other points of privilege, places me in a position in 
which I can neither fully appreciate nor understand the nature and extent of those sacrifices. I 
thus encountered the problem of over-empathising through the material with the 
circumstances and conditions that begot ‘my’ freedom. 
As such, I became acutely aware of needing to maintain a critical pen through the process of 
reflection and writing. The frustrations of pursuing objectivity have been obviated by 
acknowledging the ‘situated-ness’ of my writing. Indeed, as Donna Haraway has posited, 
strength exists in the “practice of objectivity that privileges contestation, deconstruction, 
passionate construction, webbed connections, and hope for transformation of systems of 
knowledge and ways of seeing.”65 It is precisely this conception of knowledge creation that 
informs the present study, and in so doing, serves as a “means of avoiding the false neutrality 
and universality of so much academic knowledge.”66 More than that, a reading of this thesis 
will confirm Gillian Rose’s conclusion that, 
We cannot know everything, nor can we survey power as if we can fully understand, 
control or redistribute it. What we may be able to do is something rather more modest, 
but perhaps, rather more radical: to inscribe into our research practices some absences 
and fallibilities while recognizing that the significance of this does not rest entirely in 
our own hands.
67
 
A Final Comment  
An extensive range of archival and other documentary material was obtained in the course of 
fieldwork. I have not been able to utilise all of this rich documentary evidence in the analysis 
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and discussion in the chapters which follow, but they have informed the overall conception of 
the discursive and representational orientations in the political marketing of the ANC. I have 
asserted and acknowledged the partial nature of the research materials that inform this study, 
and thus, by extension, I acknowledge the partiality of the present study itself. Despite this, 
its theoretical and empirical purport provides a novel insight into the means by which cultural 
production and consumption through the techniques of political marketing operate within the 
post-colonial and post-apartheid milieu. Moreover, and drawing on the historical tradition of 
marketing within the ANC, the thesis examines the continuity and discontinuity of discursive 
forms of political exchange and interaction in South Africa. In research to date, no similar 
study of this nature and scope has been undertaken. 
This thesis thus makes a unique interdisciplinary contribution to studies of political 
marketing, which has tended to be neglected in geography, sociology and cultural studies and 
rendered technical in political studies. The interdisciplinary nature of the thesis is brought 
into sharper focus when consideration is given to the fact that within political geography, the 
study of liberation and post-liberation contexts has tended to place emphasis on the process of 
political struggle, nation-building, citizenship and geopolitics.
68
 Similarly, seminal studies on 
the culture, power and identity in Africa have located the authoritarian colonial and post-
colonial state at the centre of such construction.
69
 However, the thesis will foreground the 
liberation movement and political party in the political process and its contribution is thus 
distinguished from other studies on post-colonial Africa and post-apartheid South Africa. The 
thesis does not ignore contributions to understanding the process of liberation and national 
culture in Africa, but rather recasts these contributions through the lens of political 
marketing.
70
 Despite the important empirical lacunae that political marketing fills in the study 
of political processes and change, criticism of the practice remains highly instructive. While 
its epistemological base is being consistently debated, its meta-theoretical utility as an 
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analytical lens has been neglected. The thesis aims to address these challenges by illustrating 
its utility – both explicit and implicit – in understanding South African politics. It also 
addresses the Western-centric bias in the epistemological and ontological base of political 
marketing. 
SCOPE AND ORGANISATION 
This discussion commences with an introduction to the notion of political marketing. In 
chapter two, I trace the outlines of the sub-discipline and expand its theoretical and analytical 
scope to include a wider set of representational practices that enrich its applicability in the 
study of persuasion. This broader conception of political marketing allows for a more 
dynamic understanding of the discursive and representational practices of the ANC in the 
political realm. 
Given their centrality to understandings of the political marketing of the ANC, the thesis is 
structured around three themes: liberation, political culture and spectacle. While their 
interpretive significance will be further demonstrated in the chapters which follow, it is 
important to note that these themes provide an enduring basis on which to conceive the 
struggle against apartheid and the emergence of the democratic state. As such, their heuristic 
import lies in the ability to critically examine the political marketing of the ANC over time. 
The notion of liberation has been deeply inscribed in the registers of the ANC. In chapter 
three, I examine the various ideological and philosophical threads that inform the notion of 
liberation for the ANC and the means through which a dominant conception of liberation 
came to obtain through political marketing. Noting the significance of marketing for the 
ANC, the chapter examines the influences and grammars of liberation adopted and 
popularised by the MK, Robben Islanders and the UDF. In so doing, I highlight the complex 
interaction between various agents in the political sphere and demonstrate the nature of 
relationships that punctuated the contest against apartheid. Chapter four makes an important 
contribution to the second theme, political culture, and focuses on the campaign for the 
Freedom Charter and the event that bore it, the Congress of the People. Critically 
interrogating the narrative of the Charter’s formulation and the means by which it became the 
touchstone of the ANC’s vision for a democratic South Africa, the chapter aims to ‘de-
mythify’ the narrative of its constitution and demonstrate the starkly political imperative that 
underlay it. Here, the centrality of marketing is rendered clear. This chapter is also an 
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important link for crystallising understandings of the content of liberation as well as the 
providing an understanding of the political culture of the ANC. 
In chapter five, I examine the 1994 election – an act of liberation in itself – and the strategic 
and political behaviour that informed the campaign. While this election has generated 
significant academic and popular enquiry, the present analysis offers an insight into the 
continuities and discontinuities in the ANC’s modes of political exchange and the historical 
rootedness of its representational and discursive orientations. Further, this exchange exposes 
a tension in its organisational identities – between liberation movement and political party – 
that would be important as the ANC prepared itself to govern a democratic South Africa and 
provides an insight into conceptions of liberation and political culture of the ANC. 
Chapter six examines the changing political cultures of the ANC through the economic 
policies of the RDP and GEAR. In a shift from the more public and demonstrable forms of 
marketing that are evident in the previous chapters, I aim to show a more nuanced operation 
of political marketing where the emphasis on the symbolism of policy functions as a means to 
market the state. A strongly modernising ethic is apparent with the introduction of GEAR 
which obtains greater resonance through the marketing of the notion of an African 
Renaissance. While performing a powerful symbolic function in marketing the resurgence of 
the continent of Africa, led by the ANC, I nevertheless demonstrate the tensions inherent in 
the adoption of a neoliberal economic policy by a rhetorically composed popular, people-
centred political movement.  Economic policy became a site of immense contestation 
between various formations within the ANC and the tripartite alliance and the tussle between 
Mbeki’s ANC and the alliance partners would break down finally in the mid-2000s. 
Chapter seven examines the 2009 general election campaign as constitutive of political 
spectacle. The internecine battles for power necessitated a political campaign that asserted the 
need for unity and reconciliation within the political sphere and the corralling of support 
would be premised on campaign that was endowed with theatricality, carnival and 
performance. While South African politics is marked by spectacle, historically and presently, 
the analysis here notes the strategic and tactical manoeuvring that was undertaken in a rapidly 
changing political milieu in which Jacob Zuma ascended to the presidency of the ANC. 
Recourse to ethnicity and personality were important variables through which to garner 
support. While recourse to traditions, personality, memory and history were integral to the 
overarching register of the campaign, the 2009 election also required the ANC’s ‘coolness’ to 
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be demonstrated as a new youth demographic came to hold increasing electoral power. 
Utilising modern campaign practices together with more tried forms of organisation, the 
campaign aimed to demonstrate the entrenchment of the ANC’s power in the political sphere 
and generate support for its primary candidate, Jacob Zuma. 
In chapter eight, I conclude by reflecting on the political marketing of the ANC over time and 
highlight the strategies by which its marketing gave it representational and discursive 
consistency. As a lens to reconceptualise the  politics of the ANC and thus the politics of 
South Africa, political marketing also offers an important means through which strategic and  
organisational behaviour may be conceptualised. Similarly, the political marketing of the 
ANC provides an important means through which the sub-discipline is enriched and given 
greater theoretical applicability. 
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2. 
FRAMINGS: 
TOWARDS THEORETICAL ECLECTICISM 
*************** 
Understandings of the political marketing of the ANC are duly indebted to a theoretical and 
conceptual framing that is located at the centre of a disciplinary crossroads that includes 
electoral geography, political sociology, voter behaviour and cultural studies. In 
acknowledging such positioning, I argue that this mode of framing provides an apposite lens 
through which to fully conceptualise the ANC’s interaction in, and engagement with, the 
political and public spheres. An ‘eclectic’ theoretical and conceptual mooring enhances 
understandings of the political marketing of the ANC and allows for a richer and more 
diverse examination of its discursive and representational oeuvres, over time and across 
changing political milieus. 
I noted in the previous chapter that the thesis employs a conceptually broad understanding of 
‘political marketing’ to encompass the promotional, publicity and propaganda activity of the 
ANC. Expanding the theoretical ambit of political marketing to include these range of 
practices allows for a greater conceptualisation of the discursive and representational 
construction of the ANC; it nevertheless renders the idea of political marketing as 
theoretically ‘loose’.  Rather than limiting the scope of its utility to explain political activity, I 
argue that such ‘looseness’ endows the notion of political marketing with a greater heuristic 
and theoretical significance. Indeed, such ‘looseness’ permits for more sound 
conceptualisation of political marketing as an “orientation”, in which a marketing 
“consciousness” informs the operations of agents in the political realm.1 Such 
‘consciousness’ is central to explicating the “interactive” nature of this realm, in which there 
is acknowledgement both of the  dynamism that exists in relations between agents – that is, 
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between the disseminators and receptors of the communicative act –  and commensurately, in 
the form and content of the ‘marketing’ method employed.2 
Regarding the form of the ANC’s discursive and representational practices, it would be 
myopic and indeed fallacious to view these as conforming to the strictures of ‘marketing’ – 
rather, these practices are fluid and shift between promotion, publicity and propaganda. 
While the former may be understood as directly related to marketing, propaganda, as will be 
demonstrated below, is not. Regarding content, the present study interrogates the ANC’s 
political marketing as a set of historically-conditioned and resonant discursive registers and 
representational enactments that are informed by the more ‘cultural’ aspects of the ANC’s 
political history, including myth, memory, symbolism, spectacle, carnival and ritual. Thus, I 
argue, that to understand the political marketing of the ANC, and the continuities and 
discontinuities therein, a richer and wider understanding of the range of influences that 
impact upon and inform its pronouncement and practices is required. Moreover, while the 
application of marketing to the political realm has garnered much critical commentary, this 
enquiry foregrounds marketing as a fundamental means of political interlocution that deeply 
informs debates on the social and cultural bases of political change in a post-colonial and 
post-apartheid setting. 
This chapter proceeds by examining the contours of a narrow and more technical conception 
of political marketing and its key features that render it applicable to explaining the political 
behaviour and strategy of agents in the political realm. I argue here that despite its essentially 
commercial applicability, marketing constitutes a sound analytical device in which to 
examine the operation of persuasion in the political sphere. While utilised traditionally in 
election campaigns, political marketing activities need to be foregrounded against traditional 
conceptions of voter behaviour. The utility of this understanding lies not only in the short-
term influences that inform decision-making at election time, but more fundamentally I 
argue, in the insight it provides into the longer-term and enduring bases upon which  party 
support and allegiance are premised. As such, greater theoretical thrust is given to the 
influence of marketing activities over time and the means by which it was able to inculcate 
allegiance and support, and influence voter decision-making. While not discounting the short- 
term influences on such decision-making, models of voter behaviour hold important heuristic 
significance in understanding the historical, social and cultural bases upon which perceptions 
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and attitudes are formed. The interplay between the construction of these bases and ‘political 
marketing’ is significant for the present examination. As such, the second section of this 
chapter briefly unpacks the key factors that inform voters’ perceptions and attitudes in 
political and electoral decision-making through an adumbration of the tenets of key models of 
voter behaviour. While these understandings are indebted to more ‘rational’ and ‘scientific’ 
premises, in the third section of this chapter I examine a range of aforementioned ‘cultural’ 
factors that influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviours. I argue that these ‘cultural’ 
influences are deeply implicated in the discursive grammars and representational enactments 
of the ANC and as such permit a richer and more dynamic understanding of its social and 
cultural influence in the political sphere in South Africa.  
POLITICAL MARKETING: PREMISES 
My intention here is not to relate the genealogy of the sub-discipline, but rather to foreground 
certain key theoretical constructs and ideas that have informed reflections on political 
marketing. As a “hybrid sub-discipline that draws on the parent disciplines of commercial 
marketing and political science”, the development of political marketing as a nascent, yet 
emerging,  field of enquiry has been marked by theoretical meanderings and conceptual 
imprecision.
3
 Despite the fact that “no consensus existed about a definition of political 
marketing”, in part because the definition of marketing itself was contested, its political 
application was nevertheless clear.
4
 Indeed, seen as “offer[ing] new ways of understanding 
modern democratic politics”, the utility of marketing in the political realm lay in its ability to 
“[offer] insights into the strategic options and behaviour of parties” and more imperatively 
for the scope of the present enquiry, 
It shares with history the desire to investigate and explain the behaviour of leading 
political actors, and thus its focus extends from campaigning into the high politics of 
government and party management [...] The use of marketing changes relationships 
between leaders, parties and voters. It has consequences for democratic practice and 
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citizen engagement. Its influence cannot be confined to the limits of the formal 
election campaign periods.
5
 
While the commercial bias of marketing was obviated by re-orientating the definition to 
capture a wider range of public and promotional activity, such re-orientation was given 
greater theoretical clarity by being premised on the notion of exchange “between an 
organisation and its environment.”6  In premising political marketing’s ontological and 
epistemological bases on the principle of exchange, greater emphasis is given to the 
interactive nature of the political market and the dialogic processes that characterise the 
relationships in the political sphere.
7
 The effect of this is to re-orientate marketing away from 
its strictly commercial and profit-driven bias, and locate it more strongly with the selling of 
services. In undertaking such a re-orientation, greater consonance is accorded to the 
interaction of marketing with the political sphere. Indeed, such consonance is explicit for as 
Harrop opines, 
Marketing a party has more in common with marketing services [...] services are sold 
on trust [...] Establishing trust means demonstrating competence, reliability and 
consistency. These solid virtues are the criteria by which service organisations, 
including parties are judged. So marketing a party consists essentially in projecting 
belief in its ability to govern.
8
 
Moreover, understanding the resonance between political and relationship marketing’s 
theoretical purview, a greater appreciation of marketing’s applicability in the “packaging of 
politics”9 may be obtained. Indeed, the emphasis placed on “confidence-building strategies” 
which are informed through “information policy, through an authenticated record of 
achievement and through commitments and promises that seem credible to potential 
purchasers” resonate strongly with the campaigning and political activities of parties and 
candidates.
10
 But inculcating such confidence is reliant not simply on tangible ‘deliverables’, 
but also importantly on less tangible qualities of image and reputation. For Harrop, the image 
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that political parties (and candidates) are able to cultivate and promote is important, as 
“voters support the party whose policy profile comes closest to their own.”11 Central to this, 
is the recognition that at its core, “[p]olitics is concerned with the affirmation of values” and 
“a political issue is not merely a product to be merchandised, but a vibrant value symbol 
connecting with an individual’s sense of who and what they are.”12 As a result, the image of a 
party or candidate is seen as a “soft variable tangled up with emotional attachments,” and, as 
opposed to the influence of the ‘harder’ variable of reputation, which is assessed on 
performance and the achievement of political, economic and social goals, emphasising 
political image “is a strategic imperative of the political market.”13 While not dismissing the 
importance of the policy imperatives of politics and the affirmation of the values that it holds 
for both an individual and group, the ‘softness’ of image lends it a perceptual malleability 
that locates it at the centre of political and representational strategy. Indeed, as “voters choose 
a government rather than compare manifestos”, political image is central, for as Schumpeter 
has espoused, “the psychotechnics of party management and party advertising, slogans and 
marching tunes are not accessories. They are the essence of politics.”14 
Given that the import of political marketing pivots on the notion of a pervasive marketing 
‘consciousness’ and that it is what parties and candidates “actually do” in the political 
arena,
15
 its focus on the “shared interests of voters” lends it an important theoretical 
significance which is not sufficiently analysed in disciplines such as political science or 
political geography and sociology.
16
 Indeed, the emphasis in these cognate disciplines and 
sub-disciplines is largely on the point of conflict and cleavage in the social and political 
body.
17
 However, in a critical stock-take of its ontological and epistemological bases, 
Henneberg has argued that political marketing continues to display fluidity and looseness in 
its theoretical and conceptual universe and key ideas and concepts are still “ill-defined.”18 As 
a sub-discipline ‘in the making’, such looseness allows for the operation of a wider 
interpretive schema that permits political marketing to operate as an “integrated way of 
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managing politics” instead of being a mere “communication tool.”19 Such management is 
dependent on recognising that there is a “structural connectedness” between “the 
management of politics and politics itself.”20 Indeed, rather than view the “content and 
packaging of politics” as two discreet operations, political marketing theory undertakes an 
epistemological bridging function to call forward the imperatives and bases of politics.
21
 In 
this way, rather than being seen as merely “putting the gloss on politics”, political marketing 
has a broader theoretical and empirical remit that allows for a deepening of its analytical 
practice.
22
 
The integrative aspect that is forwarded by theorists of political marketing places emphasis 
on locating “marketing activity” within the “political environment in which it is deployed” 
and thus provides an “holistic understanding of all political activities, exchanges, players, 
structures” and the like in the political market.23 In addition, this wide interpretive schema 
berths the theory of political marketing within a tradition of “methodological pluralism” in 
which it serves as a “complement” to a range of theories that inform understandings of the 
political market.
24
 Given the scope of the present enquiry and the structure of the discussion 
that follows, this conception of political marketing serves an apt theoretical and heuristic 
function in explaining the nature of the political market in which the ANC operated and 
provides an apt illumination of the strategies that it employed both as a political party and as 
an incumbent government. In addition, analysing the South African political sphere through 
the lens of political marketing permits an important insight into the relationships of power 
and influence that occupy that space. Indeed, while the overarching focus here rests on the 
political marketing activity of the ANC, a more nuanced analysis is undertaken to 
demonstrate the various influences that inform its representational practices. In undertaking 
this examination, the analytical thrust of the thesis satisfies the management function of 
political marketing which places emphasis on the practical application of marketing activity 
in the public sphere while commensurately foregrounding the exchange nature of agents that 
constitute that sphere.
25
 In addition to this, the emphasis on the exchange character of 
political marketing permits a reading of South African politics and more critically, ANC 
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politics, in which the dynamism of the “totality” of the exchanges and interactions are 
centrally located.
26
 
The analytical focus of the discussion in the subsequent chapters adopt the approach of 
examining the dynamisms of the political market, while commensurately highlighting the 
shifting temporal plane upon which the ANC’s marketing was undertaken. Thus, in both 
looking forward and backward through time, the analysis below renders clear continuities and 
discontinuities in its discursive and representational registers and strategies. 
In offering an alternative means to theorise the political sphere, it is necessary for studies in 
political marketing to acknowledge the “embeddedness of politics” and “its relationship with 
social and other narrative models of representation.”27 Conceiving of marketing as a 
technology of power that aims to induce specific behaviours through the construction of 
perceptions, influence and persuasion, the acknowledgement of politics’ 
“interconnectedness” in these broader systems of representation offers a richer and more 
distinctive “contextual frame” in which to understand the behaviour of political 
protagonists.
28
 Moreover, such interconnectedness also gives greater content to the 
importance of relationships that underpin the marketing exchange and the networks of 
interests and agents that interact in the political sphere.
29
 The effect of this is to cast political 
“interactivity” and “exchange” as an “enduring social process” between all political agents 
that extends beyond merely election based interaction.
30
 Here, the imperative to develop 
“long-term trust and commitment-based relationships” becomes the foundation upon which 
extended social relations and engagement are premised and a veritable ‘social contract’ 
between the citizenry and political institutions is established.
31
 The utility of emphasising the 
relationship nature of the marketing exchange, and apt for reducing the global trend toward 
political dealignment, is the prospect of “greater involvement,” wherein increased 
consultation, community mobilisation, and engagement with “policy delivery and 
implementation” forms an important “aspect of the political marketing exchange.” 32 While 
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this conception of relationship marketing ideal-typically constructs the nature of the 
relationship facilitated between the citizenry and government, the empirical observations in 
the chapters that follow demonstrate the partial nature of the exchange process in the political 
sphere in South Africa, despite the rhetorical and representational emphasis placed on 
interaction, information-sharing, bottom-up mobilisation initiative and engagement in policy, 
by the ANC. The reasons for this partiality will be demonstrated and discussed in the chapters 
that follow and its resonances for understandings of the political marketing of the ANC 
rendered clear. 
Of crucial importance in facilitating the relationship aspect of political marketing is the 
bestowal of a “sense of political ownership” to allow for greater cohesiveness between 
political agents, notably political parties, candidates and the citizenry. Such ownership not 
only manifests in “bonds of solidarity” but also more critically in “bonds of intimacy”.33 
These bonds act reciprocally and augment relations between political agents.  Indeed, while 
solidarity emerges through openness between parties, through trust and is developed over 
time, similarly the need to cultivate intimacy between players in the political sphere relates to 
affective and emotional ties which political marketing aims to ‘accent’.34 Using emotional 
appeals to “connect” with the citizenry greater impetus is given to ownership and 
participation in the political process and greater legitimacy is accorded to the political 
protagonist.
35
 In this way such bonds of solidarity and intimacy endow political marketing 
with the ability to serve “as a means of neutralising the deeply alienated in society” while 
commensurately informing perceptions, ideas and opinions of those not alienated.
36
 
It should be clearly evident from the foregoing that political marketing cannot be considered 
a “neutral aspect of politics”, given its overarching objective of ‘exchanging’ information, 
ideas and the like to effect behaviour.
37
 While promotional and publicity functions 
undertaken by political actors and political parties in particular aim to inculcate positive and 
affirmative values and impressions in the political and social body to garner support, I have 
argued above that  a “strategic imperative” lies in establishing “enduring relationships” to 
provide continued legitimacy of the political entity, whether political party, candidate or 
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government.
38
 Thus, while political marketing offers a lens through which to understand 
political behaviour, its explanatory potential is further refracted and enhanced through 
understanding the adjunct, and indeed highly complicit process, of political branding. 
As a cognate of political marketing, branding extends the focus on reputation and image by 
raising the “emotional connection” that a political brand induces. Its political utility lies in its 
three constitutive features, namely “internal values, external presentation and consumer 
perception.”39 While notions of reputation and image do not meld all of these features within 
their explanatory remit, branding’s utilisation endows it with an added ‘robustness’ which is 
expedient in not only analysing “election campaigning, but is particularly helpful in 
understanding efforts to sustain relationships and maintain loyalty during the period between 
elections.”40 Providing a heuristic space for an “emotional connection” to be illuminated, 
branding’s value lies also in its ability to “provide a conceptual structure to link advertising 
insight into all aspects of the brand, positioning, development and promotion.”41 Given this, 
The general value of branding to campaigners is both conceptual and practical. It 
provides a conceptual framework to distinguish and fathom links between the 
functional perceptions of parties and leaders [...] such as economic management, 
policy commitments and the competence to deliver, and the emotional attractions [...], 
such as “one of us”, authenticity, approachability, and attractiveness to the ear and 
eye. It brings together the emotional and intellectual, rational and irrational [...], the 
big and tiny details that feed into overall brand images.
42
 
For political parties, the concept of the brand offers a useful empiric through which to 
understand party marketing as it allows for a distillation of meaning to facilitate “voter 
cohesion, recognition and predictability.”43 Such distillation also serves to disentangle the 
complex associations attached to the political party and provides an ‘informational shortcut’ 
for supporters, so that the “building of trust and commitment” is smoothed through the 
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“dyadic relationship” that exists between the supporter and the party/candidate.44 More than 
that, brands also serve to facilitate the formation of associated “brand communities” with the 
objective of creating a platform through which ‘political consumers’ are able to “interact with 
the brand and, critically, other users of the brand.”45 
Further, as a site of meanings, affections, ideas, opinions and the like, the branded political 
party is also complicit in an associative practice of “provid[ing] cultural meaning” as they 
serve as repositories for “societal norms and values.”46 Branded parties also function as 
signifiers of “aspiration” and are instrumental in “evoking a particular vision of the ‘good 
life’ and holding out the promise of personal enhancement based on a set of values.”47 
However, brands are “not inviolable” and 
[when] a party becomes disunited and/or sends conflicting messages to voters [and 
more broadly, supporters], the perceived cohesion of the party brand breaks down, its 
credibility is lost – and voters are notoriously disinclined to support a disunited 
party.
48
 
Disunity and the risks associated with fractious party relations functions to disrupt the 
“connection” brands establish with supporters.49 The disruption of the “brand connection” 
affects the foundation of the ‘dyadic relationship’ that exists.50 Through this disruption, 
identity bonds that exist between the branded product (in the case under examination, both 
party and leader) and its support base give way and the ideal-typical associations held by 
stakeholders of the brand – the “epistemic social schema” – is diluted.51 This dilution signals 
a rupture in the temporal development and conceptions of the brand. Brand associations and 
the identity that brands attempt to capture and project are formed over time and not through 
singular, ephemeral interactions. Thus, the persuasion imperative that underpins a political 
brand occurs through “a series of messages [that] will work together, constructing and overall 
image and set of schematic relations that will convince the audience members to take the 
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desired action.”52 The means to “develop positive feelings” for a political party and its 
candidate” is therefore, 
[...] accomplished by continually displaying visual associations between the product 
and some object or symbol that is already schematically tied to a positive value 
(thereby taking advantage of the emotional responses already associated with that 
value).
53
 
Thus, the constant process of articulation and re-articulation of a brands’ representational 
assets over time invests in the supporters an historical repository of positive associations 
which may be accessed at politically expedient times. The analysis in this thesis will render 
clear the ANC’s continuous attempts of inculcating a brand identity over time. Keenly aware 
of the need to locate itself at the centre of a moral-ethical universe in which it signifies the 
representation of positive values – political and economic liberation, democracy, non-
racialism, constitutionalism and associated rights  – the ANC aimed to monopolise this 
universe and incorporate all associations of these values under the rubric of its brand. When 
disunity within the party actualised, the recourse to these associations through the invocation 
of a narrative of historical claim and ownership of events, persons, values and the like served 
to mythologize the ANC role in South African political history and thus lend greater credence 
to its claims for political and moral authority. In doing so, the ANC aim to obtain an “iconic 
brand” status, for through the recourse to historically-indebted (and indeed, constructed) 
narratives, it “aims to address the collective anxieties and desires of [the] nation.”54 
Moreover, with the shift in emphasis “in consumption from function to identity definition,”55 
brands 
[...] become iconic when they perform identity myths: simple fictions that address 
cultural anxieties from afar, from imaginary worlds that consumers regularly 
encounter in their everyday lives. The aspirations expressed in these myths are an 
imaginative, rather than literal, expression of the audience’s aspired identity.56 
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Thus, in positioning itself as the ‘sole and authentic’ agent in overcoming apartheid – both 
through the first stage of political liberation and the continued project of economic and social 
liberation and captured in the overarching slogan of providing ‘A Better Life for All’ – the 
representational and discursive orientations of the ANC function to inform this myth, so that 
it “becomes a symbol, a material embodiment of the myth.”57 Important for the purposes of 
the current investigation too, is the acknowledgement that the ANC’s hegemonic position in 
the political and electoral spheres lies in its aptitude for ‘authorial’ dominance for, 
[w]hen a brand authors myths that people find valuable, it earns the authority to tell 
similar kinds of myths (cultural authority) to address the identity desires of a similar 
constituency (political authority) in the future.
58
 
The analysis in subsequent chapters will unpack the means by which the ANC obtained such 
authorial predominance and problematise the various thematic, historic and fabled strands 
through which the myths were constructed. Colonialism and apartheid, and the liberation 
struggle, forms a powerful and enduring political, economic, social and cultural backdrop 
against which these myths and stories were told and provides an important reference point 
against which the ANC centred its moral-ethical predispositions and its strongly emotional 
appeals. Given this, it follows that the utility and importance of brands lies in their function 
not only as symbolic signifiers in a particular market (whether political or commercial) but 
rather as “social media” which is more akin to a “cultural pattern – a particular experience or 
mode of relating – which is reproduced in a wide variety of different situations, involving 
many different actors.”59 For the present analysis, understanding this ‘mode of relating’ 
provides more critical content to understanding the rhetorical and discursive premises upon 
which the ANC sought to engage and maintain support in the political market. Such 
engagement and support, it should be noted, extends beyond periods of electoral activity to 
include the ‘everyday’ interactions between the citizenry, the party and the government. 
The discussion above has conceptualised and illuminated the strands of a wider and more 
theoretically appropriate notion of political marketing that operates as a critical lens through 
which to understand the discursive and representational politics of the ANC. Broadening the 
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theoretical ambit to demonstrate its intersections with the cognate concept of political 
branding, the content of this theoretical terrain is apt for permitting a unique insight into the 
relation of forces in the political market while providing a novel analytical aperture in which 
to understand the historical, conjunctural, political and cultural influences in that  market. 
This broader interpretation of political marketing obviates the definitional imprecision that 
informs debates on its theoretical content and conceptual applicability.
60
 Moreover, in 
examining factors beyond the remit of traditional marketing and voter behaviour models, a 
wider interpretation of political marketing lends itself greater ‘causal’ weight and provides a 
more historically-grounded, richer and dynamic constellation of variables through which to 
understand the political market and certain determinants of voter behaviour. In doing this, 
greater accent is placed on limiting, though not dispelling, more pointed criticisms of political 
marketing, namely that it begets a “poll driven politics”; that it is increasingly about ‘spin’; 
that it lends itself to politics that is “void of content”; that politics and politicians genuflect to 
money;
61
 or that it permits a “rented allegiance.”62 Finally, while critics have argued that 
marketing has permitted a whittling of “democratic practice” through disengagement and the 
promotion of superficiality in political life, the cultural imperatives that inform a broadened 
conception of political marketing offers instead an avenue of enhancement of such practice.
63
 
Indeed, and as noted above, just as brands allow for ‘modes of relating’ that are premised on 
the “reproduction of a particular pattern of affect and community”, within these modes, there 
exist democratic potentials and spaces of resistance.
64
 Rather than see marketing as an 
homogenising force, it needs to be located as one of a range of factors that shape and inform 
attitudes, opinions and behaviour in the political sphere. To view citizens’ political 
participation solely as being instigated by the marketing activities of a political actor is to 
limit the agency of the citizenry and curtail the vibrancy of the political sphere. Certainly, 
while citizens and more specifically voters align themselves to marketed ‘products’ and 
brands, they also undertake a continuous process of critical engagement, evaluation and 
interaction. To assume that the citizenry will continuously “elevate style over substance”, is 
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to render opaque a critical feature of politics: notably the lived and experienced politics of 
everyday.
65
 
Political marketing, despite the diversity of its theoretical and empirical purview, constitutes 
one element in a matrix of understanding citizen behaviour and political motivation. While 
this thesis examines the political marketing of the ANC during elections, it also addresses the 
marketing activities undertaken between elections using the example of economic policy as a 
marketing device. In understanding the impact on political behaviour, I now turn to a brief 
overview of the key models influencing citizen decision-making. Voter behaviour models, 
while focused on providing an explanatory framework for decision-making and behaviour 
during elections, nevertheless hold significant theoretical import in considerations of the 
influences and variables that inform such behaviour over the longer-term.  
IMBRICATIONS OF INFLUENCE: 
A SYNOPSIS OF VOTER BEHAVIOUR MODELS 
My aim in this section is to provide a brief synopsis of the major variables that influence 
voter decision-making. The cursory discussion here posits that while voter behaviour theory 
is largely silent on the influence of political marketing, there nevertheless exists important 
scope for foregrounding the points of intersection and overlap.
66
 Voter behaviour models are 
generally rooted within a set of pragmatic ‘rationalities’ that provide an explanatory 
framework for understanding decision-making in the political sphere. While these models are 
premised essentially on accounting for the influences that impact upon the electoral 
behaviour of the citizenry, it nevertheless permits a more long-term and historical insight into 
the social, psychological and structural factors that influence such decision-making. In doing 
so, it allows for the initial outlines of the range of interactive influences impacting upon the 
individual and society to be foregrounded. Again, and as will be evident below, these models 
should not be seen to operate within strict parameters, but spaces of overlap and interactivity 
are clear. 
Rational choice models of voter behaviour assert the primacy that voters accord to 
government performance evaluations in delivery social and economic benefits.
67
 While 
abiding to the mantra that “voters are not fools”, the rational model was premised on a 
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strongly utilitarian foundation in which assessments of performance were made.
 68
  As Lewis-
Beck notes, rational choice voters “look backward and forward, at the economics of the self, 
community, and government, forming reasoned and not so reasoned opinions that decide his 
or her party preference.”69 This ‘backwards and forwards’ aspect highlights the “prospective” 
and “retrospective” assessments that voters undertake when assessing their social and 
economic positions, and thus adding a temporality to the decision-making process.
70
 
Importantly, performance evaluations are undertaken on the lived experience of voters, for as 
Fiorina suggests, “citizens [...] know what life has been like during the incumbent’s 
administration. They do not need to know the precise economic or foreign policies of the 
incumbent administration in order to judge the results of those policies.”71 
The lived experience variable also has important implications for a sociological 
understanding of voter behaviour in which “social group attachments” and “characteristics” 
are determinants of behaviour. 
72
 Serving as a compass for “values and political beliefs”, 
class, religion, ethnicity, race, gender and the like also become important conduits through 
which socialisation occurs.
73
 Here, “party preference was a matter of heredity and habit, not 
decision-making” and importantly, voting is seen as “a periodic occasion for reaffirming 
one’s social identity, not an opportunity to choose between administrations or belief 
systems.”74 While the social class aspect dominated the theoretical paradigm, the 
‘boundedness’ of these sociological cleavages provided an analytical weakness to this model. 
Criticised for not adequately capturing a more complex and nuanced social realities, the 
model still holds heuristic significance for a South African political reality in which social 
cleavages of race and class remain important variables in decision-making.
75
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While sociological markers afford voters consistent cues upon which decision-making is 
premised, voter behaviour research was also directed to consider the psychological aspect 
informing electoral choice. The emergence of the socio-psychological framework was 
premised on understanding the “attitudes and values” that informed decisions.76 Premised 
essentially on three pillars – “party attachment, issue opinions and candidate images” – the 
model made important contributions to understandings of partisanship and provided a sound 
account of “actual voting decisions.”77 Moreover, and important for understandings of 
political marketing, its value lay in the consideration it gave to the “the events of the 
campaign” which influenced opinions and decisions.78 The approach, unlike those discussed 
heretofore, understood voter ‘attachment’ to political parties as being premised on “long-
term, affective, psychological identification.”79Voters are socialised politically through 
“acquir[ing] those skills and beliefs necessary to orient him the political community of which 
he is part”, and thus is premised on the extent to which the “values and attitudes and the 
political culture of a society are inculcated.”80 Serving further as a “stimulus for engagement 
in campaigns and elections” and thus serving a distinctly ‘mobilisational’ function, 
partisanship is ‘transmitted’ through basic social structures like the family.81 
Partisan affiliation is premised on the key idea of how “people like me” make electoral 
decisions and it becomes a central variable in how citizens “view events, issues and 
candidates.”82 Thus, as an “emotional prop and informational crib”83 partisan affiliation is 
also closely related to the notion of “party image” that voters hold, which essentially is a 
reflection of the “mental pictures, or psychological images, that voters have of parties.”84 
While party “inclusivity” is the key premise given that it is based on the “credibility and 
trustworthiness of a party”, such inclusivity is underpinned on a range of sociological factors 
– in South Africa, race remains the key factor. 85 The operation of sociological factors as 
determinants of voter behaviour does not mitigate the extent to which the electorate is 
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‘cognitively mobilised’. 86 Here, the emphasis is on the “political sophistication”87 of voters 
and is instructive in providing information on how “politically interested and well-educated” 
voters undertake the process of political decision-making.
88A ‘cognitively mobilised’ 
electorate relies less on “party identifications as shortcut to handle difficult and often 
confusing political decisions” and rather on political information  obtained through at its own 
discretion.
89
 
This cursory overview of the pragmatic ‘rationalities’ that inform voter decision-making 
provides an important insight into the range of factors that shape and inform electoral 
behaviour. Significant for the present purposes is the temporal, psychological and structural 
aspect of these influences. Rather than acknowledging these models as operating as singular 
explanatory frameworks, the discussion above has cursorily emphasised the interactive nature 
and influence of the key variables in each model. In doing so, a richer and more complex 
understanding of the influences that operate in the political market is obtained. However, in 
addition, in demonstrating the range of societal, psychological and structural influences upon 
the voter, a theoretical aperture is presented. Indeed, while these models foreground the more 
‘rational’ bases of influence, it nevertheless permits a space in which other ‘cultural’ 
determinants may come to inform decision-making. Historically determined, societal-based 
and psychologically persuasive, these factors are important adjunct determinants on political 
and electoral decision-making. In constituting a fundamental basis of an ‘eclectic’ theoretical 
framing, it is to a discussion of these bases that the analysis now turns. 
BETWEEN ELISION AND INFLECTION: 
POLITICAL MARKETING AND THE ‘CULTURAL’ ASPECT 
Technical understandings of political marketing and voter behaviour render silent the strong 
cultural foundations upon which political action is situated. In the preceding discussion, I 
have attempted to construct a wider understanding of political marketing which takes 
cognisance of the cultural influences that permeate the political sphere. The analysis below 
examines key influences in understanding the varied textures of the ANC’s discursive and 
representational appeals. The recognition that “symbols, ceremony and rhetoric may be more 
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critical” than appeals to policy, has not been absent from analyses of political marketing.90 
Moreover, within the discipline of marketing, the broadening of its explanatory ambit to 
include theoretical influences from the social sciences and humanities introduced a more 
cultural paradigm into its intellectual and explanatory universe.
91
 The cultural aspects, 
including myth, ritual, spectacle, symbolism and the like resonate with the overarching 
emphasis of political marketing for they all constitute part of a “web of communication 
shared by a community” that informs exchanges and interactions through  an alternative 
narrative models.
92
 Rightly, Stuart Hall asserts moreover that the significance of the ‘cultural’ 
aspect lies in the contribution it makes to the “production and exchange of meanings – the 
‘giving and taking of meaning’ – between members of a society or group.”93 For the present 
study and as demonstrated below, the ‘cultural’ aspect is afforded greater import for 
understandings of the ANC’s political marketing practice as it provides a means through 
which the political world was, and is, constructed, or perhaps, imagined. The direct political 
outcome of such ‘imagining’, and the cultural processes that underscored it, allowed the 
ANC, according to Raymond Suttner, to be “inserted into the cultural consciousness of 
people, becoming part of their being” and in so doing, extend its hegemony in the political 
sphere.
94
 
In the discussion below, I unpack further these and other critical ‘cultural’ aspects of 
influence in the political market to provide the foundations of a richer and more dynamic 
understanding of political marketing. While not able to explore in great detail each of these 
aspects below, the analysis below adumbrates the most pertinent elements of a theory to 
understand the political marketing of the ANC. 
Myth and Memory 
Myth performs an important and expedient function in the political realm. Characterised by 
Roland Barthes as “a mode of signification”, its power lies in its “illusory”95 potential which 
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centres “on perception rather than historically validated truths.”96 In this way, its power lies 
in its ability to create an “intellectual and cognitive monopoly” in the process of “ordering the 
world and defining world-views.”97 Endowed with this power to ‘order’ and ‘define’, myth is 
complicit in establishing systems of “morality and values” within communities and as such is 
central in to the process of “cultural reproduction.”98 While historically berthed, the authority 
accorded to myth, though not absolute, lies in its “recurrence” and as such, it is perceived to 
obtain greater resonance, veracity and legitimacy.
99
 In doing so, it becomes an orienting node 
around which allegiances gather and “solidarity” is founded, for as Schopflin posits, myth 
subverts any “ambiguity that is present in all exchanges and communications” and that, 
Cognitive processes cannot grasp the entirety of reality, so that, in order to construct 
some kind of meaningful collective existence, aspects of experience have to be 
represented in mythical and symbolic fashion [...] myth is a simplified representation, 
an ordering of the world in such a way as to make sense of it for collectivities and 
thus make it binding.
100
 
As a simplified representation, it is nevertheless endowed with significant meaning and as 
such, provides an important communicative conduit through which political persuasion may 
be effected. Indeed, the ability to access and even “celebrate” the mythological heritage of a 
community or society taps into the core of its cultural repository.
101
 The significance of 
invoking a community’s mythic past for political means lies in the ‘validation’ function of 
myth wherein myth serves as a means of acknowledgement. Indeed, for Barthes, 
Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, 
it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal 
justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a 
statement of fact.
102
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Moreover, the effect of this validation function has a direct impact on memory, or the 
“maintenance of memory.”103 For myth to operate effectively and “resonate”, it needs to 
“make an appeal” to an explicit occurrence “in the collective memory” and thus constitute a 
point of cultural reference for a particular entity. In addition, the weight attached to memory, 
and particularly useful for the analysis is this study, lies in its correlation with power. As 
Alonso has posited, 
If social action is mediated by history, it is because the past has a political and 
discursive significance. Memory, meaning and power are internally related [...] Thus, 
an inquiry into the construction and dissemination of historical memory, itself a 
central site for the production of effects of power, is critical for an analysis of 
hegemony.
104
 
As will be demonstrated in more detail in the chapters that follow, the utilisation of myth and 
memory by the ANC to effect political behaviour was a key strategy in attempts to secure 
allegiance and support. Recourse to key events and personalities in its history became a 
central feature of its discursive arsenal and was mobilised to strong effect in forming a 
cognitive and emotional bridge to a mythic and historic universe. The narratives and 
discourses utilised in this recounting instigate a sense of collective remembering “that 
connects people across time and space” but are “selective” in their appropriations of the 
past.
105
 While such a selective recall operates to create “links between the individual and the 
group and well as between the past and the present”, it also permits a ‘whitewashing’ of the 
predominant narrative and puts into service an expedient recollection of the agency, power 
and resistance.
106
 
Central to understanding the interplay between myth and memory is ritual, “wherein the 
individual participating in the rite is flooded with memories of previous occasions on which 
the rites were performed, engendering a sacred continuity.”107 Increasingly, the fundamental 
rite of democracy, namely voting in elections, became a site for the intersection of memory, 
myth and ritual. I argue below that remembering mythic events through the discourses around 
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contemporary elections became a central means through which to connect the present day 
ANC and its supporters with valorised events of the past, and in so doing, allow for the 
inculcation of perceptions of ‘sacred continuity.’ More broadly, however, the utilisation of 
memory is intimately implicated in the process of the establishment of a “new cultural 
memory” premised on the “resistance narratives” in the struggle against apartheid which form 
the “foundation myth for a non-racial, democratic society.”108 This ‘new cultural memory’ 
accords with what Crain Soudien has called a “triumphalist memory” that centres on an ethic 
of “redemption” and is “rendered essentially as a memory of the triumph of the human spirit, 
of the inevitability of goodness.”109  In the present study, this ‘triumphalism’ has come to be 
embodied in the figure of Nelson Mandela, who “iconised”, 110  undertakes a particular role of 
constituting a recursive moral touchstone for the ANC, and is put in to service to “perform 
the particular myth society especially needs at a given historical moment.”111 Thus, as will be 
further explicated in the chapter that follows, the myth of Mandela is akin to the general 
utility of myth, in that it 
[...] condition[s] the public to the powerful symbols used by politicians. Myths 
underwrite the status quo in times of stability and they chart the course of change in 
times of stress.
112
 
Myths and memory serve as repositories of ideas that circulate, inform and influence 
cognitions and behaviours, and thus have a particular resonance as a fount which can be 
tapped to contextualise discourses of political marketing. To give effect myth and memory 
requires acts of performance. It is to this the analysis now turns.  
Performance: Ritual, Spectacle and Carnival 
Performance of the political invokes Schumpeter’s recognition of the ‘psychotechnics’ of 
politics. Indeed, performing politics lends itself to the dramatic and theatrical elements of 
political behaviour which when premised on “cultural expressions and enactments” allow for 
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greater “emotional persuasiveness” as well as “political and social connectedness.”113 The 
analytical and theoretical utility of performance in the examination below centres on specific 
moments and events, but as will be demonstrated, such performance is a central feature of 
both apartheid and post-apartheid political life. 
While in the previous section I noted the centrality of ritual in permitting ‘a sacred 
continuity’ by allowing for an interplay between myth and memory, it is important here too, 
to understand the greater performative power that ritual undertakes in the political sphere. 
Indeed, ritual is intimately involved in “communicat[ing] the core of a group’s self-identity 
and history”114 and in so doing 
[...] energiz[ing] the participants and attach[ing] them to each other, increas[ing] their 
identification with the symbolic objects of communication, and intensify[ing] the 
connection of the participants and the symbolic objects with the observing 
audience.
115
 
As a means of fostering identity-creation through “repetitive” performances, ritual allows for 
the “reproduction of cultural identity” while commensurately reinforcing claims to 
solidarity.
116
 As much as it is complicit in this process of identity formation, it also acts to 
ring-fence identities through an exclusionary practice that emphasises “differences” and 
distinctions between groups “by creating a symbolic universe in which groups can be 
conceived, made palpable, and assigned moral qualities.”117 Moreover, ritual enactment is 
constituted as “symbolic behaviour” wherein the ritual serves to inculcate meaning in the 
symbol – for Kertzer it allows for “symbols come be defined, diffused and energised.”118 
Further, the political effect of this inculcation was to ensconce leaders (and parties) with an 
“aura of sacrality” and by “manipulating and claiming ownership to [...] symbols, power 
holders demonstrate their special power and legitimise their claim to authority.”119 While able 
to “exist only through symbolic representation”, these processes of legitimation are highly 
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complicit in “structur[ing]   the contact between the power holders and the masses.”120 More 
importantly, and also instructive in understanding its function as a means for political  
socialisation, ritual “serves to link the individual to society” as it is “[t]hrough ritual [that] the 
individual’s subjective experience interacts with and is [moulded] by social forces.”121 In this 
way, rituals are put in to service or “invented” to reflect new “social circumstances”, but 
emanate “largely out of a stock-pile of pre-existing symbols” that allows for “an 
understanding of the world.”122 
Performance through ritual is underpinned by the ‘dramatic’ where specific parts are 
prescribed and enacted by various protagonists. Serving as “a symbolic trigger of 
confrontation”,123 this dramatic aspect lends greater emotional credence to politics and serves 
as a catalyst for “social excitement” and “physiological stimuli” that is underpinned by 
“music, singing and dancing.”124 These modes of enactment themselves are invested with an 
important social and political function. Writing about the social power of music and other 
artistic forms in Africa, Liz Gunner keenly asserts that they function as “midwives to new 
ideas and new social visions” while “summon[ing] up collective memory with amazing 
speed.”125 Thus, and as will be discussed in greater detail in chapter seven, when candidates 
for political office perform liberation era song and dance at politically expedient moments  as 
means to link their personal travails with the memory of a wider resistance struggle,  they not 
only tap into and connect with the sentiments of political and socio-economic exclusion 
experienced by their audience, they also become the embodiment of those sentiments and 
transfer the ‘sacrality’ associated with a mythic past into the present moment. In this way, the 
“genius of ritual” is exposed, for it is deeply implicated in “fostering heightened emotional 
states, identifying them both with particular social bonds and with a particular worldview.”126 
The analysis in the chapters that follow examines the ritual and performance imperatives of 
the ANC’s political marketing and highlights the larger context and resonances of such 
performance. While I have focused thus far on the performance aspects of ritual, it is 
important to note that political performance is constructed more widely to include a range of 
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expressive and public acts. Indeed, these acts are not empty of meaning and serve to construct 
political theatre as an important means for the exercise and “creation of political power.” 127 
Indeed, as Apter has argued, political theatre can be central to “precipitating and promoting 
disjunctive moments – revolution, social transformation, the redemptive occasion.” 128  Here, 
the extent of the “dramatistic” allows for the creation of a “meaning-full’ politics.129 As in 
traditional theatre, the “quality” of the performance dictates the extent to which political 
theatre can open a space which creates adequate “symbolic capital.”130 By suggesting the 
notion of ‘adequacy’, I follow Apter’s position that there exist “a premium on certain kinds of 
political theatre” where “theatricality”, devoid of strong “symbolic capital”, is pervasive.131  
As will be demonstrated in the chapters that follow, the performance of politics in South 
Africa, especially but not exclusively around election campaigns, functioned more as 
spectacle and carnival, with the “real business of politics going on elsewhere.”132 Despite 
this, the spectacular and carnivalesque nature of ANC politics was laden with symbolic 
capital and as such, operated to inculcate a sense of power, history, dominance and even 
inevitability to the staging of political life. 
I demonstrate in chapter seven how the election campaign of 2009 constituted a prime 
example of spectacle in South African political life. Indeed, the campaign satisfied 
conceptions of the spectacular as it served as a “form of captivation”, was aesthetically 
compelling, and gave life to the narrative and textual aspects of political theatre.”133 ‘Events’ 
in South African political life and political theatre are also underpinned by the inter-related 
notion of ‘carnival’, which is defined as ‘“a spectacle without a stage’, in which the 
participant is ‘both actor and spectator.’”134 Theorised by Mikhail Bakhtin essentially as a 
literary device to think through “folk culture” the notion of carnival is premised on the idea of 
the ‘contest’ and ‘challenge’ to dominant forms of power and hierarchy.135 Further,  
‘carnival’ is premised on the duality of the lived experience of “ordinary people” – inhabiting 
both the “official” world authority, formality, hierarchy and the like, as well the “unofficial” 
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which is characterised by “reversal, parody, song and laughter.”136 Thus, ‘carnival’ functions 
as an apt lens through which to understand certain events in South African political theatre 
and the textures of seminal events in the ANC’s narrative such as the Congress of the People 
in 1955. Constituting the event at which the ANC was able to construct a new political, 
moral, economic and social universe through the drawing up of the Freedom Charter, the 
prescriptions of which served as the antithesis to apartheid, the ‘carnivalism’ lay in the fact 
that, 
[t]he spectacle staged by carnivalesque rituals is not actually directed against 
institutions, whose functions and forms are only usurped for a temporary period of 
time, but rather against the loss of utopian potential brought about by dogma and 
authority. The festival [...] releases this utopian potential.
137
 
Indeed, the ethos of utopianism and the symbolic purport of the Congress of the People – 
especially given its multi-racial representation and the visionary potential of the Freedom 
Charter – endowed the struggle narrative with a strong mythic and transcendent value.  The 
import of the event, in the conjunctural moment at which it was performed, lay in the fact that 
it was in itself, emancipatory. Indeed, in its challenge to the authority of the apartheid state, 
its inscription in a memorialising narrative of resistance lay in the following of carnival:  “[it] 
is the people as a whole, organised in their own way, outside of and contrary to the ‘coercive 
socioeconomic and political organisation’, suspended for the time of festival.’”138 While I 
have used the example of the Congress of the People to illustrate the operation of the notion 
of carnival, it will be evident in the analysis in the chapters that follow, that a carnivalesque 
impetus underlies political performance at various levels of activity and analysis. 
Acknowledging this is instructive, for it provides an insight into the representation of various 
internal conflicts and leadership struggles in the ANC, while commensurately, informs 
debates on how the ANC shifts between its twin personalities of liberation movement and 
political party – or a shift between the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’. This will be rendered 
clearer in the discussion that follows. 
In construing political behaviour as performance and theatre, recognition of another central 
aspect of such a conception is required: the actors. The increasing trend toward celebrity, 
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fomented by a media-dominated public sphere, has led to the proliferation of the 
“personalisation of politics” and the creation of political “stars.”139 The  trend toward the 
‘celebratising’ of political actors – and such personalisation – is for Mancini and Swanson 
part of the larger shift toward “increasing social differentiation” and the “fracturing of 
citizens’ identities” due to the imperatives of modernisation.140 The “breakdown of traditional 
social structures”,141 which as noted above are deeply complicit in shaping and informing 
political and voter behaviour, has led to the “creation of new symbolic realities [with] their 
own symbolic templates of heroes and villains, honoured values and aspirations, histories, 
mythologies and self-definition.”142 As such, the ‘celebritising’ thrust is accorded greater 
import through technologies of political marketing and advertising, so that “[p]oliticians 
become stars, politics becomes a series of spectacles and citizens the spectators.”143 For 
Street, this turn in politics to celebrity is indicative not merely of marketing’s influence on 
political practices, but rather that “politics is marketing.”144 Indeed, while the tendency 
toward celebrity in politics privileges image and image-creation, or “appearance”, over policy 
and political substance, it nevertheless may “stand as a proxy” for “character and 
competency” and thus is not devoid of substance.145 
The value accorded to the ‘celebritised’ political actor is thus premised on “their aesthetic 
talent of being able to represent political reality in new and original ways.”146  Such ‘aesthetic 
talent’ is indicative of “political style” which “enables citizens to regain their grip on a 
complex political reality by restoring mundane experience to the centre of democratic 
practice.”147 At times rendered both explicitly and implicitly, the analysis which follows 
demonstrates the functioning of political celebrity in South Africa and the utilisation of 
‘aesthetic talent’ of political leaders. Indeed, Nelson Mandela’s style as a ‘reconciliator’, 
Thabo Mbeki’s style for delivery and Jacob Zuma’s style for ordinariness emphasised the 
personal brand of each and was utilised expediently in differing and prevailing political 
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conjunctures. The effect of these representations, as will be demonstrated in the chapters 
which follow, was important in “establishing [each] as a ‘person of qualities’ within the 
public space of ‘demonstrable representativeness.’”148 As such, the foregrounding of these 
‘qualities’ allows the specific “political values” to “condense” within the individual leader 
who then becomes the ‘embodiment’ of particular histories, traditions, attributes and 
identities of “the party, the people and the state.”149 Further, such embodiment is underpinned 
by the “powerful resonance” of “political culture and mythology [...] regardless of the actual 
content of” these leaders’ political orientation or programmes.150 
 While performance and theatre are “intrinsic” to politics, they are also “dangerous,” as it 
permits the “instrumental manipulation of symbolic expression”, while allowing for 
[...] opportunities to beguile, entice or entrap an audience, a public, or a citizen. It is 
also a way of encouraging a preference for passion over reason [...] In short, it is a 
method for instrumental gulling [...] It is suspect [...] It can be simply fun, 
entertaining, but not when that prevents citizens from taking a more proper measure 
of truth.
151
 
Given this, and given the aptness of viewing politics and political action as constituting 
performance, it is nevertheless incumbent upon the analyst, as Askew claims, to question 
claims to “authenticity” and “instrumentality” – what is reality, if all politics is performance? 
Moreover, are there “intrinsic” identities if these performances are predicated on performing 
roles within the political sphere?
152
 While the discussion above has opened a space in which 
the utility of performance may be understood, it is important further to recognise that the 
decision to perform is made on an acutely “political” basis and a solid grasp of the material, 
historical, cultural and economic realities is required to communicate effectively with the 
body politic.
153
 Thus, a ‘meaning-full’ politics is permissible and allows for a legitimation of 
political actors (and institutions) through an interactive and dialogic relationship between the 
‘power-holders and the masses.’ Moreover, the space that performance and theatre permits 
for subversion and contestation through the carnivalesque is imperative for inducing a 
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democratic potentiality within the political sphere and empowering the citizenry to challenge 
dominant power structures. The importance accorded to ritual action is highly complicit in 
identity creation and through political enactment. Finally, the utility of understanding politics 
as a performance lies in its ability to 
[...] puncture the pretensions of those in power with the cruelty of parody or the 
devastating effects of comedy. It can be used as well to glorify those in power, 
reinforce or denounce extant political figures, firm up orthodoxies or tear down 
beliefs, or even more subversively, expose political subterfuges and reveal what 
otherwise might have remained hidden from public view.
154
 
Symbolism 
Symbolism, as intimated above, is intrinsic to both the process of myth and memory creation 
as well as ritual and performance. Some further points of issue require discussion here. The 
import of the symbol and symbolism lies in their ability to “give meaning to the world around 
us; they allow us to interpret what we see and, and, indeed, what we are.”155 As such, 
symbolism lies at the heart of politics – or more than that, “the symbolic is real politics”156 – 
and is central to permitting what Bourdieu has called “political capital” (which forms part of 
the broader  notion of ‘symbolic capital’), which “exists only in and through representation” 
and obtains its power, “because the person who submit to it believes it exists.”157 Writing on 
the centrality of representation to political and symbolic capital, and with particular emphasis 
on the political struggle to assert a specific mode of representation, Gil Eyal has noted that 
Political representation [...] is a complex act of naming through which what is 
represented is thereby made real. Thus, political ideologies do not simply ‘reflect’ the 
social bases of political actions – if anything, the opposite is true: political struggle is 
precisely a fight over the capacity to impose a legitimate vision of social space and its 
relation to the political field, i.e. to convert political capital (control over the 
instruments of political representation) into symbolic power (the prestige of being the 
effective “delegate” of a social group).The political struggle, which determines the 
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capacity to impose representations, is itself neither autonomous nor a social struggle 
in disguise, but a “theatricalised representation” of the struggles in the social space.158 
While the notion of symbolic and political capital is utilised to understand the actions of the 
state in asserting its “hegemonic location at the centre of society” and the means by which 
this “is (re)produced through symbols”, it nevertheless holds theoretical significance for 
explaining the similar articulations of the ANC’s location at the centre of South African 
political life.
159
 The ANC’s symbolic cache, developed in the period of struggle, and utilised 
continuously and repetitively, functioned in the political sphere to “stir up emotion” and 
“impel people to action” for as Zdzislaw Mach has noted, “the more antagonistic a social 
situation [...] the more active role symbolic actions play, integrating a group, canalizing 
conflicts or, often, generating open action against opponents or enemies.”160 By extension, 
symbols also serve to inculcate and “build political solidarity” as they “express, embroider, 
simplify or resurrect myths.”161 
The ‘condensation’ function performed by, and through, the symbol is important in the 
process of image creation, and deeply resonant with the discussion of the utility of the 
political brand above. Indeed, the importance of image to marketing, branding, symbolism 
highlights the imbrications and interweaving that this theoretical framing aims to accentuate. 
As such, the centrality accorded to the image of an individual politician or political 
organisation is a “carefully constructed condensation” of a range of “attributes”, associations, 
emotions and the like that the individual seeks to represent.
162
 These images are imbued with 
meaning and “correspond” to the “core values” of the political actor, or those that they would 
like to publicise.
163
 Given that images hold important cognitive associations, they are 
“constructed to advance a particular agenda” and more imperatively, for Strachan and Kelly, 
“the emotional appeal of these images to patriotic values encourages unquestioned 
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acceptance of candidates’ images and candidates’ patriotic definitions of the nation, as well 
as the stands on policy that flow from these definitions.”164 
The import of this contention will be clearly demonstrated in the chapters that follow. Indeed, 
I have noted above how various attributes came to be accorded to post-apartheid ANC leaders 
(and South African presidents), but the symbolic value of these attributions also had 
important political outcomes. Symbolic meaning through image appropriation is not only the 
preserve of political candidates and or parties. The line of argument informing the discussion 
on economic policy in the subsequent chapters asserts the centrality of the notion of 
“symbolic government” in accordance with the “symbolic state.”165 The construction of the 
symbolic foundations of the ‘new’ South African state is predicated on the discursive 
registers of the ANC, which are complicit in the “the creation of symbolic images, symbolic 
actions and celebratory rhetoric” and which constitutes the “principal concern” of symbolic 
government.
166
 Moreover, such government is a, 
[...] government by narrative – the small narratives by which governments account for 
their daily work, and the meta-narratives, the big themes that lend their many 
activities coherence and give them direction.
167
 
The notion of a ‘government by narrative’ obtains greater import when understood through 
the lens of policy-making and policy intent. Indeed, within democratic polities, the contest 
over policy is as much a contest over symbolic value of policy as it is over “ideas and their 
meanings.”168 Certain types of policies, and the goals they seek to achieve, also function as a 
basis around which identities cluster and as such, provide a dividing line between “support 
and opposition” and “coupled with their socially supported teleological connotations” 
become “potent condensation symbols.”169 Indeed, despite the “instrumental” nature of 
policy, it operates too as a “symbolic entity” wherein “meaning” is “determined by its 
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relationship to the particular situation, social policies, and ideological framework of which it 
is part.”170 
Flowing through policy are “ideologies and values” that are rendered explicit through 
language
171
 – more than that, it is language’s ability to act as a “translation mechanism [...] 
between political rationalities and regulatory aspirations” that endow it with symbolic 
significance.
172
 Thus, in the South African case, the notions of ‘reconstruction’ and 
‘development’ – the eponymous economic and social programme that characterised the 
political policy landscape in the years immediately after 1994 – functioned as important 
symbolic and linguistic signifiers in the creation of a post-apartheid state. The RDP thus 
operated as a “generative narrative” in post-apartheid South Africa and ensconced the newly 
democratic state within a richly symbolic ethic and the prospect of the realisation of the 
ANC’s teleological mission. 
The narrative conveyance of symbolism need not be dramaturgic, for the drier registers of 
‘bureaucratism’, despite attempting to “sedate”, are highly symbolic.173 Indeed, rather than an 
indication of banality, the technocratism, statistics and data inform a new political and 
cultural reality which in itself is symbolic of a changing governmental dispensation. Thus, in 
chapter six, I argue that the GEAR macro-economic strategy, marketed as an adjunct to the 
RDP, sheds light on the changing power and leadership dynamics in the ANC, and is 
instructive in providing and analytical lens through which to view the politics that informed 
the processes of social and economic change in South Africa. 
The contest over economic policy, condensing the values within different constituencies 
within the ANC and within key personalities is pertinent to understanding the ‘story’ that is 
the modern and democratic South Africa. This story “expands epistemology” to allow for a 
better conception of “the ways individuals are embedded in the wider social contexts of 
situation and society.”174 More than that, and as I have noted above, the story of economic 
policy in South Africa is instructive for it permits an insight into the strategic and tactical 
motivations of key players in the South African political market.
175
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Economic policy, and the narratives which inform it, are part of a broader set of influences 
that punctuate the South African symbolic landscape. This landscape is informed by a rich 
and important cultural register that the ANC is able to construct, access, negotiate and 
employ – at both particular and general moments. The continuous utilisation of this register, 
which is both historically-indebted and future-oriented, is complicit in endowing the ANC 
with an hegemonic presence in the political sphere. However, the creation of hegemony 
through symbols leaves space for the citizenry to interpret, understand and render meaningful 
those symbols.  The utilisation of symbols in the communication process and the 
consequence of their manipulation are also central to an understanding of propaganda. It is to 
this I now turn. 
Propaganda 
Criticism of political marketing has centred on equating its practice, outcomes and effects 
with that of propaganda. While at times a clear difference between the two forms of political 
representation may seem theoretically impermissible, a clear distinction is nevertheless 
present. Thus, as an inflection to a broader understanding of political marketing, it is 
important to recognise that propaganda is premised within a theoretical remit that includes 
myth, emotion, hyperbole and the like, it nevertheless is a conceptually distinct.
176
 Thus, 
unlike the more marketing-aligned practices of publicity and promotion, propaganda is 
heuristically important, for it within its scope and practices, it serves as the ‘art’ to political 
marketing’s “science” of persuasion and influence.177 
While numerous definitions of propaganda obtain, O’Shaughnessy posits a particular 
“elasticity” to the term and in so doing, dilutes its traditionally negative associations such as 
its “overt polemicism” and demonstrates its ability to “inform many cultural products, 
including [...] apparently politically neutral areas.”178 Characterising ‘propaganda’ as ‘elastic’ 
permits greater representational fluidity to its utilisation as a form of representation in the 
political sphere. Indeed, it lends richness and complexity to analysing the representational 
and discursive overtures of the ANC, while simultaneously demonstrating the highly 
interactive and shifting nature of these overtures. As such, greater effect is accorded to the 
attempt to assert a hegemonic economic, political and cultural presence in the public sphere. 
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As noted, various definitions of propaganda obtain.
179
 However, while acknowledging that 
definitions are important, for the present analysis, I prefer to outline key explanatory features 
of the idea that serve a more heuristic and purposive function. Indeed, central to an 
understanding of propaganda, is recognition that its “meaning is negotiable” as the universe 
of representations that constitutes ‘propaganda’ is open, fluid and dependent on a particular 
cultural, historical and social milieu – or perhaps, more simply, “what is propaganda to one 
person is not propaganda to another.” 180  The distinction between propaganda and political 
marketing lies in the “didacticism” of the former, which is premised on ‘assertion’, while the 
latter “is rooted in consumer response” and lacks the visible “ideological fervour” of the 
former.
181
 Moreover, the ‘didacticism’ and ‘fervour’ of propaganda “simplifies and 
exaggerates”, while simultaneously being premised on a clear and direct notion of 
“utopianism”.182 Further, and whereas marketing is premised on the notion of exchange and 
thus implicitly promotes interaction between the parties, propaganda “eschews argumentative 
interchange.”183 
Unlike the notion of persuasion which is premised on a “transactional” undertaking between 
parties and “is more mutually satisfying”, in that the needs to the persuader and persuadee are 
“fulfilled”,184  propaganda’s overall imperative to “manufacture consent”185 implies “mass 
suggestion” where the appeal is based on an “emotional” claim rather than a “rational and 
informational” one.186  The centrality of the emotional appeal made by propaganda is central 
to an understanding of both its strategic and theoretical utility. While the discussion on the 
determinants of voter decision-making above emphasised a more rational approach to such 
decision-making, the influence, circulation and very presence of propaganda in the political 
sphere indicates the importance of emotion and emotional appeals in effective political 
behaviour and decision-making. Importantly, this ‘emotional’ appeal is based on the principle 
of the “self-interest of the source” through “a careful and predetermined plan of prefabricated 
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symbol manipulation.” 187  While symbol (and myth) manipulation are the key means through 
which propaganda is actualised, rhetoric performs an important, but by no means exclusive, 
articulator function. Indeed, it is through rhetoric that the emotional appeal is given effect for 
it “provides something for thought to get hold of, something concrete, an image, a scrap of 
language or feeling.”188 Rhetorical injunctions to effect behavioural change through 
emotional appeals are wrought with strategic utility as they “sharpen faction” and corral 
allegiance based on symbolic and mythic sentiment.
189
 
The propagandistic intent of rhetoric is not confined merely to the use of language, but also 
imagery. From political posters, banners, cartoons and the like, the use of images to invocate 
political attitude or behavioural change, or even to draw attention to a particular social and 
political circumstance, has a long and rich history.
190
 The analysis in the chapter below 
examines the political posters, banners, graffiti and political with the aim of analysing the 
‘cornucopia’ of influences that operate in and through visual rhetorical constructions in 
apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa. Moreover, the discussion also demonstrates the 
political and social continuities that exist through this rhetoric, and the strategic importance 
of this for the ANC’s construction of a lived and material reality. Writing about political 
cartoons specifically, but with a sharp resonance to the ‘mediatory’ effect of images 
generally, Janis Edwards posits that these “visual presentations” serve to 
[...] create images and define analogies. Familiar imagery is often employed to create 
metaphors or analogies that guide interpretation. They are rhetorical in the sense that 
social values and effects are expressed when symbolic forms are put into public 
play.
191
 
The durability of the image and its complicity in metaphor relay make it a powerful tool for 
both propaganda and marketing use. Indeed, in accentuating a particular social and political 
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circumstance, it also serves to ‘activise’ narratives in that it “refers back to its earlier [or 
present] contexts and suggests future action.”192 However,  the impact and power of these 
images, used in the creation of propaganda materials,  creates a “highly selective narrative” 
which “emphasizes collective memories” that function to demarcate specific identities and 
allegiances and can be filled with “moral superiority claims.”193 
The contours of the notion of propaganda utilised here, and its imbrications with a wider 
definition of political marketing utilised in the thesis, does not render the theoretical and 
conceptual frame opaque, but rather undertakes to display the acute inflection between 
different discursive and representational modes. As will be demonstrated more clearly in the 
chapters that follow, the interactive and dynamic  nature of the political sphere require a 
wider and more ‘eclectic’ theoretical mooring to understand the fragmented and multifarious 
approaches to communication that political parties and governments utilise. Only in so doing, 
will a better understanding of the complexity of the political sphere be grasped. 
CONCLUSION: POLITICAL MARKETING AND THE ANC 
The foregoing discussion has cast light on key theoretical and conceptual notions that inform 
a wider understanding of political marketing. Rather than see each as constituting a separate 
explanatory framework, it is at the intersections of their purview that a richer and more 
meaning-laden understanding of the political market may be obtained. Theoretically, as I 
have noted above, advocates of political marketing acknowledge the need for expanding the 
boundaries of the sub-disciplines’ theoretical remit through acknowledging its 
‘embeddedness’ within larger discursive and representational arenas.  Indeed, in taking 
cognisance of the wider social, cultural and economic ambit in which it is berthed enriches 
the praxis of political marketing and legitimates its claims to authenticity and representivity. 
A fuller, richer understanding of the political marketing of the ANC needs to take cognisance 
of the operation of numerous cultural influences in its discursive and representational 
registers. As will be demonstrated in the chapters that follow, the constant refrain to a more 
glorious past, ensconced in the veneration of leaders and the sacredness of the struggle for 
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liberation, endowed the ANC with an important cultural register with claims to historical 
hegemony. The re-enactment of these claims at specific moments in the course of everyday 
politics provides an important moral-ethic and teleological touchstone for the party. More 
than that, these claims are located within a cultural register that informs the very existence of 
the ANC. David Kertzer has argued as much, demonstrating the interplay between symbol, 
myth and ritual in the performance of politics, when he notes, 
Political parties can exist only through symbolic representation. They can be 
conceived of, and seen, only through their associated symbols. Rites are crucial to this 
process of associating individuals with symbolic entities such as parties, religions or 
nations. Through the party-associated rites, individuals both identify themselves and 
become identified by others with the party. Rituals allow individuals to come in 
contact with the holy symbols that bond them jointly to this symbolic entity. They 
provide a context in which the myths that sustain the party can be validated and 
energised. They perform a crucial organisational function in marking the in-group 
from the out-group, distinguishing those associated with the party from all others, by 
making public the link between member or sympathiser and party symbol.
194
 
The ‘cultural construction’ of the ANC enriches understandings of electoral decision-making 
and the social, structural and psychological foundations upon which such decision-making is 
premised and influenced. While these models are premised on pragmatic and rational bases, 
the influence of the ‘cultural’ aspects provides a qualitative ‘layering’ to enrich 
understandings of decision-making and electoral behaviour. Importantly too, the longer-term 
bias implicit in these models is useful for conceptualising the continuity in the various 
representational registers employed by the ANC. 
The creation of the branded political party through its political marketing activities is 
important, for it locates the party as the centre of political and cultural meaning. The refrains 
to history, memory, culture, personality and the like, notwithstanding its dominance in the 
electoral sphere and its veritable embodiment of the state, endows the ANC with a creative 
power to ‘imagine the community’ and gives content to the creation of a post-apartheid and 
democratic state.
195
  But underlying this process of ‘imagining’ and creating is a more 
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fundamental question: to whom is the ANC marketing? The core constituency, as I 
demonstrate in the following chapter, is the historically-conditioned concept of ‘the people’ 
whose definition and constitution has shifted with the social and economic changes that 
political liberation brought. The significance of this shift – reflecting the multi-class, multi-
racial and gendered character it has sought to abide to – lies in the creation of differing 
publics to which the ANC has variously marketed, and continues to market, itself. Indeed, 
while there is constancy in its discursive orientations, prevailing political realities have led 
the ANC to inform and engage new publics. The political marketing that is put into service in 
different locations by different organisations (chapter three); in election campaigning 
(chapters five and chapter seven); and in the process of policy-making (chapter six) 
demonstrates the “multiple publics” that ANC has engaged and negotiated over time.196 This 
not only has important ‘discursive’ implications, but spatial ones as well. As Lynn Staeheli 
and Don Mitchell remind us, “it is conceivable that the public is not only differentially 
located discursively, but also geographically, and that different kinds of publics occupy 
different kinds of spaces.”197 The discussions in the chapters which follow render this spatial 
aspect clear and permit deeper insights into the way in which the ANC’s political marketing 
was adopted and adapted by its constituencies. 
The lack of clarity and precision in defining the boundaries of the public and “multiplicity of 
meanings” that it encourages are compounded further in the ANC’s case when consideration 
is given to its conception of the nation and its location of ‘the people’ therein.198 This 
conception is indebted to the interplay of its organisational personalities as both a national 
liberation movement and a formal part of the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. The fluidity 
of these identities sheds an important light on the negotiation and creation of ‘the people’ and 
their relation to the ANC. Indeed, as Raymond Suttner is apt to posit, the liberation 
movement discourse centres on, 
 [...]  a language of unity and a language that tends to represent the unified people as 
embodied in the liberation movement organisation and then equate them with the 
people as a whole. We find this in many slogans throughout the continent, and on our 
own: ‘ANC is the nation’ or ‘ANC is your mother and your father’. In this sense, the 
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liberation movement depicts itself as a proto-state. This notion derives from a 
framework of ideas in which the seizure of the state was presented as the central issue 
of the day. It also sees popular nationalism, embodied in the national liberation 
movement organisation, as embodying all politics.
199
 
It is evident from this, that the national liberation movement discourse elides notions of the 
state, the public (sphere) and the locating of ‘the people’ therein. These elisions are important 
in understanding the contours and textures political marketing of the ANC and the 
motivations that underpin its political communications. 
I have outlined the contours of a broadened understanding of political marketing that is 
theoretically and heuristically relevant to understanding the behaviour of the ANC in the 
South African political sphere. The following chapters will demonstrate the utility and 
applicability of this broader conceptualisation and foreground the richness, diversity and 
complexity of the ANC’s discursive and representational grammars. 
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3. 
PALIMPSESTS: 
MARKETING LIBERATION 
************** 
Bounded 
You gave me knowledge 
Of Freedom 
 
Silenced 
You taught me how 
To Speak
1
 
The notion of liberation is a central and enduring idea in the political cosmology of the ANC, 
animating its discursive and representational registers and according theoretical significance 
to the struggle against colonialism and apartheid. This chapter untangles the various threads 
that inform the political marketing of the notion of liberation and in so doing, demonstrates 
the means by which a dominant conception of liberation came to inform, discursively, 
rhetorically and through representation, the struggle against apartheid. Such marketing 
intimately connects and gives richness to the “ideological passion” of the ANC, wherein it 
“offers an explanation of the past, announces the present discontents and projects a vision of 
the future.”2 Indeed, in giving content to this ‘passion’, the marketing undertaken by the ANC 
and its associated organisations permits a nuanced and deeply textured understanding of the 
various influences that located the ANC at the centre of the political market. 
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In this chapter, I examine the influences that shaped and packaged the idea of liberation and 
in so doing, gave it theoretical and political content. Rooted in the economic and political 
malaise of apartheid, its contours were given shape and direction through the structures of the 
ANC and associated formations. This analysis permits a sharper understanding of the 
relationships and interconnections between organisations within the political sphere and as 
such, and importantly for analysing the political marketing of the ANC, illuminates the 
discursive relationships that were developed between the organisations and particular 
constituencies. These relationships were premised on lived realities and as such, the 
marketing of particular notions of liberation expressed the values of various constituencies. It 
will be clear from the ensuing discussion that a pervasive ‘marketing consciousness’ operates 
through these organisations, and hence, the ANC. In the first part of this chapter, I explore the 
centrality of marketing for the ANC in the anti-apartheid struggle. Examining its utility for 
the movement as well as its effectiveness and capacity to undertake such activity, I 
demonstrate the various means through which its messaging and marketing was undertaken. 
In the second part, I examine the various threads that informed the content of this marketing 
through an analysis of the ANC’s constitutive and associated organisations. Examining the 
marketing and propagandising undertaken by Umkhonto we Sizwe, United Democratic Front, 
and on Robben Island, I demonstrate the various fronts on which specific images and 
messages of the ANC were developed and proliferated. While acknowledging that these 
organisations do not represent the full spectrum of influences that were active in branding the 
ANC and a particular idea of liberation, the analysis nevertheless offers a comprehensive and 
strategic understanding of the ANC’s political and marketing behaviour. 
POLITICAL MARKETING AND THE ANC 
Discussions on the formulation, tenor, use, and impact of propaganda, publicity and 
promotion were an integral part of the strategic positioning of the ANC both inside and 
outside of South Africa. Indeed, the importance ascribed to a communications strategy that 
could rally support and encourage action against the South Africa government, while also 
locating the ANC at the centre of anti-apartheid activity, is clearly evident from a reading of 
its strategic communications documents, especially from 1982 onwards. Driven by the 
Department of Information and Publicity (DIP), located in both London and Lusaka, the 
ANC’s approach to propaganda, publicity and promotion were acutely informed by the 
exigencies of struggle and the capacities of the apartheid government to dominate the flow of 
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information in the public sphere.
3
 Using a range of archived DIP documents, I highlight the 
approach to propaganda adopted by the ANC from the early 1980s onwards.
4
 
The benefits of propaganda were not missed by those in its information, propaganda and 
publicity apparatus. Indeed, the utility of “political propaganda and agitation” lay in its ability 
to “organise the masses” and only through such organisation, would the “conditions be 
created for educating them and building up the immense strength of the revolution, for once 
organised, their power will increase one hundredfold.”5 Such rhetoric however gave way to a 
more pragmatic understanding of the operation and utility of propaganda. Indeed, for the 
ANC, propaganda was important to the process of “winning support” as it aimed to, 
(i) develop in the people a [deep-seated] hatred and resentment against apartheid 
colonialism; reinforce their sense of daily grievance and injustice inherent and 
practiced by the system. 
(ii) [o]rientate people towards the aims, policies, programme and forms of 
struggle waged by the ANC. 
(iii) mobilise and arouse the people to activate participation in the struggle against 
the apartheid regime [...] and support their Liberation Movement, the ANC 
and the People’s Army, Umkhonto We Sizwe. 
(iv) Consolidate the Unity of all forces fighting for national liberation under the 
leadership of the ANC. 
(v) [...] 
(vi) neutralise all force committed to or supporting the regime directly or indirectly 
(vii) draw still uncommitted elements closer to us with the objective of finally 
winning them over to our side 
(viii) work for isolation of and wage a relentless psychological warfare against the 
regime and its supporters [...] 
(ix) defend the ANC against enemy attacks [...] 
                                                 
3
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(x) keep high the moral of people by constantly making them aware of the fact 
that they are not fighting alone [...]
6
 
The overall purport of the ANC’s propaganda is thus clearly evident from the above. But to 
give it greater effect and resonance, it was also acutely aware of the need to target specific 
social groups. In its report to the joint National Executive Committee-Revolutionary 
Committee, the DIP aimed to address specifically an “urban population” constituted of the 
“black working class”, farmworkers, migrant miners, and the “uncommitted groups” notably 
the “middle strata of professionals.”7 This urban constituency would be a ripe audience for 
the ANC message to challenge “economic exploitation” while commensurately, directing its 
propaganda activities to highlight state repression and the subjugation of the South African 
majority. Its propaganda content would also be directed “against economic investors and 
other international imperialist economic, political, cultural and diplomatic ventures in support 
of the system” and additionally, would direct its message to the “capitalist class, the white 
middle and working classes” inside South Africa “to weaken enemy cohesion and [...] 
neutralise or win over section of the white community.”8 
Operationalising its propaganda activities and the strategic impetus that underlay its public 
representation was the need to accentuate the ANC’s position “as the chief mobiliser, unifier 
and vanguard of the liberation struggle.”9 But this positioning needed to be tempered to 
“avoid”, according to former DIP head Pallo Jordan, “projecting a sectarian image” in which 
the ANC was endowed with the image of ‘monopolising’ the struggle.10 Rather and 
consonant with the ANC’s public ethos of ‘the people being their own liberators’, there was a 
need to not relegate the “masses [to] the role of onlookers by giving the impression that the 
ANC is or wants to usurp all initiatives.”11 Rather the impetus of the ANC’s media would be 
to circulate the idea of the “seizure of state power by the people through the ANC” and as 
such, would “project” the ANC as an “alternative source of political and moral authority in 
our country and the Freedom Charter pushed as the harbinger of a more just, equitable and 
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democratic social and political order.”12 Popularising these notions at key events, it was 
imperative to convey further the message, 
That the ANC is a living and growing organism born out of the struggles of the 
oppressed people of South Africa. As such it is both the product of history and also 
the maker of history. We have to move away from the tendency to project the 
movement as the brainchild of a handful of patriotic geniuses while at the same time 
being cognisant of the crucial role played by the founders and all those individual men 
and work who have helped shape and mould the ANC into what it is today.
13
 
The ANC utilised a range of media to communicate its messages. Publications like Sechaba 
and Mayibuye functioned as an important platform through which to communicate with 
specific sectors of its constituency and supporters both inside and outside South Africa.
14
 
While its external propaganda efforts were undertaken through diplomatic representations, 
sympathetic movements, documentaries, films and the like, internally, the propaganda 
offensive was more fraught. Indeed, the conditions of exile and clampdowns on activists and 
organisations within the country, made the formulation and circulation of propaganda 
materials tenuous. In an undated (but post-1984) memorandum on internal propaganda, there 
was a realisation by the ANC of the need to “intensify our propaganda offensive and improve 
its content” while also and more urgently, to “set up [underground] propaganda units and to 
solve problems of flow of information, distribution and feedback.”15 The seriousness of this 
task was evident in the tone of the memorandum which similarly directed the action to be 
taken to improve the propaganda capacities of the internal, underground-based movement 
inside the country, as well as those located in the frontline areas/states (Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Lesotho).  Internally, the memorandum reveals a mixed 
picture of ANC’s propaganda machinery. The production of propaganda material was 
undertaken across the country, but concentrated in the three larger provinces, namely the 
Transvaal, Natal and the Cape Province. But even within these provinces, regional variation 
                                                 
12
 Jordan, ‘Draft Guidelines for ANC Propaganda and Information Media for 1982’, n.p. 
13
 Jordan, ‘Draft Guidelines for ANC Propaganda and Information Media for 1982’, n.p. 
14
  In assessing the strengths and weakness of its publications, and other forms of external propaganda, see 
African National Congress, ‘Sechaba and External Publicity: Report for DIP Conference – Problems, 
Achievements and Perspectives, July 1983’ ANC London: Documents, Media, 1977-1985, Mayibuye Archive, 
MCH02-133 
15
 African National Congress, ‘Memorandum - Internal Propaganda’, ANC Lusaka, Women’s Section: 
Documents, DIP, Mayibuye Archive, MCH01-12, Box 12.5., 1. I have based the dating on a reference in the text 
to the Nkomati accord, which was signed in 1984. 
73 
 
existed as did the means of communication.
16
 Neighbouring southern African states provided 
an important space in which the propaganda (in addition to political and military) capacities 
of the ANC would be enhanced as well as providing refuge or a base from which to operate. 
While again the capacities of the propaganda units in each varied, they functioned to provide 
logistical, technical and creative support to the production and distribution of propaganda. 
The Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana based units were engaged in external production of 
materials and supported operations in the Cape Province (Botswana) as well as the Transvaal 
and Natal (Swaziland).
17
 The operation in Zimbabwe performed a more specialised 
production role by creating propaganda “particularly for the white community and the anti-
militarisation campaign” while the Mozambique unit held much “potential” and was being 
primed to play a larger role in the ANC’s propaganda efforts.18 
The ANC was acutely aware of the need to stratify its target audience according to 
geographical, sociological and other factors to yield the fullest benefit from its messaging and 
positioning. In a memorandum on propaganda activities, it was asserted that such 
stratification should proceed according to, 
AREA: Here a breakdown must be made according firstly to the Provinces and then 
further according to the areas within the Provinces; in terms of GROUPS: Africans, 
Indians, Coloureds, whites. If possible this should be further broken down i.e. Xhosa, 
Zulu, Hindu, Muslim etc. This must be done in an expert and in a very systematic 
way.
19
 
Evident here is not only an awareness of the need to formulate a tailored and structured 
programme of messaging to differing constituencies, but also the incipience of a more 
‘scientific’ and marketing approach to its political communication – and evidence of its 
‘marketing consciousness.’ Indeed, the memorandum continues, 
[...] we must give much more thought to the content of our leaflets. Today there are 
various advertising, publicity [organisations] which use various techniques to ‘sell’ 
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their products. I don’t see why we can’t make use of their ideas or methods. This of 
course will mean that there will have to be somebody in our [organisation] which 
becomes an expert in this field.
20
 
The acknowledgement of the need to professionalise and render ‘scientific’ its approach to 
communications was nevertheless underscored by appealing to the specific contextual issues 
that would resonate with a larger audience. Openly acknowledging the need to “propagate” in 
communities at expedient times such as political trials and funerals, an aura of venerability 
over the movement was also necessary. Such inculcation would be effected through an 
emotional appeal that played into the reality of struggle and sacrifice. As such, the 
memorandum acknowledged that “[w]herever possible the names of our dead should be given 
prominence.”21 Further, the brand identity of the ANC was enhanced through associating key 
personalities and the images of leadership with the ANC. The memorandum was quick to 
posit that, 
It is important that the images of our leaders are built up. There is [no] doubt that 
names such as Mandela, Sisulu, Kathrada, Fischer, Mbeki etc are household names. 
This could be at the beginning but it must be dealt with in a high powered, emotion 
evoking treatment.
22
 
The invocation of the memory of those who died in the struggle through the utilisation of 
their names, as well as those doyens of the ANC’s leadership, was part of the ANC’s 
acknowledgment that “if information is not suitably packaged it will not have the desired 
impact.”23 Indeed, the recourse to the memorialisation, historical personalities and the 
conscious decision to foreground specific leaders – most notably Nelson Mandela – was part 
of the ANC’s larger publicity orientation to ‘humanise’ the struggle and locate it within a 
specific personal narrative. While self-promotion was impermissible, certain exigencies 
necessitated the promotion of personalities. Indeed, due to the demands of the “western 
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media [which] hates anonymity” a position was adopted which promoted individuals when 
expedient.
24
 Indeed, it was noted that 
[w]hilst individuals should not be promoted or promote themselves, we must 
recognise that the media will want to use names and individuals, and personal 
rivalries and jealousy should not be allowed to hold back effective propagation of the 
ANC message. At the same time, we must not accept a situation where even the 
leadership decided to become shy and refuse to be interviewed, or to refuse to allow 
any personal information to be used. It is human interest that sells politics!
25
 
Despite this, the packaging was not bereft of “political content” for the ANC acknowledged 
too, the importance of creating a politically rich product.
26
 Moreover, such packaging itself 
would “be guided by the objective” and issues pertaining to “style, language and vehicle” 
would be determined by the “target recipient.”27  For the ANC, the richness of the political 
content of its propaganda and information was already evident, for the report on its 
information policy noted that “[a]ll our output [...] assumes a high level of political 
consciousness and commitment in the use of vehicle, style language and contents.”28 The 
problem with this, was that there existed “tremendous variation in the political consciousness 
and degree of support for the ANC that cuts across [its] target groups.”29 In addition, such 
factors as illiteracy also affected the impact of, and the ability to, produce and disseminate 
propaganda. Thus, in “trying to keep the image of the ANC in the minds of the masses”, and 
especially those illiterate within the masses, it was posited that 
We would generally have to use our imagination and devise means that will reach this 
[group]. Some obvious ones are to reinforce the work cadres do in the field by the use 
of songs, ANC colours used in dress, beads, scarves, pictures of ANC leaders, 
pictorial stickers.
30
 
This marketing ‘sensibility’ in developing and using a material culture to support its 
representational and discursive presence added texture and depth to the ANC’s presence 
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within South Africa and abroad. It would be false to assume that it was only through such 
petty, yet powerful, ephemera that the ANC’s presence was kept in the ‘minds of the masses.’ 
The ANC’s presence was also deeply inculcated in a socialisation process that had been 
occurring since the ANC’s banning in 1961. Indeed, Raymond Suttner has recently noted that 
a “cultural link” existed to the ANC, “a connection passed down from many parents to 
children in a variety of ways, or part of a cultural environment where values were transmitted 
through various means.”31 Indeed, in an interview with an activist, this is rendered clear when 
it was noted that, 
Every day, in our families and households, people undermined the state, even as they 
feared it. Even when there was no mass struggle, there was song and mothers crooned 
and sang to their children. They whispered the names of Nelson Mandela, Govan 
Mbeki and Walter Sisiulu, Robert Sobukwe, Lilian Ngoyi and Albertina Sisulu in 
their prayers behind closed doors. Much of this consciousness remained with the 
supporters of the ‘absent’ liberation movements.32 
The process of socialisation toward the ANC was driven as much from the bottom upwards, 
as it was directed downward from the ANC. Indeed, Raymond Suttner has adeptly described 
how members of communities became propaganda ‘vehicles’ in both rural and urban areas. 
Informing groups of people of the ANC’s existence and history not only served the function 
of endowing the ANC with a presence in South Africa during the period of its banning, it also 
served to valorise the aims, objectives and very being of the movement. Relating the story of 
activist Mongezi Radebe, Suttner demonstrates how members of communities became 
veritable mouthpieces for the ANC, 
In our township we had a granny called Ma Mokhele who used to tell us a lot about 
black history. Later I started understanding that she had been a member of the ANC 
and she had been sent to Heilbron under banishment. So she used to explain a lot of 
things: what they were doing in the Women’s League, what ANC was in the initial 
stages when it became militant, when the young ones like Mandela came into it. She 
was explaining its historical significance and why we should be proud of it, and why 
                                                 
31
 Suttner, The ANC Underground in South Africa to 1976: A Social and Historical Study, 61 
32
 Suttner, The ANC Underground in South Africa to 1976: A Social and Historical Study,  62 
77 
 
we should take on from where they left. That’s how we started understanding a lot of 
things politically.
33
 
The ANC’s presence inside South Africa was maintained through Radio Freedom. If its 
periodicals such as Mayibuye and Sechaba were directed at “organisers rather than at the 
mass popular level”, then radio provided an appropriate means through which to 
communicate with and mobilise groups on the ground.
34
 Indeed, despite its location outside 
South Africa, Radio Freedom functioned at a number of levels  inside the country.
35
  
Emotive, emancipatory and educative, Radio Freedom broadcasts increased the geographical 
spread of ANC propaganda as it conveyed “broad messages about the history and policies of 
the organisation.”36 Raymond Suttner has noted that with its operation deemed illegal and, 
despite no concrete figures on the scale of its listenership, “turning in to its broadcasts 
became a daily ritual or duty for those who considered themselves part of the struggle” and 
became a “form of identification with the ANC.”37 Despite this, and despite the recollections 
activities have on the effect of its operation inside South Africa, 
38
 it nevertheless did suffer at 
times from unclear content focus and technical inefficiencies. Critical reflection and 
improvement of capacities were constant. Indeed, in a letter written by then DIP head Thabo 
Mbeki to Radio Freedom producers dated December 1984, there was an acknowledgement 
that while broadcast content was “topical”, the “programmes do not give direction to the 
listener – they are virtually non-committal on the tasks facing the audience.”39 Highlighting 
the importance of needing to segment the target market, and the overall purport of radio 
communications, Mbeki was apt to note that, 
The selection of topics and the emphases also depend on the audience as well as on 
the strategic and tactical line of the movement. In selecting the areas to be covered 
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and in working out the content, necessary emphasis should be laid on the actions, 
debates, [...] we could encourage positive developments [...] and without claiming a 
monopoly of wisdom, suggest better forms of action, deepen the discussion and 
discourage negative tendencies.
40
 
Moreover, the packaging and “presentation of programmes” needed to be improved through 
better training in “tone, voice modulation etc.”41 I noted above that radio stations in various 
African capitals carried Radio Freedom broadcasts. One problem with this related to the poor 
scheduling and coordination between these broadcasts as slots overlapped and thus did not 
allow for the efficient utilisation of time by Radio Freedom. Thus, rather than having 
broadcasts flow into one another across the stations to improve continuity and yield a more 
authoritative effect, the overlap diluted their overall content.
42
 Moreover, this was 
compounded by the poor quality of the programmes as a result of insufficiently educated 
journalists and presenters. Poor programming again diluted the content of the broadcast 
programmes and the ANC expressed concern that “listeners [say] they like to listen to our 
freedom songs which they tape [record] but immediately put off their radio sets when the 
analytical part starts.”43 Moreover, poor information flows led to outdated content being 
aired. Technically, broadcasts suffered from poor reception quality given the “weak power of 
the transmitters” in the countries from which it broadcasted.44 
The changing nature of the struggle and the greater space accorded to movements and 
organisations inside South Africa from the mid-to late 1980s onwards altered the nature of 
the representational and discursive strategies within the country. The mass democratic 
movement, assisted by the liberalisation of political space, provided a fillip to the propaganda 
and marketing activities of the ANC. Indeed, the mass demonstrations and increased activism 
inside the country by these movements fulfilled the ANC’s earlier contention that “action 
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itself is the best propaganda especially when the ground has been prepared to take advantage 
of it, for action creates a climate of receptivity to our propaganda.”45 
When liberalisation gave way to the realisation that a larger process of transition toward 
democracy was incipient, the ANC was keen to assert the need for propaganda to establish 
itself in the political sphere. Indeed, the DIP report of a meeting held a fortnight after the 
release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990, noted that seriousness of this effort holding that 
the “prime task” it was now faced with, was “the building of the ANC inside the country” and 
“to do this, propaganda on a massive scale is vital.”46 The political content of this propaganda 
aimed to balance the tightrope “between the question of negotiations and that of the armed 
seizure of power” while commensurately, needing to “motivate and address the issues of our 
strategic offensive.”47 As part of its wider political strategy, it was envisaged that the DIP 
undertake a “central role in ensuring that the presence of the ANC is felt in every corner of 
the country, by every segment of the society and by every possible constituency.”48 
Moreover, such propaganda would aim to, 
[...] familiarise everyone with the policies, the ideas and programme of the ANC in 
language, symbols and concepts that are easily grasped, assimilated and with which 
our people can identify. [...] The task now is to activate and inspire the people into 
every form of self-activity expressive of their self-confidence and self-knowledge as 
their own liberators. The ANC and its allies, the MDM [Mass Democratic Movement] 
and the general movement for national democratic transformation of our country must 
be seen and embraced as their movement and their instrument for bringing about the 
transformations we seek. It must have visibility, it must be a constant and ever-
growing presence, addressing their needs and also giving them direction in terms of 
their satisfaction.
49
 
Thus, the strategic need to communicate the idea of self-emancipation while concomitantly 
acknowledging the ANC’s (and latterly the MDM’s) centrality in ‘bringing’ liberation needed 
to find expression in a range of publicity materials. Asserting its hegemony, the ANC noted 
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that its now legal status made it possible to “cover every conceivable surface with an ANC 
message everyday and every week, in every written and spoken language in South Africa.”50 
The inculcation of such hegemony was informed by the central premise, that 
[i]f the ANC is to win the hearts and minds of the South African people, it must 
popularise its programme, its ideas and its leadership as the repository of the most 
profound hopes and expectations of our people.
51
 
While the nature of the struggle against apartheid was undertaken on various planes, the 
ANC’s communications offensive, as noted in the cursory examination above, was a central 
part of its overall political strategy, even if at times neglected by elements of its leadership. 
But the movements’ communications function was undertaken with some difficulty. Indeed, 
given the exigencies of struggle – both in exile and within the underground structures – the 
capacities of the ANC to communicate effectively within South Africa were routinely 
compromised. Despite this, these capacities nevertheless permitted the circulation of a wealth 
of propaganda, publicity and promotional material through the ANC and its affiliated 
organisations. In the analysis below, I examine these forms of communication particularly on 
the theme of liberation and the means by which it was communicated within different 
constituencies by the various groupings within the ANC and affiliated organisations. 
Historically-rooted, the analysis demonstrates congruence in the ANC’s messaging across 
these groupings and explicates the means by which the ANC was able to develop a presence 
both inside South Africa and in exile. However, to understand this marketing, it is important 
to obtain an understanding of the contours of the notion of liberation. In obtaining such 
understanding, the analysis berths its marketing activity within a broader discursive and 
representational universe and demonstrates the ability of this marketing to function a means 
of managing politics and not merely communicating it – that is, the packaging is not bereft of 
content. 
THINKING THROUGH LIBERATION: A PRIMER 
Any clear understanding of the contours of the ANC’s conception of liberation needs to be 
placed in an appropriate historical context. Indeed, both the conception and discursive thrust 
of the notion of liberation must be seen in relation to the nature and exigencies of apartheid, 
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where apartheid functioned as the orienting framework against which liberation is conceived. 
The content and character of struggles for liberation in various colonial theatres reflected the 
specificities of the socio-economic and political milieus in which they occurred, through time 
and across space. In South Africa, the specific nature of “internal colonialism”, later re-
branded as “Colonialism of a Special Type” (CST), became the exigent conceptual 
framework against which an understanding of liberation could be counterposed.
52
 In the CST 
thesis, the colonising power is located geographically within the colonised territory and 
“economic control and political supremacy are in general exercised by an indigenous ruling 
class with a unitary state which purports to represent the general will of all inhabitants.”53 
While conceptually the CST came to predominate discourses on the content and form of 
liberation, these discourses were informed and punctuated by variance and differing 
emphases, further lending to its ‘palimpsestic’ quality. As such, these discourses functioned 
ontologically in defining the nature of the oppression in the political realm while 
commensurately permitting a longer teleological purview through which the goal of full 
liberation could be realised. 
In the following chapters I unpack these positions in greater detail and argue that not only is 
the process of liberation still ongoing, but its discourses are strategically employed within the 
ANC’s representational grammars for strategic political effect. It is important to note at the 
outset, that the theoretical terrain upon which ideas of liberation were founded were highly 
contested and premised on shifting bases of meaning and interpretation, particularly after 
1994. Nevertheless, they serve as important marketing devices for they link the theoretical 
content of the freedom sought with a strong representational and persuasive effect.  
Of Revolutions, Charters and People’s Power 
Liberation in South Africa would be realised through a national democratic revolution 
(NDR). Originating in the South African Communist Party’s (SACP), the theory of the NDR 
was premised on the need to “conceptualise the relationship between [the] overarching goal 
of (international) socialism and the more immediate anti-colonial project of national 
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liberation.”54  Rooted too in this theoretical schema was a conceptualisation of a staged 
transition to a socialist end, so that unlike the experiences of other post-colonial contexts 
wherein nationalist parties assumed power and the drive to a socialist end was stalled, in 
South Africa, “there would be no blocking of the route onwards to the next destination.”55 
The close relationship between the SACP and the ANC is rooted in their joint banning in 
1960 and the shared exile experience which facilitated the circulation and inculcation of ideas 
(and indeed, leaders and members) between and within these organisations.
56
 
The theory of the NDR was “institutionalised” and placed at the centre of the ANC’s 
organisational and discursive apparatus at its landmark conference in Morogoro, Tanzania in 
1969.
57
 Held at the time of tremendous organisational rift and lack of focus within the ANC, 
the theoretical weight injected into the movement sought to address what ANC stalwart Ben 
Turok had described as “the utter failure of our leadership to introduce a political line in the 
movement which could orientate it to our main tasks.”58 Incorporated into the Strategy and 
Tactics documents of the conference, it was argued that, 
[...] it is only the success of the national democratic revolution which – by destroying 
the existing social and economic relationships – will bring with it a correction of the 
historical injustices perpetrated against the indigenous majority and thus lay the basis 
for a new – and deeper internationalist – approach. Until then, the national sense of 
grievance is the most potent revolutionary force which must be harnessed.
59
 
The vision of those social and economic relationships was captured earlier in the Freedom 
Charter which provided an authoritative and democratically-produced (although, and as will 
be shown, this is contestable) account of the contours of a liberated South Africa. Its import 
lay in the fact that it was “more than a mere list of demands for democratic reforms” but 
rather “a revolutionary document precisely because the changes it envisages cannot be won 
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without the breaking up of the economic and political structures and development of mass 
struggles on the widest scale. The most vital task facing the democratic movement in this 
country is to unleash such struggles and to develop them on the basis of the concrete and 
immediate demands of the people from area to area.”60 Further, espousing that “South Africa 
belongs to all who live in it, black and white,”61 linked it more intimately with the NDR’s 
“strategic objective” of, 
the creation of a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society. This, in 
essence, means the liberation of Africans in particular and black people in general 
from political and economic bondage. It means uplifting the quality of life of all 
South Africans, especially the poor, the majority of whom are African and female.
62
 
Thus, at its core, the NDR was premised on the “transfer of power to the people” wherein 
greater “political, social and economic control” could be exercised on the path toward a 
future socialist reality.
63
 The NDR’s theoretical purview is grounded on the intersections and 
interplay of race and class dynamics under apartheid capitalism which intimately accords 
with the notion of CST. While a large and theoretically impactful literature exists on the 
nature of these intersections under apartheid, the present study demonstrates how these 
intersections underscored the ANC’s propaganda, publicity and promotional activities. 
Indeed, the theoretical conception of the nature of apartheid colonialism deeply informed the 
discursive and representational thrust of the ANC. This will be evident in the discussion 
below. 
Given the ‘special type’ nature of apartheid’s political and economic colonialism, “the 
immediate struggle for change” was the “national liberation of the African people and, with 
it, the destruction of all forms of racial discrimination.”64 Further, national liberation would 
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be conjoined to the attainment of “social liberation” and would be realised only through the 
“destruction of the existing capitalist structure.”65 Indeed, it was posited that, 
It was precisely because in South Africa capitalist production relations are the 
foundation of national repression that the national struggle itself has an objective 
coincidence with the elimination of all forms of exploitation.
66
 
Moreover, it was argued by the ANC that, 
South Africa is a capitalist society and apartheid is the specific form which capitalism 
has assumed in this country. National domination and the creation of the black 
working class took place at the same time. Racism is bound with the class nature of 
South African capitalism and therefore can only be eliminated through the destruction 
of capitalism. True national liberation is impossible without social liberation.”67 
While the NDR was conceived of as “a revolution of the whole of the oppressed people”, 
there was the acknowledgment of ‘the people’ as constituted by “different classes and strata 
(overwhelmingly black)” that were subjected to “varying forms and degrees of national 
oppression and economic exploitation”68 Further, the emphasis on the ‘African’ people 
became a broadly encompassing notion which incorporated a range of ‘motive forces’, but 
most pertinently, “the African working people.”69 The emphasis on the urban-based working 
class did not serve to preclude elements of the both proletarian and petite-bourgeois caucuses 
of revolutionary movement – for the latter, especially because of the racial limitations on its 
development and its supine political power. This broadly interpretive notion of class was also 
accorded to notions of race. Indeed, the thrust of emancipation, as will be further explicated 
below, has an overtly inclusive nature and was premised on the creation of a future national 
identity characterised by racial unity and patriotism. Indeed, Raymond Suttner has argued 
that, 
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[...] it is only through a recognition of its [liberation’s] African character that we will 
ever become truly integrated in our own country” and further that, “[T]he struggle for 
liberation in South Africa is a patriotic struggle which will enable all South Africans 
to feel proud of and attached to their country; to feel honoured to say they are patriots. 
It is a struggle to end strife and conflict and finally bring justice to our land.
70
 
While there is certitude in not undermining the oppression and exploitation of other national 
groups in South Africa through its representational strategy, the primacy accorded to African 
liberation and concomitantly national liberation is an enduring theme in the ANC’s political 
cosmology that is premised on the concept of unity and non-racialism, particularly from 
1955, or the ‘moment’ of the Freedom Charter. That oppression of all groups in South Africa 
can be overcome through the process of liberation, is captured in a speech delivered by ANC 
intellectual Francis Meli, who argued that, 
[T]he ANC is fighting for the national liberation of the oppressed majority, especially 
the Africans, and this is seen as an aspect of social emancipation of all the people of 
South Africa – black and white. This is all in the Freedom Charter. We are not 
fighting to reform apartheid, but to destroy it.
71
 
Conjoining social and political liberation, and recourse to the idea of ‘the people’ in 
explicating the contours of such liberation, resonates with the continuity of the idea of the 
democratic imperative that characterised the earlier composition of the Freedom Charter. As 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, this democratic imperative was rooted the lived 
conditions of the oppressed.
 72
 Capturing these conditions in its publicity and propaganda 
served not only to render clear the ‘lived’ oppression of the majority, but also gave 
expression to the content of the NDR. Indeed, in a leaflet that was produced and banned in 
South Africa, such oppression was rendered clear, when it was noted, 
To men (sic) who are oppressed, freedom means many things. It means living wages 
to feed the family and bring them up in decency; the end of pass laws and influx 
control; the right to live and work anywhere and in any job; the right to vote and be 
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elected to parliament; education; sports and culture; the right to own land to plough, 
clothing and shelter; the end of insults, humiliation, indignities and persecution based 
on creed or race. Freedom means just this.
73
 
The imperatives of national and social liberation are thus evidently conjoined in this 
formulation of freedom and are crystallised in the Freedom Charter. The realisation of the 
social content of liberation by both the ANC and the SACP, given the exigencies of the 
prevailing global environment in the late 1980s, was not equated with a transition to 
socialism in the first instance as I have noted above. Indeed, there was a “distinction between 
the social content of the National Democratic Revolution and socialist transformation” 
especially given that nature of the apartheid in South Africa.
74
 Joe Slovo argued as much, 
noting that “the present phase of our revolution contains elements of both national and social 
emancipation; it is not the classic bourgeois-democratic revolution nor is it yet the socialist 
revolution.”75 
The nature of the struggle against apartheid and the greater popular participation that it 
enjoyed – beginning in spurts in the early 1970s and gaining momentum at key ‘moments 
thereafter’ – provided impetus to the idea of the ‘people’ driving their own project of 
liberation.
76
 Indeed, as the resistance took on more popular connotations, so the nature and 
discourse of liberation came to be shaped by a stronger populist thread. This popular thread 
was captured and circulated in the slogan (and notion) of “people’s power”.77 In essence, the 
notion of ‘people’s power’ “represented a marriage between the ANC’s emphasis on armed 
insurrection and organisational developments spreading across the country, and a direct link 
between present struggles and liberation.” 78 The emphasis on “grassroots civic organisation” 
emerged as a response to collapsing state infrastructure and governance at the local level.
79
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As such, the inculcation of ‘people’s power’ as the guiding means toward liberation was 
premised on the idea of ‘ungovernability’ where the emphasis was placed on “mass 
resistance, on an intensified armed struggle and on [a] growing refusal to obey racist 
authority.”80 Its organisational foundations would be decentralised, so that the ‘street’ would 
become the locus of popular resistance activity and conferring the administrative and 
bureaucratic power of the state to local level communities. As Raymond Suttner has posited 
on these organisational structures, 
In many of the townships of South Africa […] street committees were set up, and 
zone committees, yard committees, block committees. These are what we mean when 
we speak of primary organs of people’s power. […] They also undertook many of the 
functions that were normally the function of the South African police. This was in 
some cases because the police had gone into exile in the white areas […] In other 
cases, the police remained there, but people would still got to the community 
organisations for resolution of their problems. In some cases, the police actually said 
‘Go to the Comrades.’81 
The legitimacy that these structures attained rested on the agency with which it endowed 
communities to “invent new forms of organising and mobilising” while setting the ground for 
the “transfer of power to the people.”82 The emphasis placed on the popular dimensions of 
struggle and the location of agency within the masses, allowed them, it in the words of ANC 
stalwart Mac Maharaj, to project a “vision of a future of freedom, accept that vision as one 
that that is in keeping with their aspirations and are convinced about the victory of their 
cause. That is why we also speak about the need for the masses to be a conscious political 
army of liberation.”83 More importantly, the emphasis on ‘people’s power’ and its realisation 
permitted greater clarity on the means by which the Freedom Charter could be 
implemented.
84
 
In reaction to increasing repression by the South African state, there was the realisation that 
the internal and popular anti-apartheid struggle “entered a new phase in realising the national 
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liberation of the people of South Africa.”85 Indeed, increased content was given to the 
‘national’ in characterising the struggle as “national democratic” in two ways.86 As Suttner 
expounds, the “movement” came to encompass “every nook and cranny of South Africa, 
every geographical area” while at the same time, it aimed “get through to every group of 
South African people who suffer under apartheid oppression or every democrat who wants to 
associate himself or herself with the struggle to free South Africa.”87 The extent to which the 
national democratic foundations of ‘people’s power’ entrenched itself within upon the 
resistance landscape was similarly popularised by the ANC. In an address to an anti-apartheid 
gathering in Spain, then ANC Secretary General Alfred Nzo noted how, 
[...] during 1986, the revolt gathered further momentum, engulfing new areas of the 
country including the bantustans. In mass action, the democratic forces have 
decisively emerged as the alternative power within the country. The essence of their 
actions has been to wrest control from the regime and to start implementing the 
demands of the National Democratic Revolution.”88 
That the content of people’s struggles remained the administrative and governance reform – 
or “popular control of the townships and popular justice” – was intimated above.89 Moreover, 
clear demands for socio-economic redress were also a rallying point of these struggles. The 
engagement of ‘the people’ in the struggle signified what Mahmood Mamdani has called “a 
new path to liberation” and highlighted the shifting “locus of struggle from the external 
(exile) to the internal (home), the agency of struggle from professional revolutionaries to 
popular strata, and its method from armed violence to nonviolent agitation.”90 
While Mamdani’s conclusions are correct, within its discursive ambit, the ANC continued to 
project the violent revolutionary content of ‘people’s power’ through a conceptualisation of 
‘people’s war’ and as evident from the above, accorded itself an instrumental role in guiding 
popular agitation inside South Africa.  Premised on the insurrectionary seizure of power by 
‘the people’, it offered greater militant content to the notion of people’s power, and where it 
became “war in which a liberation army becomes rooted among the people, who 
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progressively participate actively in the armed struggle both politically and militarily, 
including the possibility of engaging by partial or general insurrection.”91 In subsuming the 
organisational structures of the ‘people’s war’ under the umbrella of Umkhonto we Sizwe 
(MK) the ANC was able to maintain, at least rhetorically, a link to the conduction of the 
struggle inside South Africa, through characterising the MK as 
[...] a People’s Army which draws its strength from the oppressed masses. Its cause is 
just, and it cannot be destroyed […] Through a combination of mass political action 
and armed actions we have seized the initiative from the enemy […] The racists can 
only react with desperation to our offensive.
92
 
The utility of the notions of the ‘national democratic revolution’, ‘freedom charter’ and 
‘people’s power’, while providing the ideological content of liberation, similarly are 
important rhetorical devices through which the ANC and its associated organisations were 
able to market the nature, form and content of liberation. In addition, they also formed an 
important discursive register through which ownership of the struggle could be exercised and 
provided an historical repository through to which a future ANC could turn, to invoke the 
salience and sanctity of the struggle for liberation. Marketing liberation, and the various 
strands that composed its definition, was not exclusively undertaken by the ANC, but by 
formations within and aligned to it. In the next section, I focus on this marketing of liberation 
and demonstrate the rich publicity, promotional and propaganda activity that was undertaken 
by the ANC and the organisations closely affiliated to it. 
AGITATING FOR LIBERATION: MARKETING PERSPECTIVES 
Umkhonto we Sizwe 
Born in the milieu of the aftermath of the Sharpeville Massacre in March 1960, Umkhonto 
we Sizwe (MK) keenly asserted its popular character through the embrace of the ‘people’. 
Indeed, in its founding manifesto it clearly asserted its guiding mission as being “at the front 
line of the people’s defence.”93 Further, in conceiving of its mandate, it argued that “[I]t will 
be the fighting arm of the people against the government and its policies of race oppression. 
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It will be the striking force of the people for liberty, for rights and for their final liberation!”94 
The nature and content of this liberation was intimately linked to the prescriptions of the 
Freedom Charter. Indeed, in a leaflet entitled Why We Fight there is a rhetorical invocation of 
the key components of apartheid oppression in which the contours of the Freedom Charter are 
evident. Addressed to “the sons and daughters of the soil” it asserts that, 
The white oppressors have stolen our land. They have destroyed our families. [...] We 
burrow into the belly of the earth to dig out gold, diamonds, coal, uranium. The white 
oppressors and foreign investors grab all this wealth. [...] In the factories, on the 
farms, on the railways, wherever you go, the hard, dirty, dangerous, badly paid jobs 
are ours. The best jobs are for whites only. In our land we have to carry passes; we are 
restricted and banished while the white oppressors move about freely. [...] Our homes 
are hovels; those of the whites are luxury mansions, flats and farmsteads. There are 
not enough schools for our children; the standard of education is low, and we have to 
pay for it. But the government uses our taxes and the wealth we create to provide free 
education for white children. We have suffered long enough.
95
 
By acknowledging the range of exploitation suffered by the black population, this form of 
publicity is able to give credence to violent insurrection and link the political/popular and 
armed struggle. This characterisation of the struggle wherein political, economic and social 
deprivation are foregrounded serves to endow a ‘justness’ on the armed struggle and 
legitimates the enactment of violence. The ANC was keen to pronounce on this, asserting that 
armed struggle “[had] not been part of the strategy of our liberation movement” and that due 
to “the elimination of all alternatives by the racists” the movement was “forced to adopt this 
position.”96 Moreover, the ‘rootedness’ of armed struggle within the ‘people’ and hence its 
conception as an expression of popular resistance, permitted it a democratic rectitude onto 
armed action.  Indeed, it was argued that “the armed struggle is a vital, indispensible 
component of the struggle for national and social liberation in South Africa, [and that the] 
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democratic majority of our country supports the People’s Army – Umkhonto we Sizwe.”97  In 
espousing the ‘ownership’ of MK as residing with ‘the people’, it continues that 
All of us are responsible for making MK stronger and more rooted among the people 
[and] Umkhonto we Sizwe must grow in size, the spread and quality of its operations 
and in the weight of every blow delivered. The armed struggle must grow!
98
 
While the nature and content of armed insurrectionary activity under the rubric of ‘peoples 
power’ was demonstrated above, the actual ‘marketing’ function of the MK found expression 
in its ‘armed propaganda’ activities. ANC intellectual, Francis Meli notes the role and 
significance of this, arguing that, 
Throughout the fiercest repression of the 1960s and until the mass democratic 
movement became firmly established in the early 1980s, the armed struggle was 
limited to armed propaganda. As such, it played a vital role in the earlier period of 
maintaining, in the ‘vacuum’ created by the virtual crushing of the extra-
parliamentary opposition, the spirit of revolt and the possibility of successful action 
against the regime.
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Figure 1: The Freedom Charter being taught in an MK camp, Mayibuye Archive, MK-2 
This ‘spirit of revolt’ stemmed largely from the actions undertaken by MK to “inspir[e] our 
people and populariz[e] the ANC.”100 Indeed, following its formation, there were numerous 
attacks on the “symbols of apartheid” that clearly signalled this intent.101 The targets included 
“government offices administering discriminatory laws” in addition to “explosions at railway 
installations and electric pylons.”102 Such armed incursions were to have both a “political and 
psychological impact” and they would serve to “instil self-confidence in the people and 
transform the latent hostility of the people to the regime into open mass confrontation.”103 
Intention and rhetoric did conjoin, as the propagandistic utility of these actions were 
successful in garnering support for the ANC and inculcating a sense of ‘presence’ within the 
populace. According to Tom Lodge, “[A] series of opinion polls and surveys have borne 
witness to the ANC’s rising popularity amongst urban black South Africans as have the 
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massively attended funerals of ANC activists and veterans.”104 Moreover, the success of these 
operations also saw the ANC “[being] accorded sole and legitimate representative status” 
both in sympathetic African states and internationally.
105
 
Despite this, there existed a disjuncture between the strength and capacity of the internal 
political movement’s ability in providing leadership and popularising the ANC in this period. 
According to Tom Lodge, there existed an observable ‘weakness’ in the strength of the “non-
military political dimension of the ANC’s internal work.”106  That the MK inside South 
Africa was plagued by organisational weakness and at times inefficacy was not a new 
development. Writing of his experiences in the 1960s, Nelson Mandela noted that “in [their] 
enthusiasm for violence as a weapon to strike at the enemy” there was a general “neglect” of 
“strengthening the political organisations by recruiting new members, holding branch 
meetings, conducting political classes, and using legal platforms to reach the masses of our 
people.”107 But, while this ‘non-military political dimension’, or the Area Political 
Committees (APC), which were ought to “provide overall leadership to co-ordinate military 
with political work” were largely ineffectual, Barrell has argued in his seminal study of the 
MK that, 
Inside the country, legal and semi-legal popular political organisations were 
burgeoning. The ANC’s small political underground helped steer the resurgence 
towards the ANC and its symbols […] the ANC focused on broadly-based campaigns 
for the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and against the 
twentieth anniversary of South Africa becoming a republic. The Freedom Charter was 
promoted as the major alternative vision to white minority rule. ANC flags appeared, 
as if from nowhere, in anti-Republic meetings and marches.
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Armed activity was not the only means of propaganda and publicity for the MK. Indeed, its 
propaganda apparatus was not singularly confined to sabotage and armed campaigns, but 
operated strongly within the confines of a discursive public sphere. Indeed, MK was astutely 
conscious of the need to inform and persuade public opinion. In the annual general meeting 
of its journal, DAWN, there was consensus that the periodical’s “main function [was] to 
establish contact between the masses and MK” and form part of the broader narrative 
offensive of the ANC’s Department of Information and Propaganda through the “tactical use 
of language on particular issues” by which “DAWN would receive constant communication 
from DIP H/Q so as to be completely in touch with how to deal with specific issues.”109 The 
very conception of propaganda was expounded in a 1986 edition of DAWN. Indeed, it was 
argued that, 
Our main method of propaganda is persuasion. It is based on truth, scientific approach 
and does not hide its partisanship. The aim is to educate the masses and to activate 
them to revolutionary action for the seizure of power […] Our propaganda must 
always be on the offensive. Among our people and their army, Umkhonto we Sizwe, 
the role of propaganda is to instil patriotism.
110
 
Within this conception of propaganda, it is apposite that DAWN was seen as a vehicle aimed 
at “uplifting the political consciousness of our people’s army” so that it may “contribute 
towards the building of a loyal, dedicated cadre, full of initiative and always at the service of 
the organisation and the masses of our people.”111 It was imperative moreover, for the ANC 
to exert ownership over the MK and thus the armed struggle, given the exigencies of the 
internal struggle and the opening of ‘a new path to liberation’ and the concomitant sprouting 
of newly invigorated, internally-based and operative mass movements. ANC propaganda took 
on many forms. In a verse dedicated to MK in the performance piece entitled I am Prepared 
to Die, these ideas are rendered clear, for it is noted that, 
Under the banner of the African National Congress the phase of revolutionary armed 
struggle has begun. You have heard the sound of gunfire from across our borders in 
Zimbabwe. The day must come when it will be heard throughout the length and 
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breadth of our motherland. Be ready. The battle will be long, hard and bitter. But it 
will be end with victory for us and FREEDOM AT LAST.
112
 
In asserting its ownership of the armed struggle and concomitantly its presence inside South 
Africa, the ANC similarly attempted to emphasise its determination to confront the apartheid 
state militarily and challenge its hegemony, declaring purposively in the handbook entitled, 
We are at War!, that 
[T]he government fears us! Our organisations were outlawed, our leaders banned, 
restricted, jailed for life, murdered. But the ANC survives and grows underground!
113
 
We are at War! similarly invokes rousing rhetoric to stimulate mobilisation and confrontation 
and enjoins the consumer of its propaganda to fight the “white oppressors” for “[if] you do 
not fight like a man, you will live and die like a slave.”114 Imperatively too, as a piece of 
agitational propaganda, the document undertakes to link the then struggles against the 
apartheid regime, to the longer teleology of black challenge to colonialism through the 
invocation of the memory of the ‘deeds’ of heroic, African leaders. Tapping into this cultural 
memory, the document proclaims, 
[O]ur soldiers are skilful. They take the enemy by surprise. Their deeds are brave like 
the warriors of Shaka, Makana, Sekhukhuni, Moshoeshoe, Cetshwayo. We shall 
win.
115
 
In so doing, not only is the action being encouraged by connecting it to a more mythic past, 
but there is a concomitant legitimation of the struggle being undertaken validation of its 
effects and outcomes. 
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Figure 2: Women Arise and Act! Join Umkhonto We Sizwe Mayibuye Archive, SW1-3-13 
The more militant, even vitriolic, rhetoric and imagery invoked by the ANC through the MK 
functioned to position itself at the centre of revolutionary action against apartheid. Such a 
representational and discursive construction captured a wider market for the ANC and located 
it across various arenas of struggle. Women were not excluded from the ANC’s mobilisation 
activities as evidenced in figure 2 above. Women’s liberation was intimately connected to 
national liberation, and by the 1980s, the ANC’s commitment and recognition of the 
militaristic role of women in the struggle was keenly communicated.
116
 Targeting women as a 
market to engage in armed propaganda, destabilised the ‘traditional’ conceptions of women 
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in struggle and gave impetus to the democratic and equality premises of the notion of 
people’s power. 
Moreover, the creation of a militant, insurrectionary image served to locate the ANC at the 
centre of the internal resistance campaign against the apartheid state. This rhetoric, however, 
belied a political reality in which commitment to a direct military offensive against the South 
African regime by the ANC was varied and the organisational capacities limited. Indeed, 
within the various constituent elements of the ANC, the recourse to armed struggle was not 
fully supported. A wide literature exists on these dissonances and it is not my aim to recount 
them here.
117
 Rather, given the focus of the present study, what is important, is the invocation 
of a specific grammar of resistance and liberation which the ANC aimed to monopolise and 
embody. However, various grammars existed and circulated among the numerous 
organisations fighting against apartheid. The more militaristic of the MK was offset by a 
popular democratic one of the UDF. The emergence of the UDF “inspired an insurrectionary 
movement that was without precedent in its geographical spread, in its combative militancy, 
in the burden it imposed upon government resources and in the degree to which it 
internationalized hostility toward the apartheid.”118 The significance of the UDF from a 
political marketing perspective lay in the fact that from its formation, it “undoubtedly 
borrowed from the traditions, symbols, iconography, and ideology of the ANC” and thus 
provided an important fillip to the ANC’s marketing activities inside South Africa.119 It is to 
an examination of this I now turn. 
United Democratic Front (UDF) 
The founding of the UDF in 1983 and the concomitant embarkation upon ‘a new path to 
liberation’ was central to the narrative of liberation that informed the struggle against 
apartheid. As demonstrated above, the ideological content of liberation and the centrality of 
‘the people’ fed into a broader ontological understanding of resistance and opposition that 
was prefigured in the 1976 ‘Soweto moment’. In the palimpsest of liberation, the UDF was 
the harbinger of capturing the discursive construction of the popular dimension of the anti-
apartheid forces. More than this, the significance of the UDF’s contribution to the 
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representative entrenchment lay in its capacity to give the ANC “presence” in South Africa, 
together with the trade unions and other organisations of the mass democratic movement.
120
 
While the key to this ‘presence’ was the coalescence of these forces around the ideological 
banner of the Freedom Charter, the latter’s acceptance and propagation as a socio-economic 
and political panacea was, however, initially opposed by the UDF. Dismissing claims that it 
constituted an “ANC front”, the UDF emerged out of its “opposition to the new constitution 
and the Koornhof Bills”121 that envisaged the creation of a ‘tricameral parliamentary system’ 
which would afford Coloured, Indian and white South Africans representation, albeit 
unequally, in a “central government” that “excluded the African majority altogether.”122 In 
counterpoint to the stratification and opportunism that underpinned these proposed executive 
reforms, the UDF’s political programme was premised on the precepts of a “united, 
democratic South Africa based on the will of the people” in which the there was the declared 
goal to “strive for the unity of all people through united action against the evils of apartheid, 
economic and all other forms of exploitation.”123 Abiding to “the principles of non-racialism 
and democracy”, the UDF’s narrative strategy aimed to capture and appeal to the broadest 
range of social and community formations.
124
 While its emergence was premised on 
opposition to the Bills, it would be false to view such opposition in narrow terms. Indeed, 
asserting that the imperative of the Bills would be to foment further disunity through the 
disparities of “living standards” given apartheid spatial planning, it went on to list other 
socio-economic and political factors such as poor wages; the lack of access to a quality 
education; the ‘harming’ of religious and cultural life; and the “oppression and exploitation” 
of women and the extirpation of conventional family life as reasons to resist promulgation.
125
 
While distancing itself from clear subscription to the Freedom Charter and therefore asserting 
its independence from the ANC, the rhetorical invocation of the taxonomy of malaise bears a 
clear resonance with the remedial aspirations of the Charter. 
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Given the wide remit of formations that constituted the Front and the attendant range of class, 
racial and ideological dynamics of these formations, varying political dispositions were 
evident. A “strategic shift”, evident after its campaign against the Koornhof Bills, saw the 
UDF move from an emphasis on “grass roots” struggles to an engagement with “the existing 
political struggles being waged in the townships.”126 More than this, the ‘shift’ effected 
changes to the UDF in three ways: first, there was a move to “reorientate the UDF towards 
African rather than coloured and Indian areas”; a greater need for organisational development 
and restructuring; and finally, “an overall different role for the UDF” in which it would cease 
to “co-ordinate protests as much as co-ordinate the organisations which sought to direct 
resistance.”127 
 
Figure 3: UDF Poster, Mayibuye SP1-1-13 
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This shift was necessitated by an organisational sclerosis that beset the Front and diluted its 
ability to transition from “resistance to the apartheid system and growing ungovernability to 
developing mass based democratic organisations and organs of people’s power.”128 While 
this sclerosis varied across regions and provinces, the problems encountered are nevertheless 
instructive for understanding the strategic and organisational capacities of the internally-
based anti-apartheid movement. Thus, for example, in the Northern Transvaal region, there 
was a “lack of active involvement of older people in structures, lack of political training [and 
the] need for more coordination of students and youth at a regional level.”129 Furthermore, the 
“lack of political education” among youth saw “their consciousness [being directed] at the 
police and government” and held an insufficient “understanding” of the ideological content of 
“non-racialism and democracy [...] the Freedom Charter, [and] what is meant by 
ungovernability and organs of people’s power.”130 
The opposition to apartheid, captured in the Front’s political programme, and its conception 
of the nature of apartheid oppression, was undertaken through a political register that was 
consonant with that of the ANC’s and, importantly, the Freedom Charter. This is instructive 
for it highlights not only the nomenclatural but also organisational imbrications that 
characterised the anti-apartheid struggle. Despite this, the decision to adopt the Freedom 
Charter by the UDF was contested. Concern revolved around the fact that it would 
“undermine the continued building of a broader alliance under implicit Charterist 
leadership.”131 The ANC, however, was clear to assert that the adoption of the Freedom 
Charter was not a precondition for the formation of any coalition of social forces in 
contesting the regime.
132
 While initially deciding against adoption, there were moves made 
for the UDF to conduct a “campaign to popularise the Charter”133 and its affiliates were 
charged with “discussing” and “explaining” it in its publicity and promotional drives. 134 In 
1988, the Charter was adopted by the UDF. Such popularising gave expression to the core 
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precepts of the Freedom Charter in the UDF’s iconography. As evident in figure 4 below, the 
demand to ‘Unban the ANC’ was communicated and evoked through a metaphorical use of 
images to indicate the demand for access and ownership of mineral wealth, land, housing, 
education and a lack of discrimination. Underpinned by the declaration of the ‘Freedom 
Charter for People’s Power’, the poster below crystallises the core content of the notion of 
liberation. 
 
Figure 4: UDF Poster obtained online 
fromhttp://www.nelsonmandela.org/udf/index.php/poster/unban_the_anc_freedom_day/ (accessed on 2 June 2010) 
Such publicity and promotion found expression through a range of materials, performances, 
marches and in line with its organisational ethos, community-based arts projects. Moreover, 
funerals were used as political platforms for publicising the struggle and resistance to the 
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apartheid state. The subscription to the Charter’s vision of liberation for the UDF obtained 
further currency in the emotionally charged and symbolic atmosphere of the funeral for 
David Webster, a white UDF activist assassinated by the apartheid regime. In a speech by 
Mohammed Valli Moosa, a senior UDF leader, the invocation of the Charter and its centrality 
in guiding the UDF were clear, when he noted, 
Today, more [than] ever before, the legitimacy of the Freedom Charter is accepted by 
the overwhelming majority of South Africans. A large number of mass organisations 
have formally adopted the Freedom Charter as their political programme [...] It has 
become an ideological force of its own. Even the [captains] of our economy could not 
ignore this document – they continue to seek clarification of its clauses from the 
African National Congress [...] it must be said that the debates around the Freedom 
Charter raged amongst us did serve a valuable purpose. They contributed towards 
enriching our understanding of the nature of South African society and the nature of 
the struggle itself.
135
 
In the same address, the content of liberation came to be revealed through a discursive 
manoeuvre that linked the fundamental precept of liberation – democracy – to its 
organisational realisation. Rhetorically, democracy is premised on popular foundations and 
economic emancipation, where the struggle for the realisation of such democracy is premised 
on unity. Adumbrating the outlines of this conception of liberation, Moosa continued 
[...] let us give impetus to the process of building a single South African nation. [...] 
Let us display respect for all the languages, cultural practices and religions of our 
people. But let us remove the culture of apartheid which fosters division and stunts 
growth. Let us build a true people’s culture, so that our struggle does not become a 
struggle only to change laws, but which changes individuals themselves.
136
 
Given the popular nature of the composition of the UDF, the subscription to unity became an 
imperative that not only found expression in the concept of liberation, but was a vehicle 
through which the struggle for liberation could be realised. Indeed, that the front was founded 
on opposition to the Koornhof bills which sought to magnify racial, tribal and ethnic 
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divisions through ‘co-optation’ provided further impetus for calls to unity to counter the 
divisiveness of apartheid.
137
 Finding expression in the popular UDF slogan, ‘UDF Unites, 
Apartheid Divides’, such unity would also provide the basis for the creation of a post-
apartheid ‘nation’. As the image above demonstrates (see figure 3), unity informed the 
iconography of the UDF. The masses of people, organised under the banner of the UDF, and 
depicted as both purposive and engaged, captures the very ethos of the Front. Moreover, it 
communicated the message of a nation in the making and was entrenched in the very process 
of struggle. Indeed, Murphy Morobe, UDF National Executive member explained as much in 
an interview, noting, 
What we see is the destruction of the SA nation here by apartheid policies, and what 
we believe is that for the building of a new SA, a new South Africanism that does not 
have to wait for liberation whenever that will come, but has to be a process that has to 
be begun whilst we are engaged in struggle.
138
 
More than that, in the palimpsest of liberation, the motif of unity came to serve as a 
discursive link between the ANC and allied formations in the pursuit of liberation. For the 
ANC, the ‘anticipated’ role of the UDF in the struggle would fit neatly into this conception. 
Indeed, in an interview with the MK journal DAWN, Thabo Mbeki noted that the UDF’s 
central contribution to the struggle was its “focus on united action for a united, democratic 
and non-racial South Africa” which would “raise our struggle to a higher level.”139 The 
resonances here with the guiding precepts of the NDR are evident. More than that, the 
process of struggle also came to demonstrate the intimate connection between the ANC and 
the UDF, and the imbrications – of people, leadership, ideologies etc. – that informed the 
resistance movements. In the theatre of the political rally, this finds clear expression. In the 
transcript of a rally entitled the ‘People’s Weekend’ the fervour of the participants is evident. 
The transcript reads, 
(Starts with crowd chanting: “Oliver Tambo, Oliver Tambo!”) 
(singing) (song about Tambo) (chanting Oliver Tambo!) 
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(more singing) (about Tambo, Mandela, Umkhonto) (Botha – voetsak voetsak)140 
(Singing – one line, two lines. Chant; Joe Slovo, Joe Slovo, Oliver Tambo!) (Song) 
Woman: One South Africa, One Nation! [...] Now it’s my time and your time and our 
time and UDF’s time. We’re going to sing about UDF and must all shout UDF! (UDF 
song) 
Woman: You know you must bring that spirit of the 1976 back to date. You must 
SING people.  [...] (song about Tambo). (cuts)
141
 
Linking leading personalities of the ANC and SACP, as well as MK, inculcates a sense of 
authenticity to the people’s struggles engaged in by the UDF and links the actions at the time, 
within a longer teleology of the struggle against apartheid. Indeed, by urging the audience to 
action through the commemoration of the ‘spirit of 1976’, the UDF is able to tap into a very 
specific narrative of liberation that augments the populist dimension of the struggle. In 
highlighting the relationship between the ANC and the UDF, the content and conception of 
liberation is rendered less opaque. 
Sustained action and revolt in the late 1980s and the increasing pressure on the regime saw 
reform measures being introduced as the inevitability of political change in South Africa 
became apparent. The release of political prisoners from Robben Island and the unbanning of 
the ANC in 1990 placed the UDF in an organisational flux that required an assessment of its 
future. In handwritten notes by founding member of the UDF, Popo Molefe, the strategic 
thinking and available to the UDF are evident. Indeed, there is the acknowledgement that 
“some UDF affiliates can be absorbed into the ANC” which included the Transvaal and Natal 
Indian Congresses, as well as the South African Youth Congress and UDF Women’s 
Sector.
142
  The strategic imperative for the UDF remained the “task of rebuilding the ANC” 
and that it was necessary for the UDF to ‘exist’ “up until the ANC structures are intact” and 
at least up until the December conference of the ANC, after which “the UDF should review 
its existence.”143 However, Seekings notes that at the regional level, the disparity in the 
positions on the future of the UDF were manifest.
144
 While some favoured the dissolution of 
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the Front, at the UDF National Executive Committee meeting held in July 1990, an 
organisational assessment revealed that “[T]here is still some need for UDF to play a political 
role in some areas as the ANC branches are still very weak” even though it “should de-
emphasise its political role and assume a co-ordinating one for those mass organisations 
outside of the ANC.”145 However, this co-ordinating role among civic organisations, 
premised on non-partisanship, was compromised because of the UDF’s proximity to the ANC 
and its earlier adoption of the Freedom Charter. In Molefe’s consideration, “the adoption of 
the Freedom Charter narrowed the base of the UDF.”146 But more than that, poor 
coordination and organisation in the various regions provided the primary impetus for the 
disbanding of the Front.
147
 Indeed, by the March 1991 National General Council meeting, 
Popo Molefe noted that, 
[...] the UDF is at its weakest in the entire history of its existence. Very few regional 
councils meet regularly. There is nothing that provides for joint strategising and joint 
decision-making. Leaders no longer operate on the basis of sufficient mandates, nor 
are they sufficiently accountable because meetings are irregular.
148
 
The UDF’s pressure and contestation of the apartheid regime opened an important internal 
front through which the struggle could be undertaken. Indeed, through the State of 
Emergency of the late 1980s and the formation of the Mass Democratic Movement, the UDF 
with other civil society groupings exerted immense internal pressure on the apartheid regime 
and punctured conceptions of its strength and its continued longevity. Like the MK, the UDF 
was intricately involved in the discursive contestation against the South African state. Open, 
public and aimed at a mass audience, its marketing of liberation and political action served to 
mobilise and organise targeted constituencies. The discursive and representational activity of 
the ANC was also undertaken in less open and public arenas. Robben Island, more than just a 
prison, became an important site in which persuasion was undertaken through inculcating an 
understanding of the ideological orientation of the ANC in the political education of 
prisoners. 
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Robben Island 
Robben Country 
Country that separated fathers 
With children and wives 
Country that left loneliness 
In our motherland 
Country that is a concentration camp 
of patriots
149
 
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the experience of apartheid in various ‘sites’ 
came to inform the ideological and discursive construction of liberation. Despite its physical 
and epistemic isolation, Robben Island became an important “site of struggle” against 
apartheid primarily for the emphasis placed on the nature and content of the education of 
political prisoners and the concomitant ‘emancipatory’ potential that this held, even obtaining 
the sobriquet ‘The University of Revolutionary Politics.”150 Given the focus of this thesis, the 
marketing function for the ANC turned on the nature, focus and scope of the education being 
provided. Locating the ANC at the centre of this process of education, and political education 
specifically, a particularistic narrative of the struggle against apartheid is communicated. 
More than that, the ideological content of this education also provides an orienting 
framework through which liberation is theorised. 
As noted in the analysis above, the marketing function of the ANC and its associated 
formations was conjoined to a mobilisation and organisational imperative. On Robben Island, 
the same imperative was evidenced. In an interview, Walter Sisulu noted as much when he 
posited, 
One of the first things we did when we got to Robben Island was to set up our own 
machinery and to conduct political education, to guide us as it were. We set up the 
machinery we called the High Organ. In other words this was the controlling body in 
the Island prison. Not for the whole Island. The main section continued its own 
activity. It had its own machinery, and we were merely starting our own in the area in 
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which we were. That also brought a relationship between us. That is how we, the 
leadership, got together with the main section.
151
 
Given the nature of disciplinary power exerted on prisoners, especially during the period that 
Sisulu refers to, “a well organised clandestine network [was] set up in all the different 
sections of Robben Island.”152 Heuristically, the educative content of the materials – from 
political polemics, essays, newspaper articles, and the like – aimed to provide not only a 
political education, or what became known as mrabula for prisoners, but also a “deepening of 
resistance” among them.153 Indeed, in Jacob Zuma’s words, there was a sense that  the 
“objective was that if you were a political prisoner on Robben Island you’d better come off 
Robben Island a better politician, a better fighter.”154  The content of the political education 
being expounded, as noted above, was instructive in understanding the means by which the 
idea of liberation came to be constructed and disseminated. In a handwritten report by a 
Robben Island education committee head entitled, On Our Political Education, the 
importance ascribed to such education is evident here. Indeed, and echoing Jacob Zuma’s 
sentiments it is argued that 
In dealing with our proposed syllabus we think it is necessary to repeat that a clear 
political line forms an important guide in our struggle. Pol. (sic) education is 
something inseparable from the struggles of all revolutionaries. Just as our armed 
combatants undergo meticulous training in warfare [...] Similarly political training is 
an indispensible weapon for every cadre in our struggle.
155
 
Moreover, constructing and utilising a particular conception of apartheid into the syllabus of 
political education on the Island, had the effect of producing a very specific narrative of the 
nature of liberation and how it would be obtained. Indeed, the same report it was noted 
further that, 
If we are to overthrow fascism and set up a new society it is imperative that we 
thoroughly understand (a) the country we live in, (b) the nature of oppression and 
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exploitation, (c) why change is needed […] Power is not only maintained by force but 
by winning the masses onto the side of the new society and make them realise that it 
is the People’s Govt (sic).156 
A survey of the content of the educational material used, especially toward the latter stages of 
apartheid, indicates a strong emphasis on the role of the ANC in the struggle and the 
ideological premises upon which liberation was based. Indeed, the main mrabula programme 
in 1990 for example, was divided thematically into three areas. Under the theme, ‘Strategy 
and Tactics of the South African Revolution’, a focus on the ideological imperatives through 
its core documentation forms the basis of the instructional material for prisoners. Here, the 
syllabus contains analyses of the ANC’s 1969 Strategy and Tactics document adopted at the 
seminal Morogoro Conference; the Freedom Charter; interpretations of the People’s War as 
well as an analysis of the 1985 Kabwe Conference.
157
 Examination of important texts relating 
to the SACP, COSATU and the UDF are also undertaken. Analysis of the second and third 
themes provides an insight into the ideological terrain upon which mrabula was premised. 
Indeed, the keen ascription to Marxism-Leninism and the study of socialist revolution in 
Europe and the struggles against colonialism in the ‘third world’ indicate abidance to the 
perceived ontological orientation of the ANC. There is a consistency that is evident through 
time in the content and focus of the educational material that was used as mrabula. 
Indeed, the explicit articulation of this ideological orientation can be evinced in commentary 
on newspaper articles by prisoners. In response to a newspaper article entitled ‘Terrorists 
want a Communist Republic’ in the Cape Times of August 25 1981, the People’s Scribe 
offers an illuminating handwritten riposte, noting, 
Meneer [Mr.] Major-General, you are, to be exact, Chief of the Security police of the 
bourgeoisie – foreign and local – and not of the State of the People –  ‘the people in 
their true sense, that is, the majority of the people, those who have had to live in 
exploitation and cruellest neglect…that is, the oppressed and exploited classes’ and 
against whom you secure the bourgeois status quo.
158
 
                                                 
156
 Sechaba, 
157
 Supplement A: Main Mrabula Programme, Robben Island: Mrabula Planning Documents, Political 
Programme Documents, Mayibuye Archive, MCH64-76  
158
 The People’s Scribe, English Essays Robben Island: Mrabulo Reading Material, Mayibuye Archive, 
MCH64-77. Michael Dingake in his memoir entitled My Fight Against Apartheid (London: Kliptown Books, 
109 
 
The ideological orientation of this education, and the input it gave to the construction of the 
idea of liberation was not confined solely to written material. Performances and plays were 
also an important means, especially in the early mid- to late-1960s, of communicating 
allegorically at times, the nature of the contest against apartheid. In his memoir, Natoo 
Babenia describes the operation of various plays and their political content. Indeed, 
Sophia was staged in B1. It is about a slave uprising in a small Greek enclave ruled by 
a King. But the real dominant force is actually Sophia, the sister of the King. [...] The 
slaves are in jail. However, led by Babana [“the leading black slave”] they refuse to 
fight the gladiators. An uprising takes place, supported by Sophia and they are set free 
with the help of the gladiators and slaves from outside.
159
 
Despite the brutality and harshness of the living conditions on the Island, evidence suggests 
that a vibrant educational, cultural and sporting life existed. In its own right, the Island was a 
microcosm of life on the mainland. As such, it would be incorrect too to assume that the 
ANC was alone in operating in these spheres on the Island. A multiplicity of organisations 
and formations existed and were supported by prisoners on the Island, but despite this, 
primacy was still accorded to the ANC. This primacy finds expression in handwritten copies 
of manuscripts that were circulated within the mrabula groups. The diffusion of the ideas of 
locating the ANC at the centre of the struggle is evidenced here for it is posited that, 
The ANC is the leading force in the National Liberation struggle of South Africa. 
Based principally on an alliance of class forces amongst the nationally oppressed, the 
ANC seeks to forge a broad non-racial movement of all democratic elements pledged 
to [the] overthrow of the apartheid state.
160
 
The circulation of these ideas through the prison population not only endowed prisoners with 
an ANC-centric political worldview but also performed an acute marketing function. 
Raymond Suttner has noted that for the ‘Soweto generation’ mrabula had the effect of 
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“consolidating their understanding of the history of resistance and in many cases, converting 
to the ANC.”161 Indeed, it was noted that 
The Island was a political education for me. Firstly, we developed a deep 
comradeship through discussion with the older leaders, and a deep respect. Before I 
went to the Island my understanding of the Freedom Charter was not thorough. There 
I had time to look back at history […] We delved into our history. We discovered that 
we young people were not the first to take up the fight against apartheid, but a new 
part of a developing process.
162
 
While conversion of young prisoners to the ANC due to mrabula certainly occurred as a 
result of its ‘marketability’, the significance of creating a specific narrative of history and 
liberation from apartheid would lie in “the significant political role” these prisoners would 
have after their “release.”163 Indeed, that Robben Island would “produce capable activists 
who would eventually go back to their communities” and inform and shape the struggle was 
an overarching objective of older “inmates”. 164 Then Islander, and now Cabinet minister 
Pravin Gordhan, espoused the ‘heroic’ status that returnees were met with on return to their 
communities and the authority that they possessed in shaping attitudes and perceptions within 
those communities. An implicit marketing function is evident here. Indeed, he notes, 
They were the bearers of history, bearers of experience, bearers of anecdotes, bearers 
of the Congress culture, ‘this is how you do things, this is how you analyse things’, 
they were bearers of inspiration, because you could relate to them as heroes, and there 
were not many heroes at the time, and each of them has a different quality because 
they each played a different role.
165
 
Given that the “youth of ’76 represented the future of the movements and the liberation 
struggle”, the imperative was therefore a “critical process of training activists, teaching them 
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organisational histories, ideologies and strategies, and preparing them for their political 
obligations and mandates upon release.”166 That these activists would take up leadership 
positions in UDF structures explains the congruence and diffusion of ideas and practices 
among the ‘broad church’ of ANC-aligned organisations.167 
CONCLUSION 
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the marketing of liberation was informed by 
various threads in the ANC’s discursive and representational arsenal. Acknowledging the 
pervasiveness and operation of a marketing consciousness through the ANC and its 
associated organisations, a consistency in the message is evident over time. Importantly too, 
despite the differing contours and emphases that each of these organisations encouraged, as 
well as the jostle for influence over the struggle against apartheid, the ANC remained the 
locus around which the discursive and representational power orbited. As such, a sense of 
political ownership of the ANC by the oppressed and disenfranchised was inculcated, and 
rooted in a conception of liberation in which they were empowered to realise it, actively 
participate in it, and reap the benefits of it. Indeed, the representation of liberation was keenly 
informed by the theoretical content of such liberation. Further, the ANC’s political marketing 
of liberation was deeply infused by a values-oriented conception of a free and democratic 
South Africa. The ongoing and incomplete nature of liberation, as defined and marketed by 
the ANC, resonated across time and features centrally in post-apartheid political discourse. 
The chapters which follow pick up on these themes and demonstrate the longevity of the 
ANC’s discursive and representational universe. 
 In locating itself at the centre of various conceptions of liberation, the ANC was positioned, 
as in other decolonising contexts, as the ‘sole and authentic’ representative of the aspirations 
of those seeking liberation.
168
 Through such strategic political manoeuvring, the ANC was 
able to inculcate a brand identity that resonated across different political markets, and attain a 
hegemonic status amongst the various and contending movements for liberation. The 
narrative of the struggle against apartheid was deeply informed by these discursive and 
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representational registers. Within the theatre of struggle against apartheid, the ANC’s 
political marketing of liberation and its positioning at the centre of these discourses endowed 
it with a legitimacy that became apparent as the liberalisation of South Africa began in late 
1989 and early 1990. This process of liberalisation would pave the way for a democratic 
election in 1994 in which the ANC actively sought to tap into its discursive, representational 
and organisational reservoir to contest and market itself in the election. I will discuss this 
further in chapter five. Before that however, the legitimacy of the ANC’s vision and the key 
marketing device with which it articulated this vision was the Freedom Charter. An enduring 
symbol in the ANC’s discursive and representational reservoir, it crystallised the moral-
ethical basis of the struggle and a liberated South Africa while commensurately positing the 
basis for a democratic and participative political culture. Myth and lore however infiltrated 
popular narratives of the Charter and its formation which the following chapter examines. 
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4. 
‘Of Singing Tomorrows’: 
 THE FREEDOM CHARTER 
**************** 
Through all this complex tapestry of different forms and methods of struggle, armed and unarmed, legal and 
illegal, underground and open, on the political, economic and ideological battlefronts, the ideas and inspiration 
of the Freedom Charter ran like a golden thread, unifying the diverse forces that together make up our 
liberation movement.
1
 
In the preceding chapters, I have demonstrated the centrality accorded to the Freedom Charter 
in the ANC’s discursive and representational stock. Indeed, that the Freedom Charter came to 
crystallise the aspirations of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa owes much to 
its ethos and vision, as it does to its symbolic currency as the orienting framework for the 
ANC. Written in 1955 to redress the “existential anguish” of blacks, the prescriptions of the 
Charter needed to be read in counterpoint to political and socio-economic milieu effected 
through the vast array of apartheid legislation.
2
 As a result, the Charter provided an apt means 
through which the ANC could market its opposition to apartheid and adumbrate the contours 
of a liberated and democratic South Africa. Underpinned and promoted in popular struggle 
narratives as an exercise in participatory democracy and a direct challenge to apartheid 
authoritarianism, it was not only the content, but also the process of the writing the Freedom 
Charter that came to be idealised. 
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Given its centrality in both pre- and post-liberation discourses, this chapter critically 
interrogates the narrative of the Charter’s formulation and the representational overtures that 
were made to popularise and promote it. Crystallising the notion of liberation, the Charter 
was mythologized in popular narratives and served the political aim of mobilising and 
organising opposition against apartheid. However, I argue for a more variegated and nuanced 
understanding of the process underlying its constitution, adoption and promotion by the 
ANC. In doing so, greater accent is placed on the interplay between the marketing and 
politics of the Charter. The dissonances that emerge between this recounting of the Freedom 
Charter and its popular adjunct provide an important insight into the political culture of the 
ANC. Such insight is not only useful for understanding its struggle era culture, but also 
permits an appropriate lens through which to understand such cultures in the post-apartheid 
period. This will be evidenced in the chapters that follow. The analysis here proceeds by 
examining the event of the Congress of the People (COP) which symbolised the democratic 
nature of policy-making within the anti-apartheid ‘Congress’ movements. Emphasising the 
popular organisational imperatives that underpinned its writing and the dissonances that 
emerge in narratives associated therewith, the discussion then proceeds to examine the 
ANC’s marketing of the Freedom Charter. Such marketing served to locate the Charter at the 
centre of the ANC’s ideological and political universe as it became the repository of 
conceptions and meanings of nature of liberation and the creation of a post-apartheid state. 
The importance of the Charter is evidenced in the centrality it is accorded in the governing 
narratives of the ANC across time. The conclusion of this chapter examines the precise nature 
of its legitimacy and longevity and posits the means by which it has become deeply 
ensconced as the ‘lodestar’ of the ANC’s ideological orientation. 
Organising for Freedom 
In “wonder[ing] whether the time had not come for the ANC to consider the question of 
convening a National Convention, a Congress of the People, representing all the people of 
this country irrespective of race or colour to draw up a Freedom Charter for the democratic 
future of South Africa,” ANC leader Professor Z.K. Matthews set in motion in 1953 the 
process of one of the most significant events in South Africa’s anti-apartheid political 
history.
3
 The enduring effect of the COP would lie in it being “a democratically elected 
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assembly of representatives of all races and of all parts of the country to frame and adopt a 
Freedom Charter expressing the will of the people.”4 Contained in the resolution of the Joint 
Conference of the ANC, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the Coloured People’s 
Organisation (CPO) and the Congress of Democrats (COD) – the constituting organisations 
of the Congress Alliance – the democratic import of this will to action stood in stark 
counterpoint to apartheid’s central tenets of division and ‘separateness’. Capturing the 
essence of this, it has been stated repeatedly that, 
We, the political leaders of our people, would not simply give a directive as to the 
meaning of freedom. We would get the people to tell us. They would draw up a 
Freedom Charter as a guide for us. We would consult the people in town and country, 
in every occupation, and across all the race and colour barriers of oppression. We 
would ask what shape they would like to give the freedom that was coming. And 
finally, we would compile what they demanded into a single Charter. A simple idea: 
but we were not so simple as to believe that in South Africa it would be easy.
5
 
As such, the campaign was directed at “reaching ordinary people and embracing their 
aspirations in the Charter” through a “series of campaigns held in huge rallies, small houses, 
flats, street or factory meetings, gatherings on kraals or on farms.”6 While there is an 
acknowledgment that this process was “uneven”, it nevertheless remained a seminal moment 
in the popular narrative of the struggle for liberation as it was contended that “South Africa 
[had] never had any similar process of democratic discussion and participation.”7 
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Figure 5: A campaign poster calling for participation in the COP, Amadelakufa Media, Obtained online at http:// 
2884.co.za/background.html 
Indeed, this democratic imperative to have large-scale input and berth the process amongst 
‘the people’ was underpinned too by a specific publicity and marketing imperative. An 
unidentified participant, ‘Patel’, noted that, 
[I]n this campaign we spent two or three hundred pounds, money collected by the 
people. Over a quarter million leaflets have been distributed, organisers sent out to the 
remotest corners of our land [...] the Congress has been brought close to the people.
8
 
By doing this, and by widening the geographic reach of the campaign to include workplaces, 
townships, villages and the like, the mobilisation effort gave effect to the charge made in the 
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COP’s slogan: “a delegate from every town, every suburb, every village.”9 In fulfilling this 
objective, the momentum for the campaign gathered pace. Patel continues, 
The campaign was launched in several stages, popularising the Congress of the 
People, formulating and sending in freedom demands and finally election of the 
delegates. Our delegates assembled here are not only from the organisations and 
groups. They have been elected from the small groups of housewives, by farm 
squatters, by miners in the compounds, by people gathering in large numbers and 
small. Our delegates assembled here speak with the voice of the people everywhere 
who have been taking part in the direct democratic election and have spoken of their 
demands from their hearts.
 10
 
The diffusion of resistance and power in popular recounting of the event of the COP duly 
emphasise the spirit of defiance in which it was ensconced. The very process of collecting 
demands and publicising the COP could be seen as a small but critical intervention made on 
the ground by activists, and filtered into a longer series of interventions, or resistances, 
against apartheid. The popular dimension of such resistance informed the advertising of the 
event. In his recollection of obtaining demands of the people, Eric Singh notes that this 
process started as early as 1953 when the idea to hold the COP was mooted. For him, “it was 
decided that we from the branches all over the country must inform the people about the 
intended COP.”11 In so doing, he continues, 
[w]e went from house to house talking to people, encouraging them about what 
should be included in the Freedom Charter. We gave them forms to fill in and passed 
them onto our head offices. We did this over a period of two years and ordinary 
people responded wonderfully.”12 
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Figure 6: The campaign for the COP attempted to target a broad constituency. This picture of sari-clad women is 
testament not only to the reach of the campaign, but also indicative of localised and individual resistance, Mayibuye 
Archive, University of the Western Cape, EW2-1-3 
This approach, of ‘bottom-up’ engagement and participation, was facilitated by a sense of 
volunteerism that marked the organisational effort. Indeed, “freedom volunteers” were 
enlisted to “serve as ‘shock brigades’ to give impetus to the campaign.”13 Volunteers, deemed 
to be “an organiser and a leader of the people”, were instructed to “write down the demands 
and grievances” and obtain the fullest understanding of the effect of “unjust laws or 
oppression” which afflicted the people and the means by which these could be corrected. 14 
Further, and imperatively, in driving the mobilisation effort and focusing on the various sites 
to rally support and inform people about the COP, volunteers were urged to form committees 
of activists and build a web-like grassroots momentum in attracting people to the cause of the 
Freedom Charter. In a charged appeal, it was noted that 
For all volunteers, a meeting of neighbours in a house, perhaps only of one street or 
block, can be called together. From these small beginnings we must branch off, going 
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from street to street, from block to block, organising meetings, explaining, listening, 
and recording. For the next few months volunteers must work like missionaries, 
without resting. It should be our aim to meet with one group of people or another 
every [night], systematically covering our whole town or locality so that no citizen of 
South Africa is left out of the discussions on the Freedom Charter [...] But a good 
volunteer does not work alone! He works in the first place with other volunteers in the 
neighbourhood, planning together with them all that is to be done.
15
 
This highly participative, diffused and democratic imperative that underpinned the campaign 
lent credence to the ‘mystique’ accorded to the Charter. Indeed, the ‘everydayness’ that 
characterised such resistance activity imbued the COP with a logic that stood in direct 
counterpoint to the restrictive and highly paternalistic modes of apartheid governance. The 
simple act of noting grievances and stating demands “on sheets torn from school exercise 
books, on little dog-eared scraps of paper, on slips torn from C.O.P leaflets” informed a 
narrative of citizen engagement and popular participation that has come to inculcate the near-
sanctity of the process and constitution of the Charter.
16
 
This narrative of engagement and participation was augmented by a popular re-telling/s of the 
event of the congress and thus inscribed constancy into the lore that surrounded it.  Eye-
witness accounts of the proceedings captured the palpable sense of surprise and awe of the 
reach of the congress’ organisation.17 More than this, a ‘carnivalesque’ atmosphere keenly 
informs popular accounts of the event. Reflecting on the activities of COP, a participant 
expounded, 
By noon, there was a carnival atmosphere as singing and chanting reverberated across 
the plain. Despite the apartheid regime’s aggressive segregation policies, the mixed 
crowd mingled freely, singing, chatting and dancing. The Security Branch police 
could do nothing. They themselves were surprised at the turnout.
18
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Such characterisations lend credence to the ‘carnivalesque’ ethic that underpinned the COP. 
Indeed, and as recalled in chapter two, the bottom-up organisation, popular input and 
‘everydayness’ of the concerns raised, together with the multiracial constitution of 
participants,  served to release the ‘utopian potential’ in the spectacle of the COP. Such 
characterisation also highlights the duality of existence by the participants and the 
contestatory nature of the event – through its organisation but also through acts of singing 
and chanting –  to the ‘officiality’ of the apartheid regime. The excitement and performative 
nature of the event and the carnivalesque character that it came to embody should not detract 
from the seriousness of its purport. Indeed, the potential threat that the COP posed for the 
Nationalist government (in addition to restrictions on the freedom of association) was marked 
by heavy special branch police surveillance and intimidation that added to the dramaturgy 
and theatricality of the event. 
 
Figure 7: A diverse group of participants highlighting the constitutive organisations of the Congress Alliance and the 
geographic ‘reach’ of the popularising of the campaign, Mayibuye Archive, University of the Western Cape EW053-
4-3 
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It is apparent from the foregoing that the intervention that the COP made into the tableau of 
resistance politics in South Africa was not limited to the macro-political sphere. Indeed, 
individual acts of resistance – the collision of the personal and the political – informed the 
overall subversive nature of the event.
19
  But in the predominant narrative of challenge to the 
apartheid state, the COP and the formulation of the Freedom Charter marked a definitive 
rupture in the continuum of anti-apartheid resistance politics. Writing in his autobiography, 
ANC leader Chief Albert Luthuli, noted the import of the event, stating that, 
Nothing in the history of the liberation movement in South Africa quite caught the 
popular imagination as this [the COP] did, not even the Defiance Campaign. Even 
remote rural areas were aware of the significance of what was going on. The noisy 
opposition in most of the white Press advertised the Congress and the Charter more 
effectively that our unaided efforts would have done. (“if the white Press objects on 
this scale,” most Africans felt, “it must be a good thing!”). So the awakening spread 
farther. The participation of all race groups in this effort underlined the scale of 
awakening resistance.
20
 
The significance of the Charter and the event that birthed it lay in the fact that it  “represented 
the crucial historical moment where a completely new order, based on the will of the people, 
was put on the agenda” and “all political solutions ‘from above’ were ruled out.” 21 However, 
such rhetorical insistence on the popular and democratic imperatives that underpinned the 
COP belies a more contentious and nuanced reality. Essentially, the COP was seen as a 
“political campaign” bent on “educating people rather than learning from the people” and 
succeeded in “allow[ing] the ANC and its allies to spread their political message.”22 
Certainly, the basic contours of the Charter and the framework in which they were posited 
were common in debates about opposition to apartheid. In early 1954 a year before the COP, 
Moses Kotane, a stalwart of both the ANC and SACP, set out the provisions of a ‘freedom 
charter’ in the New Age newspaper espousing the precise contours of the document that 
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emerged at the COP.
23
 Indeed, detailing the call of basic freedoms such as speech, movement 
and assembly, it went further to call for the provision of socio-economic provisions of 
housing, schools and hospitals.
 24
 Economic freedom would also be realised through de-
monopolisation and ownership of industry would “become the property of the people.” 25 
The demands here, as I have noted, read as a common exposition of equitable redistributive 
and social democratic rights that would have universal applicability in most unequal 
societies, they nevertheless closely mirror in tenor and scope the imperative clauses of the 
Charter itself. Popular (re-)telling of the preparations for the event note that as “the 
resolutions began to roll in it was remarkable to see the similarity of demands voiced.”26 
However, the popular narrative of the event, as I will demonstrate, obscures a more nuanced 
exercise of influence and power over the constitution of the Charter and the dissonances that 
informed its construction. 
Dissonances 
In its own recollections of the COP and the drawing up of the Freedom Charter, the ANC has 
noted that, 
Up to the very day of the Congress of the People [...] no one except the drafting 
committee saw the finished effort. It was revealed all in one piece, as a draft for the 
delegates.
 27
 
The imperative of popular and democratic input into the Charter that informs narratives of its 
development obscured a more limited reality wherein the “ultimate form of the document was 
decided by a small committee and there were no subsequent attempts to alter it in light of 
wider discussion.”28 Further, given the lack of accountability of the NAC secretariat and their 
mandate to provide “clearer ideological focus” to the final document, the end product was 
removed from its populist moorings.
29
 Such removal led to a ‘softening’ of its clauses 
through the drafting process and a move away from any ambitious, revolutionary change. 
Thus, for example, a key clause placed express emphasis on the need for “popular control 
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over the organs of government”, but was later was diluted to remove the “specific provision 
for direct consultation” and came to be captured in the clause that South Africa should be “a 
democratic state based on the will of the people.”30 
 
The effect of this clausal re-orientation through the instruction of “a more populist language” 
was to foreground the “collective will of ‘the people’” as against other specific groupings 
such as “families or bodies of citizens” and, as such, set the premise of the “future state in 
South Africa [on] the embodiment of the people’s collective will.” 31 The Charter thus came 
to be written against the socio-economic and political milieu of apartheid. More than this, the 
final version also was expressly more purposive. The notable shift to the use of ‘shall’ in the 
final charter from the less enjoining ‘should’ in the initial draft had the effect of allowing the 
Alliance to “[assert] its demands as [a] non-negotiable process” as opposed to achieving them 
through “reasonable persuasion and argument.”32 But, the authority and weight accorded to 
the final document through this linguistic alteration is also indicative of a pointed attempt to 
distance popular deliberation and sentiment from the demands for socio-political change. 
Indeed, the lack of full popular input emerged as the Charter was “drafted by a small 
committee of the National Action Council and reviewed by the ANC’s National Executive 
Committee on the eve of the Congress” and contrary to popular (re-)tellings, “[t]he resulting 
document was thus not the end-product of a protracted process of discussion at all levels of 
the ANC.”33 Moreover, evidence supported the contention that the document was drafted by a 
small sub-committee or even an individual.
34
 That the provisions of the Charter were firmly 
set before the COP, and thus not readily amendable by the ANC, was also evidenced by the 
fact that key ANC leaders – Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela and Joe Matthews – despite 
being banned were able to see “the draft in the days before the Congress met.”35 However, 
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their ability to alter the draft provisions was severely limited given the impending 
commencement of the COP and the fact that “thousands of copies of the Charter had already 
been reproduced.”36 
Further, the perception that the content and tenor of the Charter were foregone prior to its 
writing is supported by examining the mandate of the volunteers that were charged with 
promoting the COP and engaging with civil society to extract the grievances and demands 
that would inform the Charter. In his estimation, Davis asserts that, “[T]he people were 
guided carefully in framing their demands.”37 Indeed, within politically-oriented media, we 
have noted the particular framing of the idea of freedom espoused by Moses Kotane above. 
This was further amplified in the educative role that volunteers were expected to play. 
Volunteers were instructed in lectures on the “significance of the campaign” that, 
[I]t was essential for each and every volunteer to attend these lectures where they will 
be trained to understand, analyse, and correctly assess the local and national situations 
[...] so that they will be able to give the correct lead to the people.
38
 
This process of the ‘understanding, analysing and assessing’ so as the give the ‘correct lead’ 
operated within a very specific purport of the local and national situation. Mirroring almost 
exactly the demands of the Freedom Charter, the content of the lecture on “The world we live 
in – change is needed” gave effect to certain key provisions that existed in the charter, 
including: 
(i) Everyone must have an equal right to vote for and be elected to all official 
positions in the State. 
(ii) The police force and army must be replaced by a genuine people’s armed 
guard to uphold the rights of the people 
(iii) The biggest imperial monopolies and industries and mines and factories must 
become property of the people 
(iv) The farming land of the country must be shared on an equitable basis amongst 
all who work the land 
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(v) The equality of all races and sexes must be guaranteed by laws and all 
discrimination must be declared a crime 
(vi) The right to form trade unions, to enjoy living wages  and security in old age, 
sickness and unemployment must be guaranteed by law 
(vii) Housing must be provided for all the homeless by a redistribution of present 
housing and schools and hospitals to be equally opened to all without 
discrimination.
39
 
It is evident from this that the production of the Freedom Charter and the event of the COP 
served two important and very much inter-related objectives. The first objective was to 
adumbrate, for the first time, the contours of a liberated, democratic South Africa and provide 
a vision around which both intellectual and corporeal opposition could rally. The second 
objective, and linked to the first, was that the COP needed to be seen, and continues to be 
seen, as a clear-cut “political campaign” – a “remarkable achievement which allowed the 
ANC and its allies to spread its political message.”40 While the ANC was marginalised from 
the process of writing the document, the campaign allowed it to capitalise on locating itself at 
the centre of the liberation struggle in South Africa. Indeed, small and symbolic publicity 
devices – like the green, black and gold armbands worn by the volunteers – gave cause to the 
assertion of ANC ownership of the COP. This was a conscious and highly expedient act. 
Organisational imperatives dictated the need for the ANC to assert its claim to ownership of 
the COP. While popular liberation movement narratives asserted “that the Congress of the 
People was held at a time when the political strength and organisational capacity of the 
African National Congress was already beginning to shake the foundations of the fascist 
order”, a contending position asserts that the ANC used the event of the COP as “part of a 
wider effort to revive sagging membership levels in the ANC from a maximum of 100,000 in 
1952 at the height of the Defiance Campaign to a mere 32,000 in 1955.”41 The desire to boost 
the ANC’s strength through the campaign was practically encumbered by a set of 
organisational difficulties that beset the process. One of the major obstacles related to 
imposition of banning orders on key ANC leaders including Albert Luthuli that prevented 
their participation in the event. The actual imperative of the COP was also open to 
misconception for whereas it was originally conceived by Matthews as “simply a campaign 
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of the respective organisations belonging to it”, a more strongly interventionist position 
argued that the COP would be “replacing parliament in its authority to ‘write all the laws with 
which the people will be ruled in this country.’”42 The precise nature and role of the COP was 
more fragmented at a regional level where the Transvaal Provincial Organiser “reported that 
the COP was generally viewed at the branch level as a separate organisation to that of the 
ANC.”43 This confusion affected branch level organising which proved problematic and 
compounded the difficulties of popular participation in the construction of the final 
document. Reflecting on this, Albert Luthuli noted that “[T]he main disadvantage from which 
preparations [for the COP] suffered was that local branches submitted their material for  the 
Charter at a very late hour – too late, in fact, for the statements to be properly boiled down 
into one comprehensive statement.”44 If the discussion above noted the elite influence in the 
construction of the Charter, the recording of disorganisation at branch level provided a 
necessary justification for it.
45
 
The organisational failures that beset the intended planning and execution of the COP should 
not detract from the success of the overall campaign. The ability to alter strategy and the 
nominal flexibility of the campaign structures allowed the overall campaign to succeed on 
one critical front: that the COP won the publicity and propaganda war and set the basis for a 
sustained mobilisation at a mass level not only around the specific precepts of the document, 
but of the Charter itself. Even more successful, was the enduring weight accorded to the 
Charter despite the ‘unevenness’ of its provisions and its disputable ideological orientation.46 
The mythical significance of the COP is indebted to the fact that it “represented less a 
spontaneous reflection of the volksgeist than it did a campaign designed to promote a clearer 
ideological position amongst members of the Congress organization.”47 Moreover, and in 
agreement with Davis, the demands of the Charter that envision a free and democratic South 
Africa also signify the triumph of the COP itself as a form of resistance. This sense of 
triumphalism was aptly captured when it was written that, 
                                                 
42
 Rich, 266 
43
 Rich, 266 
44
 Luthuli, Let My People Go, 158 
45
 The lack of organisational coherence and the tangible disorganisation of event did not escape the organisers. 
In a “highly self-critical report on its preparation” it noted a host of deficiencies – organisational, administrative 
and heuristic – that plagued the COP including “an inability to link the COP with day to day struggle”; an 
insufficient number of local committees; and did not make a sufficient impact in either small towns or the 
countryside. See Davis, 3 for more.  
46
 Albert Luthuli acknowledged as much, stating “The result is that the declaration made in the Freedom Charter 
is uneven – sometimes it goes into unnecessary detail, at other times it’s a little vague.” See Luthuli, Let My 
People Go, 158 
47
 Davis, 3 
127 
 
Nevertheless, we did it. Banishments and proscriptions of our active workers and 
propagandists multiplied. Meetings were banned, gatherings disrupted by armed 
police, leaflets confiscated, posters torn down. War was declared on us. But we did 
it.
48
 
It is evident from the foregoing that a disjuncture exists between ‘official’ recollections of the 
event and the resultant narrative that emerged from the proceedings, and more ‘political’ 
practices that led to the formulation of the prescriptions of the Charter. While it may be 
posited that the Charter is an elite written document, the importance of the popular input it 
garnered should not be discounted. A reading of the Charter makes this clear. Further, the 
strength of the process of constituting the Charter lay in its ability to form an ideological 
nucleus around which protest and resistance could mobilise. Such action was supported by 
the discursive weight that the Charter exacted and publicised through a deliberate and 
consistent rendering of its provisions. It is to this ‘marketing’ that the discussion turns. 
The Marketing of the Charter 
When the charter was drawn, 
A vision of a true society was born. 
A dark cloud giving way to the blue sky. 
The freedom wagon moved with direction. 
Yes, the people’s agenda was adopted. 49 
The campaign for the Freedom Charter, as noted above, succeeded because it was able to 
successfully ‘capture the imagination’ of the masses and inspire dissent and revolt. The 
utilisation of critical discursive manoeuvres facilitated this process of centring the Freedom 
Charter and succeeded in according it an ‘hegemonic’ status as the ontological and 
teleological representation of a future democratic South Africa. But more than positing this 
future emancipatory vision, the repeated recourse to the Freedom Charter played a critical 
role in creating an historical memory of the veritable process that occasioned it. Significantly, 
the process succeeded in “articulate[ing] a hegemonic sense of tradition” or what Raymond 
Williams would refer to as “selective tradition”.50 The repetitive memorialising of the event 
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of the COP allowed for “an intentionally selective version of a shaping past and pre-shaped 
present, which is then powerfully operative in the process of social and cultural definition and 
identification.”51 The dual utility of the Charter to remember backwards but also to 
concomitantly dream forwards provided the fundamental basis of its ability to entrench its 
discursive hegemony in the narrative of opposition to apartheid. 
An early indication of the Freedom Charter’s overriding ethos was rendered clear in the Call 
to the Congress of the People leaflet which publicised the event and instigated its target 
audience to act. ‘The Call’ was a rousing document and while addressed to “[the] people of 
South Africa, black and white” it nevertheless commenced by targeting a specific audience of 
farmers, miners, rural and urban workers, the petty bourgeoisie  and women – the motive 
forces of the NDR.
52
 An attempt to imbue a sense of defiance in each of these groups is 
witnessed by a deft rhetorical injunction to “Let us speak....” Prefacing a description of the 
harsh realities that each of these groups encounter in their daily and working lives, each 
group is roused and enjoined to the call to “Let us speak of Freedom.”53 In this way, ‘The 
Call’ succeeds in linking the pernicious reality exacted on each of these groups with a will to 
action to contest the apartheid state. Indeed, for example, in addressing the interests of the 
mineworkers, it is noted that, 
WE CALL THE MINERS OF COAL, GOLD AND DIAMONDS. 
Let us speak of the dark shafts, and the cold compounds far from our families. 
Let us speak of heavy labour and long hours, and of men sent home to die. 
Let us speak of rich masters and poor wages. 
LET US SPEAK OF FREEDOM.
54
 
Critically, ‘The Call’ instigated popular participation and social action by calling on its 
audience to “speak now of freedom, and to write their own demands into the Charter of 
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Freedom.”55 Thus, by passing ownership of the content of the ‘Charter of Freedom’ over to 
participants through this rhetorical process, there is an adjunct manoeuvre of linking the event 
of the COP and the formulation of the demands of the Freedom Charter to the imperative of 
freedom.
56
 This injunction to freedom and the process that would beget it is furthered by the 
organisational attempt to clearly illustrate the anticipated range and diversity of the social 
forces party to the event. Moreover, it augments the notion of the ‘bottom-up’ construction of 
the idea of freedom. 
It is evident from a reading of ‘The Call’ that the general tenor of the campaign to allow the 
people “to speak freely and as equals” signalled a near-revolutionary turn in anti-apartheid 
resistance for it directly contested the ontological notion of ‘separateness’ that defined 
apartheid’s social and political essence.57 Moreover, a strong thrust toward non-racialism 
underpinned the COP. Indeed, such emphasis allowed the COP to be seen as a “spontaneous 
assertion of unity in thought, in action and in spirit for a better South Africa.”58 These notions 
of unity and non-racialism are later given further rhetorical impulse in the opening of the 
Charter itself, captured in the opening declaration “that South Africa belongs to all who live 
in it, black and white [...].”59 While the commitment of the ANC to non-racialism from the 
time of the COP was evident, it had two important consequences – one intended and 
politically expedient, and the other unintended. For the former, the incorporation of a non-
racial ethos into the both COP and the Freedom Charter itself served to broaden the base of 
political opposition and mark decisively and finally, deferment to mass mobilisation 
resistance as opposed to the persuasive argumentation that preceded it. The unintended 
consequence of the abidance to a non-racial ethos was that it fomented internal opposition 
with more radical elements in the ANC and eventuated in the breakaway of a grouping that 
would later form the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).
60
 This will be discussed further 
subsequently. 
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More than merely a tool for mobilising mass support for the COP, ‘The Call’ espoused the 
envisioned emancipatory potential of the Freedom Charter positing that it would “express all 
the demands of all the people for the good life that they seek for themselves and their 
children.”61 More than this, it would serve as a “guide to those ‘singing tomorrows’, when all 
South African’s live and work together, without racial bitterness and fear of misery, in peace 
and harmony.”62 Further, as an “awakening of all men and women to campaign together”, 
‘The Call’ acknowledged the momentousness of the event and the rupture it presented in anti-
apartheid resistance by positing that it was the “greatest movement of all our history.”63 
Indeed, with an express aim to “[r]ouse the people to discuss what they want of freedom” 
through the direct work of the volunteers, ‘The Call’ instructed the reader to three particular 
ends: firstly, to express interest and willingness to assist in the campaign; secondly, to “form 
committees to campaign for the Congress of the People”; and finally to “gather groups to 
send in their demands to the Freedom Charter.”64 Moreover, the leaflet itself aimed to be 
utilised as a mobilisation tool and shared amongst all interested parties, for  there is a direct 
injunction to, 
NOT THROW THIS LEAFLET AWAY! PASS IT ON TO A FRIEND. DISCUSS IT 
WITH OTHERS. SEE THAT IT IS READ BY MANY PEOPLE. 
It is evident from this that ‘The Call’ launched the publicity and propaganda offensive that 
continued through the COP and came to be embodied in the Charter itself.  Moreover, the 
ontological orientation of the nature of apartheid captured in ‘The Call’ – and by extension 
the seeds to challenge it – asserted deeper significance in the Charter itself. 
‘Selling’ the Charter to the ANC was an imperative of the ‘Charterists’ within the ANC. As 
intimated above, and as will be discussed further below, there was significant internal 
opposition to the adoption of the Freedom Charter in the movement. It was only in 1956, a 
year after the COP, that the Charter came to be fully adopted by the ANC. Thus, while 
general assertions posit an uncritical acceptance of the Charter, its centrality as a manifesto 
for opposition to apartheid was not accepted automatically or unproblematically. Significant 
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efforts were needed to popularise the charter and ensure that it obtained acceptance amongst 
the disenfranchised. This fact was not lost on the ANC leadership and efforts at such 
popularisation, most notably through a signature campaign, aimed to obtain widespread ‘buy-
in’. Furthermore, there was an organisational motive to such popularisation, for as an ANC 
NEC report states, 
It is not enough to have adopted the Freedom Charter. It must not become a document 
framed and hanging on the wall. The Charter can and must be the inspiration of the 
people in their freedom fight: it must be their organiser. Every signature won to the 
Charter is an adherent to our cause and a fighter for the Congress movement.
65
 
It is evident from these extracts of the NEC report that there was a conscious 
acknowledgement that the success of the organisational drive for mass mobilisation came to 
be located extrinsically on a political campaign that centred on generating publicity to inspire 
confidence both in the emancipatory vision that it espoused and in the guiding organisations 
themselves. The report also noted the ANC’s strategic thinking on the means by which such 
confidence would be inspired, noting that 
No campaign is merely a routine task, least of all the collection of signatures for the 
Freedom Charter. The people will not sign with enthusiasm if they think signing 
consists merely in making a mark on a piece of paper. But if we present the Charter to 
them as we understand it: the organiser and inspiration of the people in a united 
political struggle, the signatures will flow in. The Charter cannot just be explained by 
words. It must be related to struggle, it must be illustrated by life itself. In every 
campaign we undertake [...] the overall demands of the Freedom Charter must be 
related to the people’s needs.66 
It would be false to disclaim the overarching political imperative that underpinned the 
accentuation of ‘the people’s’ demands and needs, given the primacy now accorded to 
resistance through mass mobilisation. But it is evident too that the direction of its marketing 
activities supported and sustained the focus on the Freedom Charter’s mass appeal. More than 
this, the focus on its mass appeal and ownership also served to provide legitimacy to the 
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ANC’s claims to be the authentic and main liberation movement in the struggle against 
apartheid. Indeed, the political and marketing effect of this calculus continued through much 
of the ANC’s representational strategy. Commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the 
Freedom Charter in 1985, the ANC’s political periodical Sechaba keenly re-inscribed the 
centrality of the ANC in the composition of the Charter while playing on its popularly-
inspired content and ownership. It noted that “[although] the idea of the Freedom Charter 
emanated from the ANC, it was adopted by the people of South Africa – hence it is a 
people’s document.”67 The ‘story’ of the Charter and the myths and lore that centred on it are 
deeply entrenched in the discursive and representational histories of the ANC. This 
entrenchment is also given witness in the breadth of the Charter’s incorporation into ‘official’ 
ANC documentation and the centrality it assumed in narratives of resistance.
68
 This will be 
demonstrated in the latter part of this chapter. 
The public function of its marketing strategy, however, was also intimately connected to the 
more political imperatives of mobilisation and education. Indeed, this was rendered clear 
when it was noted that, 
[w]e will not win support for the Freedom Charter by peddling it like backache 
powders. We will only win support for the Charter by entering into the daily agitation 
and education and campaigning which are the life-blood of the Congresses. Support 
for it is won in the course of Congress work on the issues of the day.
69
 
Thus, more than seeing the Charter as a symbol around which the anti-apartheid movement 
could rally, the more urgent imperative was to “integrate” the ethos of the Charter into the 
“daily struggles” against apartheid and thus berth it more forcefully around localised 
resistance activities.
70
 The strength of the Charter as a heuristic device – given the centring of 
the educative and agitation activities at the local level around its prescriptions – served the 
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more clandestine objective of giving room to the ANC to locate itself at the centre of 
resistance politics. More than this, such centrality was occasioned by the ability of these 
heuristic manoeuvres to endure over time. The marketing effect of this was a conjunction of 
the rhetorical and the experiential to provide an ideological framework in which resistance 
activity could be executed. Writing about the Alexandra Youth Congress (AYCO), a 
township-based youth organisation in the 1980s, Charles Carter has observed that, 
The ideological constructs embraced by members of AYCO embodied the demands of 
the Freedom Charter and the dictates of the ‘national democratic struggle’. These 
constructs were as much rhetorical as they were real to those who espoused them, and 
while socially constitutive in character, this repertoire was used to prescribe 
organisational identity. ANC-inspired iconography made for a political imagery and 
appeal which attracted a nucleus of dedicated youth activists who took seriously their 
self-appointed task of winning others to ‘the struggle’ and of appropriating their 
township terrain.
71
 
That the Charter would serve an enduring agitation and mobilisation function is evident from 
the foregoing. Further, the heuristic significance of the Charter, as intimated in chapter three, 
was evident and was not confined only to the internally based movements during the period 
of struggle. The circulation of the Charter had a longer and wider circulation within the ANC 
and its associated formations. The fillip for the foregrounding of the Charter came with the 
flight of youth and students out of South Africa and into exile in the wake of the 1976 Soweto 
uprisings. It was in the MK camps that the Charter re-emerged as the ‘lodestar’ around which 
political education and ideological mobilisation could occur.
72
 The ‘compulsoriness’, as one 
MK recruited recounted, of political education through the Charter’s provisions was 
fundamental to the programme of equipping recruits with the ideological basis struggle 
against apartheid. Further, ANC media was keen to conjoin the valour associated with 
military training and the nobleness to the Freedom Charter, for it was noted in the ANC’s 
political periodical, Sechaba, that “the ideal cadre [is] ‘a man who is dedicated to the cause of 
                                                 
71
 Carter, 218 
72
 Ian Phillips, ‘ The Political Role of the Freedom Charter’ in Nico Steytler (ed.) The Freedom Charter and 
Beyond: Founding Principles for a Democratic South African Legal Order (Plumstead: Wyvern Publishers, 
1991), 68-69 
134 
 
our people and their political programme – the Freedom Charter; in short a man who has the 
professional know-how (also in military affairs) and is able to lead and educate others.’”73 
 
Figure 8: MK political education class, Mayibuye Archive, MK-2 Colour 
In addition to this mobilisation and the concomitant “increase in armed incidents involving 
soldiers of Umkhonto we Sizwe”, the ANC was also able to (re-)establish its predominance 
in South Africa through the liberalisation of the public sphere which was characterised by 
“renewed political discussion and the establishment of a number of other political 
organisations.”74  A renewed confidence was evidenced by 1980 when the ANC thematised it 
as the ‘Year of the Charter’. Indeed, the centrality accorded to the Charter “was based clearly 
on the rejuvenation of ANC cadres, structures and resolve.”75 Augmenting this sense of 
rejuvenation was the popularisation of the Freedom Charter through a “media blitz” that 
“involved the widespread distribution of the [Charter] through pamphlets and slogans 
throughout the country.”76 In inaugurating the ‘Year of the Charter’ in his 8 January address, 
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ANC President Oliver Tambo was keen to reassert the all-encompassing nature of the Charter 
and explicate its over-arching aim positing that, 
The Freedom Charter contains the fundamental perspective of the vast majority of the 
people of South Africa of the kind of liberation that we are fighting for. Hence it is 
not merely the Freedom Charter of the African National Congress and its allies. 
Rather it is the Charter of the people of South Africa for liberation.
77
 
Further, the important need to publicise and popularise the Charter was not lost on Tambo, 
for he enjoined his listeners, 
[...] to make available millions of copies of the Freedom Charter to all our people 
young and old, in the towns and the countryside so that these great masses of our 
people can once more renew their pledge of dedication to the future that it 
visualises.
78
 
The constant invocation of the Charter and its utility in fomenting action against the apartheid 
state provides sufficient instance of the revolutionary nature of the document. Moreover, I 
have shown that the central objective of the Charter was to adumbrate a vision of a future 
South Africa in direct contradistinction to the pernicious realities of apartheid. To this end, I 
have demonstrated that the Charter’s instrumentality lay in its ability to serve as an 
organisational device, especially in the tempest of the post-1976 period. Writing in the 
African Communist in 1980, ANC then secretary-general Alfred Nzo commented, 
That the ideas of the Freedom Charter are gaining ground rapidly in South Africa 
today and it is clear from even a superficial glance at the policies and programmes of 
different groups. Consciously or unconsciously echoing the Charter (and increasingly 
it is unconsciously), the demands of different sectors of the oppressed chime together 
in a swelling and harmonious chorus [...] the African National Congress is soberly 
confident of its capacity to widen and deepen the political mobilisation of the 
oppressed masses and democratic forces to the point where it becomes possible to 
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transform the ideas of the Freedom Charter into an irresistible physical force. This is 
the challenge of the eighties.
79
 
Indeed, as such mobilisation gained ground in the 1980s with both the establishment of the 
UDF and the emerging “presence of the ANC [...] on the ground”, the Freedom Charter’s 
utility lay in the fact that it was a symbol that captured popular resistance sentiment in that 
moment.
80
 Organs of civil society such as students groups and trade unions were able to 
proclaim that, 
We reiterate our uncompromising commitment to the historic Freedom Charter as the 
only democratic document drafted in the history of the liberation struggle. The 
Charter stands out from all other alternatives for change in South Africa, not only 
because of the manner in which it came into being, but also because of the demands 
reflected in it. It can therefore never be substituted without the will of the majority. 
Any attempt by an individual or group to discredit or undermine it can only be seen as 
an act of betrayal to the aspirations of all the people of South Africa.
81
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Figure 9: An example of a ‘community’ style poster capturing an integral clause of the Charter, Mayibuye Archive, 
University of the Western Cape, SF2-1-11 
That such a commitment to the Freedom Charter was premised on its ability to both organise 
the masses and serve an important part of the ANC’s discursive arsenal is apparent from the 
protracted inference to it in the ANC’s publicity and propaganda materials. Moreover, the 
sanctity accorded to the Charter is apparent in the injunction of the ANC’s Department of 
Information and Propaganda (DIP) to “defend the Freedom Charter” and “monitor enemy 
attacks on [it] in order to respond to them” and this was combined with a more strategic 
publicity function of “ensur[ing] the widest possible dessemination (sic) of the Freedom 
Charter at home and abroad, in as many languages as possible.”82 This sanctity accorded to 
the Charter is premised, I would argue, on the emancipatory potential of its vision of liberated 
South Africa – where liberation would effect change at the individual, socio-political and 
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economic levels. Indeed, given the exacting and pernicious environment that apartheid 
occasioned, the desire for freedom came not only to hold significant emancipatory currency, 
but also critically informed the ANC’s discursive construction of the content and means to 
achieve such freedom. Recalling the discussion in chapter three, it is evident from ANC 
publicity materials that “[f]reedom is defined in the Freedom Charter” and despite the range 
and extent of its prescriptions, the overarching demand was to “[Give] us back our country 
and let us rule ourselves as we choose!”83 Enjoining a cross-section of the populace to 
partake in the struggle to “crush the racists” through a “unity in spirit”, the pamphlet entitled 
The ANC Calls on You...aimed for inclusivity in its audience by charging that “[E]veryone 
one of us can and must become a soldier in the great army of national liberation.”84 Here, the 
notion of the ‘soldier’ is equated to that of a ‘true patriotism’ for it is posited that 
[The struggle] has required many a patriot to give up the comforts of home and family 
life; to sacrifice the security of a steady job and income; to live the existence of an 
outlaw in one’s native land. The struggle calls for devotion, courage and tenacity. It 
will even involve making supreme sacrifices as so many have already done. But no 
matter what the cost to ourselves, we have committed ourselves to pursue our cause 
till victory or death.
85
 
It is evident from this that the strategic objective of inciting action centred as much on the 
mass-level as it did on the individual level. Indeed, the success of such incitement was 
premised on the ability of the ANC to utilise the vision espoused in the Freedom Charter of a 
future, democratic South Africa to ‘capture the imagination’ of the masses and provide a 
definitive remedy to the socio-political and economic malaise that characterised ‘black life’ 
in apartheid South Africa. Such political utility is underscored by a cultural utility that 
continues to exist in the political discourse of contemporary South Africa. To illuminate this 
point, it is instructive to examine a guidebook for schools published by the Department of 
Education to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Freedom Charter in 2005. In the 
foreword by the then Minister of Education and ANC NEC member, Naledi Pandor, it was 
noted that, 
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On the forty sixth anniversary of the Freedom Charter in 2001, President Thabo 
Mbeki implored all of us “to take additional measures to familiarise greater numbers 
of our people with the Freedom Charter”. This year provides us with the opportunity 
to discuss, debate and convince all our people of the continued relevance of the 
Charter to the South Africa of today. The Freedom Charter is not merely an historical 
document. As the President said: “It remains still, an important guide about the 
direction in which we should all take our country as a consequence of its 
reconstruction and development.”86 
 
Figure 10: The clauses of the Charter with photographs of the leading members of each of the Congress Alliance 
constituents, augmenting the claims to the multi-racial nature of the COP and the Freedom Charter,  Mayibuye 
Archive, EW050-3-1 
The inculcation of the Freedom Charter into the school curriculum and the associated 
predominance that the ANC was able to augur in its narration of the conditions that 
precipitated the calling of the COP and the subsequent struggle against apartheid, is 
significant for it taps into a register of celebration that is critical in creating a symbolic 
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“government by narrative.”87 Such ‘government by narrative’ is further evidenced by 
adapting and inculcating the ‘education clause’ of the Charter – instilled as “The doors of 
learning and culture shall be open through quality education for all” – as the leitmotif of the 
anniversary celebration.
88
 Moreover, in marking a complete break with the apartheid past, 
this “auspicious occasion” [the anniversary] allows for the “celebrating [of the] 
transformation process in education and the huge strides that we have made since 1994.”89 
Conferring such legitimacy on the Charter and locating the starting point of its vision with the 
highly significant ‘moment’ of the 1994 elections serves to signal continuity in the narrative 
of the struggle against apartheid, where subscription to the Freedom Charter promotes a 
vision that was born in 1955 and was given effect with the final ending of white minority rule 
through that election. The ability of the ANC governed state to create and entrench symbols 
reflecting the appropriation of a highly particularistic history is indicative other postcolonial 
regimes. That governance by symbols has come to effect both a greater legitimacy and 
longevity on the Charter is therefore evident.  To understand the longevity and legitimacy 
that has been accorded to the Charter over time, it is necessary to understand its, at times, 
complex and contradictory meaning. 
The Meanings of the Freedom Charter 
Despite the initial uneasiness and ‘politics’ surrounding the adoption of the Charter, the 
declaratory intent of the language it utilised promoted a sense of optimism and confidence 
within the movement. Indeed, the ANC NEC’s annual report of 1955 recognised that the 
Charter represented “more than ‘the sum total of our aspirations”, rather, it would be “the 
road to a new life.”90 As such, the report stated further that, 
The Charter is no patchwork collection of demands, no jumble of reforms. The ten 
clauses of the Charter cover all aspects of the lives of the government. It demands 
equal rights before the law, work and security for all, the opening of the doors of 
learning and culture for all. It demands that our brothers in the Protectorates shall be 
free to decide for themselves their own future; it proclaims the oneness of our aims 
for peace and friendship with our brother in Africa and elsewhere in the world [...] 
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The Freedom Charter has opened up a new chapter in the struggle of our people [...] 
With the adoption of the Charter all struggles become part of one: the struggle for the 
aims of the Charter.
91
 
If stipulating the contours of the idea of freedom was the key aim of the Freedom Charter, 
arousing mass interest in the process of its formulation came to symbolise “a rejection of the 
concept of domination of any one section of [the] people over the other and a rejection of the 
sectionalism – whether tribal or racial – imposed on [the] people by the colonial-apartheid 
system.”92 As I have demonstrated above, the symbolic appeal to the forging of such racial, 
ethnic, gender and class unity through the process of formulating the Charter was apt to 
provide a visceral projection into the possibility of a future democratic South Africa. Given 
the scale and manner of the deprivations enacted on the black body politic in South Africa 
then, the vision of the future espoused in the Charter and the process of its constitution was 
deemed to be an act of consecration that obtained a moral-ethical significance that informed 
the mythology surrounding the Charter. This sanctity was noted during the COP when 
leading ANC and Youth League member, Robert Resha noted, 
[...] sons and daughters of South Africa, we [are] here to decide the future and destiny 
of South Africa. This ground on which we are standing here today is holy, friends. 
This shall be the monument of the people of South Africa. Friends, let it be clear to us 
that this great assembly of the people of South Africa is an assembly where the people 
will from today march on to freedom.
93
 
Giving credence to this notion of sanctity of the Charter was the explicit move to defer 
authority to ‘the people’ – through the emphasis on the popular dimension of its construction 
and elucidation. Indeed, writing in Sechaba in 1976, it was noted that the ‘idea’ and content 
of the freedom that was envisioned would come from a more spontaneous and organic 
process informed by the desires of ‘the people’. 94 This sense of national catharsis would in 
itself represent emancipation from the strictures of apartheid and thus signal a rupture in the 
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nature and type of resistance that preceded it. Indeed, it was noted in a subsequent issue of 
Sechaba that the adoption of the Charter represented “a culmination point, a crystallisation 
and a highest form of political expression” from all other campaigns of resistance, and as 
such, the Charter is “a people’s expression of their collective experience and wisdom.”95 The 
cathartic impulse that underscored the development of the Charter lay essentially in the 
inscription of popular demands as the core of resistance to apartheid. Indeed, the precise 
‘everydayness’ of the constitutive demands of the Charter and the lore and myths that 
accompany its constitution, acted to inscribe it firmly within the resistance consciousness of 
the oppressed. However, in a more critical interpretation and as presented in the evidence 
above,  the valorisation of the ‘popular’ in the lore accompanying mythology plays into a 
greater move to construe the Freedom Charter as 
[...] the imaginative creation of a political movement at a particular moment in time. It 
has been dressed up, however, as the condensed expression of the will of the people. 
Herein lie the seeds of an idealized view of ‘the people’ whose universal will 
appeared as an abstraction to underwrite a form of politics and to whose authority 
appeal could be made to counter dissent.
96
 
If indeed the act of valorising the Charter served to ‘idealise’ the notion of ‘the people’ and 
thus allow the Charter to obtain a moral legitimacy that subdued ‘dissent’, it would be false to 
assume that the liberation movement remained uncritical of its prescriptive power and 
discursive appeal over time. Leading ANC theorist, Mzala, writing in the African Communist, 
noted as much arguing that 
We, the upholders of the Freedom Charter, do not regard it as some righteous 
document before which all men must kneel and worship; we, instead, understand very 
well that no programme, no constitution, is immutable for all time. Conditions 
change, and so do attitudes. Even the most seemingly sacred or absolute principles or 
policies should be constantly under review, endorsed if found still to be correct, 
altered or scrapped if found to be out of date.
97
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Indeed, the mutability of the Charter lay in the openness of its prescriptions and the 
‘interpretive flux’ which characterised its intent. This openness and flux was proved 
expedient as it was apt to serve as a basis upon which wide-scale and varied support could be 
obtained. More than this, it reflected the numerous ideological influences that constituted 
both the ANC and the Congress Alliance. The broad interpretative schema that the Charter 
embraced came to crystallise around the questions of its political and economic orientation, 
and most notably around the adherence to socialism. Such adherence, as will be shown in 
subsequent chapters, remains of significant import to understanding the contemporary 
discursive and rhetorical orientation of the ANC in its creation of a symbolic South African 
state. More than this, it also allows for a more critical interpretation of the political culture of 
the ANC and stresses the strains of the internal politics of the movement and later, political 
party. For present purposes, however, it is necessary to adumbrate the contours upon which a 
socialist orientation of the Charter assumed ideological primacy. An examination of its 
clauses is not undertaken here, but rather an analysis of its overall purport and changing 
meaning in the context of the transition from apartheid to a democratic South Africa. As 
such, it is important to understand further that throughout various periods of struggle, the 
Freedom Charter came to be “understood not only from its words but also outside the 
document and in a different way in every period of the Charter’s existence.”98 Indeed, the 
centrality of the Charter during the struggle against apartheid came not only from the fact that 
it was presented as the “people’s programme”, but rather that it contested the very ideological 
basis and meaning of apartheid. 
Given the discussion of liberation in chapter three, it follows that the Charter was 
discursively located as being an “anti-capitalist programme, because any programme to end 
racial oppression in South Africa has to be anti-capitalist.”99 Thus, and as I have intimated, 
construing the meaning of the Charter in this way was premised on a particular definition of 
apartheid in which racism and capitalism were not only intimately connected, but also self-
perpetuating. Indeed, such interconnection between the political and the economic sufficed 
not only to maintain the ideological premise of apartheid, but served also to inform the 
specific resistance to the legacy of inequality that persists during South Africa’s democratic 
era. In addition to the anti-capitalist stance, the Charter was also informed by a strongly anti-
imperialist position that was founded at its inception and continued to inform and resonate in 
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the ANC’s discursive representations through the anti-apartheid struggle. In an article 
published in the New Age in 1957, and written four months after the adoption of the Charter 
at Kliptown, an apt synopsis of the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist positions was provided. 
Indeed, it noted that once political power was assumed by the democratic movement, “the 
major problem of raising the economic status of the Non-European and of doing away with 
the basic inequality of wealth which is part and parcel of the present system” needed to be 
addressed.
100
 In presciently outlining the problems that the political settlement of 1994 would 
engender, the piece posited further that, 
If every discriminatory law on the statute book were repealed, but the mineral wealth, 
monopoly industry and financial empires were not transferred to the ownership of the 
people as a whole, the system of White superiority would in its basic essential be 
perpetuated for many generations. The wealth of South Africa cannot be created by 
law. It is there. If it is left in the hands of the present dominant groups the new state 
will, with a great deal of justification, be able to say it cannot ‘afford’ to provide 
education, to do away with slum conditions, and so on.
101
 
The wide interpretive ambit that the Charter encompassed did not necessarily accord the idea 
of political and economic redress with an adherence to socialism. Noting that the “immediate 
aim of the liberatory movement is not and cannot be the establishment of socialism”, there 
was a further declaration that “[T]he Charter does not advocate the abolition of private 
enterprise, nor is it suggested that all industries be nationalised or that all trade be controlled 
by the state.”102 The rejection of socialism by segments of the ANC is important given its 
close association with SACP and may shed light not only on the balance of forces within the 
liberation coalition but also the strategic overtures that informed this relationship.
103
 More 
than this, it also permits an insight into the ideological terrain on which the Party operated. 
For the SACP, socialism remained the primary economic and liberatory goal, but its 
institution needed to be preceded by national liberation. Indeed, and as noted above, the 
conjoining of the struggle against political and economic exploitation that informed the 
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ideological bedrock of apartheid, allowed the SACP to envisage the struggle for socialism as 
being intimately connected to national liberation where “the latter [was seen] as the necessary 
vehicle for the attainment of the former.”104 Given this, it is important to recall that the 
ideological consonance between ANC and the SACP came to be premised on the notion that 
South African apartheid represented a ‘colonialism of a special type’ and its overthrow would 
be enacted through a national democratic revolution. The centrality of these precepts, it could 
be argued, came to form the lens through which a strategic interpretation of the Freedom 
Charter was undertaken. 
That the SACP would ascribe to the provisions of the Charter given that it was viewed as 
“combin[ing] the liberal ideals of the Enlightenment and the social ideals of the modern 
welfare state”105 and made no reference to the “socialisation of the means of production,”106 
highlights the specificity with which it viewed the nature of South African apartheid. Unlike 
the traditional movement from capitalism to communism mediated through socialism, in the 
South African case, the SACP envisaged this movement from (apartheid) capitalism through 
national democracy and eventually to communism. Here, national democracy came to be seen 
“as a non-capitalist transitional form of society” and its import lay in it being the “sine qua 
non condition of the ANC-South African Communist Party alliance.”107 But there was also a 
clear acknowledgement the South African condition begets a different set of circumstances to 
other countries where national-democracy was grounded. Indeed, the relative development of 
the South African economy and the size and political weight of the proletariat are more 
conducive to “the material prerequisites for socialism [to] exist” than they are for national 
democracy. But, given the characterisation of South Africa as an ‘internally colonised’ 
society where the state operates as a “racial dictatorship”, race superseded class with the 
effect of “inhibiting the emergence within the black proletariat of a class consciousness.”108 
Moreover, the movement to national democracy is given further impetus as a sense of 
national consciousness is inaugurated through a “convergence, amongst the colonised, the 
nationally oppressed, of economic class interests” from “black capital owners, members of 
the middle class, and black workers.”109 The significance of this conception of the transition 
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to communism in the context of ‘colonialism of a special type’ renders clear the prescriptions 
of the Charter “as comprising national-democratic demands” where a “national-democratic 
state is more opposed to foreign political and economic domination, more anti-colonialist and 
anti-imperialist, than anti-capitalist.”110 Moreover, Hudson is keen to assert that 
[...] anti-imperialism is not exhausted by the struggle for political emancipation. It 
also involves striving for the restitution to the colonised nation of its wealth via the 
nationalisation of large, foreign-owned monopoly capital. Once the thesis, based on 
the colonialism-of-a-special-type analysis of South Africa, that the white population 
of South Africa should be identified as a colonising nation, is accepted; and once it is 
borne in mind that monopoly industry, the principal financial institutions and the 
mineral wealth were (and still are, very largely) white-owned, then the Freedom 
Charter’s call for their nationalisation appears as a national-democratic demand.111 
While the Charter provided the basis of an economic settlement between the state and the 
democratic forces, it also set the moral-ethical and ideological parameters in which a political 
settlement could be achieved through provision of constitutional contours. Asserting such, in 
an interview, the head of the ANC’s Department of Information and Publicity, Pallo Jordan 
noted, 
[...] the  Freedom Charter became an instrument of the struggle. I would say the most 
important lesson in relation to that, just as the Freedom Charter was an instrument of 
struggle, the democratic constitution towards which it was striving is the result and 
the product of struggle. It is not something that is going to come about because of an 
agreement, in a smoke-filled room, between one set of politicians and another. It’s not 
going to be the result of wheeling and dealing, at some conference table, between one 
set of politicians and another. It’s going to be the outcome of hard-fought struggles by 
the majority of our people [...] At this time, especially, we need to maintain our 
vigilance, must maintain and expand our struggle around all fronts, because it is only 
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through that struggle that are going to be able to move from the Freedom Charter to a 
democratic constitution.
112
 
In entrenching the similarity between the popularly-driven formulation of the Freedom 
Charter and the future South African constitution, Jordan ensures a temporal continuity in the 
mode of participation and the mediating effect of the process of struggle. In giving further 
credence to the narrative of popular participation in effecting a democratic constitution, there 
is a clear recognition of the organised people’s resistance to the apartheid system. Indeed, 
such resistance, through the UDF and its constitutive civic associations not only provided an 
organisational basis of resistance, but also a strategic accomplice to the theory of the national 
democratic revolution. The heritage of popular resistance – from the Defiance Campaign and 
COP of the 1950s to the local and national level civic agitation in the 1980s – allowed for the 
Charter to obtain “concrete embodiment” through the “organs of popular power that began to 
take over governance.”113 As such embodiment rightly diffused through these ‘organs of 
popular power’, it had the effect of allowing the ANC to obtain maximum political capital 
from these efforts by locating it at the centre of such resistance. Indeed, popular narratives of 
the struggle against apartheid would detail as much. 
That the Charter was accorded moral-ethical and ideological centrality within the discursive 
and representational universe of the ANC and other democratic formations in the narrative of 
resistance to apartheid is clear from the foregoing discussion. However, as much as it served 
as a unifying symbol for these forces, the openness of its provisions and the concomitant flux 
in its interpretations also served a more divisive function. Indeed, given the constellation of 
ideological positions between and within the constituent elements of the anti-apartheid 
movement, such divisiveness has continued to characterise debates on the Charter since its 
formulation.
114
 
Two areas of divergence were prominent, namely on the issue of socialism and non-
racialism. I have noted above that varying interpretations of the Charter have led to 
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disputations about the precise meaning of its economic clauses and the ideological 
imperatives informing them. The flux which informed the pronouncements on the Charter’s 
economic orientation, while serving the distinct function of mobilising and organising the 
broadest coalition of forces to challenge the incumbent regime, was unsettling for 
constituents within the ANC particularly. In giving credence to the non-socialist orientation 
of the Charter, Nelson Mandela wrote in Liberation, “the newspaper of the Congress 
Movement”, in 1956 that, 
Whilst the Charter proclaims democratic changes of a far-reaching nature, it is by no 
means a blueprint for a socialist state but a programme of unification of various 
classes and groupings amongst the people on a democratic basis. The Charter [...] 
visualises the transfer of power not to any social class but to all the people of this 
country, be they workers, peasants, professional men, or petty-bourgeoisie.
115
 
However, Mandela was keen to assert the redistributive motive for the nationalisation of 
financial, agricultural and mining monopolies that had “for centuries plundered the country 
and condemned its people to servitude.”116 Indeed, it was only through the ‘smashing’ of 
these monopolies that the fullest expression of the Charter’s purport of “the termination of the 
exploitation of vast sections of the populace” and the concomitant “rise in the living 
standards of the people” could be realised.117 Thus, while eschewing the prospect of 
socialism as the ideological force in a liberated South Africa, the rhetorical abidance to 
nationalisation provided liberals within the ANC to posit conspiratorially that the Freedom 
Charter became a manifesto “to condition the African people for the purpose of accepting 
communism via the back door.”118 
If questions related to the nature of post-apartheid economy provided an area upon which 
ideological orientations in the ANC were rendered clear, a second and perhaps more 
politically significant area of contestation revolved around the ideas of non-racialism that 
infused the Charter. My aim is not to recapitulate the debates that have assessed and analysed 
the ANC’s adherence to non-racialism since its inception.  A rich literature exists on this. 
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Rather, my aim is to highlight briefly the marketing of its claims to non-racialism and the 
dissonances between rhetoric and practice. In doing so, the analysis suffices to demonstrate 
the politics that underscores, or perhaps envelopes, the marketing of the Freedom Charter. 
As a starting point, the thrust of non-racialism is inferred most poignantly in the Charter’s 
preamble that ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white’. Despite this, the 
internal organisational dynamics and orientations of the ANC, precluded the adoption and 
support of non-racial ethos within the movement. Indeed, at the time of its formulation, the 
strongly Africanist-oriented grouping in the ANC objected to such racial observance on the 
basis that “the ANC has summarily forfeited the Africans’ inalienable right to full 
‘ownership’ of South Africa.”119 While claims to an earlier “restrictive” conception of 
African Nationalism were premised on the nature of colonial oppression, by the time of the 
Charter’s formulation, a more inclusive orientation was permissible.120 The notion of African 
Nationalism was given a broadly inclusive meaning, devoid of racial exclusivity, in a 
presidential message by Albert Luthuli at the ANC Annual Conference in December 1955. 
He argued that, 
It is also fair to infer that the African National Congress, having accepted the 
multiracial nature of the country, envisaged an ALL INCLUSIVE AFRICAN 
NATIONALISM which, resting on the principle of “FREEDOM FOR ALL” in a 
country, UNITY OF ALL in a country, embraced all people under African 
Nationalism regardless of their racial and geographical origin who resided in Africa 
and paid their undivided loyalty and allegiance.
121
 
Despite this declaration, the reticence within elements of the ANC towards multiracialism, 
evinced in its participation and leading the Congress Alliance, had roots that were apparent in 
1940s and driven by the ANC Youth League. The division between the Africanists and the 
Charterists provoked consternation within in the leadership of the movement with former 
ANC President, Alfred Xuma decrying “certain tendencies” that were attempting to 
“[undermine] and [weaken] the Congress as a National Liberation Movement and a 
                                                 
119
 Karis and Gail Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South 
Africa, 1882-1964 Volume 3, 65 
120
 See Nhlanhla Ndebele, ‘The African National Congress and the policy of non-racialism: a study of the 
membership issue’, Politikon 29, 2 (2002), 136  
121
 Albert Luthuli, ‘Special Presidential Message’, African National Congress Annual Conference, December 
17-18, 1955 as published in  Document 13a,Thomas Karis and Gail Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge: A 
Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964 Volume 3, 65 
150 
 
mouthpiece of the African people.”122 These tendencies, while premised primarily on the 
dilution of an African leadership in the movement (in favour of a more united ‘Congresses’ 
approach), would result in “Africans [being] confused and wonder[ing] who are their leaders 
and whom they must follow as a consequence.”123 The letter is interesting for it reveals not 
only the internal discontents that pivoted on the issue of non-racialism, but also for the insight 
it provides on the varying political cultures within the ANC.
124
 That Africans themselves 
would be responsible for their own liberation – a theme which was widely propagated in the 
ANC publicity material but emphasised the more democratic imperative of people’s 
engagement in the struggle rather than its racial dimension – was also asserted. In concluding 
his critical assertions on the problems of leadership in the ANC, Xuma reasserted the primacy 
accorded to African organisation and action in guiding the future development of the 
struggle, noting, 
One and all must realise no will ever free the Africans but Africans themselves. Their 
genuine friends can help them, but the African themselves must rely on themselves. 
We must learn to do things for ourselves in order to grow, to plan our programme and 
campaigns and rely upon our own leadership. Until we can do that, have faith in 
ourselves as well as self-reliance, depend on our inner strength, we do not deserve 
freedom and could not maintain it if it were offered to us on a platter. Let us 
reorganise our people, re-integrate the African National Congress as the mouthpiece 
of the African people [...] Africa expects all her sons and daughters to serve the cause 
of the people loyally, sincerely and honestly. Let us close ranks, fellow-African and 
do our duty. 
125
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The ‘Certain Tendencies’ episode provided the impetus for the later breakaway of the Pan-
Africanist Congress (PAC).
126
 The non-racial position forwarded by the Charter, and in 
Tambo’s injunction of a broader notion of ‘African’ noted above, was not effected within the 
political and organisational practices of the ANC. Until it was confronted with ‘de-
racialising’ its membership structures to permit non-African members – to a limited extent in 
1969 and then more fully only in 1985 – the ANC pursued and was committed a strictly 
African membership policy.
127
 The persistence of the ‘thread’ of non-racialism, to use the 
title of Julie Frederikse’s book on the issue, has garnered significant debate in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Intimately connected to discussions on nation-building, the Freedom Charter 
has operated as an important arbiter of these discussions. This will examined further in the 
chapters which follow. 
It is evident from the foregoing that as much as the Charter came to be the centrepiece of the 
ideological orientation of the ANC and the ‘lodestar’ of a future democratic South Africa, its 
authority owed much to the mythology that emanated and proliferated from the time of its 
inception. Such mythology was created and sustained through a determined publicity effort. 
However, it is evident too from the foregoing, that the process of the Charter’s construction, 
adoption and even meaning occupied a highly contested space with the organisational 
structures of the ANC. Commenting on this, Suttner and Cronin have astutely noted that  
“while the Freedom Charter was conceived as a unifying programme (and a more or less 
explicit affirmation of a still banned Congress movement), it was also a line of demarcation 
from other progressive trends, addressing perhaps more limited constituencies. That line of 
demarcation has sometimes become a line of intolerance.”128 Yet, despite this, the Freedom 
Charter’s longevity owes much to the efforts of the ANC to exert an ‘ownership’ over its 
content and purport and to locate at the centre of its discursive and representational universe. 
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CONCLUSION: LASTING LEGITIMACY 
...the clarity and correctness of the ideas of the Freedom Charter testify to the revolutionary maturity of those 
responsible for drawing up the Charter – the people of South Africa. That the Charter has stood the test of time, 
outlived its critics and defeated every attempt of the enemy to brand it as’ treason’, demonstrates the rich 
heritage of struggle of  our people, the justness of our cause and the necessity of the Charter as the definitive 
expression of the goals of our national liberation struggle.
129
 
I have argued that the centrality accorded to the Freedom Charter was part of a successful 
discursive manoeuvre by the ANC to entrench symbolically, culturally and politically a 
vision of a liberated and equitable South Africa. This entrenchment was supported by an 
active process of myth creation that was expediently utilised as a rallying symbol to ensure 
the remembering of the ANC in South Africa during the exile years. Such remembering lay in 
the Charter’s ability to embody the aspirations of the oppressed and marginalised. In this 
way, the Charter became a visceral manifesto of a free and democratic future. 
The strength of the myth-making lay in the ability of key ANC personalities to attribute a 
particular credence not only to the Charter, but to the nature of the organisational forces that 
were complicit in its development. Writing in Liberation in 1956, Nelson Mandela argued 
keenly for a “strengthened and developed” unity across the anti-apartheid congresses so that 
“the Freedom Charter will be transformed into a living instrument” in order to “vanquish all 
opposition and win the South Africa of our dreams during our lifetime.”130 This call for unity, 
so as to ‘enliven’ the Charter, serves to illustrate the connectedness between political 
aspiration and organisational desire. But even more than this, the Charter came to be 
intimately linked to a conscious rhetorical strategy that found expression in autobiographical 
re-tellings of key ANC personalities and thus conferred on the Charter recognition of 
embodying individual struggles for freedom. This is most aptly captured again by Nelson 
Mandela when he asserted that the, 
[the] principles have been embodied in the Freedom Charter, which none in this 
country will dare challenge for its place as the most democratic of political principles 
by any political party or organisation in this country. It was for me a matter of joy and 
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pride to be a member of an organisation which has proclaimed so democratic a policy 
and which campaigned for it militantly and fearlessly.
131
 
Moreover, the ANC’s representational stock also sought to link personalities with the 
publicity of the Charter, as demonstrated in figure11 below. The authoritative stance and 
purposive intention communicated in the figure of Chief Albert Luthuli, aptly endowed the 
Charter with a moral-ethical resonance and legitimacy. Moreover, it linked the Charter 
intimately with the ANC. As a form of media, the poster circulated through the ANC’s 
various formations, as figures 8 and 11 aptly indicate. The poster above, affixed to the tree in 
the images, thus came to be intimately connected to the political education of new MK 
recruits. 
That the Charter therefore came to find centrality in the ANC’s discursive apparatus owes 
much to the endorsing contributions of leading personalities within the movement – moral 
arbiters in their own right who came to personify the values of the struggle against the 
machinations of the apartheid regime. If the repeated invocations of the superiority of the 
Charter in capturing the ‘existential anguish’ of the oppressed majority through diffusive 
forms of publicity located it at the centre of discursive opposition to apartheid, then the moral 
sponsorship obtained from leading personalities only served to augment the legitimacy 
accorded to the document. 
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Figure 11: The image of Chief Albert Luthuli on a poster publicising the Freedom Charter, Mayibuye Archive, SF-2-
1-3 
The ANC were keenly aware of the political capital that could be extracted from highlighting  
popular foundations of the Freedom Charter and sought to entrench this further through 
deliberate and wide-scale publicity and propaganda activities, perhaps most notably by 
dedicating the year 1980 as ‘The Year of the Charter’. The immediate effect was “manifest in 
popular campaigns and expanded to trade unions and numerous youth and community 
organisations” and endured through the early- to mid-1980s as the ‘people’ became 
increasingly implicated in the struggle against apartheid.
132
 Indeed, the popular agitation was 
driven by the idea that the Freedom Charter was the “alternative to the Republic”, and 
extended through the “distribution of the Charter”; it was “emblazoned [on] banners with its 
clauses; and all over the country they burned the South African republic flag and hoisted the 
ANC in its place.”133 The effect of this agitation and popularisation was that it fed into the 
proliferation of resistance activity across the country and “emerged within the old Congress 
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Alliance associations such as the Indian Congresses that began a process of revival in the 
early 1980s.”134 Not only was the Charter a reflection of the ideals of a liberated South 
Africa, it also came to fulfil its role as in “organising instrument which means that serve[d] 
very much as a flag” as it “enable[d] people to identify themselves, group together and act 
unitedly (sic).”135 
 
Figure 12: Use of graffiti to popularise the Charter, Mayibuye Archive, University of the Western Cape, LA223-10 
As these forms of publicity became more numerous and internal popular agitation began to 
proliferate across South Africa, there was widespread re-entrenchment of the purport and 
vision that the Charter espoused. Indeed, in monumentalising 1980 as ‘The Year of the 
Charter’ in the temporal expanse of the struggle against apartheid, the ANC managed to 
rearticulate consciously and successfully the goals envisioned in the manifesto. The effect of 
this constant re-articulation over time, I contend, created a programmatic path toward full 
liberation which would only commence with political independence being attained. As such, 
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prosperity and freedom would not be fully realised until it was democratised. The placing of 
such a limitation on the realisation of freedom served to extend the life of the Charter beyond 
the political struggle and allow it considerable future relevance and resonance. More than 
this, it also sought to locate the ANC at the centre of the process of its realisation with the 
coming of political emancipation for it was argued that “the people of South Africa created 
the African National Congress as their vehicle of unity and struggle precisely to fight for the 
restoration of this birthright.”136 While such birthright came to be premised primarily on the 
formal political rights and the rejection of discrimination, there was also a strong socio-
economic imperative that underpinned its conception. In an interview with prominent ANC 
member and current speaker of the National Assembly of the South African parliament, Max 
Sisulu noted that, 
So you’re fighting not just for political independence, which is very important, but 
you are also fighting for socio-economic emancipation, because even if you remove 
apartheid or apartheid goes, you still have a whole economic system which is 
entrenched [...] That is why at that early stage we supported the Freedom Charter and 
went about publicising the Freedom Charter before the ANC was banned, and even 
after the ANC was banned we used to paint slogans and distribute leaflets at night.
 137
 
That the Charters’ utility and vision would remain of paramount significance in the post-
apartheid period, as much as it did during the struggle, is evidenced here. Further, placing 
emphasis on the socio-economic redress that the Charter envisioned allowed for it to fulfil its 
mandate as a ‘living document’ by giving effect to a vision of liberated South Africa. 
Rhetorical insistence ensured the historical longevity of the Charter and the insistence on the 
Freedom Charter as central to the teleological stream of victory over apartheid. This is 
evident in a speech delivered to the ANC’s 2001 National Constitutional Conference, by then 
President, Thabo Mbeki. Noting that the Charter “gave South Africa’s future generations an 
architectural design [and] overarching model of the society and government around which 
they were to mobilise and pursue the objective of national liberation struggle”, Mbeki 
continued that, 
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The Freedom Charter, for the first time in our history, sketched out in clear terms the 
central objective of the national democratic struggle. It called for a South Africa 
which is united in its composition, democratic in its character, non-racial in its 
political complexion and prosperous in its socio-economic objective [...] Any form of 
construction, however, needs both the architect and the bricklayer. It needs both the 
act of conception and that of building, the act of designing and that of putting one 
brick upon the other. If the Congress of the People in 1955 marked the maturity of 
conception of design of our future society, April 27
th
 1994 called upon all of us to 
hone our skills in the act of bricklaying.
138
 
Such ‘bricklaying’ would pivot closely on the implicit centrality of the Charter in the 1994 
election campaign. Indeed, its vision came to be intimately inscribed into the discursive and 
representational stock of the ANC and would form the ideological basis upon which it would 
engage with electorate. In the following chapter, I examine the 1994 campaign as an 
important moment in the teleology of liberation and the continuation of the precepts of the 
Freedom Charter in the realisation of a ‘new’ and democratic South Africa. 
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5. 
1994: 
THE ‘LIBERATORY’ MOMENT 
**************** 
I have shown in the previous chapter that the ANC’s conception of liberation was deeply 
rooted in the political, economic and social dislocations that apartheid effected. Popularised 
in the theatre of struggle by the ANC and associated organisations, a nuanced notion of 
liberation circulated in the public and private spheres. In this chapter, I examine the much-
analysed election of 1994 through a range of primary documentation to highlight the strategic 
and political behaviour of the ANC through its first election campaign. Further, conceiving of 
the election as the key liberatory moment in the political history of the struggle against 
apartheid, the reading of the campaign presented in this chapter offers an insight into the 
discursive, representational and organisational continuities and discontinuities that punctuate 
the ANC’s modes of political exchange. I use the term liberation in a broad sense to signify 
not only the liberatory ethos that the election came to inculcate, but also the social and 
economic processes in the creation of ‘a better life’ that would commence after the election. 
This chapter begins with a short overview of the political context which preceded the 
election. Certain themes emanate from this period that are in the ANC’s campaign marketing. 
The discussion then proceeds to examine the contours of the campaign and demonstrates the 
historical rootedness of both its discursive and representational strategies and well as its 
organising capacities. As such, the ANC was able to shift between its identities as a liberation 
movement and formal political party. The importance of the ‘people’ was central to the 
campaign – rhetorically, strategically and ideologically. The broad ethos of liberation, 
wherein the mission was to create ‘A Better Life for All’ was important not only in marketing 
the ANC, but in crystallising the essence of its revolutionary thrust. 
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THE ELECTION OF 1994 
A Transitioning South Africa: A Brief Political Background 
The overtures made by the apartheid regime from late 1989 indicated the imminent and 
inevitable liberalisation of political space in South Africa. Indeed, the incipient public detente 
was given a fillip in the 2 February 1990 announcement of the unbanning of ANC, SACP and 
Pan Africanist Congress, the easing the State of Emergency and the release of Nelson 
Mandela.
1
 As the task of easing the restrictive legal and extra-legal prescriptions that 
characterised apartheid rule commenced, the transition process would be characterised by a 
‘messiness’ as the ANC attempted the balancing act of reconstituting itself within the country 
while navigating the demands and needs of the constellation of forces that constituted it; and 
commensurately negotiating the terms for democratic power-sharing in South Africa. 
A large and detailed literature describes these processes and it is not my intention to review 
such scholarship and even “punditry” here.2 Rather, I highlight briefly the key political and 
organisational obstacles that the ANC needed to traverse prior to the election and which 
informed the discursive and representational registers of the campaign. 
The events of 2 February set in motion a protracted and uneven process of talks and 
negotiations between the ANC and the ruling National Party (NP), the advance of which was 
publicly declared in key minutes, records and declarations.
3
 Clearing the path to substantive 
political negotiations, this process aimed at bringing accord between the protagonists despite 
mutual distrust and continuing animosities. The very idea of negotiations to end apartheid 
remained anathema to sections of the ANC’s constituency. Moreover, the “suspension” of the 
armed struggle by the ANC, and not the MK, in August of that year reflected a shifting 
balance of power and disparate nature of its organisation and decision-making structures.
4
 
Discursively, the “illusionary rhetoric” of the idea of the “transfer of power” promoted by the 
ANC was misguided, for as Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley note, “power sharing” rather 
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than the “transfer of power”  would “be the inevitable outcome of negotiations.” 5 As such, 
the tempering of allusions of insurrection and the seizure of power through armed revolution 
was undertaken by the designated ANC leadership. By the end of 1990, at its national 
conference, animosities emerged over the “leadership’s confidential and unilateral decision-
making” to undertake the process of negotiations and the sidelining of mass participation to 
determine the course of a democratic South Africa.
6
 Strategically, the ANC would continue 
to maintain the support of the masses and utilise their power tactically to place pressure on 
the apartheid regime at key moments in the process of negotiations. 
The first round of talks, named the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) 
commenced in December 1991 and set up the organisational structures, or working groups, 
through which later negotiations would proceed.  The process did not get the support of right 
wing parties on both sides of the racial spectrum, and animosities between the party leaders, 
Nelson Mandela and FW De Klerk, were openly laid bare.
7
 However, the desire by the white 
population in South Africa for political change, as evidenced through their vote in a 
referendum in March 1992 on the continuation of negotiations, prompted the NP to continue 
talks with the ANC. The second round of CODESA negotiations commenced in May 1992, 
but was marred shortly thereafter by the events of the Boipatong massacre in June. While the 
negotiations period was marked by violence and intimidation, the culmination of this in the 
Boipatong massacre – wherein Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) partisans attacked ANC aligned 
hostel dwellers – served to derail the second round of talks as the ANC withdrew from the 
convention. The call for ‘rolling mass action’ given these events served to destabilise 
optimism in the process of a negotiated political settlement. 
If violence destabilised the process, it also served to get it back on track. The Bisho massacre 
in September 1992, in which “Ciskei security forces (commanded by white officers of the 
South African Defence Force) opened fire on an Alliance march”, served also to re-focus the 
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parties and the NP generally as the threat of “civil war” loomed.8 Concessions that the ANC 
had earlier requested were assented to, and in the midst of the parties managing the tensions 
within civil society, the ANC and NP signed a Record of Understanding, and an agreement 
on the institution of a “transitional arrangement which would govern during the transition.”9 
The seriousness of these efforts eventuated in the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum and later, 
the interim governing body the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), which “would have 
collateral authority with the cabinet in one area alone: preparing the ground for an election.”10 
Despite the ongoing violence and the problems encountered in attempts to “accommodate” 
black and white right wing parties, the renewed emphasis on finalising an interim constitution 
and working towards an election occupied South African political life.
11
 Even the 
assassination of Chris Hani, veritable SACP personality, did not derail the process. 
The themes raised in this cursory overview permit an insight – limited as it may be – into the 
political context in which the election campaign was undertaken. Moreover, as will be 
evident in the discussion below, certain key themes from this period emerge in the ANC’s 
discursive and representational overtures during the campaign. 
It would be myopic to assume that the electorate viewed the ANC as the natural successor to 
the NP regime. Rather, an apartheid-weary, violence-disenchanted, racially and ethnically 
diverse electorate with lingering prejudices toward African rule, and which had been the 
focus of a sustained and prolonged state propaganda onslaught, confronted the ANC as they 
prepared for an election campaign. But the movement had generated a stock of symbolic 
capital in the years preceding 1990. Indeed, its discursive inculcation within the political 
marked permitted activists to conclude that the ANC was endowed with a significant 
emotional appeal within the electorate.  Such appeal came at a price however. Indeed as, 
former exiled Gill Marcus and then ANC spokesperson, lamented in 1991, 
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The emotional support for the movement is massive, but translating that support into a 
knowledge and understanding of the ANC’s policies, strategies, programmes and 
tactics is proving to be an unenviable task.
12
 
But this ‘emotional’ support highlighted the marketability of the ANC and the movement was 
acutely aware of this. Just prior to the commencement of the second round of talks at 
CODESA, the ANC’s organising department characterised the organisation as “strong” and 
posited further that, 
[...] this means that the ANC is a marketable ‘product’ if we may use the term. The 
people know it is there. With the ordinary man and woman in the street you are not 
introducing something strange, something that needs a lot of explaining or 
convincing. Even in those regions, outside the violence torn ones, where membership 
is low, it is not a question of hostility to the ANC that keeps that membership low. It 
is simply a question of lack of regional strategic recruitment drives brought about by 
political lethargy, bureaucracy, factionalism, power-mongering and a host of other 
weaknesses that impair the performance of leadership in most of the regions.
13
 
This recognition permits an important insight into the strategic and operational thinking 
behind the ANC’s election campaign. Moreover, it asserts the pervasiveness of a marketing 
consciousness and the importance of cultivating the ANC’s brand in the prevailing 
circumstances. In the discussion below, I examine how the ANC put into service historical 
memory and the conjunctural factors in formulating a campaign to contest the election. It is to 
this analysis I now turn. 
Preparing the Ground 
The ANC embarked on a process of conceiving the campaign as early as 1992 with the 
formalising of its own election commission.
14
 That the overall emphasis of the campaign 
would centre on liberation, is apparent from the strategy documents emerging from the ANC. 
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More than this, liberation would inform the entire narrative of the year, 1994. In an interview, 
Nelson Mandela asserted as much, holding that, 
It is not an exaggeration to talk of 1994 as the year of liberation. The achievements of 
our long struggle, and the negotiating process which has led to the firm date of 27 
April 1994 for the first democratic elections is indeed an important event which we 
must celebrate. However, while 1994 is indeed the year of liberation, there is still alot 
of work to be done to move from elections to the improvement of the living 
conditions of the majority. We cannot expect this to be done overnight. That is why I 
constantly say that 27 April will not be reaping time. It will be the time for ploughing 
and sowing. I am optimistic we will achieve our aims because for the first time South 
Africa will have a democratic and legitimate government.
15
 
Liberation, as evidenced from this quote, would be an ongoing task that would be intimately 
connected to socio-economic freedom. For the ANC moreover, the self-emancipatory 
potential of the elections is clear – elections essentially endow the people with the ability to 
“[determine] their own future and can be seen as the culmination of hundreds of years of 
struggle against colonialism and for national liberation. The election must be seen as a 
contest between apartheid and democracy.”16 Characterising the contestation of the election 
as one between the forces of apartheid and democracy allowed for the ANC to inform the 
strategic and discursive content of the campaign in ways that proved more inclusionary than 
exclusionary, and segued with the overall aims of the national democratic revolution. 
 The NDR assumed discursive primacy as the orienting framework for understanding the 
contours of a post-apartheid South Africa, and the strategic thinking emanating from the 
ANC asserted that a central objective of the campaign would be “the establishment of a 
united, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist South Africa” which would be realised through the 
popularisation of ANC policies. 
17
 This idea of liberation however, became the “central 
message, but [had] different emphasis for various sections of the electorate.”18 For blacks, it 
signalled an “end to oppression, racism, apartheid, discrimination”, while for white South 
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Africans, liberation sought to quell concerns relating to their minority status and the 
inculcation of “real democracy.”19 The overarching narrative would be one in which 
liberation entailed the creation of “a democracy of which all are part of [and the creation of] a 
legitimate political system for all.”20 This narrative sought to quell the fears of Indian and 
Coloured constituencies, who were in an ‘ambiguous position, given their ‘victimhood’ under 
nationalist policies, but nevertheless held a “deep-seated fear of African domination.”21 
While the ANC remained a “symbol of the liberation struggle” due to its “longevity”, such 
symbolism misrepresents the organisational efficacy and strength of the movement.
22
But this 
observation is significant, however, when consideration is given to the enormity of the 
organisational task that confronted the ANC in “sensitising” the historically disenfranchised 
to the very idea of elections.
23
 The ANC argued that it was necessary to “strengthen our 
organisational capacity” as “71% of voters are concentrated in regions and some of those 4 
regions are our weakest.”24 In what it viewed as “the largest campaign for the attainment of 
political power,”25  the “issue of elections” needed to be incorporated broadly into all ANC 
activities. Indeed, it was argued that there was the “need to start talking about it everywhere 
so that our people get used to the idea that elections are coming and that it involves them.”26 
Building on the traditions of mass civic participation, the ANC aimed to inaugurate a range of 
social formations in popularising the “concept of elections”, including trade unions, churches 
and “all organs of civil society.”27 For the movement, this preliminary ‘sensitisation’ phase 
was more about inculcating a belief in the democratic and electoral process than for garnering 
votes.
28
 The political and procedural backdrop against which this process needed to occur 
was complex and a number of key issues still required resolution. As of August 1992, during 
the CODESA interregnum, the question of “[whether] the general election [would] be for the 
Constituent Assembly [CA] only with CA transforming itself into a national assembly or, 
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whether there will be a second election for a democratic parliament/government” was still 
unresolved.
29
 Together with “a lack of clarity on what the content of the electoral law would 
be,” the political status of homelands states, the TBVC, was also unresolved at the time and 
required settlement.
30
 At the procedural level, no election date had been set and there was no 
indication of whether “voters would be required to register” and “what form of identification 
would be used”31 
Despite the organisational, procedural and political obstacles that the ANC foresaw, a 
consistency in the electoral strategy emerged across the regions so that a unified and coherent 
campaign would ensue. In an election strategy document for the Pretoria-Witwatersrand 
region dated late 1992, there is a conscious targeting of the working class and rural areas in 
mobilising these constituents to participate in the election. More tellingly, the objective of the 
election is to win so as “to ensure that people do not starve nor are they unceremoniously 
jailed.”32 It is evident from this that these socio-economic and political considerations are 
specific conceptions of the broad nature of the liberation that the ANC envisaged. An insight 
into this broader electoral conceptualisation of liberation is obtained through hand-written 
points in the margins of a document entitled General Strategy to Win the CA [Constituent 
Assembly] Election. Here the “Expression of Liberation” is, “(i) Decisive; (ii) Slogans, (iii) 
Justice, Democracy and good Govt: not liberal in translation, [...] (v) Environment in which 
elections to be placed.”33 While not offering a qualitative understanding of the meaning of 
liberation, it does however offer an insight into the communication of liberation. Indeed, it 
was argued that “[Communication] is very important and a sense of comradeship should 
prevail so that we can sustain our morale.”34 
It has been argued above that the symbolic meaning and role of the ANC in the liberation 
struggle was undercut by organisational obstacles. However, the strength of its position in the 
collective consciousness of the oppressed and marginalised as the ‘liberator’ begged little 
dispute. In a series of focus group interviews held in December 1992, it was noted that “[The] 
ANC stood for people’s aspirations during the worst times. I suppose from all of that, people 
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have very strong confidence in the ANC.”35 While the ANC certainly located itself 
consciously at the centre for the liberation of South Africa, it endowed the people themselves 
to act as their own liberators. Addressing the National Conference on Reconstruction and 
Strategy, Nelson Mandela intimated as much, noting that “the people of South Africa, have, 
at last, entered our new age, during which we shall be called upon to respond to the call of 
history which summons us to achieve our own freedom from tyranny, from injustice, from 
hunger, from deprivation and from the indignity and insult of racism and apartheid.”36 
Liberation then, it should be noted, would come also through the act of voting for the ANC, 
and such act would be “to express the deep seated hope of all our people [to] at last achieve 
our emancipation.”37 
‘It’s the (Socio) Economy, Stupid!’38 
Liberation had come to be conceived as “the contest between apartheid and democracy”, 
where this conception of democracy placed significant emphasis not only on political, but 
also, as noted, socio-economic redress. The election then came to be about 
[...] improving the life of the poor [...] The new Constitution drawn up by the 
Constituent Assembly must completely eradicate apartheid and transform societal 
relations in a manner that will qualitatively improve the life of the underprivileged 
[...] An ANC victory will mean the beginning of a process of creation of peace, jobs 
and the opening of educational opportunities to all children regardless of race and 
class. This is one election which if handled well can give hope to and bring to an end 
frustrations of millions of South Africans. Therefore the ANC must win decisively in 
the coming elections.
39
 
The overt and consistent emphasis on the socio-economic content of liberation – in the 
ANC’s “ability to change society” – was emphasised over its charge to “dwell on the 
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majority’s struggle against apartheid.”40 As such, and at the strategic level, there was a need 
to address the fundamental issues that plagued the ANC’s “historical constituency”, but the 
vagueness of its prescriptions led to the creation of a “creative ambiguity” through which the 
ANC could “not lock itself into specific policies and thus be all things to all men and 
women.”41 In counterpoint, however, and as will be discussed in greater detail below, the 
ANC sought through its representational strategy to assert that it had carefully constructed 
and measured policies – in essence, communicating the idea that “we have a plan.”42 Further, 
there was the observance of the need “to build an image of the ANC as capable of governing 
and sophisticated enough to manage a fragmented society with regard for everybody’s 
interests.”43 
The character of the campaign would continue the ANC’s tradition of the mass mobilisation, 
where there was the need to “consistently relate the [election] platform to local issues and 
demands.”44 Indeed, there was a conscious attempt to link popular, local issues with the 
election campaign. In a sense, the election campaign would come to be the extension of these 
local level campaigns. Thus, for example, a campaign for “free political activity” that 
focussed on “Bophuthatswana , Kwazulu, Ciskei as well as the small towns dominated by the 
right wing and hostels” occurred under the aegis of the ANC Youth League.45 Similarly, a 
second campaign envisioned to be subsumed under the umbrella of the election campaign 
would be the Asinamali Campaign where “the everyday problems of unemployment, 
education and lack of housing” were ripe for absorption into a national political campaign.46 
Identity Politics 
Given the scale of apartheid’s political and socio-economic dislocation for the majority of 
South Africans, the utility of the ANC maintaining and “build[ing] the broadest anti-
apartheid front” was clear and was the means to “ensure that winning the election [could] be 
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equated with the act of achieving liberation.”47 But of crucial import in understanding the 
nature of this broad-based front is the precise composition of forces that would constitute it. 
Four options were available to the ANC: that it would contest the election as a singular 
organisation; that it would participate “with the Alliance”, or “with the Alliance plus Patriotic 
Front Organisations; and finally that it would participate “with the Alliance plus some 
selected PF organisations, and/or non PF organisations.”48 The popular consensus within the 
ANC seemed to “favour a form that involves an ANC led campaign, with participation on the 
basis of ANC symbols, lists etc but which involves the Alliance in an integral way” and 
where “other parties would be brought on board following bilateral discussion and agreement 
to participate in an ANC led campaign.”49 
This configuration of forces for the election, however, speaks to an earlier strategic debate on 
the nature and character of the ANC and the means by which it would enter the transitional 
and post-apartheid political environment – as a liberation movement or political party. As 
early as 1991, a discussion paper from the Department of Political Education chartered the 
ideological and theoretical terrain that this question posed and provided a critical insight into 
the thinking of the ANC on its political nature and character. For the authors of this paper, the 
“liberation movement form [was] a more effective strategic weapon” as it allowed the ANC 
to “retain its broadness and unity” in the pursuance of “its goal of dismantling apartheid and 
building a democratic state.”50  Such characterisation was also indebted to the ideological 
premises of the CST thesis, wherein the need to maintain its broad-based identity was of 
strategic political importance in the phased development of a future socialist reality.
51
 Thus, it 
was argued that the ANC needed to maintain an “identity with ‘the people’ to represent their 
aspirations and to involve them in active struggle for the creation of a new nation.”52 
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Political utility provided further impetus to maintain the movement character of the ANC, in 
that the ‘masses’ were essential to its strength both in the current period and under 
democratic government where transformation will require the mobilisation of the energies of 
all South Africans.”53 Given the balance of forces of the coalition of groupings that 
conducted the anti-apartheid struggle, the moral appeal of the ANC ranked highly among the 
“oppressed people as a whole”, as the ANC “is more than a single organisation made up of 
branches” but rather “stands at the head of a social movement for change.”54  In that specific 
conjuncture, the appeal to maintaining its mass-based character had further political 
significance. In moving to a more ‘modern’ political party form, there would be the 
commensurate narrowing of focus and the ANC would “be more likely to take more specific 
and defined positions on policy questions” and not allow for the “winning of demands in the 
transition as well as to reconstruction and ongoing participation in a future South Africa.”55 
The result of this, it continued, would be the manifestation of “tension” among the various 
alliance formations and the numerous “class interests and political tendencies” that constitute 
the ANC.
56
 To this end the ANC would be weakened by the Nationalist Party agenda to 
formally institutionalise the movement. Such institutionalisation influences the particular 
manner in which electoral participation occurs. The ANC, in its estimation, argued that, 
The existing political parties in South Africa are modelled on Western democratic 
lines, where the party apparatus is geared almost exclusively to contesting elections. 
The party keeps lists of voters in each constituency and while it does recruit members, 
more attention is paid to recruiting voters. At the time of elections, voters are sent 
literature and visited by party workers and volunteers, more as a public relations 
exercise than a political one where real issues are debated. Public meetings are held in 
each constituency and the mass media is used to popularise party positions. This 
process takes place every five years and is generally the only opportunity for voters to 
hear from or possibly influence their member of parliament. Elected representatives 
then disappear and are involved in the formulation of policy and decision making, 
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without active participation of the people. It is even accepted practice for MPs to 
cross the floor and change parties while representing the same constituency.
57
 
The ANC was keen to set itself apart from both the practice and conceptualisation of political 
party engagement in elections. Indeed, one of the overriding objectives of its continued 
subscription to its liberation movement character was that “grassroots” participation and the 
involvement of “the people” in policy formation would remain.58 Further, “the mobilisation 
of people for elections must extend beyond the elections themselves to mobilising people for 
the process of national liberation in general” where “[T]he securing of a democratic 
constitution and democratic elections is the starting point of this process and opens the way 
for the social transformation and the continual deepening of democracy entailed in national 
liberation.”59 
Emerging Contours of the Campaign 
While mass mobilisation and general people-driven campaigns for liberation would certainly 
have the effect of popularising the ANC, there was the concern that its representational 
capacity ran at a deficit. At least at the provincial level, there was the admission that a 
“failing of the ANC [was] that our propaganda has been weak – we do not have the capacity 
to produce large scale propaganda at national and local level.”60 Importantly, the ANC was 
aware that despite having a professionally run campaign, the textures of its marketing needed 
to be located within the masses. Indeed, it was tellingly noted that “[We] can’t give our 
campaign to an advertising agency because they we’ll lose the mass character of our 
campaign on the ground.”61 As will be shown below, the ANC managed to successfully 
combine both mass and professional marketing to obtain a nuanced representational character 
to its campaign. However, and despite this admission, there was a representational repository 
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that the ANC could draw on. Indeed, from the time of its unbanning in 1990, the propaganda 
political programme provided guidelines on the creation of leaflets that would present 
“[D]ay-to-day issues at national, regional and local levels” and sought the best means to 
convey the idea on the “[I]ssue of political power” in addition to sending targeted messages 
to a highly stratified constituency which included “workers; rural and Bantustan 
communities; residents of squatter camps; enemy armed forces; intelligentsia; whites; youth; 
women; [and the] religious community in its variety.”62 In providing more content, its 
pamphlets would seek to provide information on “What is the ANC”, which would include a 
“brief history [and] basic policy positions” and the outlines of a “people’s economic policy” 
amongst others.
63
 
As the election preparations gathered momentum, the ANC required a representational 
strategy that would promote unity in its mass base. As noted, the objective of this strategy 
was to accord the campaign resonance with the concerns and deprivations in the everyday life 
of the marginalised. As a result, these concerns and deprivations were crystallised in a bank 
of slogans highlighted in its Programme of Action. These were, 
PEACE, FREEDOM AND THE VOTE! 
JOBS, HOUSES AND EDUCATION FOR ALL! 
LAND, JOBS AND EDUCATION FOR ALL! 
INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY NOW! 
Prefaced by the phrase, “Working together…” to assert both the mobilisation imperative 
required of the task at hand and the unity of social forces that constituted the democratic 
movement, the broadness of these slogans were, as noted above, criticised for inculcating a 
sense of ‘creative ambiguity’ in the policy positions adopted by the ANC.  
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Figure 13: An example of a campaign Poster, Mayibuye Archive, SE2-1-16 
On the one hand, the slogans highlighted the immediate demands of the ANC’s core 
constituency at the time of the election. On the other, as a representational device, the slogans 
sought to capture the content of the history of struggle against apartheid and continue the 
narrative teleology of projecting the future vision of South Africa as one premised on the 
fundamental prescriptions of the Charter. Indeed, through this ideological device, the 
campaign would be able to “vigorously assert the humanistic and democratic value of the 
ANC, its unbroken record of principled struggle and it[s] vision of the future and its 
commitment.”64 The abiding belief that the general prescriptions of the Freedom Charter 
could be used as a catch-all device to “project an image of inspiration and hope for all South 
Africans” and in so doing provide a vision to address the legacy of socio-economic ills 
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plaguing South Africa, was impractical. In his recent memoir reflecting on the ANC’s 
campaign, American pollster and consultant Stanley Greenberg noted that the ANC, 
[…] presumed issues came organically out of the history of the ANC and its charter 
through elaborate deliberations. But a campaign can’t champion every issue. At the 
very least, polling can help it decide which issues matter most. Further, what issues 
the campaign embraces and the battle lines it draws determines who gets mobilized 
and can be persuaded to support the campaign.
65
 
It would take some time, however, before the ANC would narrow its campaign strategy. 
Indeed, designating 1993 as the year of “Votes for All”, its capacities were directed to 
organisational development and the “conversion of [the] organisational machinery to 
undertake a strenuous election campaign.”66 In January of that year, the outlines of the 
content of election manifesto were tabled in a confidential national election strategy 
workshop. In addition to addressing issues on the “form and content of the democracy” that 
was envisaged, the document also intimated the close proximity of the relationship between 
the ANC and its Alliance partners. Thinking on the redress of the qualitative socio-economic 
content of the manifesto would be informed by the Reconstruction Accord developed by the 
trade union movement.
67
 The final policy considerations that would emerge in the final 
version as the RDP, and its impact in informing the political culture of the ANC will be 
discussed more critically in chapter six. But for the present purposes, it is important to note 
that the Accord would comprise the contours of the RDP and was “seen as setting out the 
framework within which organisations of the poor and working people [would] reconstruct 
the economy in the future.”68 It was further asserted, and instructive for understanding the 
association between the alliance partners, that the Reconstruction Accord would inform the 
economic policy content of the ANC manifesto by “offering practical and concrete solutions 
to the serious problems of jobs, education and health care.”69 
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Representing the ANC 
By mid-1993, the ANC was confident of its ability to “tackle the election campaign”, despite 
the fact the organisational constraints remained. 
70
 In an interview with ANC chief election 
coordinator Popo Molefe, it was noted that these issues included, 
[...] consolidation of [the] structures at local level, consolidation of task teams at 
national level, the setting up and finalisation of the process of setting up sub-regional 
offices […] But we do believe that the amount of work that we have done, and the 
ideas that we have developed to prepare for that election date, have reached a fairly 
advanced stage.
71
 
Its publicity capacity had already been put into action, given that the “media was one of the 
most important organising tasks in the ANC” for the election.72  Indeed, in underlining the 
seriousness of the role of media, but also with a hint of jest, it was argued that, 
[M]edia is our weapon. So we must use it carefully, we must make every round count. 
We must sure we hit our target (and that we don’t shoot ourselves in the foot!)73  
With the overarching aim of “produc[ing] media that speaks directly to the people at local 
level,” activists were encouraged to utilise a range of publicity techniques ranging from more 
creative and artistic forms of expression such as graffiti to the more conventional, such as 
posters, banners and pamphlets.
74
 While the former was seen as “the most effective form of 
communication in urban areas,” the latter, especially banners, gave “the ANC ‘presence.’”75 
It was clear early on that one of the greatest weapons in the ANC’s media arsenal would be 
the “personality of its greatest human asset, Nelson Mandela.”76 Certainly, the adept 
“exploitation” of Mandela allowed him to “personify to many, moderation and pragmatism 
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married to loyalty to ANC traditions.”77 While more critical examination of this occurs in 
subsequent chapters, evidence of the centrality of Mandela is observed in a range of publicity 
materials. In ‘A Personal Appeal’, a high-quality publication used for fundraising purposes, 
the frontispiece is watermarked by the fundamental clauses of the Freedom Charter and 
overlain with a quote by Nelson Mandela stating, “[T]his is the most urgent appeal I have 
ever made for support in the struggle for and democracy in South Africa.”78 The “essence of 
the appeal” lay in the need to secure sufficient financial capacity and a narrowing of the 
resource deficit to allow for a “free and fair” election contest with the National Party and thus 
give effect to a truly “legitimate democracy.”79 As a highly stylised piece of support and 
mobilisation media, the emotive use of popular artworks with revolutionary slogans and the 
inclusion of photographs of prominent ANC leaders served to link the traditions of popular 
struggle and history with a sophisticated and capable projection of the ANC as a legitimate 
governing party. Moreover, as a ‘personal appeal’ by Mandela to the reader, a ‘bond of 
intimacy was created and the reader would obtain a sense of ownership in the overall 
campaign, as well as a contribution to the making of a democratic South Africa. 
While it has been demonstrated that a mass-based and popular campaign, headed by the 
ANC, would be undertaken, the impetus for a concerted and focused publicity and marketing 
campaign was born out of the results of a series of polls that were conducted in the early 
stages of the campaign. The utility of the information obtained from polling was noted by 
Greenberg above, and the ANC itself came to understand the importance of such information 
in informing the overarching narrative of the ANC’s election campaign.80 Between October 
1992 and July 1993, the ANC conducted three focus groups of “swing voters”, a “preliminary 
national survey of 2000 respondents”, and a third with 8000 respondents.81 Similarly, the 
views and opinions from ‘People’s Forums’ were also obtained, as well as “a survey of 1800 
people among Coloureds in the Western Cape, Africans in Natal and Africans in the PWV.”82 
The results are illuminating. National support for the ANC stood within a 54-58 percentage 
point range and while there was an increase in Coloured support for the ANC in the Western 
Cape, there had been “even larger growth” in support among this group for the National 
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Party. 
83
 While “support amongst African voters is solid [at 75 percent]”  there were a large 
number of Indian and Coloured cohorts that could be characterised as “Uncommitted 
Voters,” with this lack of commitment premised on the belief that the ANC would “bring 
mismanagement”, “associated [the ANC] with political violence” and were “apprehensive 
about its links with SACP.”84 The spatial location of these two groups – Coloureds in the 
Western Cape and Indians in Natal – informed the tailored electoral campaigns that were 
required in these two provinces. This will be discussed subsequently. Despite the overt focus 
on the targeting of women during the struggle that was discussed previously, the profile of 
the ANC’s weakest supporters was “female, rural and less educated.”85 In counterpoint, the 
“target constituencies” were “overwhelmingly Black (African, Coloured and Indian), 
working class, in urban and rural areas, 53 percent women, with some religious affiliation, 
but politically un-organised.”86 While rural support for the ANC remained “a matter of 
speculation”, there was nevertheless “strong identification with Mandela” which would it was 
hoped, “indicate a similar level of support for the ANC.”87 The ANC brand in this campaign 
would revolve around the personality of Mandela. As the embodiment of historical 
associations with the venerability of the struggle against apartheid – mythologised 
strategically by the ANC – Mandela’s cross-demographic appeal provided the ANC with an 
important campaign asset. As shown in figure fourteen, the ANC’s iconic poster of 
Mandela’s smiling visage framed by the colours of the ANC sought to communicate a 
simple, clear message of Mandela’s popularity as the ‘people’s choice ‘ for President.88 
Indeed, the decision for Mandela to front the ANC’s campaign was premised on the fact that 
“no other ANC leaders had comparable stature among swing voters.”89 
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Figure 14: The ‘iconic’ election poster, Mayibuye Archive, L 061 
Further, and to augment the position of the ANC and secure ‘buy-in’ from all targeted 
sections of the electorate, the party list process also became an important political variable in 
marketing the democratic foundations of the movement. Indeed, the motivation was to ensure 
“a breadth of appeal such as not to jeopardise our principal support base while winning 
support among those sectors of the population who have an interest in democracy and have 
traditionally supported the democratic movement.”90 Mandela’s appeal also lay in his 
construction as the emergent South African nation’s patriarch, the embodiment of 
reconciliation and the instigator of notions of ‘rainbowism’ – a symbolic device utilised to 
celebrate the multi-racial and multi-cultural sense of nationhood in a ‘new’ South Africa.  
More than that, the imagery that the ANC utilised also evoked ideas of a peaceful and 
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hopeful future characterised by non-racialism, non-sexism and diversity. These themes are 
aptly captured in figure eighteen below. 
The continuation of the historical ties with the Alliance partners, headed by the ANC, was 
also secured through the process where the list would be “reflective of ANC policies and 
policy objectives, which is rooted in the tri-partite alliance but leaves no doubt of the ANC’s 
leading position.”91 More than this, the breadth of the list came to include representatives 
from a range of “spheres” such as “celebrities which boast of such diverse fields as 
musicians, actors, runners to church leaders, workers and academics.”92 The emphasis on a 
bottom-up approach to informing the list was an important consideration for the ANC, and 
there was a conscious attempt to emphasise through the list that “the ANC government 
should be representative of the people as a whole – just as the ANC has always been a broad 
national liberation movement.”93 
 In fulfilling its marketing function, reports in the ANC’s periodical, Mayibuye, suggested 
that given the breadth of candidates selected, the “ANC was represented as a true rainbow 
coalition, bringing together an enormous range of South Africans and giving it a strong claim 
to represent most of the country, and not any single racial or class interest group” and 
securing the enduring vision of a non-racial and non-sexist South Africa.
94
 It is of 
significance here that the “grassroots” focus of list process formed part of the “self-
emancipation” initiative of the ANC, and the conscious concern that 
[…] the list must avoid the temptation to project an ANC which will be all things to 
all people. The movement’s basic character as an instrument of the people engaged in 
struggle and not a slick electoral machine, must be clearly visible. Our greatest 
strength is our track record of militant and consistent struggle for democracy. We 
should avoid the temptation to make our movement look and behave like the 
established political parties through we must take on board some of the universally 
applicable electioneering practices they are accustomed to.
95
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If the list process, in addition to its obvious political function, served as a marketing and 
publicity device, then the message that would capture the essence of the ANC’s electoral 
platform was also imperative. The overarching aim was to maintain its teleological purview 
and hence there was a need to inculcate a “consisten[cy] with our principles and our past” and 
to ensure that the content of its representational strategy “conveys that we have a vision and a 
plan for the future and confidence in our capacity to deliver as well as a vision which 
empowers ordinary people”.96 To counter the perception of the ‘creative ambiguity’ that 
critics had noted, there was a determined effort to ensure “credibility” by “providing specific 
and concrete programmes on issues such as Peace and Jobs in the main, but Education and 
Housing to a lesser extent.”97 
 
Figure 15: Campaign poster, Mayibuye Archive, SE 2-3-20 
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Further, given the tenuous support that the ANC held amongst minority groups, there was a 
drive to “[R]eassure voters that addressing the needs and expectations of the majority does 
not threaten [the] living standards of others” and that confidence in the ANC could be 
predicated on its self-characterisation as “trustworthy”, “consistent”, “non-racial and non-
sexist”, and “inclusive.”98 Finally, the content of the message would need to be premised on 
the idea of “contrasts”: where the ANC would stand for “hope”, “have a plan” and “be for all 
the people”, the National Party would come to “represent despair”, have little or no plan, and 
be narrow and exclusivist.
99
 
As such, the pillars of the ANC’s message would be numerous, but would revolve around 
specific economic issues such as “job creation, a living wage, rural development and tax 
policy.”100 A second theme related to “basic needs” which would include access to “housing, 
education, water and electricity and pensions and health.”101 Given the political milieu at the 
time, “peace” became a central theme of the ANC’s message tableau, even more than 
freedom. Moreover, peace would be linked to both “jobs and economic growth.”102 The 
plight of women formed another pillar of the ANC’s message, and noting their importance as 
a constituency of “undecided voters” it became imperative to address “their main problems”, 
which included “equality in pay, rights and decision-making as well as an answer to 
abuse.”103 Two other telling prescriptions sought to underwrite the ANC messaging. The first 
was a rejection of a negative mode of campaigning and that “focusing on the past would not 
be effective.”104 The second, and more enduring position, was that the overall tenor of the 
campaign would insist on the notion of self-empowerment in which ‘people would be their 
own liberators’ and where “the people will be given the opportunities and the environment in 
which they can do things for themselves.”105 
‘Going to the People’ 
The message would be deployed through a series of spectacles that constituted a campaign 
that would “generate an ‘election fever’, with rallies, barn-storming and all the razz-ma-tazz 
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of elections to create a bandwagon effect”106 The campaign in this sense was seen as a 
vehicle to “create a climate of anticipation and popular feeling that the movement’s campaign 
is unstoppable so that waverers (sic) are convinced to join the winning side.”107 Strategy was 
turned into practice. In what was described by Pallo Jordan, the head of the Department of 
Information and Publicity, as “a typical American election jamboree”, the ANC’s campaign 
commenced with the requisite ‘razz-ma-tazz’ that was anticipated.108 A series of public 
spectacles marked the campaign, the most pertinent of which was the ‘People’s Forum’ – an 
‘experiment’ in participatory democracy which allowed access to ANC leaders by the 
electorate through staged public meetings in which attendants were able to express their 
views, concerns and demands directly to these leaders.  
 
Figure 16: Two examples of posters for the People’s Forums obtained from the Mayibuye Archive, SE2-2-10 
(Afrikaans) and SE2-2-11 (English) 
The marketing function of these forums is clear, but at a political level, they also served to 
inculcate a sense of proximity of the ANC to the electorate, not only as a campaign tactic, but 
also as a possible longer term mode of governance. Indeed, “[as] a form of participation (sic) 
democracy we think we have pioneered something which could be institutionalised in the 
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future, both as a measure to encourage interaction between government and the people, and 
as a form of accountability.
109
 More than that, the People’s Forums were also used as a device 
to recall a tradition of participation and democracy in the policy making process and allowed 
for a “reassert[ion] of the basic character of the ANC, namely that it is a people’s-based 
liberation movement.”110 The publicising of the forums, as evidence by the posters in figure 
sixteen, demonstrate the organic, bottom-up process of consultation through the hand-drawn 
illustrations while at the same, show the ANC’s professionalism in targeting its message to 
different constituents.
111
 
These themes have further resonance in much of the ANC’s publicity material. In its Door-
to-Door Work Canvassing Manual, party activists are implored to, 
Go to the people, 
live with them, 
learn with them, 
love them… 
 
Start with what they know, 
build on what they have… 
…but of the best activists, 
when their work is done, 
our people should say… 
“We have done it ourselves”112 
This instructional media, while playing an important role in according agency to the ‘people 
as their own liberators’, serves to also inculcate the ‘liberatory’ act of elections themselves 
while linking the process of activism with the struggle for apartheid. The manual continues to 
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prevail upon activists that they “will be the ANC to the people you meet”, and that “[T]he 
ANC needs every canvasser to do his/her duty with the same heroism and commitment that 
we used to defeat the regime.”113 This bottom-up approach to political canvassing harks back 
to an earlier tradition of community involvement that characterised the popular struggles and 
the declaration as early as 1990 by the then constituted UDF that “all mass formations […] 
engage in a door-to-door education campaign on policies […] of the ANC.”114 Moreover, 
there was an active strategy to use “street committees to act as sites of recruitment for [the] 
ANC” so as to “intensify propoganda (sic) on the ANC.”115 Inculcating this emotive belief in 
the both grassroots activists and the targeted constituency was, however, conjoined to a 
highly analytical and programmatic set of policies that served to entrench the seriousness of 
the ANC’s vision for a democratic South Africa. This found strategic expression in a number 
of its print advertisements. Such seriousness sought to instil the belief that the “[T]he ANC 
already has its policy. Their campaign is based on fundamental principles, developed through 
years of struggle.”116 Indeed, the emphasis of its representational strategy would focus on a 
confidence-inducing, positive campaign that would be issues-based. 
Towards a Better Life for All 
In an interview, Trevor Manual, then the head of the ANC’s economics department noted, 
We are trying to campaign on a positive note and that’s been the instruction all the 
way through. The campaign is going to be about issues of policy and that is the 
predominant feature of our campaign. I haven’t seen that in the campaign of any other 
party […].117 
Under the supervision of American consultants Frank Greer and Stanley Greenberg, the 
primary task of the campaign was to utilise the historical bank of ANC policies and “fine tune 
the message, to discipline it, and synthesise it.”118 Given the centrality of newspapers in 
informing public opinion, the reach of the print advertising campaign made it an important 
mode of discursive representation for the ANC. Indeed, the strategy formed part of the 
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ANC’s attempt to campaign positively, in counterpoint to the NP, and newspaper 
advertisements were “filled with almost impossible quantities of text.”119 According to Frank 
Greer, the rationale for text-laden advertisements was to communicate a reality in which the 
ANC was represented as being “a party [that has] thought about solutions to South Africa’s 
problems and that they have been willing to present that in a plan […] Even if you don’t read 
or can’t read the details […] you get the message: the ANC has a plan, it’s serious.”120 
Serving then also as a mechanism to entrench confidence in the ANC’s ability to govern, the 
symbolic thrust of the newspaper advertisements allowed for the “shaping of voters’ 
perceptions and giving candidates’ records and their vision for the future.”121 
By projecting the idea of a serious policy vision for the future, the ANC was able to fulfil its 
stated campaign objective of needing to “vigorously assert the humanistic and democratic 
value of the ANC, its unbroken record of principled struggle and it[s] vision for the future 
and its commitment to peace [and] the ANC must project an image of inspiration and hope 
for all South Africans.”122 Such a strategy was driven as much by expediency as it was by 
sentiment. Despite strong support among African voters, such support was qualified and 
appropriate marketing and campaigning, especially among the Indian and Coloured, but also 
among the African electorate, was necessary. Further, given the exigencies of political 
violence in South Africa in the early 1990s, it is clear that the ANC needed to project an 
image of “hope [as] the core emotion which contrasts with the prevailing mood of fear and 
despondency among South Africa’s swing voters.”123 Indeed, it was noted that “[F]ear is an 
all pervasive emotion among the African swing voters. It is growing among the Indians. 
Africans in particular see violence in their daily lives.”124 Thus, by casting itself “as the party 
of hope”, the ANC would position itself suitably to win over these uncommitted voters. 
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The discussion above has demonstrated how, strategically and variously, the ANC sought to 
embody the meaning of ‘hope’ for the electorate through the emphasis on ‘liberating’ all 
South Africans from the uncertainty and conditions of ‘daily life’. Indeed, I have argued thus 
far that ‘liberation’ in a broad sense, came to crystallise around the idea of socio-economic 
upliftment in response to apartheid deprivation. While keen to assert the contours of 
liberation, the election was still seen as a contest between democracy and apartheid and came 
to be captured in the slogan ‘Now Is the Time.’ But it is evident too, that a shift had occurred 
and by the end of 1993, the ANC was keen to assert the ‘visionary’ content of the election 
campaign. 
 
Figure 17: An early campaign poster, Mayibuye Archive, SE 2-9-20 
The shift in its discourse – from a contest between apartheid and democracy to the projection 
of the future South Africa – was informed by another instrumental movement that had 
occurred, namely, the adoption of the slogan ‘A Better Life for All.’125 In his memoirs of the 
1994 election campaign, Stanley Greenberg notes the popularity and utility of the ‘Now Is the 
Time’ slogan by writing that it “had been taken up as a chant, identical in Zulu and Xhosa 
languages that animated the rallies.”126 More than that, that problem of the slogan lay in the 
fact that it “seemed […] to tell the whole history of repression and black exclusion and to 
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define the vote as an act of liberation.”127 The slogan essentially captured the thrust of the 
election as being about the past. Given the number of voters still open to persuasion across 
racial and class strata, an open and more inclusive slogan would have greater resonance. In 
focus group interviews, this materialised. Noting such, Greenberg has argued 
[…] we sat with […] about ten others behind the glass watching a group of African 
voters talk about their lives, then the election, and finally the slogans […] “Now Is the 
Time” was okay but did not light up the room. For sure, it was about power and 
freedom, for themselves, but after more than three years of frustration, the slogan did 
nothing to dispel the despondency. Putting the final nail in the coffin of apartheid was 
not enough. Will our lives really change? Will a new government bring an end to 
violence? But “A Better Life for All” and the other slogans about the future lifted the 
spirits in the room. It was as if someone gave them permission to hope for something 
better […] and when we conducted the same exercise with Coloureds in Cape Town, 
they went even further: maybe the ANC would be inclusive, for all communities, 
maybe it could control its own supporters and wanted peace, maybe it could unify the 
country. 
128
 
As a rhetorical device, there was now a certitude with which the ANC could champion both 
the ‘liberatory’ content of its election campaign while still maintaining the dynamic future 
vision. We see an example of the implementation of this device in the following slogans, 
Now is the time to end the carnage 
Now is the time to stop the terror  
Now is the time for change, the time for peace 
Now is the time for a better life for all
129
 
It would be incorrect to assume that the aspiration of ‘a better life’ did not inform the earlier 
ethos of the ANC’s campaign. Strategy documents indicate that already the ideas of ‘a better 
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life’ premised on access to adequate “housing, education, social services” were very much 
part of the ANC’s conception of liberation in late 1992.130 Crystallising this idea and 
projecting the vision for South Africa, however, was accorded greater emphasis, as noted, 
through the election process. 
 
Figure 18: Campaign poster, Mayibuye Archive, 2-1-6 
Regional Variation: The Western Cape 
While significant uncertainty existed amongst the electorate across class, race and gender 
variables, the confidence-inducing narrative turn by the ANC also had a more pointed 
political utility. Indeed, this ‘pointedness’ at projecting itself as the harbinger of change and 
hope in a future South Africa would not only serve a broader national agenda, but would also 
find political utility in the highly contested microcosms of the Western Cape and Natal. I 
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focus here on the former. Starting from the premise that the ANC needed to exude a 
“confidence” in its “ability to win the elections decisively” and demonstrate “a capacity to 
govern”, it was an imperative that an ANC victory in the Western Cape would “enable a 
democratic government to govern in the interest of all our people.”131 In this sense and 
highlighting the consistency in its overarching vision, the “non-racial democracy” that the 
ANC sought to entrench in South Africa would allow for the “possibility of fundamental 
transformation of our society to achieve social and economic justice for all.”132 The strategic 
imperative of the campaign in the Western Cape was based on winning ‘Coloured’ support – 
by the ANC’s own estimations it would obtain only 16 percent of “support from this 
community” that constitutes “the majority of people living in the Western Cape.”133 Having 
already established and “mobilised the maximum support […] among African voters”, the 
Coloured community represented a crucial tipping point in not only securing the province, 
but also affording the ANC the coveted two-thirds majority at a national level.
134
 The low 
levels of support for the ANC in the region, while historically based, also had organisational 
roots and part of the election campaign was to “mobilize, recruit and organise masses of our 
people into the ANC [as] a strong, well-organised ANC is essential to both victory at the 
polls and also to ensure that we are in a position to meet the challenges of the post election 
period.”135 Such organisation would be driven by the process of strengthening branch-level 
structures – “the main engine for the campaign” – and would serve to mobilise “and ensure 
contact with the grassroots.”136 
Early into its regional campaign strategising, the ANC recognised the immense propaganda 
onslaught that would be undertaken by the NP in this region in particular, and maintained that 
it would “at all costs […] present a consistent image based on the ANC’s commitment to 
Freedom, Justice and Equality for all.”137 Noting that a targeted message was necessary for 
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each community, there was nevertheless the acknowledgement that it was necessary to 
project an image of the ANC “which reflects real concern and commitment to resolve the 
bread and butter issues” which would “be built via active struggle on the ground in the weeks 
and months leading up to election day.”138 The core image then would be seek to cast “the 
ANC as the organization leading South Africa to Freedom, as the one organization capable of 
bringing lasting peace and security for all.”139 For the ANC, the provision of a coherent and 
consistent narrative of inclusivity in counterpoint to misperceptions exacerbated by NP 
propaganda was imperative. Thabo Mbeki, the then national chairperson of the ANC, noted 
as much in an interview arguing that, 
I suppose like everywhere else, part of the problem we are contending with is that we 
are inheriting apartheid past and clearly some racial divisions in this region. There 
you have particular perceptions which are wrong in substance but they are there and 
they influence people’s decision-making. You might get some sentiment among some 
Africans that because we got Allan Boesak as our provincial premier, we might then 
prefer coloureds when we propose provincial policies. Or you might get someone 
saying that the ANC is after all an African organisation and therefore it could mean 
that the coloureds would be discriminated against. These perceptions have come from 
an apartheid past and clearly the National Party is campaigning on the basis that it can 
frighten the coloured people away from the ANC by presenting the ANC as a terrible 
ogre […] From our point of view, what’s very important is to reach out to all of the 
community and to represent them properly, validly and consistently. When we in the 
ANC say we are a non-racial movement, we are a non-racial movement. When we say 
we are in favour of upliftment of people who are deprived, we mean all people. It’s 
important that we get that message across consistently so that people see us for what 
we are. Clearly this is one of the most heavily contested provinces in the country. But 
I think people are beginning to listen to what we are saying, rather than staying within 
a set of particular stereotypes that exist.
140
 
In challenging these stereotypes, ANC publicity material for the province sought to create a 
manifesto for the future that was widely inclusive and sought to appease coloured fears and 
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concerns. Entitled The Winning Team: A Future We Can Share the premier candidate and 
prominent UDF activist, Reverend Allan Boesak notes the pertinence of the election by 
invoking the historical significance of the franchise and linking it to the ‘liberatory’ premise 
upon which such significance rests. Indeed, he notes that, 
This is a momentous time. History is in the making and we are the people making that 
history. Our vote is the most precious thing we have. Because it is our vote that will 
make the difference between poverty and prosperity, between unity and division, 
between despair and hope. Only the ANC can guarantee a better life for all the people 
of the Western Cape. Only the ANC can attract the investment and confidence that 
will make our economy grow. Only the ANC can unite all our people. Only the ANC 
has the winning team to offer our people the hope of a future we can share.
141
 
The publication utilises hand-drawn cartoons to offer vignettes of ANC policy which range 
from socio-economic provisions (such as housing, education, food prices), to economic 
provisions (including economic growth, pensions, job creation and small business 
development), and focused on issues of peace, gangsterism, violence and religious 
freedom.
142
 The emphasis placed on these issues in the publicity material stem from the 
findings of swing voter research conducted earlier. Indeed, to instil confidence in a wavering 
electorate, a duty to assert its “economic credibility” became an important means to effect a 
belief in the ANC’s provision of ‘a better life’. 143 Impressing upon voters the ANC’s 
consideration of economic policy provisions at macro and micro levels again serves to 
directly address the concerns of this cohort of voters.  The seriousness of the policy 
consideration undertaken by the ANC are augmented by the charge that, 
ONLY THE ANC HAS A PLAN. The ANC’s plan is a realistic plan. It has been 
drawn up by professionals and experts in broad consultation with the people of the 
Western Cape and South Africa. Its cornerstones are sound economic policy and 
democracy. Its purpose is a better life for all, and to build a future we can share in 
peace.
144
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Moreover, by referring to the historical significance of the election and ascribing agency to 
‘the people’ in the process of liberation, Boesak’s injunction above serves to render clear the 
inclusive nature of the ANC and thus lessen the “distance between the ANC and images of 
racial exclusivity” – another important consideration for swing voters.145 These themes, 
which capture a segment of the coloured social experience, were emotively utilised again in 
an election speech in the coloured suburb of Manenberg in Cape Town, with particular 
emphasis place on linking peace to socio-economic redress. Addressing the crowd, Nelson 
Mandela argued that 
There can be no peace where there is poverty and unemployment. Because 
unemployment and poverty are the enemies of peace. There can be no peace when 
fully armed gangs are roaming the streets killing people; where your own unemployed 
children are joining these gangs [because they have no hope of finding a decent job]. 
There can be no peace where housing is poor and inadequate. Because poor living 
conditions are the enemies of peace […] In order to have peace we must have a better 
life for all. People must live in hope instead of fear. There must be jobs and security. 
There must be prosperity …a chance for your children to enter into a world that 
allows them to work and succeed […] We have struggled hard for this day. For the 
day when all South Africans – Coloured, African, Indian and White could together 
choose a government that would represent the interests of the majority of our people 
[…] I hope to convince you today, not only that the ANC is sincere in its commitment 
to build a better life for all South Africans, but that we have a well-worked out plan to 
ensure that this happens. This plan is not just a series of elections promises. It has 
been thought about, discussed, workshopped and costed over a long period of time.
146
 
While this quotation satisfies the marketing imperative of the ANC – to present a vision of a 
future South Africa that is non-racial, democratic and equitable to ‘motivate’ and ‘persuade’ 
people to vote – it also serves a particular discursive and teleological function. Indeed, the 
rhetoric utilised by Mandela loosely invokes the prescriptions of the Freedom Charter – 
‘there must be jobs and security’, ‘there must be prosperity’ – to provide a consistent 
narrative of the election being the logical outcome of the struggle against apartheid. To some 
measure, it could also be read as the continuation of the narrative of democracy triumphing 
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over apartheid, of the ANC triumphing over the NP.  Indeed, that this election can be cast as 
‘history in the making’ as Boesak noted above, is appropriate in that it not only signalled a 
rupture with what went before, but also, that it represents the continuation of the drive for 
liberation. Moreover, the ANC’s pragmatism in its election promises – being ‘workshopped’ 
and ‘costed’ etc – sought to inculcate a sense of confidence in its governing capacities and its 
measured approach to rebuilding South Africa. In addition, it lent discursive continuity to the 
campaign, by supporting the text heavy advertisements which aimed to communicate the 
same sentiments. 
While the themes and approaches of the strategy to capture the coloured vote in the Western 
Cape may seem tautological when consideration is given to the overarching discursive thrust 
of the national campaign, it did, however, serve to both shed light on, and emphasise, the 
political exigencies and dynamics of the political and social environment in a transitioning 
South Africa. Indeed, despite the overt attempts to win the election in the Western Cape by 
appealing to the coloured electorate, the province remained one of two that the ANC lost.
147
 
Thus, appeals to liberation, non-racialism, history, redress and emancipation outside of the 
‘traditional’ ANC constituencies were not sufficiently resonant with a diverse and stratified 
electoral market. The inability to inculcate a sense of trust and confidence in the ANC may, 
however, have had more to do with the spike in political violence that had engulfed the 
country shortly before the election. Threats from the white right wing, the Shell House 
massacre in Johannesburg and ‘ethnic’ violence in Natal had a deleterious effect on the 
overall tenor of the campaign. 
The ‘moment’ of the election itself obtains mythic status in the political history of South 
Africa. It was represented through images of snaking lines  of voters around polling stations, 
the symbolic iconography of black workers and white managers, ‘maids and madams’ 
standing side by side in anticipation of casting a ballot; these captured, in essence, ‘liberation 
in action.’ 
But this ‘moment’ of liberation, despite its multifarious significance, needs to be read as a 
transitory event in a much longer path of liberation characterised by a “process of 
democratisation and transformation.”148 That this would take time to fulfil and would not be 
heralded by an election, was not lost on the electorate, for it was noted that, “[A]n election 
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will not bring immediate change. It will take around 10 years to make this country stable 
again.”149 Moreover, and captured in the campaign slogan ‘Working together…’ there is a 
clear sense that the election represented the mere starting point along the road to liberation in 
South Africa. Trying to capture the forward movement of the post-election environment and 
commit to the seriousness of the task facing the ANC and its leadership, in his victory speech 
in Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela was keen to assert that “[T]omorrow, the entire ANC 
leadership and I will be back at our desks. We are rolling up our sleeves to begin tackling the 
problems our country faces. We ask you all to join us – go back to your jobs in the morning. 
Let’s get South Africa working.”150 In sounding the call to give effect to the idea of ‘a better 
life’ it in effect established a “mandate that would weigh on the government and entitle 
ordinary citizens to demand accountability.”151  Liberation would be an ongoing task in the 
making of a democratic South Africa. 
CONCLUSION: LIBERATION ACHIEVED? 
The election campaign of 1994 demonstrated the sophistication of the ANC’s political 
marketing. Utilising both popular and scientific techniques of persuasion, the ANC sought to 
persuade a range of constituencies of its ability to govern and deliver its mandate in providing 
a better life for all. The provision of a better life served to capture the notion of liberation and 
the social and economic aspects upon which it was deeply rooted. Indeed, more than merely 
signalling a rupture with the past, the future-oriented nature of the campaign was premised on 
the ability of the ANC to deliver economic hope and material progress and in so doing, 
realise the revolutionary mission. Therefore, the electoral victory came to symbolise the 
beginning of a process from which the majority of South Africans could reconstruct their 
lives.  For the ANC, the victory symbolised the real and monumental task of re-creating 
South Africa. Meeting in June 1994, the ANC’s National Working Committee (NWC) 
undertook the task of problematising its new role in a democratic South Africa.
152
 Needing to 
balance the exigencies between its governing and parliamentary roles and its positioning 
outside official institutions as a party and movement, the ANC set in motion the process of 
needing to negotiate and organise in these multiple roles. Politically, the ANC was occupied 
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with positioning itself as the “engine” for implementing the RDP, while commensurately 
needing to streamline its operations and audit itself organisationally.
153
 
The post-election milieu was fraught given the nature of transition politics. A key site of 
friction lay in the economic sphere. Confronted with the need to balance the demands of 
various constituencies – local and international – in the making of a democratic South Africa, 
the ANC needed to ensure confidence in its ability to govern pragmatically and rationally. 
Realising the goal of reconstruction and development required it. I have noted in this 
discussion the political and mobilisation importance of the RDP to the election campaign.  It 
was significant ideologically too, given that it provided a temporal consistency to the ANC’s 
governance narratives as it came to embody the vision and purport of the Freedom Charter. 
Indeed, noting such continuity then Minister of Public Enterprises, Jeff Radebe argued for 
consonance to be drawn between the populist underpinnings of the Freedom Charter and the 
“people-driven” formulation of the RDP which came to be defined by “the distinctive 
features of service delivery and the provision of infrastructure.”154 More importantly, in 
highlighting the successes of the RDP in such infrastructural provision to effect a 
“reorganisation of the economy”, the question of economic growth became an important 
precept for allowing the fullest realisation of the Charters’ clauses in giving effect to the 
ANC’s overarching governing narrative of providing “a better life for all.”155 What is critical 
here, is not that the imperatives of the Charter are used to motivate for economic growth, but 
rather it is the nature of that economic growth that become the key drivers  in realising both 
the purport and ethos of the Charter. Imperatively, while a cognitive link is made between the 
Charter and the RDP, in practice, the process of restructuring was guided by the then more 
neo-liberal GEAR policy.
156
 As a mode of economic and social governance that characterised 
much of the ANC’s leadership of South Africa, GEAR became a battleground of contestation 
within the ANC and amongst its Alliance partners. In the following chapter, I overlay the 
examination of political marketing on this shift, and demonstrate the rhetorical, 
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representational and discursive meanderings of the ANC in its economic policy orientation. 
These meanderings shed light on the changing political cultures in the ANC and the emergent 
bases of a new symbolic South African state. 
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6. 
‘THE SECOND WAR OF LIBERATION’: 
POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE 
MARKETING OF ECONOMIC POLICY 
************** 
There is no doubt that our struggle for political power will be crowned with victory and that victory will arm us 
with the tools for embarking on the “The Second War of Liberation – the struggle for genuine economic 
independence”1 
The analysis thus far has emphasised the very public, exterior and highly stylised forms of 
marketing undertaken by the ANC. The exigencies of the struggle for liberation and the very 
nature of political and election campaigns dictated such an open and pervasive form of 
political marketing. This chapter shifts such emphasis to focus on economic policy as an 
important discursive and representational apparatus in the political sphere. I have 
demonstrated thus far how the discursive construction of the struggle against apartheid was 
intimately connected to both the political and economic realms. Liberation could not be 
attained solely through the transfer of political power to the majority, but was “in a real way 
bound up with economic emancipation.”2 Policy generally, and economic policy specifically, 
allows for an insight into the narratives of government wherein a clearer understanding of its 
motivations, orientations and ethics are lent ‘coherence’ and ‘direction.’3 These narratives are 
also intimately connected to the creation of the symbolic South African state. Thus, focusing 
on policy permits a richer and more varied understanding of political marketing as it 
emphasises the strategic behaviours of political actors not just at specific ‘marketable’ 
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moments in the everyday course of governing. As such, its functions, as Margaret Scammell 
reminds us, to broaden the purview of marketing ‘into the high politics of government.’4 
As will be demonstrated in this chapter, analysis of the ANC’s political marketing of 
economic policy was geared toward the objectives of entrenching confidence in its ability to 
govern, and hence its reputation, and imbuing notions of trustworthiness and pragmatism into 
its brand. Importantly too, endowing the ANC’s brand with these attributes permits a deeper 
understanding of the link between the emotional attachments that were developed over time, 
with the more ‘functional’ aspects of political management. Further, that the ANC’s 
discursive and representational actions pivoted on the need to inculcate confidence in its 
ability to govern in a democratic South Africa, is clear from the discussion which follows. In 
delimiting the remit of political marketing’s operation, and focusing on the behaviours of 
political protagonists, a more holistic understanding of the politics underscoring the 
marketing is obtained. While guarding against economic reductionism, examining this 
politics through the lens of economic policy allows for a keener understanding of the 
complex relationships between protagonists in the political sphere. This politics also 
highlights the difficulties, both practically and rhetorically, the ANC encountered in its desire 
to provide ‘a better life for all.’ 
As I have noted, given the balance of forces within and affiliated to the ANC, economic 
policy became an important site of contestation and a means for the assertion of a dominant 
political culture within the ANC. Focusing specifically on the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) and the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
policy, the analysis traces the connections between apartheid and post-apartheid discourses 
and representations and pulls through the ideological threads that have informed the ANC’s 
economic and political orientation over time. In addition, and given the symbolic resonances 
of these policies, I demonstrate in this chapter the means by which each became condensation 
symbols around which political identities clustered. As such, these policies also signified the 
shift in political cultures within the ANC. This shift is also instructive in analysing the 
marketing of each. While the RDP is ensconced in a richer and more varied form of 
marketing that supported its claims of being people-oriented and driven, GEAR’s 
technocratic impulse and removal of popular content was characterised by paucity in its 
political marketing. I have noted in chapter two that the ‘language universe’ in which 
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economic policy operates is itself symbolic and is an important ‘translation mechanism’ 
between the prevailing political ‘rationalities’ and the larger vision espoused by the 
government. As such, the discussion here on economic policy functions to “expand 
epistemology beyond the confines of observational statements and logical proof” and to 
foreground “the ways individuals are embedded in the wider social contexts of situation and 
society.”5 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section one traces briefly the historical importance 
accorded to economic policy organisationally by the ANC and adumbrates the contours of its 
economic thinking in the later 1980s. The liberalisation of political space provided a fillip to 
economic thinking which was then characterised by an ambiguity in its overarching 
discourses. The RDP became a flagship for the creation of a democratic South Africa and 
provided continuity in the ANC’s adherence to the prescripts of the Freedom Charter and 
coherence to its governance purport. But the marketing of the policy obscured the incipient 
orthodoxy of its provisions. This is discussed in section two. Democracy and the need to 
conform to global economic exigencies led to the creation of GEAR, a neoliberal economic 
policy that set the ground for confrontation and contestation within the ANC. In section three, 
I posit that GEAR was part of a modernising impulse which holds importance in 
understanding the political culture of the ANC. Before concluding, I argue in section four that 
this modernising imperative was directed at a broader continental renaissance and permits an 
important insight into the motivations and understandings of this modernising tendency. 
ANTECEDENTS 
Until the latter phase of apartheid little organisational investment was placed in the ANC’s 
economic policy machinery. While the Freedom Charter and the 1969 Strategy and Tactics 
document of the ANC served as the both the ideological and publicity frameworks for policy 
pronouncements, it was only in the 1980s that serious consideration was given to the 
establishment of an economics department within the ANC.
6
 The release of Nelson Mandela 
provided greater impetus to the ANC to seriously address economic policy questions for a 
future democratic South Africa. Aware that it “face[d] an enormous task in the sphere of 
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economic policy”7 the impetus to the ANC’s economic policy capacities lay in the need to 
give the prescriptions of the Freedom Charter “scientific and substantive content.”8 
Economic policy, it was acknowledged, would be an important site for balancing conflicting 
tendencies and mobilising constituencies. Indeed, one of the functions of the ANC’s 
Department of Economic and Planning (DEP) was to undertake an “elaboration of a 
comprehensive, consistent and generally agreed perspective on the economy” both “within 
the ANC and the democratic movement.”9 Further, the DEP would also play an important 
marketing and mobilisation function given that it would “help foster mass mobilisation 
around economic issues [...] otherwise economic policy will not reflect the needs of the 
majority.”10 Imperatively, it was noted that popular acquiescence obtained through broad 
consultation and mobilisation became “the key issue in developing and implementing long-
term economic policy.”11 For its trade unions allies, COSATU, this approach would allow for 
the creation of “inclusivist programmes that will build a productive, prosperous, ecologically 
stable and culturally vibrant society where each and every citizen benefits in meaningful 
measure.”12 As the “energising force of our economic emancipation”13  and centred on the 
“needs of the people”, 14  the need to market and publicise economic policy to obtain input 
from the masses was fundamental to ensuring popular involvement and participation. 
Charged with “publicis[ing] and stimulat[ing] debate on economic issues” within branches of 
the movement, the DEP was also required to “provide the specific technical information that 
community groups and members need for specific struggles.”15 A distinctly educative 
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function underscored this publicity and promotion given the lack of economic knowledge 
within its constituency. In the minutes of a DEP national planning meeting, this was rendered 
apparent for it was noted, 
We need to consider more creative forms of presenting our documents, a video 
presentation is being planned, more effort needs to be put into education around basic 
economics for branches and economics association members. [T]here has been very 
little discussion on economic policy in the branches, despite regional workshops 
deciding on this, this needs priority attention. There needs to be more material 
prepared which explains the various options and choices available around economic 
policy and the implications of various options.
16
 
While in the struggle period, economic policy centred largely on superficial sloganeering 
given the lack of economic capacity within the movement, the imminent political settlement 
opened the ANC up to challenges and influence from organised interests, and the DEP was 
tasked to “be involved in all [...] activities in order to defend the interests” of the ANC against 
these influences.
17
 Moreover, the ANC was acutely aware that economic policy could be used 
as an instrument to pacify the fears of the white minority and market itself as a reputable and 
pragmatic organisation that would govern responsibly. At a seminar held in Lusaka in mid-
1989, it was asserted that, 
Economic questions have become crucial in mobilising our white compatriots who 
genuinely want to join forces but still have reservations or are uninformed about what 
we actually stand for. At the same time, state propaganda has led them to believe that 
a free South Africa will experience the same “chaos” as in all of independent Africa. 
Whilst a few are beginning to move away from apartheid, a future “chaotic” economy 
is not appealing.
18
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Inculcating a sense of confidence in its ability to govern and thus obviate the prospect of 
‘chaos’ would require the ANC to move beyond the prescripts of the Freedom Charter and 
advance a coherent and realistic economic policy. Despite the lack of capacity by the late 
1980s, the outlines of economic policy were beginning to emerge. Overall, these contours 
were indebted to the historical rooting of economic policy in the Charter and the ANC’s 
Strategy and Tactics document and were informed by an impulse to address the conditions 
that apartheid obtained. The key prescripts of its economic policy were marked by 
consonance in its purport. Economic liberation was premised on addressing the legacy of 
deprivation exacted on the black body politic by the pernicious policies of the minority 
regime. The extent of such deprivation and its rootedness within potential ANC 
constituencies rendered economic pronouncements and policies important instruments to 
attract and maintain support. Indeed, in a survey of attitudes of Black South Africans in 1985, 
a joint Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) and Institute for Black Research 
(IBR) study found that the vast majority of urban-based respondents highlighted either 
economic or socio-economic problems as their main grievance with “things in South 
Africa.”19 Direct economic constraints such as “unemployment, unequal or low wages, the 
cost of living and sales taxes” were noted equally with more political aspects of apartheid 
such as “racial discrimination, pass laws and no vote.”20 But economic deprivation also 
manifested in other, less direct, ways including “housing shortage, high rents, and poor 
amenities” as well as the “inferior quality” of education.21 Such socio-economic and political 
dislocation provided a ripe arena in which the ANC could market its economic outlook. To 
large measure, this was already done, for the same survey found that more than a third of 
respondents acknowledged that they believed Nelson Mandela and the ANC would be the 
“organisations [they] would most like to represent [them] in solving [the] problems and 
grievances.”22 
These findings point to the success of the ANC’s marketing of economic grievances and the 
means for their redress over time. Such marketing, examined in chapter four, was most 
evident prior to and after the COP. Given these historical and contextual factors, the ANC’s 
economic policy statements displayed continuity with these antecedents while simultaneously 
attempting to inculcate moderation and temperance in its policy pronouncements. The 
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rhetorical and symbolic orbit of its pronouncements on economic policy is indebted to a 
register that is rooted in a particular and more venerable historical past. By invoking that past, 
the present moment is endowed with that venerability and provides a framework to sanction 
and permit any divergence from it. 
Thus, a historically-entrenched discourse came to inform economic policy thinking by the 
late 1980s and by September 1990, the ANC’s most authoritative position on economic 
policy was expounded in the ‘Discussion Document on Economic Policy’ (DDEP).Viewed 
by the ANC to “represent the broadest and most developed consensus on economic policy to 
date”23 the DDEP posited that “the new path of economic growth and development must be 
based on satisfying basic needs.”24 Imperatively for the present purposes, the document 
cannot merely be read as an economic manifesto but rather as “a political instrument, 
designed to weld together as many constituencies as possible.”25 Given this motivation, the 
DDEP like key pronouncements that preceded it, was marked by “ambiguous phrasing and 
inevitably superficial presentation of key arguments.”26 
Expediency underpinned the document. The “ideological rainbow of policies” that it 
contained sought to pacify contending interests,  for while its mass base would be crucial to 
maintaining pressure on the regime to reform through a process of protracted negotiations, 
the ANC was also keenly aware of the need to maintain strong relations with domestic 
capital.
27
 This attempt to reconcile contending interests through recourse to vagueness and 
“ambiguity” in its economic policy pronouncements is consistent with the ANC’s broader 
“strategy of an all-class alliance.”28 But this strategy needed a significant confidence-
inducing mechanism given the effect of both “sanctions and popular resistance to 
apartheid.”29 While it may be argued that such a confidence-inducing mechanism came 
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through concessions to business, it was also juxtaposed with the DDEP’s explicit aim was “to 
stimulate discussion within ANC branches and other structures of the movement.”30 
The need for economic growth would be achieved by redistribution. Rhetorically, “growth 
through redistribution” became a key slogan that was underpinned by a balance of political 
forces in favour of the ANC’s more left-leaning factions.31 This redistributive thrust, and the 
radical tendencies that were projected, were nevertheless tempered by moderation and 
pragmatism, for the document noted that need to “avoid inflationary spending policies” and 
“running up large budget deficits.”32 Further, the ‘red button’ issue of nationalisation, a site 
of tremendous contestation between the ANC and liberal groups in business, the state and 
media, was not included in the DDEP. Aiming to instil confidence, Thabo Mbeki posited the 
importance the ANC ascribed to business in a television discussion panel when he noted, 
I think that it is important that the ANC should say, as it is saying, that the private 
sector has got a very important role to play in this economic transformation and that 
the private sector should naturally be certain of the safety of its investments and 
should be certain of the possibility of a fair return on its investments.
33
 
The state would assist in this task as it would “have the duty to set the general framework 
within which economic life would take place and take the lead in promoting a national 
development strategy.”34 A closer reading of the document would indicate a pronounced role 
of the state in economic affairs which led to it being misconstrued as an ANC move to the 
left.
35
 Nattrass disputes this and argues instead that the ANC envisioned a role akin more to 
strategic intervention, than pure socialism.
36
 Despite the ambiguity of its language to corral 
support from all sectors of economic and political society, there was a belief in the ANC that 
the document was overly-antagonistic to business and foreign investors. Debate and 
discussion within the ANC after the publication of the DDEP saw a lexical and indeed 
                                                 
30
 African National Congress, ‘Discussion Document on Economic Policy’, cover page 
31
 African National Congress, ‘Discussion Document on Economic Policy’, 7. Indeed, given the power the trade 
union movement exerted over South African politics at the time of the document’s writing, and the weaknesses 
of the ANC organisationally given its dispersion and resulting lack of coherence, , there was a strong political 
motive to satisfy trade union demands. Numerous examples obtain, but most clearly over its acquiescence to the 
trade unions’ desire for a ‘high-wage’ economy which seemed politically and economically unfeasible given 
historical and contextual factors  
32
 African National Congress, ‘Discussion Document on Economic Policy’, 7 and 13 
33
 South African Broadcasting Corporation, Agenda, May 1990, African Studies Library, Film Collection,  
University of Cape Town, author’s transcription 
34
 Nicoli Nattrass, ‘Politics and Economics in ANC Economic Policy’ African Affairs 93, (1994), 347 
35
 Nattrass, ‘Politics and Economics in ANC Economic Policy’, 347. See also 
36
 Nattrass, ‘Politics and Economics in ANC Economic Policy’, 347 
204 
 
ideological shift to a “growth and redistribution” path.37 Reflective too of a shifting balance 
of forces within the ANC, there was the recognition of the need to “compromise on economic 
policy and to start bringing about the conditions necessary to restore growth by mollifying 
potential investors” and to cast aside “any apparent lingering attachments to socialism.”38 The 
slight to trade unions and the constellation of forces that campaigned for liberation on the 
precepts of the Freedom Charter was apparent and set the ground for future confrontation. 
If the formulation of economic policy was deliberately ambiguous so as to appeal to different 
constituents, the issue of nationalisation was a bugbear for the ANC. A survey of leading 
South African newspapers at the time of political liberalisation indicates the emotive, vapid 
and racist undertones that informed impressions of the ANC and its consideration of 
nationalisation. For example, a Business Day editorial noted that, 
[t]he release of Nelson Mandela was first celebrated, appropriately, by the looting of a 
booze shop – an early example of the policy of appropriating other people’s property 
to which Mandela immediately gave his support. Nationalisation is at heart the policy 
of the hooligan.
39
 
While the ascription to a policy of nationalisation was continually diluted, by the end of 1991 
Nelson Mandela was keen to posit in an address to corporate America in Pittsburgh that “the 
ANC has no ideological commitment to nationalisation.”40 Excusing prior statements to the 
effect, Mandela argued further that nationalisation “appear[ed] in policy documents of the 
ANC adopted 35 years ago, at a time when the word ‘privatisation’ was not in anybody’s 
vocabulary.”41 While aiming to assert the dynamism in the ANC to adjust to changing 
circumstances and global exigencies, critics lamented “the ANC’s capitulation in the face of a 
concerted neoliberal economic campaign.”42 Such capitulation, however, did not signal the 
wholesale abandonment of its more leftward inclinations. From within the alliance, there 
emerged the Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG) which aimed to develop an 
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economic policy that would re-orientate the ANC to a more popular-inspired economic 
position which pivoted on the ‘growth through redistribution’ framework.43 Addressing 
issues of unemployment, poverty and the creation of a competitive manufacturing sector 
amongst others, the proposals were “received lukewarmly by the ANC.”44 Beset by 
organisational problems, internal politics and a “disjuncture” between MERG and DEP, the 
policy emanating from it “did not systematically feed into and inform discussions” that was 
being undertaken on the wider transition to democracy.
45
 
The vaunted adherence to popular participation and engagement that characterised the 
discourse of economic policy-making served to create a rhetorical and teleological link to the 
historical and mythical development of the Freedom Charter that was integral to the 
discursive process of remaking South Africa. The disjuncture between rhetoric and practice 
featured prominently. However, political expediency informed the ANC’s shifting 
commitment to popular participation. The need to inculcate and corral the widest possible 
constituency not only informed such expediency, but also the discursive content of policy. 
Indeed, the ambiguity inherent in policy pronouncements was undertaken to carefully 
position the appeal of the ANC within the political market. A crystallisation of the ANC’s 
economic stance was evident by its adoption of the RDP as its election programme on the eve 
of the 1994 campaign. The symbolic value of the RDP lay not only in the vision it 
propounded for a democratic South Africa, but that that vision and discourse was consonant 
with the Freedom Charter and heralded as the continuation of its teleological mission. But 
this process was fraught with political challenges to which the ANC had to adapt. In this 
climate, the RDP became a new battleground for both internal and external contestation to the 
ANC. It is to this that the following section turns. 
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THE RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
Reconstruction and Development is a journey. Our starting point is the apartheid inheritance: poverty, 
inequality, stagnation. Our final destination is a strong, democratic, prosperous South Africa. The challenge is 
to work out how we get there – our means of transport. The truth we must face is that development does not 
happen overnight. We can have short term delivery, but that must pave the way for our medium to long term 
strategy.
46
 
The period of political transition in South Africa was marked by a series of public 
performances and acts that were necessary in creating the conditions for a peaceful and 
confidence-instilling transition to democracy. Commencing with the theatricality of the 
release of Nelson Mandela, the need to capture the social and political imagination of the 
body politic became an integral part of the process of transition. I have discussed above the 
rhetorical and discursive manoeuvres undertaken by the ANC to pacify contending interests 
with regard to its economic policy persuasions. As such, and as I have argued, the symbolic 
utility of economic policy marketing has a strongly political function.
47
 
While earlier policy pronouncements sought to pacify the needs of contending interests, the 
RDP emerged as the central means through which a future South African state would be 
constructed. It was envisaged that the RDP would traverse the narrow parameters of 
economic redress and allow for the “complete reordering of politics, the economy and 
society.”48 This ‘reordering’ came to encompass a psychological, as well as material 
dimension, for as the Minister responsible for its implementation noted in the media, 
Changing minds of people, transforming the way people think, work and deliver, 
transforming our budget to meet the new priorities we have set out, transforming how 
we spend money, transforming attitudes is what the RDP is all about.
49
 
Such attitudinal change would be premised on a strongly marketing and publicity imperative 
which would aim at inculcating a sense of legitimacy for its vision and purport and lend 
credence to the transformational motive noted above. Here, the “populist rhetoric to mobilise 
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both state and civil society around addressing the historical legacy of apartheid” would serve 
to galvanise the tradition of mass participation in South African politics and lend credibility 
to the ANC’s attempt to remake the post-apartheid state.50 Indeed, its significance lay not 
only in the resonance of its overarching vision but in its ethical claim to the “mobilis[ation] of 
all [the] people and our country’s resources toward the final eradication of apartheid.”51 This 
final eradication was premised not only on political, but also socio-economic redress. Further, 
and invoking the venerability of the resistance tradition, the RDP was premised upon 
widespread consultation that saw the ANC “[build] on the tradition of the Freedom 
Charter.”52 Birthed in the trade union movement and forming the basis of the ‘reconstruction 
accord’ between COSATU and the ANC (see chapter five), the RDP was crucial moreover in 
providing the moral-ethical and political-economic vision for a liberated South Africa and 
formed the basis of the ANC’s 1994 election campaign and manifesto. 
Despite the fact that its “intellectual evolution [was] increasingly complicated and drew upon 
a progressively broader range of tributaries,”53 the RDP firmly and discursively ensconced 
the ANC at the centre of political life in South Africa, noting, 
The special nature of the ANC as a liberation movement and the traditions of the 
Freedom Charter make it the only political organisation capable of unifying a wide 
range of social movements, community-based organisations and numerous other 
sectors and formations.
54
 
Such ensconcing and the power it was able to exert over its alliance partners was firmly 
evidenced after its victory in the 1994 poll and the tempering it undertook of the RDP. 
Indeed,  marked differences exist between the ‘Base Document’ (BD), used as an election 
manifesto for the 1994 election,  and the White Paper (WP), promulgated by the ANC in the 
Government of National Unity. While maintaining, rhetorically the substance and overall 
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ethos of the RDP, the latter did however diverge significantly on a number of key 
prescriptions. This will be discussed subsequently. 
Given the historical exigencies, balance of forces and prevailing political climate, drawing on 
its historical repository of rhetorical devices, the RDP document located the ANC firmly 
within a representational teleology that endowed it with venerability and sanctified its vision 
for a democratic South Africa. Thus, in seeking to “democratise power”, the RDP 
characterised itself as a “people-driven process” and emphasised citizen participation through 
“active involvement and growing empowerment.”55 Invoking the precepts of the Freedom 
Charter, the RDP gave consideration to both the notions of “peace and security for all” and 
placed prominence on the idea of nation building.
56
  A critical feature of the base document 
was the reassertion of the earlier ‘growth through redistribution paradigm, where 
redistribution was not contingent upon economic growth, but rather that “growth, 
development, reconstruction and redistribution” were integrated.57 These principles rested on 
the full “democratisation of South Africa” which was seen as “an active process enabling 
everyone to contribute to reconstruction and development.”58 
The reconstruction and development of post-apartheid South Africa would be premised on 
five interlinked programmes. Reasserting the ANC’s earlier premise of “meeting basic 
needs”, these programmes centred on human development and empowerment in “building the 
economy” and creating a “new democratic order” that would be centred on “linking 
democracy, development and a people-centred approach.”59 Couched in phraseology similar 
to that of the Freedom Charter, it was keen to assert its popular foundations and process of 
development, positing that, 
The RDP was not drawn up by experts – although many, many experts have 
participated in that process – but by the very people that will be part of its 
implementation. It is a product of consultation, debate and reflection on what we need 
and what is possible.
60
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Concern over the populist impetus that might underlie the emphasis on citizen input and 
consultation was allayed through the pragmatism of the ANC in its acknowledgment that 
“each and every expectation will not be realised and every need will not be met 
immediately.”61 As such, an attempt was also made to avert a future crisis of expectation. 
Despite its tendencies toward pragmatism and moderation, the RDP suffered from a 
theoretical and analytical muddling and came to reflect, like earlier economic directives, a 
tacit appeasement between competing and conflicting interests. Indeed, analysts have noted 
that there was “an understandable desire on the part of the RDP’s authors to avoid alienating 
significant interest groups and constituencies, whether domestic or international, and thereby 
maximise political support for the programme.” 62  Coupled with a lack of analytical content 
and conflicting policy positions, the utility of the RDP lay more in its symbolic value, than as 
a concrete and viable policy document. Indeed, with an insufficient macroeconomic plan, 
financial modelling and costing for the intended programmes, an ambiguous position the role 
of the state in the process of reconstruction amongst others, the RDP functioned more as 
modern touchstone for the moral and ethical foundations of a democratic South Africa. 
The Symbolic Utility of the RDP 
in a love beyond 
a senseless new 
landscape of  
reconstructed hope
63
 
The ANC’s adherence to popular input and participation in the process of formulating the 
RDP and its claims to ‘ownership’ of the struggle is premised on a more nuanced reality in 
which, according to Steven Friedman, support for its political and economic project did not 
“enjoy a firm mandate from [its] constituency” and nor was there a “guarantee that they have 
accurately gauged their followers’ attitude to specific policies or strategies, or that they can 
ensure support for them.” 64 Citing two examples, he posits further that, 
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The failure to secure returns to school or a halt to violence in Natal and elsewhere are 
but two examples of the problems which the resistance leadership faces when it asks 
its constituency to compromise on strategies. There is no reason why it should be 
easier to persuade followers to accept economic compromise.
65
 
The effect of this was to afford greater primacy to the symbolic politics it purported. Indeed, 
given the divergences and incongruity on the political and economic positions it adopted, the 
ANC’s “appeal” to its constituency lay, 
[...] not on policy positions, but on symbols: the ANC draws its support more from its 
ability to symbolize decades of resistance than on identification with a particular set 
of policies or economic interests.
66
 
Marketing thus became an imperative to marshal support and entrench the presence and 
dominance of the ANC. As noted, the lack of detail on economic policy pronouncements 
aimed at appeasing a range of contending interests was underpinned by a strategic political 
motive. Indeed, the import accorded to symbolism was aimed to maintain coherence among 
the ANC’s various constituencies in light of the difficulties that would be encountered in 
delivering on its social and economic mandate. In another sense, it would serve to contain a 
crisis of expectation. Indeed, the ANC’s repetition in locating the RDP as an extension of the 
Freedom Charter provided a symbolic and temporal continuity that would fulfil this 
containment function. Moreover, as the product of a “national consensus”, the RDP’s 
democratic function was rendered clear. The promotional function undertaken by the ANC 
and the vigorous selling of the programme to various constituencies allowed the RDP to 
garner significant “endorse[ment]” from “all sections of society, including organized labour, 
business, political parties across the spectrum, social, cultural and community 
organizations.”67  Moreover, such selling was central to developing a ‘national consensus’ 
and was informed by a discourse that valorised the objectives of reconstruction and 
development undertaken by the democratic movement. Addressing a restive COSATU at its 
5
th
 National Congress – unsettled by the ANC’s overtures to big business – Nelson Mandela 
was keen to expound on this, holding that, 
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That the broad perspectives of the Reconstruction and Development Programme have 
become the property of the whole nation is thanks to the correctness of its content and 
the creative leadership of the Alliance. We are proud that organised workers have 
been and remain at the centre of efforts to define and realise national tasks. It is 
crucial that this should continue to be the case. Otherwise, what is essentially a 
programme to uplift the conditions of the poor, could easily be misappropriated to 
serve the interests of those who [have] all along [benefitted] from the system of 
apartheid.
68
 
This recourse to the idea of the nation permitted an attempt at “reconciling widely differing 
attitudes to South Africa’s development challenges”69 Its political motive was underpinned 
by a strong marketing imperative – to inculcate support in a programme which was credible 
and thus able to instil confidence in the ANC’s ability to govern by enhancing its reputation 
as the key arbiter of political and economic freedom. This brand quality would be enhanced 
further by the welcoming criticism and conjecture on its plans and imbue the process of 
reconstruction and development with a strong democratic ethos. Such an ethos was 
underpinned by pragmatism and restraint. Jay Naidoo, the minister who would oversee its 
implementation post election, opined as much, in the pages of South Africa’s leading 
business newspaper when he wrote, 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme has evolved over many months of 
drafting. In the end, ANC/COSATU/SACP and mass democratic movement 
specialists explicitly avoided a wish-list approach. But this confused some of our 
political opponents, whose first knee-jerk reaction was to condemn our approach as 
fiscally irresponsible. On the contrary, we painstakingly sought to assess and 
encourage the role of the private sector. We considered what firms and financial 
institutions can reasonably be expected to contribute to the programme without undue 
risk, diminished profits or outright losses [...] many of the ideas we came up with in 
workshops and consultations are new and innovative. As a result, precise 
quantifications of the costs and savings are still under way [...] What we are able to 
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say with confidence at this stage is that fiscal and monetary stability can be 
maintained while we implement the most urgent programmes.
70
 
Implicit in discussions of the consultative nature of economic policy was that no firm or 
immutable position was adopted. The constant process of reassuring capital and investors 
prior to the election, rendered economic policy as “evolving” and thus open to negotiation, 
consultation and even correction.
71
 The effect of this was to insert ambiguity and a lack of 
coherence in the ANC’s economic policy positions. As witnessed above, such ambiguity was 
premised on political expediency and allowed the ANC to consult more broadly with key 
stakeholders and allow for greater involvement by public and private interests. The symbolic 
utility of the RDP then, given this dual approach, was that it provided a means for broader 
ownership of the political process while commensurately aiming to provide a safeguard to 
established interests. 
The public sphere was flooded by rhetorical invocation, serious debate and capricious 
conjecture with regard to the RDP just prior to the 1994 election.
72
 Despite attempts to garner 
support around its motivations and purport, the RDP remained highly contested and an 
important “a site of struggle.”73 Moreover, and given that it formed the basis of ANC’s 
election campaign, it came under sustained attack from the NP. As a means to reassure voters 
and observers, the ANC publicity machinery undertook lengthy rebuttals through its election 
press centre. The overarching thrust of these rebuttals was to demonstrate the poverty of the 
NP’s policy capacity given the “unenviable legacy of massive unemployment, homelessness, 
economic decline and unequal education” that it bequeathed on the majority of South 
Africans.
74
 The ANC positioned itself in counterpoint holding that, 
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The ANC is convinced that our plan is realisable, workable and affordable. What 
South Africa cannot afford is one day more of the NP’s misrule, economic 
mismanagement and continuing corruption.
75
 
The RDP’s strength lay not only its vision of material provision through socio-economic 
redress for the majority of South Africans, but also the underlying promise that such redress 
would allow peace and security and the end to the violence that accentuated the process of 
negotiations and transition.
76
 The spectacle of the 1994 election was undergirded by the 
promise of the realisation of these imperatives and enacted through the process of voting. As 
expected, there was a considerable continuity in the grievances begotten by apartheid and the 
ANC had historically been skilful in centring its discourses of contestation on those 
grievances. Such continuity was still in evidence in 1994 and thus allowed the RDP 
significant capital in capturing the social and political imagination of the electorate as the 
elections approached.
77
 
Providing the “symbolic cement”78 that informed protagonists’ discourses of the creation of a 
‘new’ South Africa, the marketing of the RDP was complicit in diluting the suspicion 
accorded to it so that while “before the election it was dismissed as socialist or usually as 
unrealistic, demagogic, populist, [or as] typical election promises”, in the post-election 
period, it came to be accorded a more sanctified status.
 79
 In an interview, then SACP leader, 
Jeremy Cronin elucidated, 
We’ve turned that [image of the RDP] around so that it’s hegemonic, everyone 
genuflects to the initials, virtually everyone genuflects to the initials RDP with 
varying degrees of sincerity of course and with varying agendas, but they’re doing it 
which is important and in doing that, what they’re saying is that housing, job creation, 
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health care, housing people, all of those things are absolute priorities, are things that 
we have to focus the national mind upon.
80
 
Perhaps partly as a response to the euphoria that characterised the commencement of the 
period of transition with the election, in its aftermath, the hegemony that it exerted “began to 
fragment and dissipate” as the realities of governing in national unity became clear.81 Indeed, 
the development vision and redress that the RDP had clearly trumpeted became hamstrung in 
the historical and structural constraints that were the legacy of the apartheid economy. Of 
greater consequence, was the “compromising and tempering [of] the developmentalist vision 
of RDP” in favour of a more orthodox direction.82 Such compromise and temperance would 
set in motion a “struggle over the heart and soul of the RDP” which would have significant 
political implications – even if discursively – that would characterise contemporary South 
Africa’s political economy.83 But it is important to comment on this turn to orthodoxy. 
‘Midwifing’ Orthodoxy 
Tangible evidence of the change in the policy orientation of the ANC was witnessed by the 
re-drafting of key provisions in the RDP in the process of its tabling as a White Paper to 
parliament in September 1994. I have argued above, that the variability in the ANC’s policy 
discourse and the lack of a coherent vision of economic policy had both a political and 
symbolic motivation. Thus, it is important to note that as before, the ANC was required to 
induce confidence to external forces. Noting as much, the 1995 Annual Report of the 
International Monetary Fund noted that, 
It was clear by late 1993 that the most immediate problems facing South Africa were 
confidence related. Consequently, the African National Congress, even before it was 
elected to government in April 1994, voiced its commitment to eschewing policies 
perceived to imperil confidence – interventionist regulation, excessive fiscal and 
monetary spending and confiscatory tax policies – and to strengthen market forces 
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...[but] the most telling signal of the new government’s economic ideology has been 
its broad advocacy of free trade.
84
 
The marketing that the ANC undertook to ‘eschew’ these types of policies was witnessed 
most clearly in the changing language of the RDP. As such, its revision became the site at 
which global orthodoxy and the ANC’s modernising vision met. Its White Paper incarnation 
was marked by a lack of clarity of intent and shifted between a language of transformation 
and implementation. Adelzadeh and Padayachee were thus apt to posit that the WP offers an 
“uneven treatment of various subjects” which makes it “difficult to evaluate the document.”85 
Most striking were the complete removal of any reference to nationalisation and the embrace 
of privatisation that punctuated the document. The need for fiscal responsibility placed 
emphasis on “affordability” and the elimination of “economic factors inhibiting growth and 
investment” and “obstacles” to “private sector expansion” would require urgent attention.86 
The document capitulated to orthodoxy through numerous of ‘signature’ policy provisions, 
particularly on taxation, monetary policy and trade policy.
87
  The disjuncture between the 
discourse of redress and transformation and the practical means sought to secure those ends 
was mediated by a communications strategy that operated on two levels. Firstly, the grammar 
of orthodoxy that punctuated the WP served to allay concerns and build the confidence of the 
investor and financial community in South Africa and abroad. Secondly, and critical to the 
development of ‘on-the-ground’ legitimacy for the RDP through securing the participation of 
the people and ‘communities’ was a campaign that aimed to “build a culture of partnership – 
in which communities have rights as well as responsibilities.”88 Aptly named ‘Masakhane’, 
which translates as ‘Let us build together’, the campaign aimed to capture the ethos of RDP 
and the discursive construction of the mode of governance under an ANC administration. 
‘Masakhane’ segued neatly with the two other rhetorical devices in construction of the 
symbolic South African state, namely ‘Working together” in the pursuit of “A better life for 
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all”. The credence accorded to the use of these devices in the creation of the ‘rhetorical 
republic’ is evident in preface to the first annual survey of the RDP in 1995.89 As Nelson 
Mandela noted, 
Now South Africans can, under the conditions of freedom, work together to make our 
country the land of our dreams. This means further enhancing the freedoms we now 
enjoy; improving the security of citizens at home, in the streets and at work; and 
raising the quality of life of all the people [...] Among the urgent tasks the government 
has set itself is to work together with all citizens [...] This book outlines the concrete 
steps that have been taken thus far, in the long journey towards a better life for all. As 
this account shows, this task is not an easy one. But, working together, in the spirit of 
Masakhane, South Africans are more than capable of realising the good things that 
our beautiful country can offer.
90
 
While these devices served to inculcate in the public sphere the guiding spirit of the ANC’s 
approach to governing, the political motive underpinning their use, as I have argued above, 
was premised on the desire to reduce the perceived statist orientations of the RDP. Indeed, as 
a communications strategy that bridged both the RDP and GEAR, as it ran concurrently over 
both policies’ tenures, the Masakhane campaign sought to encourage active participation by 
the citizenry.
91
 Thus, while it diluted the perception of statism under the RDP, its continued 
operation under GEAR sought to counter the withdrawal of the state and locate agency within 
the citizenry. This will be elucidated in the discussion below.  The ANC-predominant unity 
government was motivated to confer partial responsibility for the progress of the RDP’s 
implementation and transformation drive to the citizenry, as it allowed for the dilution of any 
potential animosity that would be generated from the trade-offs that would have to occur.
92
 
The need to ‘sell’ the programme nevertheless remained an important part of securing 
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legitimacy for the newly installed ANC government and to effect the symbolic beginning of 
true and full reconstruction, development and empowerment. 
Masakhane Campaign 
The RDP, despite the ethical premise of its overarching vision, was beset by numerous 
technical, bureaucratic and administrative problems from the time of its inauguration as the 
framework for the transformation of South Africa. In addition, the lack of coherence and 
clarity that characterised the policy did not lend itself to easing the more pressing constraints 
upon which the RDP began to flounder.  The “big stumbling blocks” together with the 
“[m]istakes” and “shortcomings” that the ANC was ready to acknowledge as hindering the 
transformative effect of the RDP was compounded by the realisation that the populace was 
unable to heed Mandela’s injunction to “roll up [their] sleeves and get South Africa 
working.”93 In this way, Masakhane would aim to give effect to the ‘people-driven’ 
aspiration of the RDP. The core position of the ANC’s developmental vision – that the RDP 
would be people-centred and people-driven – was not immediately realisable. Despite the 
fanfare that surrounded the RDP, it suffered from a lack of publicity, especially in rural areas.  
Noting the failure of the promotional activities and their interconnection to wider problems 
with the document, the RDP suffered from a “communication problem” which fed into a 
“lack of coherence” and thus tempered citizen engagement and interaction with the 
programme.
94
 
Critically, it is evident from the above that there is a link between the publicity function of 
policy and the actual implementation and functioning of that policy. Notably, the 
mobilisation to effect the compact “between government and civil society” that was at the 
core of the RDP’s implementation vision required a communication effort that sought to 
inculcate citizen ‘buy-in’, participation and programmatic execution.95 The political and 
organisational impact of an effective communications strategy was not lost on the ANC. The 
failure to communicate the vision and aims of the RDP effectively generated misperceptions 
on its intent. Increasingly viewed as a “charity” or a series of “ad hoc projects”, the idea of 
the RDP constituting a “partnership” between government and the citizenry “based on 
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responsibility” was not communicated effectively and lost its coherence as the moral-ethical 
(and economic) framework for the remaking of South Africa’s post-apartheid society.96 The 
lack of clear and precise communication resulted in citizen frustration over the speed of 
delivery shortly after the inauguration of the ANC-led administration. Such frustration was 
vented through “land invasions, occupations of empty flats and disputes over rates and 
tariffs.”97 
As a corrective mechanism, “the Masakhane campaign” would lie at the “strategic heart of 
[...] communications”, the aim of which would be to create a “vibrant brand for stimulating 
mass involvement in reconstruction and development.”98 The ANC enjoined its public, 
through its annual 8 January statement in 1997, to actively engage in community 
development activities through the Masakhane campaign, noting 
[...] we are planning Masakhane weekends in the coming months, in which, at the 
community level, throughout the country we shall mobilise people to become 
involved in developmental work - school renovations, community clean-ups, anti-
crime drives, and so forth. We plan to deploy all ANC MPs and MPLs in the process. 
We also plan, through our local councillors, to introduce the practice of participatory 
budgeting at the local level. By this we mean the active participation of communities 
in unpacking local budgets and in setting priorities.
99
 
For the ANC, the communications campaign to ‘activate’ popular participation in realising its 
development objectives formed part of a broader organisational effort to build ANC 
structures ‘on the ground’ and organise its support base so that it would emerge as the 
“organiser of the South African people, the force that mobilised them to become active agents 
of the historic changes that our country needs, the leader of the struggle for a better life for 
all.”100 Empowering the citizenry to be complicit not only in the delivery of social and 
economic goods, but also as part of a longer historical process of ‘liberation’, the ANC was 
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keen to assert its tradition of the ‘collective’ as the agents of change, both within the 
movement and outside it. As such, the imperative to build popular participation in realising 
the objectives of the Masakhane campaign was aimed at according to then Minister for 
Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, Valli Moosa, “promoting a new way of 
thinking and doing things” and reducing the bureaucratic inertia that the RDP would 
experience.
101
 
The ‘newness’ of the approach posited in the rhetoric that enveloped the Masakhane lay not 
in its emphasis on participation and community involvement, but rather that it coordinated the 
programmatic functions of development with a communications strategy that would serve as 
a mobilisation and organisational tool. Quick to acknowledge the perception that the 
campaign would merely be viewed at best as an electioneering stunt and at worst a 
propaganda tool, government publications were keen to assert that “[a] narrow focus on votes 
and associated ambitious promises [are] detrimental to development” and that “[t]he fight 
should rather be for transformation and delivery [and] not votes.”102 In addition to education 
campaigns conducted through workshops and various media, including poster and 
advertisement campaigns, leaflets and pamphlets, the Masakhane campaign aimed to shape 
and inculcate the social and political imagination with the meaning of reconstruction, 
development and transformation through a widespread advertising campaign. While using 
popular forms of media including television, radio and newspapers to communicate and 
promote the programme to a mass audience, there was also a well-co-ordinated and popular 
road-show which “[reached] over 130 communities a month [and provided] an opportunity 
for more detailed explanations and question-and-answer sessions” on the nature and process 
of reconstruction and development.
103
 Indeed, the ‘spectacularity’ of the campaign was 
palpable, 
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Criss-crossing South Africa, it reaches the most remote corners of the country, talking 
to young and old, spreading the message of Masakhane, whilst educating and 
entertaining.
104
 
Aiming to instil legitimacy in its programme of governing and create an image of citizen 
responsiveness in both government and party, the motivation for the ‘psychotechnics’ that 
underlay the communication strategy is clear.
105
 Indeed, the dispersion of campaign activities 
and the messages being communicated allowed leaders from all three levels of government 
(national, provincial and regional) an opportunity to engage directly with the citizenry and 
gave further effect to the mandate of the road-shows of “[f]ulfilling a role as community 
educator” which 
aim[ed] to address expectations and put them in the context of what is achievable; 
deal with fears and perceptions; demonstrate the effects of non-payment from 
different experiences; explain service standards; demonstrate the advantages to 
communities who respond positively to their obligation and change people’s attitudes 
in all communities.
106
 
While Masakhane campaigns posited as their primary aims the need to educate the citizenry 
on service delivery and participation and change attitudes to government administration, there 
was also a clear imperative to “[build] the corporate image of government [and promote] a 
clear set of universal values” while still maintaining the need to “build credibility for the 
reconstruction and development programme.”107 That the various Masakhane campaigns (in 
some cases, ‘Focus Weeks’) operated to market the service delivery and development 
successes of the ANC-led government was evident. But the campaigns were infused with the 
more political motive of ‘selling values’. Noting as much, a Cabinet memorandum posited 
that, 
                                                 
104
 McBlain, 37 
105
 The notion of ‘psychotechnics’ was posited by Schumpeter and cited in Martin Harrop, see chapter two for 
more. 
106
 McBlain, 37. The campaign was constituted of five phases, commencing with a process of “conceptualisation 
and consultation”; then ‘consolidation’ of stakeholder responsibilities and the “mechanisms to coordinate the 
campaign”. This was followed by the “kick-start extension phase” when “capacity-building” and 
‘implementation’ were the focus. The penultimate phase, “the run-up phase”,  preceded the local government 
elections and was used to popularise the elections and would be followed by another “consolidation” phase 
where “the gains made by the campaign” would be “consolidated and the campaign will be evaluated in terms of 
the progress it has made in building self-respect and sustainable community development in targeted areas.” 
However, See McBlain, 35-6 
107
 Department of Constitutional Development: Cabinet Memorandum, 1 
221 
 
The Masakhane campaign is not the only strategy used to promote and strengthen 
good values; it forms part of a value-chain for effecting real and genuine change. 
Throughout the [focus] week the recurring message revolved around the need for 
civic responsibility, community participation and partnerships. These are values that 
should inform all of us when tackling issues such as crime prevention, service 
delivery, payment for services, job creation, moral renewal, etc.
108
 
As such, the Masakhane campaign came to constitute the key communications tool through 
which citizens’ attitudes and behaviours towards reconstruction and development could be 
shaped.  But more than this, it also sought to allow the leadership of the ANC and 
government to play a more public role in the delivery of reconstruction and development by 
making them active participants in the campaigns. In addition, business and parastatals also 
engaged in the campaigns and created an “emerging sense of partnership” that gave credence 
to the idea that “our destiny as South Africans is linked and hence the need to cooperate 
around issues of mutual benefit” by all sectors of South African economic and political 
life.
109
 Keen to assuage charges of the Masakhane campaigns being part of a larger and 
continuous election campaign, an internal government memorandum to the cabinet, notes that 
“the main challenge” was the forthcoming election and that “the issue is how to continue to 
be visible without getting enmeshed into the election politics.”110 
I have noted that the Masakhane campaign’s overall purport was the creation of a values-set 
that would be consonant with goals of reconstruction and development. The remaking of 
South African society would not merely occur though a rendering of spectacle and 
symbolism, but for the fullest transformative effect would require a more entrenched position 
in the social and political body. Such entrenchment was facilitated at regional levels by 
government departments and was inculcated through various training and development 
programmes. In the Western Cape, for example, the Culture of Learning, Teaching and 
Service (COLTS) Campaign was deemed to be “part of a broader mechanism to bring 
massive visibility, urgency and popular participation to the education ministry’s commitment 
to educational quality throughout the education system.”111 As a local initiative operating 
under the Masakhane rubric, COLTS was premised on a “decision [...] to implement a 
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Masakhane project where the community could be involved in transforming the classrooms 
of their schools into attractive spaces where learning could spontaneously take place.”112 
More importantly, signalling the effect of community participation on improving social and 
physical infrastructure of schools, would allow for “their [community’s] culture, traditions, 
environment and history” to be reflected and thereby inculcate a greater sense of “ownership” 
and concomitantly, “self-esteem and community pride.”113   Cynically, it was envisaged that 
instilling these traits within the community would serve to “deter future neglect and 
vandalism” and instead, would “encourage preservation and further creative endeavours.”114 
The discourse emerging from the COLTS programme is indicative not only of the means by 
which Masakhane came to have totemic resonance in the process of reconstructing and 
developing South Africa, but provides an aperture through which to understand the culture of 
governance that was envisaged in the early years after the transition from apartheid. Reducing 
the role of the state and placing emphasis on greater citizen responsibility would give effect 
to the creation of a leaner, more liberal bureaucracy which would play a greater facilitation 
role in development than in its actual delivery. As a guiding framework for the creation of the 
discourses of the state, Masakhane served as an ‘integrating’ mechanism to link the discourse 
of the remaking of a modern South Africa with a broader project of reconstruction and 
development of the African continent.
115
 Widely popularised as the ‘African Renaissance’, it 
came to represent the modernising ambitions of an ANC (and government) administration 
that sought to link South Africa’s liberation with broader continental designs. This will be 
discussed further subsequently. 
For all the professed virtue of participation, development and consultation that undergirded 
the publicity of the Masakhane campaigns, it was nevertheless beset by problems. One of the 
central aims of the campaign was to induce “the resumption of payments for rents, service 
charges and bond instalments” that was incurred in delivery of ‘a better life for all’.116 While 
the Masakhane campaign aimed to give content to the ‘people-driven’ aspirations of the RDP, 
the over-emphasis on payments for services delivered, real or perceived, promoted a narrow, 
economistic view of the campaign.
117
 Leading the charge against this narrow view, the 
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ANC’s Alliance partner, the SACP, cautioned against the “sheer power of capitalist ‘market’ 
ideology” that sought to transform the fundamental premise of Masakhane – namely the idea 
of ‘building together’ – into a mode of governing best captured in the slogan “government 
will deliver, you must pay.”118 Similar sentiments were expressed by a range of civil society 
organisations and the need to “redefine” the campaign became important to realise the full 
extent of its ambitions.
119
 
The Masakhane campaign offered a pointed and strategic platform from which the ANC-led 
state could market its project of reconstruction and development. Despite the investment and 
expenditure on the programme, its overall effects were limited.
 120
 While it gave impetus to 
the means through which ‘development’ was communicated, the actual “delivery of 
development” was a slower and more protracted process. The shift away from active state-
oriented development policies, as witnessed by the concomitant shift from the RDP to 
GEAR, increasingly removed the South African state from the process of development. 
Frustration at elusive of socio-economic provision led some people, particularly in the rural 
areas, to characterise such development as a “tokoloshe” –  the mystical, malevolent dwarf-
like creature –  “as they had heard so much about it but have never seen it.”121 
Of Death-knells 
It would be unfair to characterise the ANC-led government’s entire delivery of development 
as a ‘tokoloshe’. While complicated and constrained by both local and global exigencies, 
there nevertheless was a concerted attempt to realise the prospect of ‘a better life for all’. 
However, while the RDP was marketed as the panacea for apartheid-gotten ills, its 
institutional architecture was insufficient, weak and bureaucratically restrictive. Further, beset 
by a range of capacity and resource deficits, the RDP was increasingly ineffectual at 
promoting swift reconstruction and development. Paradoxically, in civil society itself, the 
‘people-driven’ predisposition of the RDP led to a “[d]isaffection with overconsultation” and 
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“internal dissension within communities snarls up delivery processes, hampering 
government’s ability to implement development projects.”122 
The notion of ‘the people’ would, however, continue to remain at the centre of the ANC’s 
discursive orientation on governance, and also more specifically, would maintain and inform 
the contours of the political culture of the movement. While the RDP purported to 
“institutionalise people’s power”123 the continued adherence to a ‘people-centred’ and more 
importantly, ‘people-driven’ transformation project was seen to give way to an orthodoxy 
that privileged the removal of popular participation from economic and social management.  
The shift from the BD to the WP, and the eventual emergence of GEAR to plug the RDP’s 
macroeconomic holes, came to “reflect a significant shift toward economic pragmatism and a 
less overt pursuit of broad socio-economic development objectives.”124 This discernable shift 
not only had the effect of distancing the ANC from the populace, but also served to highlight 
internal divisions that existed within the ANC, and between the ANC and its alliance 
partners. Indeed, the “splits between the populists and pragmatists” keenly underlay the fault-
lines within the ANC between those advocating “increased spending on Basic Needs “and 
those preferring greater commitment to macroeconomic pragmatism and fiscal stringency.
125
 
I will examine the effect of this rupture in the following chapter. Importantly, this rightward 
shift was underpinned by a concomitant symbolic displacement that witnessed the 
ascendancy of within the ANC of what the SACP would label the ‘1996 class project’ – a 
comprador class of accommodationist leaders that coalesced, and was personalised, around 
the urbane, intellectual, ‘Western’ figure of Thabo Mbeki, South Africa’s second President. 
In the section that follows, I demonstrate that while such accommodation did occur, it was 
part of a more nuanced imperative to modernise the South African economy while not 
capitulating to orthodoxy. Rather, the political marketing of a modernising South Africa and 
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ANC, it should be noted, should be read as an emancipatory project in which prevailing and 
hegemonic instruments and diktats are adopted and negotiated within the particularities that 
obtained in South Africa. The assertion of an (South) African agency within the current of 
hegemonic orthodoxy underpins this emancipatory project in which the ANC aimed to exert 
ownership over the process of economic rationalisation. 
GEAR AND THE MAKING OF MODERN (SOUTH) AFRICA 
The generation and adoption of economic policies represents the advancement of political interests. Economic 
policy has never been a technical, neutral exercise performed by a set of impartial bureaucrats. In the modern 
world, however, its relationship to politics has become even more apparent and explicit. The nature and 
character of economic policy is largely determined by political variables. And its implications are also as much 
political as they are socio-economic. The art of generating and deciding on economic policies is merely the 
continuation of politics by other means.
126
 
The stuttering of the RDP was premised on a range of inefficiencies that beset the programme 
from its adoption. Despite providing the symbolic basis for the ethos of the ‘new’ South 
African state, the implementation of the RDP suffered too from a lack of political will given 
its encumbering of streamlining the apparatus of government.
127
 The constraints on service 
delivery and the lack of sufficient job creation provided a motive for seeking out a more 
stringent and effectual economic policy. The need to ‘recreate’ and modernise the South 
African economy to allow for the swifter provision of social and economic goods was also 
premised on the need inculcate stability and predictability in its operation and management. 
Indeed, the absence of confidence in the intentions of the new administration, despite the 
goodwill that it garnered within both the local and international political and economic 
communities, left the economy vulnerable to the caprice of the international financial 
establishment.
128
 Thus the urgency of needing to stem speculation and instil confidence in the 
ANC’s ability to govern the South African economy motivated a clear shift from the 
prescripts of the RDP. Such confidence would aim to be instilled by through GEAR and 
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through its neoliberal prescripts, the ANC was able to market itself internationally and shed 
any lingering misperceptions of its liberation-era radicalism. 
Embracing Orthodoxy 
This modernising tendency needs to be offset by the economic and political milieu that the 
ANC was confronted with from the time of its unbanning in 1990. Indeed, the embrace of 
economic neoliberalism could be read as an expedient strategy to manage and negotiate the 
prevailing global conjuncture without forsaking the complete “economic sovereignty” by the 
ANC.
129
 The embrace of orthodoxy that characterised the discourse of the change in the 
ANC’s economic policy proposals, needs rather to be conceived as both “accommodation and 
challenge” in which the benefits that accrue from restructuring the economic to engage with 
the global economy is “couple[d] with the ‘concerns about the negative effects of 
globalisation and the resolve to participate in global attempts to reform international 
institutions and regimes.’”130 In mediating (but arguably not eliminating) the “schizophrenia” 
that accompanied earlier efforts at economic policy-making in the ANC, GEAR essentially 
became emblematic of the ANC’s of this dual-process of ‘accommodation and challenge’, for 
as Padayachee has noted, 
[...] while strategies for disengagement and autarkic national development are 
virtually impossible today, the integration of the capitalist economy across national 
boundaries has not entirely rendered impossible the pursuance of strategies 
[Therefore] nation states can to some extent mould and change events and the recent 
changes in the world...have opened up opportunities, as well as set limits or 
constraints.
131
 
The strategy of ‘accommodation and challenge’ was part of a broader political and economic 
approach that characterised the ANC’s “engagement with international developments” for as 
noted by presidential economic advisor, Moss Ngoasheng, 
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If you look at the politics of the ANC, it has always been one of engagement with 
international developments. On the balance of issues, we have found it beneficial to 
engage with the international debates – and hence with the international economy, 
especially because the dynamics of trade and investment were so prominent.
132
 
Such engagement, which led to the privileging of a neoliberal economic policy framework, 
had a longer history within the political economy of South Africa. Indeed, the South African 
political economy’s “exposure to the forces of globalisation did not begin with the unbanning 
of the liberation movement” but rather was intimately engaged with the global economy, 
despite sanctions and embargoes, from the early 1980s.
133
 Given the workings of global 
capitalism and its theorised complicity in fomenting the effects of apartheid’s social and 
material deprivation, acceptance of neoliberal prescripts by the ANC through GEAR would 
come to be seen, especially by its alliance partners, as the continuation of economic 
apartheid. The immense purport of this perceptual and terminological link would be ripe for 
exploitation when internal political and leadership rivalries would mark the ANC. 
Even a cursory reading of the GEAR document would illustrate its conformity with standard 
and prescriptive orthodox economic policy. In counterpoint to the RDP’s language of 
‘democracy’, ‘people’, ‘development’, ‘freedom’, ‘peace’, ‘sustainability’ and the like, 
GEAR was couched in a language of technocracy. Imperatively, in positioning itself a 
“strategy for rebuilding and restructuring the economy” GEAR was conceived as the 
macroeconomic adjunct to the RDP.
134
 GEAR called for a “competitive outward-orientated 
economy” that aimed at a growth rate of six percent and the creation of 400 000 jobs per 
annum over its five year lifespan. Moreover, it called for “several inter-related 
developments”, namely the “accelerated growth of non-gold exports; a brisk expansion in 
private sector capital formation; acceleration in public sector investment; an improvement in 
employment intensity of investment and output growth; and an increase in infrastructural 
development and service delivery making intensive use of labour-based techniques.”135 Its 
more orthodox prescriptions called for “a gradual relaxation of exchange controls; a 
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consistent monetary policy to prevent a resurgence of inflation; a reduction in tariffs to 
contain input prices and facilitate industrial restructuring [...]; tax incentives to stimulate new 
investments; speeding up the restructuring of state assets to optimise investment resources; 
and appropriately structured flexibility within the collective bargaining system.”136 If, as I 
have argued more fully in chapter two, that language functions as a ‘translation mechanism’ 
that mediates political understanding and action, the shift away from the ‘generative 
narrative’ of the RDP to the less dramaturgic and drier register of GEAR, is instructive in 
informing the cultural and political milieu of the democratic period. Moreover, recalling 
Padayachee’s contention in the epigraph of this section, this shift is indicative of the wider 
process of ‘politics by other means.’ 
GEAR also shed light on the nature of the ANC’s trade-off for political power. Indeed, aware 
that the policy would be met with consternation among its allies, the ANC nevertheless 
preferred not to “renege on its side of the implicit bargain” made with domestic and 
international capital in the early 1990s – essentially, a trade-off in which capital’s “continued 
support for the democratic process” would come to be premised on the ANC creating an 
unencumbered macroeconomic environment.
137
 Commenting on the likely reasons for the 
ANC upholding its side of the bargain, Stephen Gelb has posited pertinently while the ANC 
did not initially consider the “destabilising impact of globalisation”, its “hands were 
effectively tied” as “there had been substantial macroeconomic reform in South Africa before 
1994” and action to curtail capital would significantly “damage investor confidence.”138 The 
notion of investor confidence, or market confidence, has been recognised as a “powerful tool 
of political persuasion” and as noted in the discussion above, much of the ANC’s ‘marketing’ 
of economic policy aimed to build such confidence with local and international capital.
139
 
Gelb continues that GEAR aimed, 
[...] to signal to potential investors that government’s (and specifically the ANC’s) 
commitment to the prevailing orthodoxy. In ‘marketing’ the strategy, senior 
Department of Finance officials made explicit its close parallels with the approach of 
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the international financial institutions, while emphasising at the same time that GEAR 
was ‘homegrown’ in South Africa.140 
Indeed, the marketing function of economic policy was imperative to the political fortunes of 
a newly established, democratic South Africa. While premised on the need to avert constraint, 
the utility of GEAR as a marketing tool for the ANC was apparent. Playing into the idea of 
‘accommodation and challenge’, Harris notes too that, 
Because those effects can be both powerful and unpredictable – with changes in 
market confidence leading to sudden large fails in the exchange rate and rises in 
interest rates, as occurred in the first half of 1996, the most significant 
macroeconomic constraint is, in one sense, ‘market confidence’. But it is not an 
immutable constraint, for the government itself and South Africans as a whole can 
influence it [...] South Africa’s growth and redistribution policies, therefore, require a 
firm foundation in explicit attempts to bolster market confidence that are consistent 
with the growth and redistribution objectives. [GEAR] was designed to raise the 
country’s credibility in international markets [...] and in the long term the market’s 
confidence will be determined by what concrete measures are taken to stimulate 
growth, structural change and profitability, for the plan offered little indication of 
detailed measures.
141
 
In acknowledging the constraints of “institutional locations and the balance of power” that 
impact on market confidence, it is important to note that the ANC operated in a global 
economic environment premised on suspicion and mistrust of the liberation movement.
142
 
Again, the motivation for marketing its pragmatism and inculcating in ‘brand ANC’ the 
credentials of rationality and trustworthiness became imperative to its functioning as a 
government. Presidential economic adviser Alan Hirsch, in recalling the experience of 
economic policy-making in the early years of the democratic administration, notes that in 
order to counter such mistrust and the belief that the “markets would second guess them 
whenever given an opening” forced the ANC “to be more conservative than it would have 
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been.”143 Moreover, and as indicated above, in not wanting to forsake its “limited economic 
sovereignty” the ANC paradoxically undertook to implement policies that were conceived 
and sanctioned by international financial institutions. Indeed, “to not get too indebted to those 
who could turn their debt against them, they had to be conservative and pander to some of 
their prejudices.”144 
The need to protect the economic sovereignty of South Africa was a prime political strategy 
of the ANC, and one that was learned from the experiences of liberation in other African 
contexts. GEAR’s orientation around a set of precepts and principles that reflected 
predominant and hegemonic economic rationalities permitted the government to exercise an 
uncommon amount of ‘ownership’ over the details of the policy and manage its 
implementation – a benefit that had not been extended to previous ‘structurally adjusted’ 
countries in Africa.
145
 In “steer[ing] a course that deliberately avoided a relationship with the 
IFI’s [international financial institutions]” the South African government was well placed to 
avoid “conditionalities” and thereby maintain economic and political sovereignty.146 The 
experience of other liberation contexts remained instructive. In an interview, the ANC’s Tito 
Mboweni asserted as much, noting, 
I indicated that the experience of the sixties and the seventies in most post-colonial 
states was that left wing or social democratic governments which followed a reckless 
economic policy found themselves eventually in the hands of the right wing, 
particularly those in terms of structural adjustment programmes [...] And then they 
lose control of that domestic economic policy. It has become clear to us in the studies 
that were done of what happened in the sixties and seventies in particular that it was 
actually in the interests of a social democratic government to pursue very conservative 
macro-economic policies. That ensured that in the medium to long term you maintain 
control of your policy direction and you are in a better position to deliver in the long 
run.
147
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Such realism was apparent for the Finance Minister Trevor Manual, a key architect of 
GEAR’s implementation and marketing. Purporting a more ‘agnostic’ view of the political 
strategy to work within the prescripts of neoliberal economic policy, he asserted that his 
[...] view is the agnostic one that says, [...] ‘This thing is here! It’s alive...Let’s rather 
work out how to deal with it, let’s study the countries who have worked the system 
because they dared to understand it.
148
 
This ‘streetwise’ approach to dealing with the international financial institutions – of the need 
to ‘work the system’ to South Africa’s advantage – is indicative of ANC’s strategic adeptness 
to utilise and re-shape the tools of global orthodoxy and the hegemonic claims its makes, and 
adapt it to local circumstances. Exerting ownership over those tools forms part of the ANC’s 
emancipatory project in which the ANC, and by extension South Africa, would negotiate its 
interaction with the international community on its own terms. In asserting its agency in this 
way, I would contend that the ANC aimed as Aihwa Ong has posited, to bring “the 
refiguration of political logics and spaces” rather than a “totalizing change.”149 Such 
refiguration requires viewing neoliberalism “not as a system but a migratory set of practices” 
and in so doing, a better understanding is obtained of “how its flows articulate diverse 
situations and participate in mutating configurations of possibility.”150 Moreover, it permits 
clarity in understanding Trevor Manuel’s charge of needing to ‘work the system.’ By 
according neoliberalism a fragmentary nature and debasing its hegemonic overtures, a better 
insight is obtained on the political nature of the ANC’s adoption of GEAR within the 
narratives it constructed on liberation and freedom. Moreover, viewing neoliberalism in this 
way also permits an understanding of the duality in the ANC’s marketing discourse between 
liberation-era rhetoric and post-apartheid practice. 
While I have demonstrated above that all antecedent expressions of policy-making by the 
ANC had, at least rhetorically, placed emphasis on consultation and engagement, GEAR 
emerged through an alternative process, without going through traditional ANC and alliance 
structures. Indeed, there was consensus within the economics clusters of government that the 
trade union participation (and moreover, wider ANC participation) in policy input should be 
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circumvented in the event that concessions on GEAR had to be made.
151
 Alec Erwin, who 
along with Mbeki and Manuel comprised the triumvirate of ANC economic ‘tsars’, remarked 
ten years after GEAR’s promulgation that 
[...] we could have managed with a more consultative process and come out with a 
credible policy, but if we’d messed up the GEAR moment, we would have had three 
to four years of exceptionally difficult capital-market conditions.
152
 
The move to circumvent party and alliance participation and formalise GEAR as the defining 
macroeconomic policy of the democratic era would signal the commencement of an extended 
period of ructions within the ANC that would culminate in the “most serious schism the party 
had experienced in its century of existence.”153 While the effect of this will be examined 
more fully in the following chapter, what is of significance here is that the ‘triumph’ of 
GEAR proved instructive in understanding the internal political dynamics in the ANC.  
Indeed, the sidelining of its consultative ethos and removing decision-making capacities from 
popular input did not constitute a ‘grand betrayal’ by the party, but rather demonstrated the 
ascendancy of its “bourgeois and petit bourgeois layers.”154 This impression ran counter to 
the more commonly held view of the movement which “preferred to regard the SACP-
engineered radicalism of the 1980s and 1990s as an intrinsic feature of the organization.”155 
Such a view of GEAR and its effect on the political culture of the ANC also served to 
reorient an understanding of the NDR and its “re-articulations on race, class and 
nationalism.”156 The crux of the argument posited by Hart, and which I have been forwarding 
through this chapter, is that a regressive reading of the ANC’s tendencies obscures a more 
particularistic understanding of the ANC’s political behaviour. Such particularism, however, 
highlights “profound instabilities into the ruling bloc’s definition of the NDR.”157 Such 
instability is premised on nature of the “betrayal” that this revised notion of the NDR 
inculcated. Indeed, as Hart argues, 
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Precisely because official articulations of nationalism are linked to histories, 
memories and meanings of freedom struggles, redress for wrongs of the past and 
visions of the new nation, they are potentially vulnerable to the current counterclaims 
of betrayal. Feeding into these charges of betrayal are, of course, the depredations of 
livelihood for the majority of black South Africans, and the obscene inequalities 
cutting across race lines that have intensified with the (further) unleashing of forms of 
capitalism in the post-apartheid era.
158
 
The reorientation of the NDR and the sense of ‘betrayal’ it occasioned pivoted centrally on 
the reconfiguration of the ‘motive forces’ that would spearhead its eventuation. As Ivor 
Chipkin has posited, this reorientation has privileged the “state and the black bourgeoisie” 
over the “working classes.”159 For the ANC then, or the elite formation within it, GEAR 
represented the culmination of a protracted rhetorical abidance to an “ideology favourable to 
the development of the black capitalist class”160 and came to signal, what Mark Gevisser has 
described as ‘cleansing’ for the ANC of the “three decade aberration” of its flirtation with 
leftist ideology, the “return to the centre” marked a correction in the ANC’s ideological 
tendency.
161
 Thus, rather than view the ANC as a compradorist organisation fulfilling 
Fanon’s lamentations of post-independence liberation movements, I argue that the discourse 
and marketing of the ANC reflects a modernising tendency within the organisation that is 
premised on an assertion of a democratic African agency through the fragmentary 
implementation of a universal neoliberal practice. I will address this issue further below. 
The ascendancy of this class within the ANC accentuated the divisions not only in the policy-
formation process, but also, and concomitantly, within the political cultures of the party. 
Indeed, while GEAR’s ideological orientation created a platform for significant internal 
division, its closeting from institutional policy-making and advisory structures further 
distanced its acceptance and adoption within the party. Conceived of initially to provide the 
macroeconomic foundations for the realisation of the RDP, GEAR’s prescriptions came to be 
a response to the Mexican capital crises in 1995 and the currency crisis that “followed the 
appointment of Trevor Manuel as Minister of Finance.”162 Drafted by a small team of expert 
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economists from the Reserve Bank and the Development Bank of South Africa, the group 
was completed by leading academic economists from South Africa and consultants from the 
World Bank.
163
 Despite the lack of participation in its development, GEAR was presented to 
the executive bodies in the ANC prior to its release. As Lodge had noted, both the National 
Working Committee and the National Executive Committee’s “economic transformation sub-
committee were aware of the document’s contents before its public release.”164 It was 
apparent, however, that these decision making bodies were excluded from input, the 
perception being as Jeremy Cronin noted, that “they were more concerned about the 
shepherding of our consent and agreement.”165 Presented as a “fait accompli” the formulation 
of GEAR spoke to several divergences within the  (perceived) democratic tradition of policy 
making, notably, 
that the ANC’s party-based policy units were by-passed during GEAR’s drafting; that 
alliance consultative arrangements were involved very late in the process more to seek 
endorsement rather than to incorporate alliance partners into the drafting process and 
that at least for this most important of government policy initiatives, policy making 
was a technocratic process, located in the relevant government departments. 
166
 
In reflecting on this ‘technocratic turn’ it is apt to recall the injunction by then ANC DIP head 
Pallo Jordan in 1990, when he argued forcefully that, 
The only way to obviate it [managerialism and technicism] is the sort of political 
culture you have within the ANC. People in the ANC and the sorts of researchers that 
work within the context of ANC policy research are people who consider themselves 
answerable to the people of South Africa, and are reared in a specific political culture 
which always places a great deal of stress on accountability, and also loyalty to a 
certain political perspective. I would say that that, in itself, serves to obviate a very 
technicist, managerial approach. One needs to develop in one’s style, and in policy 
research and its methodology, mechanisms where there is continual dynamic feedback 
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from the mass of the people, so that you don’t move away, or in directions that run 
counter to their interests.
167
 
The disjuncture between maintaining the political culture imperatives of the ANC and the 
technocratic turn was premised on a realpolitik motive of seeing GEAR as the course to 
realise the ends of the RDP. Performing a defence of GEAR in his 1997 budget speech, 
Trevor Manuel promoted the utility of GEAR when he asserted that, 
[T]he RDP is the embodiment of the commitment of this government to the 
elimination of poverty in a rapidly growing economy and in the context of an open, 
peaceful and democratic society. For this vision to materialise, policies must be 
oriented towards the provision of basic needs, the development of human resources, 
and a growing economy capable to creating sustainable jobs. The success of the RDP 
is inherently bound by our ability to generate this development and redistributive 
thrust within a sound fiscal and macro-economic framework. To give effect to the 
RDP in the context of a rapidly globalising and highly competitive international 
environment requires significant change in the path of growth and development. The 
challenge to Government is to align economic policy in a way that will ensure 
acceleration of economic growth and nature improvement in job creation by the turn 
of the century. The policy set out in the GEAR programme was designed to achieve 
these objectives.
168
 
As the opposition to GEAR increased and the realisation of its employment and growth 
projections became increasingly problematic, the ANC were adept to make the link between 
GEAR and the realisation of the goals of the RDP.  In his authoritative account of South 
Africa’s transitioning political economy, Hein Marais posits that this position is not 
incongruous with the overarching purport of economic thinking in the ANC. Indeed, despite 
the RDP’s “timidity” on the macroeconomic provisions for the realisation of its objectives, 
the functional reorganisation of the institutions that would support the RDP indicated 
“consistency in the ANC’s position on macroeconomic policy between 1993 and 1996 or 
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between the RDP and GEAR.”169 Given the “reprioritizing” of budgetary allocations as a 
means to finance the programme, the RDP became subject to ‘fiscal discipline’ until its 
closure in 1996, after which its functions were absorbed into the line ministries and directed 
from the Office of the Deputy-President, Thabo Mbeki, and the Ministry of Finance.
170
 
Mbeki, a key protagonist in defending GEAR pronounced, 
For some strange reason, when work is then done to translate the perspective 
contained in the RDP into actual figures, this is then interpreted as a replacement of 
the RDP by GEAR.
171
 
While its proponents readily purported to demonstrate the relationship between the 
prescriptions of GEAR with the RDP, a more critical interpretation holds that the concessions 
made in terms of the latter (and indeed, the earlier MERG proposals) should rather be viewed 
as “contradictory impulses that sometimes accompany the application of neoliberal 
economics.”172 These impulses, which included the promulgation of a worker friendly Labour 
Relations Act, institutionalisation of corporatist decision-making structures in the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council, and an increases in social and welfare 
spending, played an important role in the process of what Webster and Adler have described 
as “bargained liberalisation” – a strategy in which “prominent groups renegotiate the terms 
on which a country engages with the global economy.”173 Indeed, the nature of the 
liberalisation programme that the ANC undertook confirms Ong’s argument on the 
fragmented nature of neoliberalism and the variable institution of its prescriptions that I noted 
above. 
I have noted the modernising overtones that informed the discourse of the ANC’s defence of 
GEAR. Publicising this defence it was argued that the democratic state was under a duty to 
“harness” globalising capital to work to consonant ends.174 Moreover, there was an awareness 
that the achievement of “a better life for all” needed to be realised “in the most cost effective 
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way” while ensuring efficiency and productivity.175 Underpinning the “historic opportunity” 
that political democracy begot was the modernisation of the South African economy, and as a 
result, the “modernisation of society”.176 An important driver for this process of 
modernisation would be the “democratisation of the economy” to allow for the “economic 
empowerment of the black majority” and thus permit the “nurtur[ing] of the culture important 
to a modern economy.”177 The democratic state would remain central to this project and serve 
as a bulwark against capitalism’s excesses. Defending GEAR rendered the ANC open to 
significant criticism from its Alliance partners and more radical observers. Such criticism 
pivoted around the lack of clarity of GEAR’s prescriptions, its lack of coherence and 
reconfiguring the bases of the NDR.
178
 The tussle for ideological supremacy and policy 
correction between the ANC, the SACP and COSATU was dramatically played out in the 
public sphere. The vitriolic and accusatory nature of the criticisms levelled against each other 
repeated earlier claims to the ‘betrayal’ and ‘selling out’ of the purport of the struggle, 
incipient autocracy in the leadership of the ANC and capitulation to the caprice of economic 
orthodoxy. 
However, as the macroeconomy began to strengthen Thabo Mbeki was able to justify the 
modernising project undertaken. At the ANC’s 2002 Policy Conference, Mbeki opined, 
The progress we have made with regard to our economy has made it possible for us to 
be confident that we can stand up to the challenges posed by the global economy, 
without any fear that we would collapse in the face of these challenges. Instead, we 
transformed an economy that owed its vibrancy to apartheid incentives, protection and 
super-exploitation to one that has the competitive strength and initiative to take its 
place within the global market.
179
 
Indeed, the idea of the South African economy ‘taking its place within the global market’ 
provides an important insight into the ideological orientation of the ANC and broader 
discursive and symbolic project of the African Renaissance that came to orientate its 
government narrative shortly after the transition to democracy. This modernising ethos within 
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the ANC, and its strongly African orientation based on the insertion of African agency into 
the global flow of economic, political, social and cultural practices, challenges the traditional 
conception of modernity and ascribes theoretically to Kwame Gyekye’s position that 
modernity “can be broadly conceived of as an ethos” rather than as “a monolithic set of 
cultural values.” 180 As such, Gyekye argues vociferously that in this conception, 
modernisation does not equate to westernisation. Resonant with the discourses of the ANC’s 
economic policy, he continues further arguing that, 
To be more modern is to demonstrate commitment to bringing about, through pruning 
and refinement or recreation, required changes in the values, practices and institutions 
inherited from the past to a level of sophistication that will augment their functionality 
and relevance to modern (contemporary) life; and to have the capability of spawning 
ideas and practices appropriated from other cultures and employing them sufficiently 
effectively to enhance a society’s innovative capacities and goals.181 
This notion of modernity is entrenched on an historical continuity that aims to accentuate the 
adaptability of, in this case specifically African, societies to respond to prevailing global 
changes. As a challenge to their peripheral status inculcated over centuries of colonial rule, 
the adaptability of African societies to ‘take their place’ as Mbeki noted, within the stream of 
global developments, on their own terms represents a revolutionary manoeuvre that 
challenges orthodoxy. It is acknowledged, however, that such attempts at engagement are 
marked by instability and tenuousness. In the section which follows, I explore briefly the 
contours by which an African modernity gained representational and discursive currency in 
the ANC’s promotion and marketing and demonstrate the link between the modernising 
economic project in South Africa (both the RDP and GEAR) and its larger continental 
inflection. 
Gearing Toward an African Renaissance 
Discourses of an ‘African renaissance’ have animated numerous post-independence contexts. 
Post-apartheid South Africa’s desire to reconstruct and develop the polity under the rubric of 
‘nation-building’ segued with a grander ambition of an African re-birth. ‘Nation-building’ 
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would come to rest on two interrelated foundations: first, the material upliftment of the 
majority of South Africans; which in turn would give impetus to the second, reconciliation. 
Indeed, characterised by the idea of the ‘two nations’ that constituted post- apartheid South 
Africa and defined by the disparity in the socio-economic circumstance between the white 
‘haves’ and black ‘have not’s’’, extrapolating this condition to the continental level and 
challenging its foundation formed the basis upon which the ‘African Renaissance’ came to be 
premised. Indeed, in playing what Kornegay and Landsberg describe as its “motivational 
role”, the renaissance constituted “an emerging ideology of domestic reconstruction and 
development, linked to a more wide-ranging transformation in southern Africa and elsewhere 
on the continent” – in essence, “a pan-African ideology of nation-building and renewal.”182  
As a marketing device, it came to embody the modernising aspirations of a democratic South 
Africa spearheaded by the Mbeki presidency. 
The African nation that the renaissance envisioned was poetically captured in a now seminal 
speech delivered by a then deputy-president Thabo Mbeki at the promulgation of the final 
Constitution in 1996. 
183
 Entitled, I am an African, the speech successfully marketed the 
notion of an African resurgence premised on the construction of a pan-African identity that 
was acutely informed by the confluence of struggles, histories and cultures.  While one’s 
‘Africanness’ would be constructed through the collective struggle for democracy, there is 
also a clear realisation a more modernist tendency to view Africans as ‘individuals’, who are 
the core of the nation. Commenting on this, Chipkin has argued that 
The African in a democracy is a new sort of being. S/he is an individual, free to 
belong to any group s/he sees fit. The democratic nation, therefore, is not simply a 
nation of multiple identities, it is a nation composed of individuals!
184
 
The creation of the modern, African subject is thus underpinned by the development of a 
modern, efficient and industrial economy; the benefits of which would permit, as Mbeki 
noted, the ‘dignity’ of the individual to be realised through an improvement in their ‘material 
well-being’.  While the speech gives discursive ‘shape’ to the creation of a modern African 
identity, it also aimed to represent reconciliation between the precepts of ubuntu – a signifier 
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of a moral-ethical code premised on communitarian principles and altruism – and 
globalisation.
185
 In tracing the outlines of a modern African identity, and noting the 
responsibilities that are associated therewith, Mbeki intrinsically forms a “moral community” 
where there is “a concern for the present and future of a particular local or regional society, 
seeking to add to the latter’s resources, redressing its ills and searching its conceptual and 
spiritual repertoire for inspiration, blueprints, models, encouragement in the process.”186 For 
Mbeki, globalisation – through GEAR and the RDP – would give effect to the needs of this 
community. 
Symbolically, the marketing of the African Renaissance would be underpinned by a political 
ethos that challenged the epithetic notions of ‘backwardness’ and ‘underdevelopment’ and 
informed not only dominant narratives about Africa’s position in the global community of 
nations, but more critically, the ability of Africans to extricate themselves from socio-
economic malaise and positions of disempowerment. The dominant narrative the renaissance 
sought to contest was explicated by Mbeki in a speech in Paris, 
[...] the Continent has no place in the world economy except as a supplier of raw 
materials; there is no requirement the Continent should have access to modern 
technology and contemporary human skills; such socio-economic problems as the 
Continent faces should be contained within Africa and addressed as welfare problems; 
non contribution to human civilisation can be expected from Africa except in the 
fields of the performing or plastic arts; and the natural habitat; and, the Continent has 
no major role to play in the global system of governance.
187
 
Thus, the discourse that flowed through and informed the Renaissance was premised on 
challenging the deeply entrenched notion of disempowerment and induce agency within the 
African subject. Indeed, Mbeki argues that “it is necessary that the peoples of Africa gain the 
conviction that they are not, and must not, be wards of benevolent guardians, but instruments 
of their own destiny and sustained upliftment.”188 In so doing, and in allowing for the 
conditions that would eventuate from processes of modernisation, development and the 
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institutions of transparent governance, there would be a direct “benefit” not only to the 
continent but to the global community as “it would ensure that stable and predictable 
conditions exist in Africa, rationally to order sustained interaction of the rest of the world 
with the globally strategic African resource base.”189 Being thus able to control the terms 
upon which Africa engaged economically with the rest of the world became a central 
imperative to its renewal and marked a rupture with the political and economic relations that 
characterised many post-colonial African states. Continental economic regeneration plans 
would provide African leaders with “a subjective response to the ideological internalisation 
of conditions of inferiority among ourselves, thus signalling a metaphorical break with 
Africa’s own complicity in its oppression.”190 From a political marketing perspective, to 
recall Henneberg postulation in chapter two, the discourse of the African Renaissance 
operates ‘as a narrative model of representation’ in which the ‘embeddedness of politics’ is 
rendered clear. Thus far, I have demonstrated the pervasiveness of the discourse of this 
emancipatory politics and its acute influence in the symbolic process of African renewal. 
Despite the appropriateness of its aims, the renaissance was criticised for its “secular 
modernising” outlook and its “mythologizing” of an African past.191 Moreover, the project 
was marked by two contending interpretations that pivoted on a “globalist” and “Africanist” 
interpretation.
192
 The first, posited South Africa as the “anchor [to] a chain of Darwinian 
economies” and was premised as an incipient and African variant of the “Asian Tigers”, won 
support from South African business who saw the renaissance as opening the frontiers to a 
wider, continental economy.
193
 The second interpretation, the Africanist, “eschew[s] the 
modernising tendency represented by Africa’s encounter with Europe” and argues that the 
while there exists no solid or firm African identity, “there is an identity coming into 
existence.”194 The challenge posited from this perspective, is to negate attempts to 
‘essentialise’ Africa and have its value made contingent upon it “ability to absorb and 
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popularise ideas, trinkets and junk.”195 While these critiques each captured the ideological 
‘fudge’ that enveloped the African Renaissance, it nevertheless opened up a theoretical space 
in which the potentialities of Africa’s development could be debated, discussed and 
disentangled. Indeed, the “inscrutable and unsettled nature” of the project “can permit a 
plethora of alternative interpretations of the future.”196 
The distinguishing feature of this renaissance, as opposed to other nationalist projects for 
Africa’s economic and social emancipation, is that it is spear-headed by the ANC and as 
such, the modernising imperatives in the South Africa obtained a greater continental blush.
197
  
As such, these modernising processes would also serve a “mobilising” function that rendered 
“overt” the “hegemonic function and class character” that underpinned the project.198 Indeed, 
Africa’s renaissance would come to depend on, 
[...] a new proletariat [...] emerging and unionised into new forms of trade unions [...] 
the unbridled flourishing of countless small and medium-sized firms that promise to 
produce a strong propertied class [...] an emerging large urban middle class comprised 
of unionised  workers, teachers, intellectuals, nurses, traders, artisans, civil servants, 
and so on [...]  This section of the middle class should also assume an entrepreneurial 
role, and become a crucial component of economic democratisation and sustainable 
economic growth. The middle class should also be understood and be seen as the 
driving force of civil society.
199
 
But the emphasis placed on the class position of the drivers of the renaissance confirms the 
earlier contention of the ascendancy of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois layers of the ANC. 
The shifting class character of the motive forces of the national democratic revolution, re-
articulated through the discursive history of the ANC, came to provide a fertile arena in 
which various interests in the ANC and alliance aimed to assert their dominance. This shift 
and the embrace of the idea of a modern(-ising) Africa needed to obviate the impression of 
ANC’s complicity in what Patrick Bond has dubbed “shining the chains of global 
apartheid.”200 Indeed, as I have demonstrated in the preceding discussion, modernisation and 
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the adoption of neoliberal economic policies was part of the ANC’s traditional negotiation of 
‘accommodation and challenge’ premised on African agency and self-empowerment. As a 
“call to rebellion”, Mbeki asserted vehemently that 
The African Renaissance demands that we purge ourselves of the parasites and 
maintain a permanent vigilance against the danger of the entrenchment in African 
society of this rapacious stratum with it is social morality according to which 
everything in society must be organised materially to benefit the few.
201
 
That the benefits of a modern economy and modern polity would not lead to elite enrichment 
was a central concern with the modernising project not just at the continental level, but also 
in South Africa. However, and in contradistinction, the ‘second war of liberation’ was 
premised not solely on economic upliftment for the majority, but also as I have noted in the 
preceding discussion, the assertion of black economic empowerment at an elite level to create 
a “new ‘patriotic capitalist elite.’”202 Indeed, as Freund has posited, this elite would be 
fundamental to the creation of a developmental state for the black economically empowered 
constitute, 
[...] an elite that has internalized developmental goals [and that can] navigate the 
waters of corporate South Africa but [stay] fundamentally loyal to the ruling African 
National Congress and [remain] ties to its hegemonic political control of the 
country.
203
 
While this aspect of economic liberation permitted the development of a well-connected, 
influential corporate elite, the excesses that it encouraged in the face of growing inequality 
were reflected upon by Mbeki when he delivered the Annual Nelson Mandela Memorial 
Lecture in Johannesburg in 2006. Highly critical of the entrenchment of “the value system of 
the capitalist market”, Mbeki was apt to proclaim that “when we talk of a better life for all, 
within the context of a shared sense of national unity and national reconciliation, we must 
look beyond the undoubtedly correct economic objectives our nation has set itself” but 
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critically “never allow the market [to be] the principle determinant of the nature of our 
society.”204 Lamenting the trend toward accumulation and materialism, Mbeki proclaimed, 
Thus, everyday, and during every hour of our time beyond sleep, the demons 
embedded in our society, that stalk us at every minute, seem always to beckon each 
one of us towards a realisable dream and nightmare. With every passing second, they 
advise, with rhythmic and hypnotic regularity – Get rich! Get rich! Get rich!205 
For Mbeki, “the deification of personal wealth” needed to give way to “the pursuit of the 
goals of social cohesion and human solidarity” and there remained the need to “integrate into 
the national consciousness the value system contained in the world outlook described as 
ubuntu.”206 The main drivers for this change would come through the ending of the economic 
and social malaise of the majority of South Africans and the promotion of national 
reconciliation. For Mbeki, 
Mere reliance on the market would never help us to achieve these outcomes. Indeed, 
if we were to rely on the market to produce these results, what would happen would 
be the exacerbation of the deep-seated problems of poverty, racism, and sexism and a 
retreat from the realisation of the objective of national reconciliation.
207
 
The political and rhetorical shift towards ‘developmentalism’ that was witnessed in the 
especially from the mid-2000s re-asserted the role of state in the developmental process and 
inserted notions of popular participation and democratic citizen engagement at the heart of its 
developmental vision. This turn towards developmentalism highlights the variegated nature 
of neoliberalism itself, but as a marketing device, operated to re-locate the ANC at the 
intersection of its traditional rhetorical repository of citizen democracy, liberation, 
empowerment and economic freedom in the pursuance of a ‘better life for all.’ A stark 
political motive underpinned this rhetorical re-orientation. Firstly, it validated the ANC’s 
claims that GEAR was a temporary means to shore up the state’s fiscal capacities to be able 
to deliver on its historical mandate, and secondly, this re-orientation was strategically 
important to fend off challenges and criticism that the ANC had digressed too far from its 
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perceived democratic and popular orientation.
208
 In light of the internal ructions within the 
ANC and between the ANC and its alliance partners, the discourse of developmentalism was 
imagined to be necessary device to link the ANC to its more venerable past and re-assert the 
claims of the Freedom Charter. Growing internal strains and challenges to Mbeki’s leadership 
of the ANC, gave this tenuous reading of recent South African politics greater purchase. The 
following chapter will examine critically the exercise of this re-orientation and through the 
lens of the political marketing in the 2009, will demonstrate the political import of this 
discursive change. 
CONCLUSION 
The function of political marketing of economic policy in South Africa was premised on 
inculcating confidence in the ANC and its brand in the international arena, while 
commensurately seeking to build consensus and support within its constituencies in South 
Africa. That this process was fraught with difficulty is evident in the preceding discussion. In 
rendering the content and objectives of economic policy ambiguous, the ANC strategically 
walked a tightrope between contending interests, both inside and outside of the movement. 
The shifting discourses and registers of economic policy prescriptions provide important 
insights into the political culture of the movement balance of forces that constituted it at 
different times in its history. That its political culture is managed by elite-dominated interests 
is evident the longer history of the ANC. However, the discursive and representational utility 
of locating ‘the people’ at the centre of its marketing strategy endowed the ANC with a moral 
and ethical power that rendered it at the centre of the struggle against apartheid. Recourse to 
history, memory, and the very politics of remembering not only provided textures of the 
ANC’s brand identity, but also sanctified its mission and purpose of delivering ‘a better life 
for all.’ The means to obtain that better life was highly contested and as such, economic 
policy became a site of intense struggle. Moreover, the modernising imperatives of the ANC 
provides further insight into its adaptability and the internal balance of forces and as 
evidenced in the discussion above, provides a nuanced understanding of the terrains of a 
democratic South Africa. The extent to which this modernising imperative stands in 
counterpoint to the ANC’s overarching goal of political, economic and social liberation is 
debatable. In the discussion above, I have demonstrated that the fragmentary nature of the 
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neoliberalism as applied in South Africa opened a space in which ANC both accommodated 
and challenged prevailing orthodoxy. As such, this space also permitted assertions of self-
empowerment and renaissance at the national and continental level. 
The discussion above provides an important insight into the interaction between political 
marketing, political culture and economic policy. Indeed, rather than focus on its 
‘psychotechnic’ qualities I have demonstrated the means why which marketing is utilised to 
create a narrative of government and endow it richly with symbolic meaning. Indeed, such 
symbolism is put into service in the creation of the symbolic foundations of the South African 
state. Focusing on the ‘high politics of government’, I have demonstrated here the broader 
utility and applicability of political marketing and expanded the boundaries of its functional 
remit to include periods outside elections. But I have demonstrated too that these periods are 
intensely political and the marketing that occurs here – and the politics that underpins it – 
critically inform the discourses and representational strategies of election campaigns. The 
very spectacularity of the election campaigns, I contend are indebted to the ‘high politics’ 
discussed here. The robustness of such politics is complicit in informing such spectacularity 
and the marketing associated therewith. It is to this that the following chapter now turns. 
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7. 
SIYANQOBA: 
SPECTACLE AND THE ELECTION OF 20091 
**************** 
The 2009 general election signified a critical moment in the democratic life of post-apartheid 
South Africa.  As the culmination of a protracted phase of highly divisive internal battles, the 
election and the campaign that preceded it, demonstrated the continued unity and strength 
that the ANC was able to display in the public and political spheres of contemporary South 
Africa. Centrally, and written into the creation of the spectacle, was the (re-)turn of the ANC 
to perceptions of its more popular, bottom up and engaged nature and signalled a 
reorientation to a more venerable and traditional form of organisation that Mbeki’s 
modernising tendency disrupted. This chapter focuses on the notion of the campaign as 
spectacle in the democratic political sphere and as such, the means by which it functioned in 
capturing the popular public imagination and locating the ANC at the centre of 
representations of political life in South Africa. As will be demonstrated, the ANC was highly 
adept at utilising the theatrics of election campaigning and undertook a consistent 
performance that was premised on the adept use of its heritage, personality, history of 
struggle and the capriciousness of popular culture to inform the overall topography of its 
campaign. An intensive, well-coordinated and professional campaign that neatly blended the 
ANC’s traditional approaches of community mobilisation, activism, publicity and promotion 
with new and innovative technological methods, the ANC was able to commandeer the 
political space and mark its hegemony in the political life of the country. 
In analysing the campaign as spectacle, this chapter disentangles the notions of the 
spectacular and demonstrates the means by which public political life in South Africa came to 
be deeply influenced by theatricality, performance and carnival. The first part of this chapter 
revisits the discussion on spectacle in chapter two and highlights and develops the framing of 
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certain key features that are pertinent to understanding its application as a lens through which 
to understand the ANC’s campaign. Locating the election within a particular political milieu, 
the second part of this chapter briefly sketches the key outcomes of the political events that 
preceded the campaign. This discussion is important for it provides an insight into the 
balance of forces within the ANC and the strategic utilisation of actors, culture and ideology 
as a means to garner support. Moreover, it demonstrates the development of the roots of 
spectacle and locates it within the strategic positioning of Jacob Zuma, and political support 
for him and the ANC, in the political market. Section three examines the calculus of the 
election campaign itself. In doing this, I demonstrate the political utility of spectacle and the 
expediency that underlay the discharge of spectacular acts and performances. Further, in 
unpacking the various strands that inform the creation and utilisation of spectacle, I 
demonstrate the various means by which the ANC was able to capitalise on its struggle 
history while simultaneously, capturing the popular imagination through the adroit utilisation 
of contemporary popular culture to target relevant constituencies. Moreover, the campaign 
performed acts of remembrance, sanctification and highlighted notions of embodiment and 
personality that informed the campaign narrative. The interplay between its ‘cultural’ and 
professional approaches to the campaign provides an important insight into the negotiation 
between its liberation movement and modern political party identities. While these identities 
overlap, they nevertheless are an important heuristic in understanding the politics and 
marketing of the ANC. 
 At the outset, it is necessary to caution against the assumption that the ANC encountered a 
passive, uncritical electorate. Indeed, Tim Cohen is correct in cautioning against the view that 
the majority held “some sort of deep, historical and cultural affiliation that goes beyond 
politics [...] rooted in the notion of liberation politics, and the supposed enduring gratitude 
‘the masses’ show towards the liberation party long after it is technically due.”2 A range of 
statistical evidence supports this position.
3
 However, the significance of, and recourse to, the 
inscription of memory, heritage, personality and the like are integral parts of the cultural 
presence of the ANC in the political sphere and thus still central to the public performance of 
its power. But in acknowledging the continued relevance of “struggle theatre” – 
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performances of obeisance to the “historical narrative” of liberation – there is a similar need 
to “look behind the curtain” so as “not to confuse the public performance with what is really 
going on behind the scenes.
4
 The thrust of this chapter aims to thus balance the continued 
operation of such ‘struggle theatre’ with the pragmatics of election campaign management in 
the creation of a marketable political product. Such balancing is also instructive in providing 
witness to the shifting organisational identity of the ANC and the means by which it operates 
between its liberation movement and political party incarnation. In addition to this, the 
discussion that follows unpacks and engages with the complexity of the election campaign 
and the spectacle that it constitutes in the political sphere. 
FRAMINGS: ELECTIONS AS SPECTACLE 
While it is a truism that elections constitute the essence of democratic political life, they also 
function as important cultural events which reflect the “singular coming together of history, 
opportunity, circumstance, tradition, personality, political culture” in the life of a polity.5 The 
‘ritualistic’ imperative elections possess for the exercise of democracy signifies “one of the 
fundamental forms through which democratic societies constitute and express their nature, 
and they are connected reciprocally to the civil, moral, economic, mythic and other forms that 
create the public and private faces of every culture.”6 Such a ritualistic imperative is 
underpinned by an implicit symbolic dimension in which the “management and appropriation 
of meanings” is central to the contestation of the political sphere.7 Symbolic meaning 
resonates along and through a number of poles, but is given greater coherence and 
“relevance” when related “to everyday lives, frustrations [and] successes.”8 Thus, the 
enactment of this relevance by a candidate or party is endowed with greater credence when it 
is able to address not only the material bases of the social milieu, but also when it is able to 
articulate the “ideologies, values [and] moral stances” of the electorate.9 As such, the 
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meaning ascribed in symbols is “diverse” and “often conflicting” as they relate to “integral 
aspects of specific material and social situations.”10 
The construction of the spectacle harnesses the inherent meanings of symbols to act as “both 
[..] systems of signification that publicly represent[s] a regime’s understanding of dominance 
and community and as functional strategies to enforce dominance and construct 
community.”11 As such, the proliferation and entanglement of spectacle into the exercise of 
power in modern regimes has led to the emergence of what Guy Debord has called the 
“society of the spectacle” in which it “can frame the agenda of a ruling class and preside over 
that class’s constitution.”12 Exacerbated in the modern era by the advance of capitalism and 
the mass media specifically, “[t]he spectacle [...] is a social relationship between the people 
that is mediated by the image” and where the image is “a weltanschauung that has been 
actualized, translated into the material realm – a world view transformed into an objective 
force.”13 At the core of this social relationship is the investiture in the ‘dramatic’ where there 
is a tendency toward “brazen, exhibitionist, openness.”14 Indeed, the South African scholar 
and writer Njabulo Ndebele has explicated that the spectacular, 
documents; it indicts implicitly; it is demonstrative, preferring exteriority over 
interiority; it keeps the larger issue of society in our minds, obliterating the details, it 
provokes identification through recognition and feeling rather than through 
observation and analytical thought; it calls for emotion rather than conviction; it 
establishes a vast sense of presence without offering intimate knowledge; it confirms 
without offering a challenge.
15
 
It is clear that election campaigns, both in their entirety and their multiple constitutive acts, 
function within such an understanding of spectacle. Indeed, as a highly public performance, 
they are premised on the desire to “dramatise aspirations” and further lend credence to the 
symbolic “display of power” by the enactor.16 The centrality of spectacle thus lies in the 
“predominance of appearances”.17 While these appearances are premised on the ability of the 
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spectacle to “[manifest] itself as an enormous positivity”18 they also serve a specifically 
“Foucaultian” imperative of being able to “discipline participants and organise them for the 
physical enactment of ritual gestures, regimenting their bodies into an order that both 
symbolizes and prepares for political obedience.”19 This disciplinary remit, I would argue, is 
demonstrated unevenly in the context of the ANC’s election campaign in 2009. While 
‘disciplining’ occurred within the moral-ethical parameters of the democratic ethos of the 
campaign, there operated too more subversive acts and “instantiations of [...] power.”20 In a 
sense, certain acts were lent greater legitimacy given the political and social milieu in which 
they operated. This will be explored further below. 
Further, the analysis of the campaign which follows acknowledges the theoretical insights 
proffered by Murray Edelman in his now seminal work on the subject entitled, Constructing 
the Political Spectacle. Edelman argues that political spectacle is premised on five vectors: 
social problems; political leaders; political enemies; political news; and the interconnection 
between political language and political reality. In augmenting the theoretical contours of the 
notion of spectacle posited, these vectors further serve to inform the analysis in this chapter 
as they provide important markers through which the symbolic and performative 
constructions of the spectacle are undertaken. It is important to note that the spectacle 
operates both “visually and audibly”, they 
anchor [...] politically significant ideas and self-conceptions that might otherwise 
remain fluid and abstract. They ground political thinking in images and symbols the 
regime puts forth, framing the way people see themselves as citizens, much as 
advertising offers people a frame in which they manage themselves as consumers.
21
 
The symbolic impetus underscoring the construction of the spectacle, as well as the attendant 
visual and audible components of its constitution, have led to the increasing characterisation 
of politics as a “play” in which “[t]he constant interweaving of fiction and reality” makes the 
enacting of politics a ‘performance’ in ‘“theatre of everyday life.’”22 Such a conception, 
while useful for understanding the enactments of electioneering, does require clarification. 
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Whereas spectacle is concerned with the representational sphere of politics, performance 
according to Askew provides a “forum for reconfiguring social relations.”23 As such, 
performance also “may contain an intrinsic element that makes it a particularly important tool 
for political action.”24 Such importance lies in the “communicative interaction” that is 
undertaken through the performance and which serves to “[bind] the audience to the 
performer” in what has been described by Bauman as the “enhancement of experience.”25 
The impasse between the aims of the construction of the spectacle and the ‘actionable’ logic 
of the performance is overcome by foregrounding the bifurcated nature of election campaigns 
in which they are deeply entangled both in a representational grammar and the construction 
of a material reality. In straddling both the spectacular and the performative, election 
campaigns display elements of constituting  an interactive, ‘conversational’ exercise bounded 
temporally and spatially with a symbolic and representational oeuvre.
 26
 In this way, one is 
able to transcend the clear demarcations of performance which Schieffelin posits as, 
[...] actions more than text: with habits of the body more than structures of symbols, 
with illocutionary rather than propositional force, with the social construction of 
reality rather than its representation.
27
 
Such transcendence therefore gives impetus to problematising election campaigns as 
encapsulating, as Askew notes, both the “power of performance and the performance of 
power.”28 In this way, it becomes imperative to view the election of 2009 as a campaign 
heavily enmeshed in creative modes of representation – dance, gesture, song, posters, and the 
like – together with “elements from history, performance practice, social values, and shared 
experiences.”29 
As noted, this framing is useful for conceptualising and understanding the strategic political 
behaviour that marked the political sphere just prior to and during the 2009 election 
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campaign. The period prior to the election was marked by tremendous fractiousness, dissent 
and animosity within the ANC. Thus, to understand the import and richness of the ANC’s 
discursive and representational overtures in the campaign, an understanding of this political 
environment in necessary. My aim, however, is not to recapitulate in detail the events of that 
period. A significant body of scholarship, analysis and even conjecture exists on it. Rather, 
my analysis draws on four significant features of the period which highlight aspects of the 
ANC’s political marketing and the behaviour of key actors in the political sphere. These 
features relate to the support of the alliance partners for Jacob Zuma; the need to instil 
confidence through policy continuity; the disruption of the ANC’s brand with the emergence 
of a splinter political party, the Congress of the People (COPE); and finally, the rise of 
ethnicity to mobilise support. 
AFFLICTIONS OF THE POST-COLONY 
Ferment 
The catalyst for the internal ferment in the ANC was the ‘release’ of Jacob Zuma from the 
Deputy-Presidency of the Republic on allegations of his involvement in fraudulent and 
corrupt practices relating to a multi-billion Rand arms procurement deal. The  “mutually 
beneficial symbiosis” between Zuma and businessman and confidante, Schabir Shaik served 
to cast a pall over Zuma given the latter’s conviction for fraud and corruption emanating from 
a multi-billion rand arms deal in which he acted as an intermediary between European multi-
national companies and various South African interests, including, importantly, the 
government.
30
 The findings against Shaik permitted corruption charges to be laid against 
Zuma. A backlash eventuated as the ‘release’ represented an apposite political moment for 
the liberation of pent up anger, frustration and “discontent within the core constituencies and 
alliance partners” towards the hegemonic powers of the Mbeki administration.31 An early and 
potent manifestation of this sentiment was effected through “an open ANC grassroots 
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rebellion” at its 2005 National General Council against Zuma’s dismal from the deputy-
presidency of the ANC. The political utility and significance of the ‘figure’ of Zuma as 
representing a challenge to incumbency began congealing. 
Discontent within the ANC centred on numerous organisational and ideological premises.  
Marked by “generational turnover and careerism” there was a slide away from the “respect 
for conventions and authority in the movement”32 coupled with the “cancer” that saw the 
ANC as a vehicle for accumulation and “access to resources.”33 Moreover, its ‘cadre 
deployment policy’ in business, state and para-state institutions, together with charges of 
ethnic (Xhosa) favouritism, eased the establishment of neo-patrimonial networks and bonds 
of loyalty to the political gentry. This was exacerbated with the locus of power centralised in 
the Union Buildings, the seat of the Presidency, rather than at ANC headquarters in Luthuli 
House. The cohesiveness of the ANC was whittled down further by the dissonance over 
economic policy that I noted in the previous chapter.
34
 Recalling the ‘non-negotiable’ manner 
in which GEAR was constituted increased criticism was levelled against Mbeki’s leadership 
and the incipience of the “zanufication of the ANC”, and a “bureaucratisation of the 
struggle.”35 In addition, the process of “demobilisation” 36 of the ANC’s grassroots during the 
period of transition and the concomitant “streamlining of [its] operations”37  and modernising 
of its structures in the mid-1990s set in motion the tension between its liberation movement 
and political party identities.
38
 
Given the nature of these discontents, a repository of collective tension, social and economic 
marginalisation and ethnic relegation could be accessed in constructing the spectacle. Indeed, 
the invocation of social problems in its construction serve as “reinforcements of ideologies” 
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and “signify who are virtuous and useful and who are dangerous and inadequate.”39 Social 
problems also manifest in political discourse so as “to assign blame and praise” and as such, 
becomes a site of “intensif[ied] polarisation”.40 Indeed, central to fomenting opposition of the 
Mbeki administration, was a discourse of betrayal that centred on the displacement of the 
RDP, as a manifestation of the Freedom Charter, by GEAR, and the rupture that it effected on 
the telos of the ANC’s claim to political, economic and social liberation.41 In positioning 
Mbeki as a threat, opposition from COSATU, the SACP and elements within the ANC, 
succeeded in “presenting [Zuma] as another of Mbeki’s victims” and thus perceptively 
allowed for Zuma to be “linked with the imagery of resistance to inequality.”42 Locating this 
resistance in the figure of Zuma served to personalise the fissure between “working class and 
[...] pro-capitalist policies” and set the basis for a confrontation between their respective 
embodiments in Zuma and Mbeki.
43
 
Political marketing would be imperative in this construction. While the political environment 
was ripe for exploiting the fissures mentioned, survey evidence prior to his release indicated 
that Zuma did not enjoy the wholesale support from union members.
44
 Thus, his ‘man of the 
people’ image became a “myth” that gained greater currency in the narrative that was 
constructed around Zuma.
45
 The ANC’s alliance partners duly informed the myth as Zuma 
became the conduit through which they could contest the incumbent ‘1996 class project’ that 
oversaw the institution of neoliberal economic policies and their sidelining in decision-
making structures and assert greater influence over the leadership of the ANC.
46
 Advocating 
for a greater distribution of the “democratic dividends”47 of liberation, the alliance partners 
were imbued not only with a capacity to mobilise a large membership, but were also more 
calculating in that they were “instrumental in revitalising ANC branches” just prior to its 
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National Conference in Polokwane in December 2007.
48
 Aware that the ‘Polokwane 
conference’ would be the central moment in which Zuma’s leadership challenge would be 
asserted, the SACP and COSATU undertook a “massive recruitment drive” so as to “feature 
prominently in branch delegations to the conference and so influence the leadership 
nomination process.”49 Noticeable growth in the rural provinces of the Eastern Cape, 
Kwazulu Natal, the Northern Cape and the North West demonstrated not only the shifting 
bases of political and class support, but also the success of Zuma’s ‘pro-poor’, pro-working 
class branding. This branding functioned largely to inform the creation of the spectacle to 
[...] make a complex and largely unknowable social world understandable [...] 
Leaders are ready symbols of good or evil, while historical trends, social conditions, 
relations of production, and modes of discourse are not. Leaders become 
objectifications of whatever worries or pleases observers of the political scene 
because it is easy to identify with them, support or oppose them, love or hate them.
50
 
While organisational and ideological divergences underscored the contest between Zuma and 
Mbeki, it was framed discursively as the “battle for the custodianship of ANC values and 
traditions.”51 Imperatively, the need to re-assert the mass character of the ANC and return it 
to its popular roots among the people – “biased towards the working class and poor” – 
accessed the historical narrative that sought to resurrect the telos of the movement toward the 
realisation of national liberation that the Mbeki years disrupted.
52
 
I contend that Polokwane signified a more symbolic potentiality than a material one, where a 
new “leadership style” rather than “a major policy shift” was the central outcome.53 The 
policy changes were themselves symbolic, as the ANC aimed to scale-back and directly 
counter the ethos of governance that characterised the Mbeki administration. Aiming to 
signify a more open, consultative and democratic style of governance, greater credence was 
accorded to a “reaffirmation of the Freedom Charter” and the prescripts of the developmental 
state.
54
 In the aftermath of his victory at Polokwane, Jacob Zuma needed to tread a careful 
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path.  Indeed, victory did not mitigate the divisiveness that he and his supporters represented 
in the South African political sphere, but also his embrace of ‘ordinariness’ and the populism 
that it sprouted, created nervousness within the domestic and international financial 
community. The rhetorical commitment to continuity that marked the interregnum between 
the policy conference and the election campaign nevertheless lent itself to an empirical 
disjuncture in the political sphere. Indeed, while the animosity expressed against Mbeki’s 
stewardship of the economy became the prism through which opposition his leadership was 
mobilised, especially by alliance partners, in the post-Polokwane period the ANC took to 
validating those very policies. Indeed, writing in the online newsletter, ANC Today, Zuma 
and the ANC provided a rationale for the institution of Mbeki’s economic policies, 
The ANC adopted a macroeconomic framework and a fiscal stance capable of 
withstanding tough times and protecting our economy and our people during times of 
global economic turbulence. Our policy decisions have sometimes been controversial, 
but if our economic policies were designed for their populist appeal, if we tried to 
finance everything, at once, for everybody, then short-term gains would quickly give 
way to long-term misery.
55
 
The ANC’s record of pragmatism and rationalism in government needed to be asserted given 
its alliance with now increasingly dominant left-wing movements. That pragmatism was 
intimately connected to both Mandela and Mbeki. In an interview with London’s Financial 
Times, Jacob Zuma was keen to impress the importance of continuity and downplay the 
significance of the events at Polokwane. Keen to note that both Mandela and Mbeki were 
supported by the trade union movement and SACP, and thus the continuity and tradition of 
support to the ANC, Zuma posited the collective foundations of the decision-making, holding 
that 
I actually fail to understand why people think then that Zuma’s going to come with 
some funny thing. You know, ANC is a very particular organisation in dealing with 
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the issue of policy – very particular, very clear. No individual can then come and 
change it.
56
 
The ANC united around this position expressly reasserting the “collective” nature of policy-
making which aimed to establish confidence in its governance directives by such 
reassertion.
57
 Indeed, the ANC as ‘collective’ needed to be asserted against the backdrop of 
Mbeki’s recall from his ‘deployment’ as the President of South Africa in light of findings that 
there had been “executive interference in the independence of the prosecutions authority” and 
which rendered further legal action against Zuma “invalid.”58 Casting a serious pall over the 
institutions of state, the findings did not exonerate Zuma completely, but did entrench the 
notion of victimhood upon which he marketed himself. 
The tremendous animosities that characterised relations within the ANC in late 2008 had both 
political and marketing significance. The splintering of the ANC and the formation of the 
Congress of the People, from a cohort of leaders aligned to Mbeki, did much to disrupt the 
brand identity of the ANC. As noted in chapter two, branded political parties not only 
inculcate a sense of community but are an important repository of meanings, affections and 
values that provide an aspirational vision of ‘the good life.’ The split with COPE, especially 
given the proximity of its personalities with the ANC’s history and traditions of struggle 
provided a significant foil to the ANC’s claims to the ownership of the struggle against 
apartheid and thus its narrative of being the ‘sole and authentic’ representative of the interest 
of the people in the democratic era. COPE was able to make claims on the historical, 
traditional and mythological heritage of the ANC and thus, according to Susan Booysen, it 
was able to “shake the ANC at its roots.”59  Indeed, its very name, the Congress of the 
People, was used to stimulate and invoke the significance of that historical moment. It was 
not unopposed by the ANC. The seriousness of its claims to ownership of history was evident 
in legal proceedings it initiated to prevent the use of the name, Congress of the People. The 
basis of the ANC’s contention pivoted on the issue that the event of the COP in 1955 “lives in 
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the hearts and minds of the people and due to its involvement in the historic event, forms an 
integral part of the goodwill the ANC has.”60  As such, the “use of the name conveys to the 
public a false message through which COPE will unfairly attract voters to the detriment of 
rival political parties.”61 Despite arguing that the name communicates a “false message” to 
the voter, the court found that COPE’s intention to “campaign on the basis that it seeks to 
uphold the principles of the Freedom Charter” did not mislead the voter in believing that it 
was the “sole heir and upholder of the ideals originated in the 1955 Congress.”62 Indeed, the 
court put trust in the ability of the “reasonable voter” to distinguish between the political 
events of 2008 and those of 1955.
63
 Finding in favour of COPE, the judge also asserted that 
COPE’s registration as a political party did not give it an ‘exclusive’ right over history and 
the event and as such, did not constitute an “unlawful competition.”64 
The arguments raised by the ANC in the court, and the foundations of those arguments, are 
revealing. Indeed, in asserting the ‘goodwill’ argument above, there is an implicit claim on 
history and assertion over the ownership of the event. More importantly, it also articulates a 
very specific and narrow narrative of the event, feeding into its mythic status of political 
resistance to apartheid. In attempting to protect these claims, the ANC in effect aimed to 
define and locate itself at the centre of historical and contemporary political life and render 
null any formation that invoked and challenged the hegemonic foundations of those claims. 
In a sense, the historical capture of the ‘hearts and minds’ of the electorate needed to be 
protected from any undue challenge as it sought to “prove that there is no alternative to the 
ANC.”65 The emergence of COPE served to bunker the ANC on the one hand, by continual 
reflection on the venerable aspects of its history, and on the other, by attacking its perceived 
enemies. Edelman has argued that in the creation of the spectacle, “in constructing [...] 
enemies and the narrative plots that define their place in history, people are manifestly 
defining themselves and their place in history as well; the self-definition lends passion to the 
whole transaction.”66 
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The political campaign waged by Zuma and the alliance prior to the election was significant 
for a fourth reason: it was underpinned by a strong ethnic dimension. Indeed, a tension 
emerges in analysing the politics of this period in South Africa. While Polokwane represented 
rhetorically, to some measure, a return to a more venerable and democratic tradition within 
the ANC, it needs to be offset with the greater mobilisation of ethnicity to give effect to his 
political cause. In understanding the emergence of the ethnic dimension within the ANC, Ari 
Sitas has argued that rather than being seen as a “primordial return to ‘traditionalism,’” it 
emerged as a result of the process of “horizontal decentralisation” of local authorities and its 
impact on the organisational and political culture of the ANC.
67
 Such decentralisation had the 
effect of centring “class struggles and competition” within branches and was compounded by 
the emergence of “loyalty and authoritative obedience.”68 
The “language of populism” filtered into the strong sense of ‘Zulu-ness’ that Zuma asserted.69 
Characterising these cultural assertions is, however, problematic, for rather than asserting 
‘Zulu culture’ it was a “Zuma culture” that came to be foregrounded.70 The appropriation of 
this ‘Zulu-ness’ and its condensation in the figure of Zuma served to stoke an ethnic 
“solidarity” that was both limited and exclusionary.71 Whether through the performance of 
song, dress or testimony provided in Zulu at an earlier rape trial – enlivening the spectacle –   
Zuma “his marshalling of Zulu identity [...] can be interpreted as a contemptuous reaction to 
the intellectualism and worldliness of Mbeki and his inner circle.”72 The circulation of the 
‘100% Zulu boy’ marker in the political sphere served to popularise the ethnic appeal of 
Zuma at a base level. More than that, by entrenching the notion of ‘Zulu-ness’, Zuma 
effectively rendered silent opposition and criticism for this “ethnic ontology” served as an 
exclusionary mechanism to non-Zulus.
73
 
The invocation of this notion of ‘Zulu-ness’ and the political utility with which it was 
disbursed in the public sphere was a ‘contaminated’ version of ethnicity, culture and tradition 
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that served a distinctly political purpose. Indeed, it was a notion of ‘Zulu-ness’ that was 
“devoid of history or dignity” and placed “hope and leadership [in] an ‘authoritative 
other.’”74 The recourse to a shallow ethnicity and rise of “grassroots authoritarian populism” 
reflected a wider move towards an “incipient political culture of coercion and violence 
couched in the rhetoric of revolution and liberation struggle.”75 The effect of this new 
political culture was to limit the space of opposition to Zuma and the new administrators of 
the ANC, and locate it within a discursive and representational oeuvre that stood at odds with 
the more popular and democratic aspects of its organisational personality. 
The significance of these developments pre- and post-Polokwane lie in their political, 
organisational and cultural resonances. Indeed, Polokwane became the moment at which the 
alliance partners reasserted their influence in the ANC and were complicit in the process of 
rebranding Jacob Zuma with a popular inflection. Able to assert such influence after years of 
contest that emerged from the inception of GEAR, alliance support for Zuma fed into and 
supported narratives of popular support and democratic participation. The rhetoric emanating 
from the ANC at this time is marked by incongruity and dissonance for while Mbeki was 
demonised by oppositional forces, for reasons of confidence and continuity, the organisation 
was keen to assert its continued adherence to the policies that his administration inaugurated. 
Ructions in the political sphere accorded a duty on the ANC to assert its cultural presence 
within the body politic. The ANC’s historical ownership of the struggle and the legitimacy 
that flowed to remake a democratic South Africa was threatened by the emergence of COPE, 
who discursively aimed to exercise similar claims to the organisational history and heritage 
of struggle. As a marketing device, the turn to an ethnic mobilisation strategy was a response 
to latent insecurities in the political sphere. Contrary to the formal position of the ANC to 
eschew ethnic allegiance, political expediency triumphed over organisational tradition. 
Segueing with the branding of Zuma as a man of the people, the ‘invention of ethnicity’ 
accessed a shallow and base understanding of Zulu-ness. The campaign that followed at times 
confirmed and denied aspects of these observations. 
Given the animosities that punctuated ANC politics in the years preceding the campaign, a  
December 2008 survey by the firm IPSOS-Markinor , just after the formal launch of COPE, 
indicated nearly “half of ANC supporters [felt] uneasy about the events which took place at 
Polokwane” and felt that the “ANC was a different party in the aftermath of the 
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conference.”76 In light of the ANC’s dominance in the electoral and political realm, it would 
be easy to conceive of an uncritical electorate. Rather, studies on party identification 
demonstrate that despite initially high levels of identification, understandable given the 
import of the 1994 elections, by 2008, “40% of the electorate were not overtly loyal to any 
particular political party” and there was a sizeable decrease in loyalty to the ANC over the 
same period.
77
 As a result, there was a greater pool of voters “open to persuasion” and this 
provided the impetus to  political parties, and the ANC in particular, to undertake a well-run, 
convincing and efficient campaign.
78
 That it would constitute a spectacle is rendered clear in 
the discussion that follows. 
THE CALCULUS OF SIYANQOBA 
We are preparing for war elections...
79
 
The 2009 election represented a key moment of affirmation in the life of the state and the 
ANC. As the foundation of democratic life, elections are an enactment of democracy and 
characterised as “a contemporary version of a totemic ritual of rebirth, making an offering 
that is supposed to atone for the ruling chaos.”80 Indeed, as is evident from the foregoing 
discussion such a characterisation is apt for the analysis here. The ritualistic performance of 
elections in a consolidating South African democracy are underpinned by the symbolic 
impetus of election campaigns which seek to, 
[...] legitimate democratic government and political leaders, uniting voters and 
candidates in displays of civic piety and rituals of national renewal. The shared 
values, history and aspirations celebrated in election campaigns are perhaps the 
clearest expression of democracy’s continually evolving mythology and perception of 
its own essential character. Both the practical outcomes and symbolic meaning of 
campaigns are important to the health of democracies [...]
81
 
The discussion below teases out the elements of this understanding of election campaigns and 
highlights their spectacular nature in the South African political sphere While the invocation 
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of myth, symbolism, memory and personality are central to understanding the contours of the 
ANC’s representational and discursive overtures, the sophistication and professionalism of its 
campaign operations should not be dismissed. At the functional level, the interplay between 
these different approaches is also important in permitting an understanding of the shift 
between the ANC’s liberation movement and political party identities. More than merely a 
shift, the discussion below demonstrates the accommodation of each identity by the ANC. 
The interplay between these identities is politically useful for it enables the ANC to reconcile 
its “mass character” with the exigencies of governing the state, and in so doing, fulfil its aim 
“to deeply transform the structures of South African society.”82 
The continued pursuit of this aim required a strong electoral showing. I noted that the ANC 
faced a highly critical and wary electorate given the fractious nature of preceding political 
milieu. Confronted with the task of needing to deflect Zuma’s polarising qualities and his 
embodiment of “the pathologies of neo-patrimonial, big-man politics”, he was cast as “the 
new South African dream”– uneducated, rurally raised and interlocking the exile, military, 
and Island traditions of the struggle together with a highly amenable persona and a grassroots 
understanding – which served as the basis of encapsulating the notion that a better life for all 
was achievable.
83
 Organisationally, the ANC needed to project an image of unity, 
reconciliation and rectitude as it continued on its mandate established by the victory of the 
1994 election. But more than that, and reflective of the changing demographics of the 
electorate biased toward young, first time voters, the ANC also needed to establish the 
‘coolness’ of its brand. These processes commenced with its popularly-informed manifesto 
launch at the beginning of 2009. 
‘My ANC. My Vision. My Future.’ 
The three young guys sitting opposite us during lunch were in animated conversation. Mixing Xhosa and 
English, the topic of discussion was the election. Young, black, and definitely upwardly mobile, that’s how they 
came across. We needed to get back on the road. ‘Did you vote the right way?’ he asked, looking at us through 
his expensive designer sunglasses. ’What’s the right way?’ we responded.’ You know...For your vision, your 
future’. He smiled. We smiled.84 
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On 10 January 2009 in the seaside city of East London, Jacob Zuma addressed a teeming 
stadium of ANC supporters on manifesto that the ANC would use to contest the election. The 
performance of power undertaken at the launch of the manifesto was underpinned by a sense 
of carnival in the large crowd. The rally evoked the images of excitement and anticipation 
and played into the “popular mass culture” of the ANC, where “[s]ongs, dances, toyi-toyi, and 
militant slogans are part of the ANC arts-de-faire.”85 The singing and chanting was electric. 
As Zuma approached the podium after veneration from an imbongi the crowds stilled and the 
struggle songs died down. Wearing a yellow T-shirt with ‘Volunteer’ across the front –
thereby forming an historical and cognitive link with the volunteers that were present at the 
COP in 1955 and signalling the ‘bottom up’ process of mobilisation and engagement in the 
campaign that would follow and of which he was a part – Zuma’s address oriented around the 
continued quest for relief from the legacy of apartheid’s social and economic deprivations by 
the “millions of South Africans” engaged  in the ordinary and everyday struggles.86 Distilling 
the ethos of the entire campaign, Zuma maintained, 
It is due to their efforts that we can now say with confidence that much has been done 
in addressing the legacy of apartheid in over the last 15 years, that much more 
remains to be done, and that working together, we can do more.
87
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Figure 19: Joy and Celebration at the ANC’s Manifesto Launch, East London. Obtained online from the  image 
repository on ANC’s  Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/photo_search.php?oid=61829275081&view=all 
Discursively, apartheid continued to figure largely in the ANC’s representational strategy. 
The explicit rhetorical ascendancy of the Freedom Charter under a Zuma administration 
sought to engage a temporal continuity with the liberation project that commenced in 1994. 
The 2009 manifesto gave greater expression to this project and functioned as an “activist 
text” wherein the longer term aspiration of full liberation directed by the ANC would be 
promoted.
88
 Thus, rather than perform “a conceptual break with the [immediate] past”, the 
manifesto aimed to ensure continuity by invoking the precepts of the Charter and thus came 
to “function through the citational, reiterative practice of performativity” that “depends on a 
repetition of previous scripts in order to achieve the effects they name.”89 Relocating the 
mission of the ANC within this historical thrust served the larger imperative of invoking 
history and memory to bind the present campaign to a longer and more esteemed narrative of 
struggle. This will be demonstrated below. 
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Constituting a spectacle in itself, the staging of the visual power exerted by the ANC as 
evidenced in the images below, conveyed a sense of dominance, direction and incumbency 
for the movement. For all the pomp, carnivalism and ceremony that the manifesto launch 
garnered, a level of disinterest permeated the crowd and Zuma laboured through the 
provisions of the manifesto. The formality of a staid and stuttering Zuma was broken with the 
eruption of the cry ‘Amandla! Matla!’ and his celebrity persona engaged as he broke into 
song and encouraged people to vote for the ANC.
90
 Popular engagement would be central to 
the campaign and spectacles of this nature would inform the overall spectacular nature of the 
campaign. As in 1994 and other election campaigns, the ANC would be accessible, ingratiate 
itself with communities and have its ear to the ground, for as its National Executive 
Committee noted, 
[T]he character of the election campaign that the ANC will embark on, will be 
dominated by door-to-door work and direct information on the gains made in the past 
15 years as well as how the challenges will be managed going forward. All NEC 
members and all candidates will campaign vigorously for an overwhelming ANC 
victory in [the] election.
91
 
The inclusive nature of the campaign was witnessed in the development of the manifesto 
itself.  In late 2008, the ANC launched the ‘My ANC. My Vision. My Future’ campaign that 
“invite[ed]   South Africans to tell us about their vision of the future as part of the broad 
consultative process” to inform the election manifesto.92 Indeed, in the tradition of the COP, 
ordinary members of the public were encouraged to submit their ideas and “suggestions” that 
would inform the purport and content of the manifesto via email, text messages or post.
93
 
Making the link explicit ANC spokesperson Jessie Duarte noted that 
In 1955 [...] the Congress of the People brought together demands from across the 
country into a vision of a new society. In the period leading up to the 1994 elections it 
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was this that inspired the People’s Forums in which ANC leaders went out to listen to 
the needs of the people.. And it was this that inspired our call [...] for members of the 
public to make suggestions for inclusion in the ANC’s 2009 election manifesto [...] 
we mobilised over 3,000 submissions via email, sms and post. What was remarkable 
about the responses was how freely they expressed the concerns, challenges and 
vision of a broad cross-section of South Africans.
94
 
 
Figure 20: Asserting the dominance of the ANC to a seated and obeisant audience. Obtained online from the image 
repository on ANC’s Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/photo_search.php?oid=61829275081&view=all 
Close to one thousand suggestions, a third of the final total, had been received by late 2008 
which would be “collate[d]” and “circulated at the ANC’s Manifesto Policy Conference.”95 
Citizen participation in this form constituted a broader consultative process that included all 
structures of the ANC and the alliance along with key and aligned formations in civil society 
and communities.  Standing in counterpoint to claims of demobilisation of communities and 
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the sidelining of popular participation in policy-making, the ANC was keen to espouse a 
decentralised mode of campaigning. Such an approach, as evident in Jessie Duarte’s quote 
above, was a feature of the ANC’s campaigning and lent its brand greater symbolic resonance 
and support in the fostering of a sense of community and engagement. Indeed, the ritual 
practice of “having a conversation with voters” at election times served to provide continuity 
with previous campaigns and inculcate a sense of ownership in the political process within 
the body politic.
96
 
 
Figure 21: Publicising the ‘My ANC. My Vision. My Future’ campaign on mini-bus taxis, Mowbray, Cape Town, 22 
April 2009, Author’s photograph 
Claims to the democratic and participative nature of  the campaign, giving impetus to the 
slogan of ‘Working together we can do more’,  also served the political function of shoring 
up alliance support for the approach and mandate obtained by the ANC by giving rhetorical 
emphasis to the aim of “building people’s power” and mitigating elitism within and outside 
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the ANC.
97
 In light of this, and despite the fractiousness of the relationship between the ANC 
and the SACP/COSATU alliance that characterised much of the democratic era, the latter’s 
electoral support has always been forthcoming. Both strategy and expediency dictate it. As I 
have demonstrated in the previous section, the need to inculcate confidence in a Zuma 
administration saw a rhetorical adherence to, and even support of, the very economic policies 
upon which challenge to the Mbeki administration was premised. In the campaign, the 
process of realising liberation was ongoing for as COSATU Secretary General Zwelinzima 
Vavi opined in a message of support on the launch of the manifesto, 
The impact of these economic and social policies has seen significant reduction in the 
levels of severe poverty and improvement in the quality of life of millions of South 
Africans.
 98
 
The show of support is underpinned by a strong marketing imperative, for in demonstrating 
support of these policies, there is a concomitant affirmation of the competence and reliability 
in the ability to govern. As in earlier marketing of the struggle discussed in chapter three, the 
ANC is accorded the central status as leader of the continuing struggle for liberation. Indeed, 
as Vavi continues 
Significant progress was made, there, toward the vision of creating a united, non-
racial and non-sexist society [...] we still have a long way to go before we can claim 
we have overcome the apartheid legacy. The struggle continues and the ANC still has 
a revolutionary duty, as both a ruling party and liberation movement, to unify our 
people for the attainment of the Freedom Charter’s vision.99 
While the influence of the Charter was clearly evident in the manifesto, so too were certain 
prescriptions of earlier economic policies discussed in chapter six that the ANC had 
eschewed. Indeed, the “realisation of the objectives of the manifesto” required a move away 
from GEAR-inspired “growth for its own sake” and abidance to a ‘growth through 
redistribution’ model as there was an attempt to “link economic growth the delivery of basic 
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necessities and services” as per the diktats of the developmental state.100 The text-heavy 
manifesto demonstrating the seriousness accorded ANC policy-making was also acutely 
aware of the need for prudence and pragmatism given the financial malaise of the global 
economic environment in 2009. 
The manifesto became an important site in locating the ANC discursively and rhetorically 
within an older Charter-entrenched tradition and repositioning the movement within a 
broader representational stream that was rooted in a people-inspired and democratic politics. 
While ANC campaigns have traditionally conformed to such an approach, the significance of 
the 2009 campaign lay in the politics that preceded its occasion. The “uncertainty” that this 
politics generated within the ANC and the threat to its dominance in the electoral sphere in 
the democratic period required a robust response that played not only on issues of tradition, 
history and memory, but also personality.
101
 The venerability of the ANC was crystallised in 
the figure of Mandela, whose spectre loomed large in campaign marketing. 
The Spectre of Nelson Mandela 
Nelson Mandela was the embodiment of tremendous symbolic capital for the ANC. Serving 
as the moral touchstone and arbiter of the most venerable traditions of the South African 
political life, there nevertheless was considerable consternation surrounding his political 
loyalties at the commencement of the campaign. The emergence of COPE, and the 
organisational and political dissatisfaction that engulfed the ANC, rendered questionable the 
loyalties of even the most prominent of ANC leaders. Mandela chose a political rally in the  
symbolic Dutywa – the home of the Mbeki political dynasty – to entrench his loyalty in the 
ANC. Cast as the grand patriarch of the ANC, Mandela’s endorsement as the “true 
embodiment of the organisation” conveyed what David Kertzer has called “solidarity without 
consensus” as he was able to appeal to many different constituencies in the ANC – some of 
which were still opposed to a Zuma presidency – while providing “popularity” and 
“legitimacy” to the regime, the elites or particular people through his very presence at the 
event. 
102
 Moreover, Mandela performed a “bridging function, linking the past with the 
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present”103and thus served to condense the history, tradition and venerability of the ANC 
given that he “led the ANC Youth League, Defiance Campaign, was volunteer-in-chief and 
commander-in-chief” and in so doing, became the touchstone of morality, ethics and 
authority within the movement and accorded veracity to its mythic posturing.
104
 
Moreover, the cultivation of the personality of Mandela was a deliberate political strategy of 
the ANC during the struggle years that trailed him, especially into his post-Presidency 
years.
105
 His ‘messianic status’ historically played into a larger “idiom and psychology of 
redemptive politics” that was keenly tapped into through his presence at the rally.106 Indeed, 
the strands of this politics intimately conveyed the notion of “deliverance from bondage, 
covenants, chosen people, divine election, promised lands, eschatologies, chiliasm and 
apocalypse” that dramatically performed the act of conferring legitimacy on the ANC of 2009 
and, more importantly, on the persona of Jacob Zuma.
107
 The utilisation of Mandela is 
intimately connected to the spectacular of nature of politics, for as Edelman had argued, such 
personalisation to garner mass support, lends the notion of leadership a ‘dramaturgic’ quality 
that is put into service in very public and theatrical ways.
108
 Thus, the parade of Mandela at a 
political rally in the symbolically rich space of Dutywa is complicit in the creation of a 
campaign spectacle. 
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Figure 22: Mandela and Zuma and the Dutywa Rally, Obtained online from the image repository on the ANC’s 
Facebook page, Available online:  https://www.facebook.com/photo_search.php?oid=61829275081&view=all 
As a moral arbiter, Mandela would also come to embody the means by which dissent and 
dissonance could be managed. In a backhanded swipe at COPE, Zuma posited that,  
“[h]e has taught us that when there are challenges or differences of opinion within the 
organisation, don’t run away but stay inside and resolve them.”109 
Moreover, in addressing the criticism that emerged over the involvement of Mandela at the 
rally, Zuma was keen to assert that Mandela’s ownership over the ANC, and thus render 
criticism of the movement as anathema to the will of Mandela. Addressing a rally in 
Khayelistha, Zuma posited, 
This ANC belongs to Madiba. He built this ANC along with other leaders. Discussion 
between Madiba and the ANC when he gives us ANC volunteers a mandate – where 
does that concern other people?
110
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The utilisation of Mandela – notionally and politically – segued both with Zuma’s own 
personal appeal and the “ANC’s populist-style election campaign” that “told the people they 
were central to the ANC’s agenda and that they could trust the ANC to improve their 
lives.”111 Mandela’s ‘iconic’ brand status within the South African polity was followed by 
Zuma’s own popularity within the electorate.112 While Mandela played a strong ‘bridging 
function’ for the ANC, recourse to memory and myth  of the past also influenced the tenor of 
the campaign. As I have argued earlier in chapter two, the recourse to the act of remembering 
serves to ‘maintain memory’ and endow the past with a ‘discursive significance’ that informs 
and perpetuates the circulation of myths. Mediated by ritual, the interplay between myth and 
memory informs the contours of the performance that constitute the spectacle. 
Remembering 
I have demonstrated through the analysis here, and in the preceding chapters, the constant 
recourse to invoking the past to serve as a moral and ethical validation and rationale for 
political behaviour. Acts of remembering and commemoration were undertaken at numerous 
sites, but funerals and memorials were the most apt arenas to inculcate memory and the 
furtherance of mythology.  Despite their “revisionist” impulse, these acts served to perform a 
very public and emotive link to the past while entrenching notions of sacrifice and loyalty in 
the present.
113
  This process is underscored by “shifting the locus of grievance” from the 
private to the public and as such, gives greater effect to open and demonstrative  forms of 
commemoration that serve to inform the spectacle.
 114
 
At the funeral of murdered traditional leader, Inkosi Mbongeleni Zondi, Zuma asserted in his 
encomium that Zondi was the “reincarnation of the legendary Bambatha”, the anti-colonial 
Zulu chief, and had fought bravely against apartheid. According reverence to both these 
struggles, Zuma shifted the political register to demonstrate Zondi’s efforts in the more 
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protracted struggle against economic apartheid and underdevelopment.
115
 In attempting to 
“put [Zondi’s] life in proper political context”, Zuma asserted, 
We know that he was a courageous leader of his people. We know that he was a 
leader in the realm of ideas and practice, by the fact that he introduced new ideas in 
his community. We know that he was a proud member of his community, and a proud 
member of the African National Congress, an organisation that he served with loyalty 
and pride, without excluding other political parties from operating in his area.
116
 
The address served not only to eulogise Zondi but also, more importantly, it served a 
marketing purpose of demonstrating the vicarious presence of the ANC in communities given 
their embodiment in leaders and members. The effect is to locate these individuals within the 
ANC’s stream of history and to render their actions as part of a larger political tendency that 
sought to fight injustice.  Public acts of remembrance also serve to locate the past in the 
present, and the discourses that operate through ‘remembering’ hold an acutely political 
function for the ANC – they serve to give thrust to the incomplete process of emancipation 
and the physical, spiritual and corporeal sacrifice that was made for that emancipation. This 
sacrifice bestows a moral and ethical weight upon the organisation, for it is in the ‘heroism’ 
of the sacrifice that ultimate loyalty to the struggle led by the ANC is performed. 
The act of eulogising a traditional leader, while not uncommon in the ANC, was lent greater 
significance given Zuma’s branding and embrace of ethnicity and tradition. The election 
manifesto also recorded this political tendency to according “increased power” to traditional 
leaders who were seen as integral agents in the ANC’s attempts to improve rural 
development.
 117
 
If an encomium to a traditional leader effected a shift in the ‘locus of grievance’ to more 
public and political ends, then acts of commemoration were even more pointed. 
Commemorating the hanging of activist Solomon Mahlangu by the apartheid regime, Zuma 
enjoined his audience to acknowledge that they were the “custodians of the collective 
memory of our fallen comrades” and thus offered an emotive impetus to link ‘memory, 
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meaning and power’ to effect agency.118 Asserting the centrality of the ANC in this process 
of remembering, Zuma sought to corral support by noting that as ‘heroes’ in the struggle for 
freedom, 
our fallen comrades were dedicated to serving their people. Were they alive today, 
they would be actively working to consolidate the gains of our liberation since 
1994.
119
 
The act of remembering therefore functions not only as a moral and ethical template, through 
which those in the present and future obtain guidance, but following from this, provides a call 
to action that has a longer tradition in a more venerable past.  Adeptly utilising history and 
historical personalities of the struggle – who are cast as heroes, and indeed heroines – enables 
the ANC to access a heritage of struggle and an ethos and tradition of overcoming adversity. 
The discourse of the ANC’s election campaigning, as needing to continue the struggle for the 
realisation of a fully free South Africa, permits the acknowledgement of the continuation of 
that earlier struggle. Inasmuch, it also served to enliven the suffix of the campaign slogan 
‘Working together, we can do more”, through acknowledging past achievements with the 
historical duty to continue the struggle. Moreover, the success of this discursive practice is to 
locate the ANC at the centre of this historical and political milieu 
Sanctification 
While invocation of memory has filtered into the mythologies of the ANC, the 2009 election 
campaign also saw the emergence of a discourse of chiliasm that operated to apotheosize and 
sanctify both the ANC and Zuma. I noted that in Zuma’s political travails there circulated a 
discourse of victimhood and persecution that was put into particular political service by him 
and his supporters. Further, the redemptive impulse of his embodiment as the ‘new South 
African dream’ coupled with the charismatic authority that he wielded served to portray him 
as a “blessed, chosen man.”120 The highly contested nature of the public sphere prior to 
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Polokwane and the uncertainty that the presidential recall inaugurated, permitted a sense of 
deliverance from such high-end political machination. 
Zuma’s ‘ordinariness’, when contrasted to perceptions of a detached, distant and aloof 
Mbeki, contributed to his location of and amongst the people. It was a perception he was keen 
to advocate. In a newspaper interview just prior to the election, Zuma pronounced, 
I still want to keep my phone and talk to ordinary people. I don’t agree with these 
protocol things. I was actually caught off guard when the presidential jet was bought 
and I could no longer travel SAA [South African Airways] I’m going to travel SAA 
so that I can meet and speak to passengers. I should be able to show confidence in our 
public transport system. People will trust our facilities once they see a president on 
the plane with them.
121
 
And, in addition to rejecting the need to “moderate his laughter” he noted that,  
[...] I ought to be myself. I will continue singing, Why can’t I? I [will] eat meat under 
a tree with my people [...] I am still an ordinary man.
122
 
Branding himself as ‘ordinary’ and utilising gestures that inform that creation – laughter, 
singing, dancing – served the critical purpose of “emancipation from the mystifications of 
politics” and rooted perceptions of Zuma and the politics he aimed to convey firmly within a 
fundamentally more popular discourse and tradition.
123
 Similarly, an evangelism informed 
discourses and representations of the ANC and the recourse to liturgical and biblical 
traditions served to venerate the movement and locate it at the nexus of morality, power and 
righteousness in South African politics.
124
 At a rally in Nelspruit, ANC provincial speaker, 
Yvonne Phosa was keen to assert such noting that, 
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[...] the ANC is in possession of the wisdom of Christ [and] will remain with us until 
Jesus comes back. We have seen Jesus’ miracles. He could not fail on anything. Now, 
He is with the ANC.
125
 
The consecration of the ANC was an important element in ritualistic practice of the political 
rally which served, to recall from chapter two, to endow an ‘aura of sacrality’ on the leader 
and the movement as whole. Using religious references to endow legitimacy in the ANC’s 
governing vision and moral rectitude, was an important symbolic act that underpinned the 
relationship between the ANC and a particular constituency. Moreover, the recourse of a 
religious liturgy also served the more pressing aim of sanctifying Zuma and ‘marketing 
away’ his moral and ethical indiscretions while feeding into the narrative of his victimhood. 
Indeed, in an address by ANC Cabinet minister Jeff Radebe to parishioners consonance  
between the conspiracies against Jesus and Zuma was drawn. Indeed, Radebe opined that just 
as the Pharisees had conspired against the former, so too was the “ANC president betrayed by 
his own comrades to counterrevolutionaries.”126 More broadly, a moral equivalent was drawn 
between Jesus Christ and the ANC, given that both have identified themselves with the “poor, 
the weak and the marginalised” and as such, “Christians have every reason to identify 
themselves with the African National Congress.”127 More than that, the strength of the ANC 
and the longevity of its rule was secured until the Second Coming.
128
 
The marketing of Zuma to a Christian constituency was an adept move at “instrumentalising 
political power” through the invocation of a religious idiom that was laced with a strongly 
redemptive motive.
129
 In constituting the spectacle, the illusory references to chiliasm and 
apotheosis that punctuated the campaign narrative mediated the contours of the social 
relationship between the ANC and a particular constituency. Underpinned by a dramaturgic 
ethos, these references and the performances in which they were communicated lent 
emotional credence to politics and stimulated the ‘social excitement’ that I noted in the 
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second chapter. Such ‘social excitement’ was given further tenor through the utilisation of 
song, to which I now turn. 
Rhythms 
The recourse to personality, history, memory, mythology within the campaign was accorded 
greater resonance through performance and song and music functioned as important conduits 
through which such performance occurred. The 2009 campaign was intimately informed by 
Zuma’s rendition of the liberation-era song, Aweleth’ umshini wami, initiated first when 
implicated for fraud and corruption and utilised to provoke support by accessing the 
performative heritage of the struggle and invoking the memory of ‘embattledness’ that 
characterised the anti-apartheid milieu. 
130
 Utilised at particular moments in the campaign, 
there was stark political motive that underpinned the performance of the song. Indeed, it 
allowed for the “yoking together of heterogeneous interests” that “cut across ethnicity, region 
and class” and allowed greater impetus and resonance to be accorded to it and Zuma’s cause 
in the political market. The lyrics of the song were simple, repetitive and given greater 
performative effect through an accompanying dance that gestured challenge and contestation. 
The basic refrain held, 
Umshini wami, umshini wami 
(My machine gun, my machine gun) 
We Baba 
(Oh Father) 
Aweleth’ umshini wami 
(Please bring me my machine gun)
 131
 
Given its lineage in the camps of MK, an inherent “riskiness” operated through the song, and 
while used to stimulate and mobilise opposition to apartheid forces, in a democratic South 
Africa, it became the rallying cry of ‘the second war of liberation’ against economic 
disenfranchisement and political marginalisation.
132
 As such, it constituted “part of a 
scurrilous subversive lingo [that] showed the power of demotic voice to question authority 
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and assert its own presence.”133 While the song’s narrative function aimed to invoke visions 
and remembrances of its guerrilla heritage – the “memories and stories of long marches 
through the bush, lost family members and camps to the north” – it nevertheless entered the 
social lexicon of South Africa through mainstream popular culture.
134
 As such, the song not 
only served as a means to personalise the ‘politics of grievance’ within Zuma, but also to 
‘celebratise’ him.135 Indeed, the aesthetic appeal of the song and the images of confrontation 
and resistance were aptly condensed within the figure of Zuma. As he campaigned vigorously 
around the country both prior to and during the campaign, the song came to signal a rupture 
with political formality and a new way of doing politics. That it generated excitement, even 
bewilderment is apparent. For example, at the COSATU Congress, the song provoked 
rapture, 
Thousands of union delegates climbed onto tables and chairs and danced and sang 
Zuma’s trademark song [...] Delegates mobbed the podium, displaying the congress 
labels showing to which of COSATU’s 21 unions they belonged [...] Others spoke 
into their cellphones amid the singing, spreading the news of Zuma’s arrival to 
friends. Men hugged one another while they danced [...] ‘Go to the hall now comrades 
– there is nothing more we can do now,’ Vavi told the delegates. ‘Go to the dining 
hall – we will sing there.’136 
Music and song were not only confined to Aweleth’ umshini wami. The ANC adopted a 
campaign song, ‘Mina ngo hlahla nginje’ or ‘I will remain ANC for life’, which was 
complicit in a process of “self-construction of the individual” for it is, 
[t]hrough the act of patronising a particular kind of music [that] individuals engage in 
a fluid and complex process of conscious and unconscious identity formation.
137
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Based on a popular song by the late singer and self-styled ‘Madonna of the Townships’, 
Brenda Fassie, the song functioned to “[politicise] personal spaces” as its pop song heritage 
made it easily recognisable.
138
 Moreover, this process of politicisation was furthered by 
enmeshing popular and political culture through the song, and allowed for a “‘portable 
politics’ through which individuals could exert some control.”139 The lyrics of the song, are 
translated roughly as 
I will remain like that, for life 
I will remain like that, like my mother 
I will remain ANC 
I will remain like that 
 
If they say the love me, and say I am going to be like the ANC 
And then I’m going to remain ANC 
I love the ANC in my heart 
I will remain like that, like my mother 
I am going to remain ANC for life
140
 
The uncomplicated and repetitive lyric, while serving to communicate a clear and simple 
message of loyalty to the ANC, simultaneously provided the overarching rhythm to the 
campaign. Moreover, the lyric sought to inculcate a loyalty and sense of longevity in being an 
ANC supporter – ‘I will remain like that, like my mother’ – and the culture and heritage of 
the ANC within communities. In addition to this socialisation role, the song also functioned 
as an important constitutive element of the ‘psychotechnics’ of the campaign. Played at 
political rallies and popularised through the ANC’s websites, on compact discs, mobile phone 
ringtones and the like, the song circulated across public and private spaces. 
Popular culture and the historically significant liberation songs provided a rich aesthetic to 
the spectacle of the campaign.   Unlike popular songs, however, liberation era songs 
displayed an adaptability and a fluidity in which their lyrics could be altered to capture the 
feelings, events or action of a particular situation or moment.
141
 Such adaptability gave 
greater credence to these songs’ functions a “subversive discourse” and as a “political way of 
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questioning and knowing about [one’s] social circumstance”142 The utility of both popular 
and liberation songs are clear. While it is myopic to draw stark distinctions between the two, 
they were utilised for politically specific ends and audiences. Indeed, as important cultural 
expressions, they endowed the campaign with a greater emotional resonance and thus 
increased political and social connectedness. That the audiences overlapped, is not in dispute. 
Importantly, through song the past and the present elided, and the ANC was able to address 
issues of history while aiming to remain relevant and appeal to first time voters.  Such appeal 
required more public acts to constitute the demonstrative nature of the spectacle and position 
the ANC as a hegemonic and competitive force within the political market. 
Rallying to the Cause: Rides, Braais and a Virtual Virtuosity 
The culture of our time is to put down the umshini wam [machine gun] and take up the laptop.
143
 
The ANC’s election campaign was frenetic. Highly professional, tightly run, encompassing 
the whole of South Africa and benefitted by strong financial reserves, the ANC was able to 
assert its corporeal, visual, audible and symbolic dominance in the public sphere. The 
excitement and anticipation that the election was able to obtain, as I have noted, was given 
impetus by the political exigencies in which it occurred. While the “election [was] 
fundamentally about the policies and programmes that will meaningfully improve the lives of 
the people”, it nevertheless was an exercise in the spectacular.144 
Political rallies have been central to mobilising support for the ANC and are an exercise that 
served to display the dominance of the party in the political sphere. Rallies, however were 
also strategic and were occasioned to “deflect attention away from Zuma’s legal troubles 
which had the potential to hurt the ANC.”145 It is important to remember that commensurate 
with much of the national election campaign, were legal proceedings to determine whether 
further prosecution against Zuma for corruption were necessary. Linking his court 
appearances with campaign rallies, the ANC shrewdly constructed a narrative of persecution 
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that removed the decision to prosecute from the judicial realm and located it within the 
political.  These carnivalesque mini-rallies courtside were characterised by the singing of 
Aweleth’ umshini wami, of the waving of mock AK-47 machine guns, of dancing and 
ululating that was “rich in mimicry, pretence, imitation and disguise” and “function[ed] as a 
playful formalization of dissent.”146 
Rallies took on two forms that spoke not only to the class appeal of the ANC, but also 
highlighted the interplay between its political party and liberation movement identities. The 
first played into traditional and bottom-up mobilisation that had a mass character and served 
to address communities and ‘activise’ ANC members to play dominant roles in campaigning 
in those communities. Driven by a programme of “sending out candidates and campaign 
workers to localities across the country to meet voters directly,” the ANC drew on a heritage 
of mass citizen engagement and participation.
147
 Inculcating such action occurred through 
large and small spectacles, characterised by singing, dancing, ululating, remembering and 
most importantly a display of the ANC’s dominant presence in the political sphere through 
staging and political ephemera.  Thus, for example, the ‘60 Days of Electioneering’ campaign 
launched by the ANC’s Women’s League commenced with a 4000-person strong rally and its 
members were enjoined, by the ANC Treasurer General, Mathews Phosa, to 
[make] contact with the voters. There is no shortcut. We must move the ground 
forces. Make them understand our manifesto and move them to the queues to go and 
vote for the ANC. 
148
 
While mass rallies sought to “galvanise” the electorate and were in ensconced within a 
carnivalesque atmosphere, the ANC’s multi-class character and its appeal to a cross-section 
of the electorate, saw a second form of political rally that was targeted at a smaller and more 
upscale market.
149
 In contrast to the carnivalism and spectacle of mass rallies, these smaller 
events aimed to attract dignitaries from business, academia, sports arts, state bodies and the 
like in gala events that were marked by a glitz and certainly glamour. Thus, after the mass 
spectacle of the manifesto launch in East London, the ANC held a more intimate and elite 
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gala dinner at the plush Sandton Convention Centre in Johannesburg, the aim of which was to 
obtain validation and succour for its past and intended governance programme from 
prominent organisations in political and civil society. Not merely a mass movement, the ANC 
was keen to appeal the range of ‘motive’ forces and receive their endorsement for the 
continuation of the revolution against the legacies of apartheid. The centrality of the “black 
middle” and professional “strata” to the overall project of the NDR and the need to economic 
empowerment motivated and necessitated the need for this type of rally.
 150
 The centrality of 
these class forces to the ANC’s governance project was rendered clear by the head of the 
Black Management Forum. Jimmy Manyi posited, 
The Black Management Forum endorses a government that is sensitive to the need of 
the poor. We say that whereas we are a middle-class in the BMF, we are a middle 
class that cares, we are a middle class that is interconnected with the poor, so if we 
help the poor, we are helping the BMF. The BMF is saying that we are endorsing a 
government that is not confused about affirmative action [unlike COPE who took 
contradictory position]. The BMF is also saying that we are endorsing a government 
that is unequivocal and that is vigorously implementing broad-based [Black Economic 
Empowerment].
151
 
In addition to the multi-class aspect, the campaign rallies also had a strongly multi-
generational dimension. Given the importance of the youth market in ‘electoral’ society, the 
‘spectacle’ was further created through a series of ‘Ride and Braai’ events the ANC held in 
townships during the campaign.
152
 In providing a momentary glimpse into a culture of 
festivity and material bravado these events were tantamount to the performance of ‘cool’. As 
the editor of the South African Sunday Times described it, 
They arrive in 4x4s and an assortment of luxury sedans. In the convoy are senior 
leaders of the ruling party, with an array of activists and hangers-on tagging along. 
They pull up at the car wash and pour out of the cars. Music blares from the sound 
system, attracting the attention of the neighbourhood. Soon the booze is flowing. 
Meat is ordered from the nearby butcheries and shisanyamas. The music and the 
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wafting meat smell draws the crowds. Before you know it, an impromptu bash is 
under way. While the locals chew on the flesh and gulp down Queen Victoria’s tears, 
party activists pounce on them with the gospel according to Luthuli House. By sunset 
the party is still pumping. The leaders and their hangers-on jump into their 
vehicles...Oh, and they leave plenty of supplies behind for the locals to continue the 
session. The convoy speeds off into the distance and the locals are left with the 
distinct message: ‘Kumnandi kwa ANC/Ho monate ho ANC’ (It’s really funky in the 
ANC).
153
 
‘Ride and Braais’, as an addition to the more perfunctory campaign activities, communicated 
important messages to township communities and its youth especially – that a ‘better life’ 
was possible, perhaps not ‘for all’ just yet, but that the ANC would deliver on this. The 
rawness of the display of material wealth and its associations with the incipient success of a 
young, black middle-class provided a powerful aspirational impetus. While ‘Ride and Braais’ 
served as a performance of ‘cool’ in the townships, there was a corresponding display of 
wealth and decadence as the ANC undertook a charm offensive on successful, young black 
supporters. Organised largely by the ANC’s Youth League (ANCYL), the league sought to 
ingratiate itself to another part of the youth market. The lavishness of the events was aptly  
noted as, 
Champagne, exquisite food, designer clothes, vibrant celebrities and girls in skimpy 
outfits attracted hundreds of people to the ANC Youth League’s parties over the past 
few weeks [...] Many sipped Johnnie Walker Black Label whisky and puffed on 
Cuban cigars.
154
 
Capturing the youth vote was central to the ANC’s campaign. Indeed, having emphasised the 
issue of youth unemployment in its manifesto, its campaign appeals to the youth were highly 
stylised as noted in the above campaign activities. Indeed, the emphasis on “the bling” and 
the increased “flair and excitement” that it generated served also to demonstrate that the ANC 
was “moving with the times.”155 If brashness and brazenness were qualities associated with 
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attracting the youth market, then these qualities were personified in the ANCYL’s leader, 
Julius Malema. The strategic utility of a Malema figure lay in his ability to deflect attention 
away from Zuma and attacks on him and the ANC, and to lead a negative campaign against 
opposition parties. By admission, Malema posited, that 
I had to keep them [opposition parties] busy on the sidelines while president Zuma 
focused on what was important – campaigning for the ANC. And the people listened. 
Instead of the opposition focusing on preaching their own party manifesto, they 
focused on my attacks. They went around say ‘Malema this, Malema that’. 156 
 
Figure 23: Images from a Ride and Braai. Obtained online from the image repository on the ANC’s Facebook page, 
Available online:  https://www.facebook.com/photo_search.php?oid=61829275081&view=all 
The power of the ANC to mobilise and engage supporters in political rallies was impressive 
given that  data generated from the period shows that one in four voters attended an ANC 
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rally.
157
 The 2009 campaign was also unique given the use of the internet and social 
networking to market the party and mobilise and engage voters. While rallies provided a 
‘corporeality’ to the creation of the spectacle, the shift to a virtual platform was also 
complicit in the spectacular nature of the campaign. The political utility of the internet as a 
medium to engage voters and serve as a “significant source of political information and a 
location of political action” rendered an online campaign an important supplement to 
traditional campaign methods and forms of participation.
158
 While online campaigning is 
traditionally seen as a means to “reduce social inequalities in public life”, the nature and 
exigencies of the socio-economy in South Africa place the ANC’s largest constituency on the 
wrong side of the digital divide.
159
 Despite this, the ANC had a strong and wide online 
presence. 
The creation of the centralised, focused campaign-dedicated website, www.myanc.org, 
provided a concentrated space for the ANC to campaign, disseminate information, connect 
users with party leaders, raise funds, and provide access to campaign advertising and 
publicity material for site users to download. Thus, given its design and purport, the website 
operated as a “strategically crafted [artefact]” that was able to “reflect the cultural-historical 
context” of the election campaign.160 The shift to the virtual realm was underscored by the 
historical emphasis on citizen engagement. In giving ‘voice’ to users, the website allowed 
them to upload their ‘ANC story’ and provided links to numerous social media platforms as it 
sought to democratise and encourage participation and involvement in the campaign. This 
democratic imperative, part of a longer narrative of engagement that the ANC inculcated, 
aimed at “flattening hierarchies” in which the utilisation of ‘interactional devices’ such as 
email and weblogs function render “organizational elites more accountable to ordinary 
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members.”161 In a sense, it was the virtual equivalent of the mythical ‘scraps of paper’ which 
suggestions for the Freedom Charter were obtained. 
The ‘interactional’ aspect of ANC’s online campaign extended beyond its website. An 
important method of communicating occurred was through ‘chat’ forums, accessed through 
mobile telephones and extremely popular with South African youth. These “chat stadiums” 
functioned as virtual political rallies but also were more dialogic in that discussion and 
participation amongst and between participants and the ANC was permitted.
162
  This virtual 
spectacle, which generated participation of up between 5000 and 10000 participants, was 
critical in stimulating youth participation in the campaign and encouraging ownership of the 
campaign. 
 
Figure 24: The ANC’s election campaign website for the 2009 campaign. Archived but available online: 
http://www.anc.org.za/elections/2009/myanc/index.php 
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Inspired by its history of democratic participation in its campaign, and the success of the 
‘chat stadiums’, there was a move toward greater “text-based interactivity” through the site’s 
blog. While the blog was expected to function as a “virtual imbizo”163 and stimulate 
participation in the campaign, it was under-utilised and parochial.
164
 Indeed, examination of 
blog posts reveals that it functioned as a shallow forum for discussion and discourse. 
Similarly, its adjunct micro-blogging function on the social network Twitter was superficial 
and did not advance discussion past a mere rendering of the manifestos main provisions and 
offering, as one participant noted, “generic” responses from the ANC.165 The ANC’s foray 
into virtual campaigning did obtain greater success on the Facebook platform. Its page 
described its purpose as being, 
[...] part of a broad range of online initiatives by the ANC to engage with its members, 
and with all South Africans that wish for a better future for all. On this group 
administrators will post the latest ANC news, and you’ll find plenty of lively debate 
amongst members: join in, your voice is important.
166
 
Sharing the similar function of its other online mediums, through Facebook the ANC aimed 
to create an online community to “foster connection-sharing, social capital generation and 
effective communication.”167 Given its multi-functionality, and encouraging not only textual 
engagement but also through serving as a repository for images and film, the ANC’s 
Facebook presence reduced the geography between the national campaign activities and 
followers in disparate localities by providing an insight into its various operations. 
The mixed success of these virtual campaign mediums permitted the creation of the spectacle 
not by the content of the messages purported, but rather by the form with which they were 
communicated. As a de rigueur part of the fabric of modern campaigns, the ANC’s capture of 
the virtual public sphere functioned as a performance which, as to recall in the opening 
section, was premised on ‘communicative interaction’ in which the aim was to ‘bind the 
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audience to the performer.’  Moreover, the medium through which this communication was 
undertaken functioned to symbolise the ANC as a modern, techno-savvy movement as it 
sought to ingratiate itself with the youth audience. Increasingly, the centrality of the virtual 
‘theatre of everyday life’ became a contested site through which a performance of power was 
exercised in the creation of the spectacle. But this theatre did not displace the performance of 
power in the non-virtual realm. The ANC’s presence was firmly established through a 
representational schema which centred on visual and artistic productions such as the 
ubiquitous campaign posters, banners, murals and comic strip. 
(Re-)Presenting Power 
The ANC’s campaign posters were ubiquitous. Functioning to provide the stylistic 
undertones to the tapestry of election landscape, they also asserted both the ‘presence’ and 
dominance of the ANC in the political sphere in South Africa. In addition, their ubiquity 
demonstrated the seriousness with which the ANC viewed the electoral contest as it asserted 
its competitive edge in visually dominating the public sphere. Underscored by a 
“simplification of a core message” the campaign posters in the 2009 election served to 
“capture the experience, or Zeitgeist¸ of a certain moment and therefore serve as ‘stored 
visual markers of past experiences.’”168 Indeed, the simplicity that underscored the ANC’s 
core message – Working together we can do more – played into a much longer rhetorical and 
visual history. Evident in the campaign posters of the 1994 election the re-invocation of the 
slogan effectively and discursively linked the social and political milieu in 2009 with that 
period. Moreover, its utilisation in the Masakhane campaign provided further consistency in 
the ANC’s traditional pledge toward people-centred and bottom-up participation and 
development. 
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Figure 25: Campaign poster, Cape Town, c. March 2009 Author’s photograph 
More instructional than “agitational”, the openness of the slogan allowed for “plural 
discursive frameworks” to operate through the poster and allowed the ANC “to win the 
consent of their own communities” while maintaining a broader appeal to non-ANC voters.169  
As the “hegemonic articulation” of the ANC’s governance project, the slogan played into 
wider iterations of nation-building, reconstruction and development. Even more instructional, 
was the ‘Vote ANC – 22 April’ poster, replete with the ANC’s entry on a mock ballot paper. 
Crisp and simple, the message in the posters functioned more as signs in the symbolic 
landscape of the campaign. The need to simplify its messaging and indeed, stay ‘on 
message’, little attention was given to policy statements or individual promotion. Unlike the 
1994 posters which utilised a range of personalities in its representational structure, the 2009 
posters focused primarily on Zuma and the ANC. However, targeting of its message to 
particular constituencies was also evident. The posters functioned to ‘activise’ memory and 
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together with the politics of identity, astutely informed its campaign in Durban, a city with a 
large Indian-heritage population. 
 
Figure 26: Targeted campaign posters,  Durban Kwazulu-Natal, cited in Piers Carey, available online, http://www. 
Dut.ac.za/site/files/6636.careyposter.pdf 
The recourse to personalities including, Mahatma Gandhi, demonstrated the paucity of policy 
content and privileging of personality that informed its representational oeuvre.
170
 Moreover, 
the purport of the posters and the recourse to historical memory are contextualised in a 
speech given by Zuma to the Indian Christian community in Durban late in the campaign. 
Noting that the “struggle for liberation was fought by both Indian and African patriots”, 
Zuma was keen to assert the relatedness of Indian and South African independence struggles 
and joint-ownership of the Mahatma by noting that he “was both an Indian and South African 
citizen” and that “he shaped the liberatory movements in both colonial theatres.”171 Noting 
further, “the important role that the Indian community has played in the liberation struggle” 
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by “fighting side by side with their African brothers and sisters” Zuma then repeatedly 
encourages the idea of the need to “join hands and work together” to realise “ nation-
building, reconciliation and reconstruction.”172 The conjoining of history, memory, 
personality and morality in the speech provides an apt grounding upon which to contextualise 
the meanings and resonances of the posters, and locate it firmly within the overarching thrust 
of ‘Working together we can do more’. 
The propagandistic nature of these targeted posters highlights a visual campaign in which the 
ANC aimed for consistency, presence and the repetition of its core message. Its poster 
campaign was augmented by its banners which were strategically placed in high-density 
population areas and near transport hubs for greater candidate exposure and the inculcation of 
the authoritativeness of the ANC. As a demonstration of the visual performance of power, 
these banners lent credence to the centrality of the ANC in political and symbolic life. Here, 
the visual supplanted the rhetorical. 
 
Figure 27: Large banner, Central Johannesburg , c. April 2009, Author’s photograph 
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The visual display of power and presence across South Africa was given creative inflection 
through a more bottom up and participative artistic production. Unlike the richness of 
resistance era art, the attempt at mass artistic involvement in the campaign, centred primarily 
on hand-painted murals that replicated the professionally designed banners. While art 
functioned to “counter banal political forms so that it can be a liberating form of political 
expression”, by utilising the modes of expression and originality characteristic of grassroots 
cultural industries to portray popular participation, an historically-endowed campaign 
aesthetic was created.
173
 But the replication of the campaign poster’s aesthetic through the 
murals mitigated any resistance impulse that underscored earlier forms of community 
artworks and did not contain elements of the “defiant art of outrage” from that period.174  
 
Figure 28: Handpainted replication of campaign banner, Cape Town, c. March 2009, Author’s photograph 
A similar tendency was evident in another visual art form that characterised the latter stages 
of the campaign. The emergence of a comic strip in a leading tabloid newspaper functioned 
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as a “visual condensation of significance”175 and operated as an “animated educational 
medium” that foreground the ANC’s achievements in service and infrastructure provisions in 
the fifteen years since 1994.
176
 Indeed, rather than “provide [a] powerful space for dissent” 
the comic served to reinforce and popularise the provisions of its elections manifesto.
177
 
Centring on a series of exchanges between the protagonist Mhambi and his acquaintances  in 
different locations, the comic captures the ‘everydayness’ of (black) South African life  and 
promotes a ‘familiarity’ with the social and economic locations of through the imagery used. 
Moreover, Mhambi is the embodiment of the aspirations of a young, black, incipiently 
upwardly mobile audience on the cusp of economic and social security. The choice of 
newspaper, the Daily Sun, reflects this positioning and targeting. As the most widely read 
daily newspaper in South Africa, and focused on the lower income market, the inclusion of 
the comic strip here is a recognition that the “political power of this target is potentially 
explosive.”178 More than that, the power of this group is evident when consideration is given 
to the fact that they have “quadrupled its income since the demise of apartheid.”179 
 While the visual undertaking is colourful and engaging, the text is unimaginative, dry and 
prosaic. However, and as I have argued in chapter two, the cartoon succeeds by ‘putting into 
public play’ the symbolic communication of ‘social values’ that are at the core of political 
marketing.  Moreover, the medium of the image and the marketing role it undertakes is laced 
with the notion of ‘play’ where an elision between fiction and reality is permitted. The comic 
series constituted an important aesthetic that engaged the overarching cultural register of the 
campaign. More than that, the ‘everydayness’ it sought to represent was complicit in the 
perpetuation a specific worldview, the discourse of which was dominated by the ANC. This 
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discourse and the spectacle of the campaign were heightened further by the advertising that 
the ANC undertook. It is to this I now turn. 
 
Figure 29: Serialised ANC comic strip, available online: http://www.anc.org.za/elections/2009/myanc/Downloads 
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Capturing ‘The Heartbeat of the Nation’ 
I have noted the various forms of representation and discourse that have informed the 2009 
election’s spectacular nature in the preceding discussion. In understanding the simplicity and 
‘demonstrativeness’ of these forms of representation and discourse, it is apposite to recall 
Njabulo Ndebele’s characterisation of the spectacle wherein ‘exteriority’ and a ‘lack of 
details’ punctuate its ‘emotional’ rather than ‘analytical’ appeal. In further inculcating its 
‘presence’ in the political realm, the use of radio and television accentuated the spectacular 
nature of campaign. Indeed, while radio has traditionally been an important medium of party 
political advertising, the focus was on personality rather than policy issues.
180
 Indeed, a lack 
of incisive and critical media commentary endowed parties with an acute ability use the 
media merely to shape their image in the mediated political sphere. Indeed, it was noted that 
[political] parties are being left to set the media coverage agenda and content. In this 
way, news coverage runs the risk of becoming merely additional free airtime or news 
space for the delivery of political advertisements [...] This form of reporting only 
encourages South African voters to make their decisions based on party personalities 
and sense of affiliation, ungrounded in a demonstration of capacity and concern to 
address critical issues.
181
 
Thus, the media was deeply implicated in the creation of ‘the society of the spectacle’ that 
Debord cautioned against and that I noted in the theoretical framing of this chapter. The 
primacy of the image – both of the ANC and Zuma – was given greater impetus through a 
series of television advertisements that were novel to election campaigning in South Africa. 
The advertisements contributed to the creation of the spectacle by providing “a gloss on the 
phenomenal worlds of individuals and groups” the “pertinent qualities” of which “include its 
history, its setting, its agents” and importantly, the “range of potentialities it promises for the 
future.”182 Given this, the campaign needed to negotiate the exigencies of the ANC’s rule, for 
as the chief executive officer of the communications agency developing the advertisement 
noted, 
Fifteen years into South Africa’s democracy, the ANC as the leading party found 
itself facing several interesting challenges. Firstly, how does the incumbent and 
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leading party drive a strong message on increased and speedy delivery without 
discounting the numerous and multiple achievements the ANC had achieved together 
with the nation? Secondly, how does it address the rising cynicism about [the] pace 
and capacity of delivery? The campaign we are rolling out is a response to these 
market challenges. Essentially it is a partnership strategy, which captures the 
heartbeat of who we are as a nation – collectively working together to achieve more 
and to hold our leadership accountable for delivery.
183
 
A series of four advertisements that centred on key themes of the manifesto – rural 
development, education, youth employment, crime alleviation, and economic empowerment 
and small business development – were aired during the latter stages of the campaign on a 
free-to-air basis on public television.
184
 Aiming to reflect the ‘lived’ experience of ‘everyday’ 
South Africans, the protagonists in each advertisement carefully reflected key constituencies 
of the ANC including women, youth and an elderly rural dweller. Its message conformed 
with the overall campaign themes. Highly stylised, well-packaged and emotive the message 
communicated the progress that had been made in the delivery of basic social needs to the 
majority of South Africans since the ANC assumed power in 1994. Each advertisement 
espouses the social, infrastructural and welfare advances that have been undertaken by the 
ANC government in its quest for the provision of a ‘better life for all.’ At the same, there is 
an honest rendering that this process is unfinished and ongoing and that greater impetus is 
needed to effect a ‘better life’ through ‘working together’. As such, the narrative of each 
advertisement filters into the overarching ethos of the campaign and endows with with a 
moral and ethical rationale to continue the project for liberation that commences in 1994. 
References to the Freedom Charter and the iconography of Nelson Mandela and his release 
from prison, provided an important emotional imagery to connect the viewer to earlier and 
momentous events. 
                                                 
183
 Nunu Ntshingila quoted in Marketingweb, ‘South African First: Political Party TV ads’, 3 March 2009 
Available online:  
http://www.marketingweb.co.za/marketingweb/view/marketingweb/en/page74600?oid=116583&sn=Marketing
webdetail (accessed 3 March 2009)  
184
 The advertisements, while broadcast on South African public television, are archived on the ANC’s elections 
2009 Youtube site. The advertisements were: Youtube, ‘My Vote’ Available online: 
http://www.youtube.com/user/elections2009#p/u/13/xNBGfboypCI (accessed 4 March 2009); Youtube, ‘My 
Dream’, Available online: http://www.youtube.com/user/elections2009#p/u/10/2vcBQREGUTc ( accessed 29 
June 2009); Youtube, ‘iLewe’ Available online:  
http://www.youtube.com/user/elections2009#p/u/7/VD14aOPh_nA (accessed 29 June 2009); Youtube, ‘The 
Woman Next Door’, Available online: http://www.youtube.com/user/elections2009#p/u/6/pOC1FXCSs8U 
(accessed 22 June 2011)  
298 
 
The stylised nature of the advertisements resonates within the body politic as the protagonists 
convey a widespread and ‘lived’ social and economic experience. The settings of the 
advertisements in rural areas and black and Coloured townships, with protagonists utilising 
local vernaculars, jargons, accents lends an authenticity to the image and the recognition 
resemblance of the social, economic and cultural milieu that they inhabit for the target 
market.  Such ‘everydayness’ and the uncomplicated narrative forwarded, reinforces the 
overarching discourse and aesthetic of the campaign and gives the ANC a definite presence 
within communities. More than that, the advertisements endow the protagonist, and by 
extension the electorate, with agency to address the ANC and Zuma directly, and assert their 
expectations that more needs to be done to realise the project that commenced in 1994. Thus, 
Alfred Xaba, an elderly protagonist asserts, 
My vote is backing the ANC and all the good work they have done to improve the 
lives of our people. It is also a message telling the ANC that the nation is expecting 
more. This is a message for you Nxamalala. Heed this call Msholozi!
185
 
Accepting the challenge made by the protagonist to continue the project that commenced in 
1994 and thus ensure momentum for the creation of a ‘better life for all’, an authoritative, 
suited Zuma closes each segment by acknowledging that “as a nation, we have achieved 
much”;   that “working together, we can do more” and that it is incumbent on the voter to 
“vote for a better life for all. Vote ANC.”186 
These advertisements functioned as important cultural artefacts and provided another 
theatrical dimension to the ritual of the election campaign. Nevertheless, they were also 
underpinned by a distinct political motive as they lent consistency and cogency to the ANC’s 
overarching governance narrative and performed a public display of its reach, successes and 
incumbency in the creation of democratic South Africa. Acknowledging its shortcomings and 
the need ‘to do more’ underscored a truthfulness and openness that aimed to ingratiate a 
social relationship between the image of the ANC and its target market after a highly divisive 
political period. As such, the advertisement served to professionally package the politics of 
the ANC and its campaign and aimed to create positive, lively, exchange between the ANC 
and the electorate, underpinned by an historically-rooted, moralistic and values-oriented 
exposition. 
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The Siyanqoba Moment 
You can’t topple elephants187 
The ANC demonstrated an assertiveness and confidence in the late phase of its campaign. 
The final decision to not prosecute Jacob Zuma on charges of fraud and corruption served as 
a political boon – firstly, as vindication for Zuma and his supporters, and secondly, by 
providing the final spark to the ANC’s election activities. The campaigning in the lead up to 
polling day would culminate in a spectacle of “the largest ever [rally] held in a South African 
election.”188 Read as an exercise in the performance of power by demonstrating its 
dominance in political sphere, the ANC held the rally, dubbed Siyanqoba, in “two adjacent 
stadiums simultaneously” in Johannesburg while being televised at eight other venues around 
South Africa. The Johannesburg rallies were expected to draw 120,000 people and aimed to 
[send] a clear signal that the ANC is the people’s movement, determined and able to meet the 
needs of the people and advance their interests.”189 
Signalling the climax point of the campaign, the rally aimed to invigorate the electorate and 
mobilise constituencies and representatives “to achieve a decisive mandate to intensify the 
struggle to achieve a better life for all.”190 The size, coordination and publicity generated for 
the rally served as a clear demonstration of the professionalism of the ANC’s campaigning 
and by extension, provided an insight into the coherence of the organisational structures, 
nationally and regionally. 
                                                 
187
 Jacob Zuma quoted in Michael Georgy, ‘You can’t topple an elephant: Zuma’ Independent Online Available 
online: http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?art_id=nw2009042320075267C254316&set_id=1&click_id=3086&sf= 
(accessed 23 April 2009)  
188
 African National Congress, ‘ANC Wraps Up Its Election Campaign With Mass Rally’ Available online: 
http://myanc.org/Press%20Statements/?id=00056 (accessed 14 April 2009)  
189
 African National Congress, ‘ANC Wraps Up Its Election Campaign With Mass Rally’ 
190
 Jacob Zuma, ‘Siyanqoba: Letter from ANC President to All Structures’ Available online: 
http://myanc.org/Hot%20Topics/?id=00035 (accessed 16 April 2009)  
 
300 
 
 
Figure 30: Siyanqoba Rally, Johannesburg, 19 April 2009. Obtained online from image repository on the ANC’s 
facebook page. https://www.facebook.com/photo_search.php?oid=61829275081&view=all 
The rally captured the prevailing mood of excitement and anticipation within the ANC and 
wider body politic. It was a carnivalesque performance evoking notions of celebration, 
accomplishment and power while serving to legitimate the leadership of the ANC. The Coca-
Cola stadium, the heart of the proceedings, was awash with a mass of supporters in yellow, 
campaign T-shirts. A sea of ANC flags and banners, both official and homemade, decorated 
the spectacle, while dancers entertained the large crowd and the sounds of the droning 
vuvuzelas punctuated the air.
191
 The dancing audience was enraptured by the presence of 
doyens of the struggle, including Winnie Mandela and Ahmed Kathrada. Special significance 
was accorded to a frail Nelson Mandela’s presence at the rally. Like it had signified at the 
Dutywa rally three months earlier, Mandela’s attendance authenticated and legitimated again 
‘this’ ANC as ‘Mandela’s ANC’ and thus as a continuation of a project that was given 
impetus in 1994, but which had deeper historical roots.  Indeed, ‘brand ANC’ was 
rejuvenated for as Zuma noted in his address, 
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The 2009 election is a defining moment for the ANC and the country. Only a few 
months ago, pessimistic predictions were made about the ANC, by many who claim 
to know best. Our exuberant campaign has proven that the ANC continues to capture 
the imagination of our people as it has always done since 1912. We have seen 
excitement about the ANC that we not witnessed since the release of Madiba and the 
1994 elections. The movement has come alive. The ANC brand is more popular than 
ever with young and old!
192
 
‘Siyanqoba’ as spectacle had the explicit intention of entrenching the ANC’s dominance in 
the political sphere and as such serve to mobilise interest and excitement just prior to the 
election. This excitement permeated across South Africa and enveloped the country. Aware 
that uniformity of experience was not possible, on polling day, I reflected on my experience 
in a Cape Town township as such, 
‘Here, my brother, hold this while I get you a T-shirt. I live just there, I’ve got a lot of 
them in my house.’ he said as he thrust his microphone in my hands to hold. We were 
somewhere between Browns Farm, Phillipi and Nyanga and the township was 
pumping! This is where the excitement was at – people on the move, cars decked out 
in ANC paraphernalia. The atmosphere was awesome, exciting ...a general sense of 
camaraderie. This is where the ANC lived.
193
 
The final result saw the ANC obtain 65.9% of the vote nationally down from the 69.7% of 
2004, in an election characterised by high voter turnout.
194
 Despite losing support across the 
provinces, save for Zuma’s home province of Kwazulu Natal, the ANC was satisfied with its 
“decisive win” and was “happy with the mandate the people have given us.”195 Aware that its 
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upon since 2004. Indeed, in Kwazulu Natal, the ANC had improved its “service delivery initiatives” that 
eventually “tiled the balance of forces” in its favour. For more, see Jabulani Sithole and Nirode Bramdaw, 
‘Kwazulu Natal Analysis’ The Thinker, 3 , (2009), 24Quoted in Independent Online, ‘ANC pleased with margin 
of victory’ 25 April 2009, Available online: 
http://www.iol.co,.za/index.php?art_id=nw20090425151102613C120534&set_id=1&click_id=6&sf= (accessed 
25 April 2009).  
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electoral dominance would not be challenged in any significant way, and confident of a 
strong victory, in a final display of ANC ‘coolness’ a street-party was held outside its banner-
covered Luthuli House headquarters on the eve of the final election result. Thousands of 
cheering supporters packed the streets of downtown Johannesburg and revelled to the songs 
and dances of well-known South African musicians and groups. 
Dressed in an ANC-branded leather jacket, a jubilant Jacob Zuma laughed and jived with 
fellow members of the ANC’s NEC. In the crowd, the inevitability of the ANC’s victory 
obtained resonance as the performance of a mock funeral opposition parties was undertaken – 
coffins bearing logos of the Inkatha Freedom Party, Democratic Alliance and COPE passed 
through exuberant hands to chants of “we are burying them.”196 As the Harley Davidson 
motorcycles were revved, magnums of champagne were splashed over the crowd and 
explosions of fireworks and confetti filled the autumnal Johannesburg air. Akin to a rock-
concert more than a political rally, a new politics, steeped in the spectacle, celebration and 
celebrity, came to characterise this election. 
                                                 
196
 News24 , ‘Funeral for opposition parties’ Available online: 
 http://www.news24.com/News24/Elections/News/0,,2-2478-2479_2506202,00.html (accessed 23 April 2009) 
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Figure 31: Jacob Zuma in celebratory mood at the pre-victory rally, Johannesburg 23 April 2009, Obtained online 
from image repository on the ANC’s facebook page. 
https://www.facebook.com/photo_search.php?oid=61829275081&view=all 
A more presidential, even rarefied, Jacob Zuma took to the pages of ANC Today to thank 
South Africa for voting for the ANC and promising “a new era of hope and progress” in 
which there would be a need to “bury mistrust, uncertainty, pain and tension, and begin a new 
chapter of harmony and collaboration.”197 Aiming to create a more responsive, citizen-
informed ANC and government for all South Africans, regardless of party political 
persuasion, Zuma keenly asserted the need to continue the project of emancipation that had 
begun fifteen years previously. Assuming this duty, he asserted that he “would lead the 
country towards the realisation of Madiba’s vision”, not the ANC’s interestingly, of “a truly 
non-sexist, non-racial South Africa, united in diversity.”198 As the fullest embodiment of the 
ANC, Zuma re-asserted his claims to bring the ANC back to its most honourable and rightful 
traditions as the “custodian of [the] hopes and dreams” of all South Africans, and more 
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 Jacob Zuma, ‘Siyabonga, Thank You Mzansi’ ANC Today, 9,17 (2009) Available online: 
http://www.anc.org.za/docs/anctoday/2009/at17.htm (accessed 13 June 2009)  
198
 Jacob Zuma, ‘I will lead the country on a path of friendship, cooperation, harmony, unity and faster change’ 
ANC Today 9,18 (2009) Available online: http://www.anc.org.za/docs/anctoday/2009/at18.htm (accessed 13 
June 2009) 
304 
 
narrowly, of its voters.
199
 The emphasis on nation-building, reconciliation and unity here 
were key themes that Zuma defaulted to in his public pronouncements in the period 
immediately after the ANC’s electoral victory. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated the utilisation of political marketing in the general election of 
2009. Viewing the campaign as spectacle, I have highlighted the rich and textured nature 
through which the ANC attempted to assert its political authority in the public sphere in 
contesting the election. The political milieu that preceded the campaign deeply informed its 
strategy, robustness and highlighted the professionalization of campaign activities by the 
ANC while commensurately berthing its discursive and representational thrust within a more 
historically-indebted register. 
The spectacle of the election campaign of 2009 served to demonstrate the power and strength 
that the ANC commanded in the political and public spheres. Disunity, and the disruption of 
its brand identity that political ructions occasioned, required a decisive, professional and well 
co-ordinated campaign. The ANC delivered on this, as it, 
[...] outspent, outthought, outworked, outmanoeuvred the opposition, muscling them 
out of every millimetre of public space. It also outsang and outdanced the, capturing 
the hearts and minds of the youth by making politics cool and sexy again.
200
 
The spectacular nature of the campaign, as I have demonstrated, was constituted by numerous 
smaller spectacles that lent public significance and presence to the ANC in the South African 
political imagination. I have demonstrated how the recourse to memory, embodiment, 
history, personality and identity were variously utilised to inform and construct the political 
spectacle of the campaign. Accessing this rich cultural repository allowed the ANC to flit 
between its liberation movement and political party identities and thus develop and undertake 
a nuanced and rich political campaign. Further, the representational aesthetic that emerged 
served to infuse the tenor of the campaign with a symbolic resonance that legitimated and 
                                                 
199
 Zuma, ‘I will lead the country on a path of friendship, cooperation, harmony, unity and faster change’ 
200
 John Daniel and Roger Southall, ‘The National and Provincial Electoral Outcomes: Continuity and Change’ 
in Roger Southall and John Daniel (eds.), Zunami: The 2009 South African Elections (Auckland Park: Jacana 
Media, 2009) 235 
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authenticated the ANC and its candidate, Jacob Zuma who represented a (re-)turn to the 
ANC’s more venerable and popular manifestation. 
The campaign was, moreover, an exercise in the performance of power by the ANC and 
sought to locate it at the centre of political life. Indeed, in the theatre of electoral South 
Africa, the ANC materially, rhetorically and indeed virtually, undertook a ‘communicative 
interaction’ that sought to ‘dramatise aspirations’ of the electorate but which was also marked 
by a superficiality and parochialism. Indeed, as props in the political theatre, the use of 
cultural artefacts such as posters, banners, comic strips and websites allowed for the presence 
of the ANC to be inculcated, but rendered politics superficial. Further, in its campaign 
performance, the ANC built on to the notion of ‘celebrity’ that coalesced around the figure of 
Jacob Zuma and marketed it to popular effect. Ultimately, and despite the reduction of its 
vote-share, the ANC was afforded a strong popular mandate to continue its project of 
providing ‘a better life for all’ and continue the move toward to full liberation of South 
Africa.
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8. 
CONCLUSION 
‘A KIND OF MAGIC’: 
 POLITICAL MARKETING AND THE ANC 
*************** 
Political marketing has been an integral part of the ANC’s political strategy, both during the 
struggle against apartheid and in the birthing of a ‘new’ and democratic South Africa. As 
such, this thesis has critically analysed and interrogated the political marketing of the ANC 
and has examined the relationship between the use of various marketing techniques and its 
strategic behaviour around seminal events in South African political life. Demonstrating the 
means by which the ANC came to locate itself at the centre of liberation and post-apartheid 
narratives, the analysis in this thesis has highlighted the continuities and discontinuities in the 
its discursive and representational grammars.  
This study of the ANC has expanded and enriched the conceptual and theoretical remit of the 
notion of political marketing to include activities. In doing this, I have demonstrated the 
fluidity between a technical application of marketing and other forms of representational 
practice including propaganda, promotion and publicity. By incorporating the ‘cultural’ 
influences that inform and punctuate the public political sphere, this thesis has accorded 
greater consideration to the complex of influences that have come to shape and inform the 
ANC’s discursive and representational registers and the narrative of its continued project to 
realise the liberation of South Africa’s oppressed. Indeed, I have argued that utilisation of 
myth, memory, symbolism and performance by the ANC are integral to understanding its 
location within the political and public spheres in South Africa. Importantly too, its 
invocation of these meaningful registers permits an insight into the means by which the ANC 
sought to position itself within the ‘cultural consciousness’ of specific constituencies. 
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 In expanding the theoretical parameters of the sub-discipline, I have demonstrated the 
‘embeddedness’ of political discourse within a wider social and cultural universe and the 
influences that inform that relationship. Colonialism and apartheid have remained an 
important touchstone around which these registers have cohered and have afforded 
legitimacy and longevity to the ANC’s discursive orientations. Imperatively, given its 
historical opposition to apartheid – physical, corporeal and discursive, representational –the 
ANC has aimed to endow its brand with a particular moral legitimacy based on such 
opposition. Thus, its continued refrains to the quest for full and final liberation are premised 
on an attempt to entrench affective and emotional ties with particular constituencies based on 
an historically-endowed repository of positive associations. However, and as I have argued, 
particularly in chapters six and seven, a more nuanced reading of the ANC’s political 
behaviour in the post-apartheid milieu reveals a disjuncture between its rhetorical 
pronouncements and its political and strategic behaviours. I will address this further, 
subsequently.  
A clear ‘marketing consciousness’ informed the ANC’s political agenda over time. Through 
the theme of liberation, this thesis has examined the importance the ANC ascribed to 
marketing and the strategic and political imperatives that informed its approaches to ‘winning 
hearts and minds’. The ANC developed and utilised a sophisticated and highly nuanced 
marketing apparatus that sought to inculcate a sense of political ownership over the process 
of liberation amongst its supporters. Despite its proscription and banning, the ANC was adept 
at marketing itself within South Africa and abroad. I demonstrated in chapter three the rich 
and varied influences that characterised the ANC’s political marketing. The armed operations 
of MK, the popularly-inspired agitating of the UDF and the more educative role that 
prisoners on Robben Island undertook, both on the Island and within communities on their 
release,  permitted the creation of a rich narrative tapestry that demonstrated the imbrications 
of actors, discourses and exchanges in the political sphere. An overarching constancy and 
continuity in its messaging was apparent. Indeed, as this thesis has demonstrated, the ANC’s 
political marketing was informed by an ideological framework that gave, and more 
importantly, continues to give, its marketing resonance and currency as it addressed the 
social, political and economic milieus of its targeted constituencies. Pivoting on the notion of 
a national democratic revolution, I have demonstrated in chapters three (on the marketing of 
liberation), five (the 1994 election) and six (on economic policy as marketing) the changing 
nature and fluidity that came to inform its premises. Despite this, the adherence to the NDR 
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over time has not only provided an ideological coherence to the ANC’s realisation of a 
democratic South Africa, but its invocation has lent temporal continuity to the process of 
realising liberation. As a marketing device, the NDR endows the ANC with the legitimacy to 
continue its historical project of realising economic and social liberation.  
Keen to ascribe an agency the people as their ‘own liberators’, the political marketing of the 
ANC nevertheless located it at the centre of struggle against apartheid and as the political 
arbiter of liberation and emancipation. The rectitude of the ANC was deeply informed by the 
lore and myth that surrounded the development of the Freedom Charter. The ideological 
harbinger to the NDR, the Charter became the centre-piece of the ANC’s moral and ethical 
vision and an instrument around which it could rally and mobilise support. As I have 
demonstrated in chapter four, the Charter’s centrality lay as much in its content as it did in the 
process of its constitution. The popular input and participation that the COP generated was 
intimately inscribed into the lore of resistance against apartheid. Multi-racial, multi-
organisational and ‘bottom-up’, the event of the COP became the rhetorical embodiment of 
the vision of a united and liberated South Africa. The widespread appeal of the Charter 
moreover occasioned support from various anti-apartheid organisations and lent credence to 
its vision and purport.  Significantly, the Charter’s marketing imperative was underpinned by 
a more dissonant political reality. While the emphasis on democratic and popular 
participation was key to ensuring the sanctity and venerability of the document, the thesis 
demonstrates that in reality, its constitution was more elite-driven and sheltered from popular 
input as those responsible for its drafting sought to ‘focus’ its ideological content. Thus, 
while the COP was important to adumbrate the topography of a democratic South Africa, it 
served a more political purpose in that it functioned as a marketing campaign for the ANC. 
The sidelining of the popular foundations of the Charter permits an important insight into the 
second theme around which this thesis orientates, the political culture of the ANC. The 
rhetorical adherence of the importance of popular input and participation in policy 
development that circulated around the Freedom Charter also informed the discourse of the 
ANC’s policy-making orientations as the democratic settlement gained momentum. Building 
on the political utility of the idea of ‘people’s power’ discussed in chapter three, the ANC 
approached the 1994 elections on the popularly-inspired RDP. Not only inspired by the 
Freedom Charter, but also seen as the natural means to give it effect, the RDP was firmly 
ensconced within the representational teleology of the ANC and gave impetus to notions of 
‘democratising power’, of being ‘people-driven’ and allowing for citizen empowerment. 
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Bottom-up participation and popular involvement were not only accorded rhetorical centrality 
in the RDP by the ANC, but also informed its campaign to popularise the programme. 
Moreover, given the continuity that the RDP signalled within the teleology of liberation, it 
also located the ANC at the centre of South African political life. Thus, the RDP played an 
important symbolic function within a newly democratic South Africa. The turn to GEAR 
signalled a tipping point in post-apartheid politics and was, as the chapter on marketing on 
economic policy demonstrated, the culmination of protracted embrace of economic 
orthodoxy within the ANC.  Akin to the process of the writing of the Freedom Charter, but 
without the veneer of popular participation, GEAR signalled the ascendancy of a technocratic 
grouping within the ANC, which was more responsive to prevailing economic exigencies.  
I have argued, however, for a more nuanced reading of the perceived capitulation to 
orthodoxy. Notwithstanding the need to inculcate a sense of confidence in its ability to 
govern through policies that conformed to global economic diktats, GEAR also represented 
an effort to modernise the ANC and similarly, set in motion the process of ‘re-birthing’ the 
African continent. Exerting ownership over its economic course was part of the ANC’s 
strategic balancing between ‘accommodation and challenge’. As I have demonstrated in 
chapter six, viewing economic policy development historically sheds light on the tenuous 
balancing that the ANC needed to undertake in asserting its economic policy orientations. A 
distinctly marketing imperative underpinned such approach.  Politically, however, I contend 
that the negotiation between ‘accommodation and challenge’ was part of a larger 
emancipatory project in which the ANC would utilise the hegemonic instruments of 
economic orthodoxy to assert an (South) African agency. Despite the venerability of an 
African renaissance, opposition to GEAR served to rupture the narrative of the ANC’s 
people-centred and people-driven bias that was codified in the Freedom Charter and the RDP.  
This rupture not only had organisational and political implications that would continue 
through the democratic period, but was marked also by ideological incongruity. Indeed, 
GEAR served to reconfigure the basis of the NDR and promote the creation of an African 
capitalist class that stood in counterpoint to its earlier formulations. Moreover, it reoriented 
notions of liberation and democracy in the post-apartheid period and the tenuousness of the 
process of state formation that the ANC encountered. In representing, the ‘cleansing’ of the 
ANC from its discursive and rhetorical flirtation with leftist ideology, GEAR re-moored the 
ANC within its earlier, elite predispositions. The changing political culture of the ANC as 
examined through economic policy has an important marketing function. Indeed, as 
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demonstrated in chapter six, the operation of marketing extends beyond its normative and 
‘exterior’ functions to provide an insight into the narratives of government and thus offers a 
clearer understanding of its motivations, orientations and ethics. In so doing, an appreciation 
of the creation of the symbolic state is obtained through the strategic behaviour of political 
protagonists.  
The intersection of themes of liberation and political culture inform the analysis in chapter 
five. Returning to political marketing in election campaigns, I argue that a deeply liberatory 
discourse permeated through the ANC’s political marketing and resonated with the 
historically-entrenched conceptions of freedom, democracy and emphasised the socio-
economic basis of liberation. Such continuity in its messaging and campaigning added to the 
sanctity and import of South Africa’s first free and democratic election. In marketing terms, 
the ANC was able to meld a formal and technical approach to political campaigns with 
bottom-up and mass-based mobilisation. Such participation and grassroots involvement also 
inflected the campaign with a ‘popular’ aesthetic. The strategic employment of personalities 
marked the campaign. The 1994 election, the moment of political liberation, also set in 
motion the ANC’s overarching project of realising ‘a better life for all.’ As the symbolic 
crystallisation of the ANC’s governing mission, the pursuit of the ‘better life’ would inform 
the ANC’s discursive project through the democratic period.  The mass-based nature and the 
populist-bent of the campaign were also significant in the ANC’s self-reflection on its 
identity between liberation movement and political party. The discussion and examination in 
this thesis has demonstrated the continuous pivoting the ANC undertakes between these 
identities and the political expediency which underlies such pivoting.   
While the 1994 campaign has obtained a mythical status within the narrative of South African 
political life given its democratic import, the election campaign of 2009 was notable for its 
use of spectacle. Such framing does not deny or exclude the spectacularity of other elections 
or general campaigns in both apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa, but rather functions 
as an apposite lens through which to highlight the textures of this campaign and thus enrich 
contemporary understandings of political marketing. Indeed, as I demonstrated in chapter 
seven, the political exigencies and malaise that preceded the campaign necessitated a 
performance of power by the ANC which ‘captured the imagination’ of the public. Moreover, 
the scale, scope and breadth of the campaign and the presence that the ANC exerted in the 
public and political spheres were unprecedented. The ructions that characterised the political 
sphere in South Africa, I have argued, fractured the ANC and permitted opposition to the 
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incumbent regime to cohere around the figure of Jacob Zuma. The threat of a serious 
electoral challenge from the ANC off-shoot COPE further necessitated a robust and 
commanding campaign. The analysis presented in chapter seven provides an insight into the 
strategy of the campaign and the utilisation of political marketing by the ANC. Highlighting 
its recourse to myth, memory, claims to history, sanctification and the embodiment of 
traditions of the ANC within Nelson Mandela, the campaign struck an emotive appeal that 
demonstrated historical continuity in its discursive posturing. Moreover, this process of 
historical reflection also manifested in the recursive claims to realigning the ANC with its 
mandate in the Freedom Charter and reorienting the foundations of the NDR to reflect its 
working class bias. Implicit in the ANC’s marketing was the characterisation of the Mbeki 
years as an aberration in the teleology of realising a liberated South Africa.
1
 Discursively, the 
framing of the campaign through the slogan, ‘Working together we can do more’ linked it to 
the 1994 election and to the Masakhane campaign that I discussed in chapters five and six 
respectively, and permitted a continuity in its representational oeuvre. However, the recourse 
to history and tradition could not promise the delivery of the election, especially given the 
changing demographic profile of the electorate. Thus, the need to render the ANC ‘cool’ 
became an important campaign technique.  
In ‘dramatising aspirations’ particularly among the black youth market, the ANC’s ‘ride and 
braais’ permitted the advertising of ‘better life’ that centred on material wealth and socio-
economic advancement – a ‘better life’ was being progressively realised. Moreover, the ANC 
undertook a technologically savvy campaign and established a ‘virtual’ presence that allowed 
for increasing interaction within the political marketplace. In addition, this virtual presence 
inculcated a sense of ownership of the campaign within its audience. The campaign stretched 
into new arenas and the creation of the spectacle was further witnessed through a set of 
television advertisements that captured key elements of its manifesto. Overall, the spectacular 
nature of the campaign was informed by numerous smaller spectacles that accessed a rich 
historical repository upon which the ANC could draw symbolic capital. I have argued in 
chapter seven, however, that as much as the ANC was able to draw on this capital, its 
campaign was also marked by superficiality and parochialism particularly in its 
representational props and visual cultures. Nevertheless, the theatrics of the campaign and the 
                                                 
1
 This rhetoric belies a reality in which the very freedoms that were struggled for are being eroded. At the time 
of writing, a highly contentious Protection of Information ( or popularly dubbed ‘secrecy’)  Bill was passed by 
the National Assembly and was awaiting consideration by the lower house, the National Council of Provinces 
before final promulgation.  The bill would effectively curtail media freedom wherein the ‘national  interest’ 
would trump public interest. 
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performance that the ANC undertook confirmed its centrality in the political life of South 
Africa and continuation of its rhetorical quest of liberation and the pursuit of ‘a better life for 
all.’ 
*** 
Political marketing provides an important lens through which to understand the political 
development of the ANC. I have demonstrated consistently through the preceding chapters 
that marketing was accorded key strategic importance in both the apartheid and democratic 
epochs. The pervasiveness of this ‘marketing consciousness’ provides an insight not only into 
the socio-political and cultural engagement of the ANC with its constituencies, but also more 
critically, the means by which such engagement was managed and mediated. As a technology 
of power aimed at persuasion, the analysis of political marketing here permits an insight into 
the strategic thinking of the ANC as a movement and party and the historical continuities and 
discontinuities in how it approached the process of interaction and engagement. Furthermore, 
I have demonstrated how political marketing provides a critical insight into the ANC’s ability 
to manage politics and its mediation of the complexity of forces and actors in the political 
sphere. It is important to note too, that such mediation of various factions and groupings 
within the ANC was also necessary. In doing so, further understanding of the shifting bases 
of the ANC’s own organisational identities – between political party and liberation movement 
– may be obtained.  
The importance ascribed to political marketing by the ANC confirms the idea that it is what 
parties ‘actually do’ in the political sphere to garner support, mobilise constituencies and 
effect political action. More critically, I have demonstrated the difficulty of separating out 
marketing from these more ‘political’ functions. A central assertion in this thesis has been to 
demonstrate the interactivity between marketing mobilisation and political action. Further,  I 
have demonstrated that the highly particularistic and nuanced means by which the ANC 
‘packaged politics’ served not only to distil its ideological posturing over time – and indeed, 
the shifting bases of that posturing – but also the means by which it was put to specific 
political effect in the public sphere both consistently and constantly. Thus, while the content 
of the messaging may have changed, the importance ascribed to its communication has not.  
I have demonstrated the uneven nature of the ANC’s approach and engagement to political 
marketing. While consultation, engagement and popular participation continue to be central 
to the discourse of its marketing approach, the professionalization of its capacities in the post-
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apartheid epoch, particularly in elections demonstrates the tensions in the modernisation of 
the ANC as a political party while aiming to maintain its liberation movement character. To 
some measure, the ANC succeeds in the balancing of these political identities and is thus able 
to effectively address contending constituencies. As such, it is able to give credence to its 
claim to representing the emergent South African ‘nation’. It is a truism that the ANC 
maintains its position at the centre of South African political life. Political marketing, as I 
have argued here, has been central to this process. 
*** 
Given these theoretical and empirical findings, this thesis make a unique and important inter-
disciplinary contribution to understandings of South African politics and the politics of the 
ANC through the lens of political marketing. Marked by a ‘methodological pluralism’, as 
outlined in the theoretical framing of the thesis, and given the inter-disciplinary approach 
here, the utilisation of political marketing has served as an adjunct to understandings of the 
political sphere. The focus on the liberation movement and political party offers new areas of 
insight to questions of culture, power and identity in both South Africa and Africa more 
broadly. Expanding the definition of political marketing to include more ‘cultural’ aspects in 
its theoretical constitution not only enriches its analytical purview, but also endows political 
marketing analysis with a particular historicity that highlights the rich and complex 
influences that shape behaviour and attitudes over time. Indeed, it serves to provide a 
longitudinal insight into the interplay between political and cultural production and 
consumption through the techniques of political marketing.  Temporally, this study remains 
significant as the debates around economic questions, the Freedom Charter, the history of the 
struggle for liberation, the national democratic revolution and more continue to punctuate 
present political discourse in South Africa.  
It would be fallacious, even intellectually offensive, to view the ‘cultural’ aspects of political 
marketing as uniquely ‘African’. Rather, the operation of myth, symbolism, political theatre, 
carnival and the like are also deeply rooted within Western political markets. Rather, in 
incorporating these elements into the analysis of the ANC’s political marketing, I have 
demonstrated points of both convergence and divergence with global political and electoral 
practices. Further, in positioning the analysis around the themes of liberation, political culture 
and spectacle, this thesis has shed light and offered a richer understanding of the key aspects 
of the apartheid and post-apartheid political milieu. Moreover, while disciplines such as 
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political geography, sociology and political science have tended to focus on points of conflict 
and cleavage in the social and political body, this study on the ANC’s political marketing has 
also provided an insight into ‘shared interests’ amongst various constituencies in the South 
African political sphere.  
As the analysis in this thesis has demonstrated, the predominance of the ANC in the political 
life of South Africa belies a more nuanced and complex reality. It would be theoretically and 
empirically myopic to assume a complete genuflection by the majority populace to the ANC 
as an organisation, both during the struggle for liberation and in the democratic period. 
Implicit in the overall analysis, is that a critical and rational, even suspicious, electorate 
continues to exist in South Africa. Thus, I have demonstrated that the need for marketing has 
been imperative to the political importance and centrality of the ANC over time.   
The focus on the elite political formation in this thesis privileges specific relations of power 
and the discourses and representations that flow from there. I do not dispute this. It is 
precisely because of the predominant position that the ANC holds in South African political 
life that an understanding of its marketing is important. As this study has demonstrated, 
analysis and examination of the ANC’s political marketing serves to provide a deeper 
understanding of the social and cultural bases of political change in a post-apartheid and post-
colonial setting.  
This study should be read as the initial step in a much longer and richer process of 
understanding the political marketing of the ANC. The elite-disposition of this analysis may 
be enriched by being counter-posed with a ‘subaltern’ analysis in which research is directed 
toward understandings of the bottom-up process of marketing that the ANC sought to 
generate within communities. Initial attempts have been undertaken in this regard but greater 
depth is required.
2
 Moreover, and as is evident in this present work, the public functions of 
the ANC were diverse and rich and the imbrications within organisations, persons, and 
functions are ripe for exploration and study. The geographical spread of the ANC and the 
discursive and representational content that was generated would make important 
contributions to spatial understandings of power and culture in resistance struggles. 
Moreover, the political marketing of the ANC should not be understood in isolation. The 
revolutionary theatre of anti-apartheid struggles led to interaction amongst fraternal 
                                                 
2
 A good  example of this would be Raymond Suttner, The ANC Underground in South Africa: A Social and 
Historical Study  
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organisations and movements, regionally and internationally Further, such studies may be 
integral to understanding the processes that inform the transition from liberation movements 
to political parties. Examinations – comparative or otherwise – of the discursive and 
representational apparatus of these movements and parties would enrich understandings of 
liberation struggles in the region and beyond. A large archival collection of ANC materials 
remains under-explored. Future research would benefit greatly from examining the contents 
of these archives and stories that they hold.  It is perhaps in this way, a better and more 
critical understanding of the ‘ANC name as a kind of magic’ may be obtained.  
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